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Philosophical reflection often begins not In wonder at any¬
thing in the world, but rather In wonder at what other people
say about things In the world. Such was the genesis of this
inquiry into the logical foundations of the criticism of art.
Art criticism is not one of the more abstruse forms of litera¬
ture. Most critical writing can be easily understood by any
interested person of sound mind and even mediocre education.
It could be read throughout a lifetime without arousing any
suspicion of the logical problems which philosophical investi¬
gations into its nature have raised. But now that these prob¬
lems have been raised, until they are settled the competence
of critics to provide trustworthy judgements of the value of
works of art remains in doubt. It seems to me that what
philosophers have said about criticism during the course of
their attempts to resolve these problems is so unsatisfactory
that the need to re-examine the logical structure of critical
discourse is urgent.
As readers of contemporary philosophy are well aware, the
scrutiny of value judgements in recent years has left their
function uncertain and their logical status in dispute. The
embarrassing lack of strict logical connections between value
statements and other statements adduced to support them has
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been revealed, and the impossibility of empirically verifying
statements of value has also been pointed out. These dis¬
closures lead to the repudiation of the critic's claim to com¬
petence in assessing the artistic merit of works of art.
Scepticism regarding the logical efficacy of argument about
value led Camap to equate the value Judgement with a "series
of empty words,""'' Dissenting from this extreme view, other
writers have attempted to salvage value statements by assigning
to them duties less onerous than the traditional one of asser¬
ting judgements. They have variously held that they express
the speaker's emotion, feeling, or attitude, that they arouse
the emotions or feelings of others, or determine their attitudes,
or that they make recommendations or issue commands.
Acceptance of any of these views entails a drastic re¬
vision of the traditional conception of the function of criti¬
cism. The emasculated condition in v/hlch the aesthetic judge¬
ment has survived philosophical analysis discourages the view
that the evaluation of works of art is a legitimate aim of
criticism. For if it is the case that critical statements
make no assertion about the works they pretend to be about,
but serve some quite different purpose, then it would be sen¬
sible no longer to look to criticism for reliable information
about the aesthetic value of works of art.
The deposition of critics from their position as Judges
of aesthetic merit would seem an arbitrary act to most readers
of critical literature. They may question the competence of
certain critics, and at times disagree with the evaluations of
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the critics in whose Judgement they have most confidence; tout
the suggestions that all critics are equally incompetent to
pronounce judgement on the aesthetic value of works of art,
and that logically speaking any evaluation can make as good a
claim to acceptance as any other, would strike them as re¬
markably sophisticated, paradoxical, and bewildering. But if
when critics begin to speak of value they cease to talk about
works of art and begin to express their feelings, or to de¬
liver rhetoric, or to issue prescriptions or commands, or to
do something else, and if the arguments they use when dis¬
cussing the aesthetic value of works of art are Inherently a-
loglcal, then these suggestions must be taken as correctly de¬
scribing the critical situation.
Most critics of art, past and present, have considered
evaluation an important part of their work. Some of these
have been of the opinion that the chief end of their pro¬
fessional activity is to arrive at a verdict about the aes¬
thetic value of the works they consider. There have been
some dissenters, critics who have disclaimed being judges,
arguing that evaluation Is not a legitimate critical assign-
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ment. Writers working on the boundaries of criticism and
scholarship, of criticism and science, of criticism and peda¬
gogy have stressed the importance of such non-evaluative work
as interpretation, dating, sociological and psychological ex¬
planation, the education of taste, the tracing of sources and
influences, the placing of individual works within an artistic
tradition, and so on. There is a great body of literature on
art which does not have the aesthetic Judgement of the works
discussed as its purpose. The propriety of calling this
literature 'critical' is not questioned here. Throughout this
thesis, however, the term 'criticism' will be used in a narrow
sense to refer to that kind of writing about art whose princi¬
pal aim is aesthetic evaluation. And the terms 'critical
argument* and 'critical discourse' will be used to refer to
those discussions of art which culminate in aesthetic Judge¬
ments, It Is critical writing of this kind that is relevant
to a consideration of the philosophic Issues raised, by theories
of value.
Since many critics assume their right and responsibility to
commit themselves to judgements of value, and since many readers
look to these critics for expert commentary on the aesthetic
value of works of art, doubts about the logical status of the
aesthetic judgement are from a philosophical point of view most
unsatisfactory. Critics pretend to make assertions about the
aesthetic value of works of art, and to defend these statements
by reasoned argument. Readers of criticism suppose that they
are being provided with information about the value of works of
art, and that at least some of the arguments adduced to support
the statements purveying this information are cogent. Some of
the philosophers whose views are to be considered here claim
that the statements in question do not fulfill their intended
function but serve some quite different purpose, and that the
arguments in question are constitutionally incapable of
supporting the kind of statement that they are expected to
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suj>port. This situation is intellectually Intolerable. If
critics are not doing what they seem to be doing, if they are
merely expressing their feelings about works of art, or de¬
claring their attitudes towards them, or doing yet something
else, then they should drop the pretense of judging their
value. And if readers of criticism are merely having their
amotion aroused, or are merely being commanded, or are having
something els© don© to them, then they should be relieved of
the illusion that they are being provided with information
about the aesthetic value of works of art. If, on the other
hand, these philosophers are -wrong about what takes place in
criticism, then they should be corrected.
In my opinion, it is the philosophers who are wrong. In
so far as the current philosophical controversy about value
concerns the aesthetic judgement, It seems to me to be the pro¬
duct of a series of closely related misunderstandings of the
method and purpose of judging works of art. These misunder¬
standings have generated the logical problems which the theories
to be controverted here have been designed to resolve. It is
not surprising that theories inspired by misunderstandings have
misconstrued the logical character of critical discourse. When
the root error of these misunderstandings has been exposed and
corrected, it may be expected that a fresh examination of criti¬
cal argument will yield a more accurate conception of its logi¬
cal structure.
The error that vitiates much of the writing about criticism
with which I am familiar may be called false dichotomy. To
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dichotomise is to divide into two mutually exclusive classes.
The operation can b© very useful In various sorts of analyses,
provided that what Is dichotomised actually consists of two
distinct kinds. If a homogenous class Is arbitrarily divided,
any analysis based upon the groundless division will almost
certainly provide a false account of what it purports to ex¬
plain. The infection of theory of value at several levels by
false dichotomy is largely responsible for the failure of
logicians to provide an effectual analysis of critical argument.
Philosophical tradition distinguishes between practical and
theoretical discourse. The difference between them ©an be ex¬
pressed in terms of purpose. The purpose of practical dis¬
course is to arrive at a decision as to what ought to be done,
and the aim of its Judgements is to promote certain actions
and to discourage others, The purpose of theoretical discourse
is to reach an understanding of phenomena, and tho aim of its
Judgements is to provide knowledge. Moral argument 1b gener¬
ally (but not Invariably) considered to typify practical dis¬
course; and natural science provides the characteristic example
of theoretical discourse. Generalizations are made about tho
logical peculiarities of these two typos of discourse, for in¬
stance, about the possibility and method of verifying the
Judgements of each; and therefore the classification of any
kind of argument as theoretical or practical will have a bearing
cm the description that is given of its logical characteristics,
The distinction between theoretical discourse and practical
discourse thus represents a dichotomy which Is thought to have
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pragmatic value for the analysis of certain subject matters.
Neither the legitimacy nor the usefulness of this division of
realms of discourse, nor the conventional classification of
ethics and the natural sciences, are brought into question
here. What I do want to point out is that the description of
the two classes, practical and theoretical discourse, has been
based upon a restricted selection of subject matters, viz.
ethics and empirical science. Therefore, any subject matter
not exclusively characterized by the defining marks of either
ethics or empirical science is likely to be misconstrued through
being forced for the purpose of analysis into either one or the
other of the two classes provided. Such has been the fate of
critical discourse.
The subsequent examination of value theories will uncover
evidence of the dichotomizing error in the assumption that
critical argument must be classified as either practical or as
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theoretical discourse. It is assumed that critical judgements
must either perform the same kind of practical function as do
moral judgements, or that they must serve the same kind of
theoretical purpose as do scientific judgements. The analyst
then works with one or the other of two different hypotheses,
depending upon which alternative he has accepted. Either he
attempts to describe the logic of critical discourse as argu¬
ment designed for the practical purpose of guiding choices, or
he attempts to show how it can be interpreted as satisfying the
standards of theoretical discourse to which scientific judgements
appeal for justification. Both hypotheses are Inadequate and
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lead to misconceptions of the logical structure of critical
argument. This is the point which I argue in the first chapter.
There I try to show that critical argument does not fit into
either one or the other of the mutually exclusive classes which
the dichotomy between practical discourse and theoretical dis¬
course provides. The purpose of critical discourse is not the
same as the purpose generally assigned to either practical or
theoretical discourse. It combines the purpose of both of
these, and it shares some of the logical characteristics of
both. But it also exhibits other logical characteristics
peculiar to itself. Therefore in Chapter I I urge the im¬
portance of approaching criticism as a unique mode of dis¬
course, without assuming the identity of its purpose nor of
its logical character with the purpose and logical character
of any other kind of argument.
The alternative approach is a primary source of the mis¬
constructions put upon critical discourse. Theorists who
assume that criticism is a form of practical discourse never
trouble to examine any critical arguments whatsoever. They
suppose that if they analyse moral argument, the prototype of
practical discourse, then their analyses will serve equally
well to explain critical argument. The ineptness of their
accounts of critical argument shows that their confidence is
not well founded. Theorists who assume that criticism is a
form of theoretical discourse attempt to show how critical
argument can be interpreted as conforming to the rules of
scientific argument. Their assumption that the logical
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justification of arguments of whatever kind depends upon their
satisfying the rules of inference recognized in natural science
raises quite unnecessary questions about the cogency of criti¬
cal argument which their theories never satisfactorily answer.
In this thesis an attempt Is made to reach a better under¬
standing of criticism by avoiding these mistakes. The logical
homogeneity of moral and critical discourse is not assumed;
rather, contrary to standard philosophical procedure, some
critical arguments are actually examined in order to discover
how they are constructed. Nor is it assumed here that the
standards of logical justification recognized in natural
science are the only legitimate standards of cogent reasoning.
The main endeavour of the thesis is to study critical dis¬
course in order to see whether it will yield its own standards
by which to distinguish cogent critical arguments from those
which fail to justify the judgements which they assert.
Another case of false dichotomy is exposed in Chapter 2.
There I discuss the misguided conception of the work of art as
being composed of a physical object and an aesthetic object.
This is a very misleading distinction upon which to ground a
theory of value judgements. From that point of view (i.e.
the critic's) from which works of art must be regarded in
order to understand criticism of them, each work constitutes
a single object, being a physical entity having a certain
value. The widely held view that each work of art is really
two objects, a material object and a value object, has had a
pernicious effect upon theory of criticism, and the
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misunderstandings upon which this deceptive notion is based
must be eradicated.
Since the assault to be made upon this view later will un¬
doubtedly encounter opposition, perhaps I should here anticipate
a concession which, if not overlooked, may make the argument of
Chapter 2 more palatable. It may be admitted that the physi¬
cal object/aesthetic object dichotomy might conceivably prove
itself useful for certain aesthetic inquiries. It might, for
instance, have pragmatic value for a psychological investiga¬
tion of aesthetic experience; the psychologist might find it
expedient at times to describe a work of art as a purely physi¬
cal object of perception and at other times as an experienced
object characterized by value* Ky argument against the di¬
chotomy has no bearing upon investigations of that kind. It
is directed solely against postulating or assuming the di¬
chotomy in Inquiries into the logic of critical discourse.
The nature of the descriptions of works of art given by psy¬
chologists must be determined by the exigencies of their own
science and by the special problems which they are trying to
solve. What I oppose Is the expectation that the logical
character of critical remarks can be correctly described by
an analysis based upon the distinction between physical ob¬
ject and aesthetic object.
Once this division of works of art has been accomplished,
a distinction between the physical features and the value
features of works of art ensues. The heedless preservation
of this distinction Indicates that no consideration has been
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given to the fact that In a work of art no 1value feature*
can exist Independently of a 'physical feature', and no
'physical feature* can exist without at the same time being
a 'value feature'. These x^idely used terms, 'physical
feature' and 'value feature', are fatally misleading, for they
encourage the generally accepted but false notion that there
are two logically distinct kinds of critical remarks correspond¬
ing to the two kinds of features. This metaphysical splitting
of the work of art into two kinds of objects, and its features
into two different kinds, is therefore dangerous, because it
misrepresents the kind of thing that critics are writing about.
The purpose of Chapter 2, then, is to expose and correct this
false dichotomy by way of a propaedeutic to a study of critical
language.
Theorists who draw this arbitrary distinction between
kinds of features quite consistently extend it to the words
predicated of works of art In criticism. Two classes of
critical terms, that of 'descriptive' terras and that of 'value*
terras, taken to be logically disparate, emerge from their
faulty analysis. (This conventional distinction between
terms may also, of course, be utilized in discussions which
contain no explicit reference to the corresponding distinc¬
tion between features.) The study in critical semantics of
Chapter 3 reveals that no critical predicate, when it is read
in context and its full implications are considered, can be
properly regarded as either purely descriptive or as purely
evaluative. There certainly are words in critical use whose
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function is primarily descriptive and others whose function
is primarily evaluative. But these differences in the rela¬
tive degrees of the descriptive and the evaluative force of
the various predicates used in a critical argument do not
warrant their being Isolated from one another by a rigid logi¬
cal distinction which is wholly insensitive to the ambiguities
of critical language.
The main purpose of Chapter 3 is to break down this di¬
chotomy and to provide an alternative method of construing
critical terms which takes into account the dual function of
description and evaluation which they all actually perform
in critical argument. The assertions made about a work of
art within a single argument are clearly intended to contain
predicates which have some logical connection with one an¬
other. So long as these predicates are cut off from one an¬
other by being assigned to one or the other of two mutually
exclusive classes, there is no hope of discovering; what the
nature of this logical connection may be.
The distinction between descriptive statements and value
statements is based upon the arbitrary division of critical
predicates into two classes. Once it is accepted that criti¬
cal remarks are of two distinct kinds, 'descriptive' and
•evaluative', difficulties of great magnitude about their re¬
lationship arise. Having unwisely admitted distinctions be¬
tween the physical object and the aesthetic object, between
physical features and value features, between descriptive
terms and evaluative terms,a distinction between descriptive
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statements and value statements of course follows} and then
it is impossible to understand how the statements within a
critical argument are connected. What are taken to be 'value
statements' are supposed not to be logically oonnected with
what are called 'descriptive statements', and are either dis¬
missed as gratuitous or defended within an elaborate theory as
performing some hitherto unsuspected function.
Chapter k is dedicated to the abolition from theory of
criticism of the generally acknowledged distinction between
statements of fact and statements of value. It becomes evi¬
dent during that discussion that much of the contemporary con¬
troversy about the value judgement arises directly from this
false dichotomy. I also try to show in that chapter that
certain recent, widely acclaimed accounts of the relation be¬
tween the statements of evaluative discourse must be condemned
as contributing nothing but confusion to theory of criticism.
The particular logical difficulties which these theories are
supposed to be capable of resolving do not inhere in critical
argument at all, but are the result of the philosophers' mis¬
take about the kind of statements that are made by critics.
A correct understanding of the logical import of critical
statements is prerequisite to an explanation of their logical
relations. Certain prevalent misconceptions of the purpose
and nature of critical assertion having been exposed by the
end of Chapter k, the field is cleared of a number of theories
which have circulated false accounts of critical discourse.
In Chapter 5 an attempt Is made to describe the logical
In¬
structure of critical argument by setting forth certain con¬
ditions upon which the inferences made from statement to
statement within a work of criticism depend. I argue there
that a statement in which a critical judgement of value is
asserted is derived from other statements about the work of
art according to specifiable logical rules by reference to
which critical arguments which are cogent can be distinguished
from those which are not. The main intention of Chapter 5,
then, is to show that standards of sound critical argument can
be formulated, and that therefore the current scepticism about
the possibility of logically justifying any critical judgement
is unwarranted.
The analysis of critical argument Introduces the subject
of criteria of value. In Chapter 6 I try to determine the
logical character of the criteria upon which critical judge¬
ments are grounded by discovering how they come to be formu¬
lated and how they are used in evaluative criticism. The
main contention of this chapter is that criteria of value are
logically adequate to support objective aesthetic judgements
of works of art. A brief consideration of the relation be¬
tween criteria of value and aesthetic theory completes the
examination of the logic of critical discourse.
The argument of this thesis is consistently antagonistic
toward the subjectlvist view of aesthetic judgements. It
seems to me that a subjectivist bias inevitably misdirects
inquiries into the logic of value discourse. Refusing to
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take seriously th© critic's intention of stating something
about a x^rork of art when he formulates his judgement of it,
the subjectivist proceeds to explain how the assertion of a
value judgement performs some other quite different function.
The subjectivist view is attractive, because it answers easily
certain questions about aesthetic evaluation which are hard to
answer from any other standpoint. It can show, for instance,
how it is that two critics can make apparently incompatible
assertions about the value of a work of art without logically
contradicting one another. And it can dispose of all ques¬
tions about the truth, correctness, or Justification of value
judgements by showing that these notions are irrelevant, since
statements of value judgements do not really refer to the
works of art that they pretend to be about. What seems un¬
satisfactory about these facile solutions to difficult prob¬
lems is that they depend upon a conception of critical remarks
quite different from that which critics or their readers pre¬
sumably hold. It is possible that critics have been mistaken
in supposing that when they stated their aesthetic evaluations
they were making assertions about works of art. And perhaps
readers of evaluative criticism have also been wrong in
thinking that they were being told something about works of
art by critics. But the ubiquity and persistence of such
errors seem too astonishing a fact to be accepted unless the
problems in question cannot be solved on the basis of some
view more in accord with what most people have always supposed
critical 'writing to be about.
16
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There are other consequences of the subjectivist view no
less remarkable for the disparity between them and what
appears to be actually the case with value judgements. It
is generally supposed that a critical judgement may be mis¬
taken, and mistaken in the sense that the wrong evaluation is
put upon a work of art. It is also supposed that when two
critics make assertions about the value of the same work of
art their statements might conceivably be in contradiction,
i.e. that their statements might be incompatible in the sense
that no one could assent to both statements without committing
a logical error. Both of these common suppositions are
denied by the primitive form of subjectivism which holds that
the assertion of a value judgement is equivalent to the asser¬
tion that the critic has a certain feeling, of approval or
disapproval, toward the work«^ On this view, a critical
judgement could be wrong only In the sense of misrepresenting
the critic's feeling; there is no question of its being wrong
about the work of art, because it is not about the work of
art. For the same reason, the apparently contradictory
statements of several critics can never really be contra¬
dictory; so long as they both give a correct report of the
critics' feelings, they both may be given assent however in¬
compatible they would be if actually made about the work of
art. Presumably when critics argue about the value of a
work of art they suppose that they are trying to justify their
aesthetic judgements, to defend or to support the statements
that they have made about the work's value. And readers of
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criticism also suppose that critics are giving them reasons
for accepting as correct certain statements about the value
of works of art. But this notion is also discounted by the
subjectlvist who rejects the question of whether what the
critic asserts about a work of art is correct or not in
favour of the question of whether or not what the critic
asserts is true to his own feeling about the tirork.
It would appear that critical discourse raises interesting
logical questions about how aesthetic judgements are justified
or supported or defended. But when critical discourse is in¬
vestigated from a subjectlvist standpoint, all such logical
questions can be suppressed in favour of psychological questions
about why the critic happens to have the feelings he does and
about the methods he might use to arouse similar feelings in
his readers. This direction of Interest is in accord with
the view that the notion of correctness relevant to statements
of value judgements applies only to the conformity of the
critic's statements to his own feelings. But it is certainly
not in accord with the critic's evident intention of showing
that the work of art does actually have the value that he
judges It to have, nor with most readers' understanding that
they are being offered expert commentary on a work of art and
not Introspective reports on the critic's emotional ex¬
periences .
My thesis is that critical judgements can be objective.
The statements in which some aesthetic evaluations are asser¬
ted are about works of art and do not always, as philosophers
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now often suppose, merely pretend to be about them. Such
statements are derived from others according to certain prin¬
ciples of inference which can be discovered by a close study
of critical argument. It is therefore possible to distinguish
a critical argument that is cogent from one that is not. And
since it is possible to decide whether the statements from
which a critical judgement is derived are correct or not, it
is also possible to decide whether or not the judgement is
correct. Subjective critical judgements are also sometimes
made; these are assertions apparently about the value of works
of art which the most careful inspection of these works would
serve neither to confirm nor refute. This eventuality in¬
dicates that the subjeotlve/objective distinction ought to be
drawn within critical discourse itself and not be posited to
distinguish criticism from other kinds of discourse.
It is generally supposed, and not without reason, that some
critical remarks are subjective, having no grounds other than
the critic's personal preference, his feeling or emotion, and
that other critical statements are objective, providing po¬
tentially reliable information about works of art themselves.
It is important to retain this distinction within criticism,
and to try to discover the logical features which distinguish
critical arguments yielding objective judgements from those
yielding subjective ones. It is uninformative and, further¬
more, misleading to posit the distinction as differentiating
criticism from quite different kinds of discourse, say that of
empirical science. Using the subjectlve/objective dichotomy
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to contrast criticism with objective modes of discourse im¬
plies that all critical judgements are subjective, and this
is not so. This faulty classification obscures the dis¬
tinguishing features of two quite different kinds of critical
discussion; that which consists of subjective remarks re¬
cording personal preferences, emotions, feelings, or attitudes,
and that which contains assertions about the value of works of
art grounded in the features of the works discussed and
supported by reasoned argument.
It is by no means uncommon to assume that the standards
of meaningful assertion and of cogent reasoning recognized in
natural science constitute the only legitimate standards by
reference to which statements can be logically justified.
Assuming this, it will b© supposed that the problem of showing
that critical judgements can be objective and reliable, as
the judgements of natural science can be, is equivalent to
showing that critical assertion and inference conform to the
same rules of assertion and inference as govern scientific
argument. The differences between critical and scientific
discourse are taken to be superficial {and of no logical con¬
sequence. It is implied or claimed that when critioism is
properly understood, its judgements will be seen to be genuine
empirical propositions, amenable to the same tests of veri¬
fication as are the judgements of natural science. But
critical judgements are not empirical propositions, and
attempts to analyse critical discourse on the assumption that
they are succeed only in arousing the suspicion that critical
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arguments are logically inadequate to support the judgements
that they are supposed to support. Critical argument does
not satisfy the logical requirements of scientific discourse.
Not only is it futile to try to show that it does, but it is
unnecessary. For the integrity of a critical argument, its
ability to justify logically an aesthetic judgement, need not
depend upon its satisfying scientific standards of assertion
and inference. Criticism has its own standards of sound
argument to satisfy, and the business of the logician is to
find out what these are.
This can be done only by examining arguments to be found
in critical literature. But theorists have been strangely
reluctant to consider any of the arguments actually advanced
by critics in support of their judgements. They have pre¬
ferred to analyse arguments invented by themselves, or rather
such fragments of hypothetical arguments as 'This is good',
•This Is beautiful', and the like. This habit of symbolizing
critical arguments by simplified, conventional models of its
judgements results in a gross misrepresentation of what
critics are saying. Thus the elegance achieved by a high de¬
gree of abstraction from the variety and complexity of actual
criticism is very costly in terms of relevance. Too often
the criticism of art has served the philosopher merely as an
occasion for speculation about general problems of axlology,
or as a source of illustrations (usually fictional) to
support theories based upon studies of moral evaluation.
This approach has contributed nothing toward an understanding
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of the logical character of critical diecourse Itself, In
this study In critical argument I shall attempt to keep what




A clear conception of the purpose of critical discourse
is prerequisite to an analysis of its logical structure.
Even the specific questions which an Inquiry such as this
tries to answer are dictated by the view that Is taken of
what critics accomplish by writing about works of art. If
it is held that certain critical remarks are assertions about
the value of works of art, then questions arise about how to
decide which of these assertions are correct and which mis¬
taken. If it is held, on the other hand, that the purpose
of these same remarks is to Influence readers in some way,
the question of how to decide whether the remarks assert what
is true of the work is neglected in favour of questions about
the way in which they exert their influence. If the logician
supposes that criticism is theoretically capable of showing
what is the case concerning the value of the works discussed,
he will ask what conditions a critic's argument must satisfy
in order to justify a reader's acceptance of the critic's
statements. But if he supposes that the object of criticism
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is to elicit a response of a certain kind, from readers, he
will ask about the techniques actually used by critics to
accomplish this rhetorical purpose. It is apparent that an
Inquiry starting from one of these preconceptions of critical
discourse will arrive at conclusions of a quit© different kind
than will an inquiry which takes the other as its point of de¬
parture .
In accordance with the traditional philosophic distinction
between kinds of discourse, these alternative conceptions of
critical discourse may be termed theoretical and practical.
Critical literature will be read on a theoretical view as
providing information of some kind about works of art. On
a practical view it will be interpreted as in some way in¬
fluencing the choices of readers* It might be supposed that
neither one of these views could be justifiably adopted until
the end of the inquiry. But this is not so. Before an ex¬
planation can be given of how critical arguments are con¬
structed, the purpose for which they are constructed must be
understood: the philosopher cannot begin to explain how criti¬
cism is done until he has made up his mind about what critics
are trying to do.
Out of deference to this rule of procedure, Nowell-Smlth
begins his recent inquiry into the logic of moral discourse by
arguing that ethics is properly a form of practical discourse.
He attributes the alleged errors of a number of philosophers
to their mistaken attempts to analyse moral argument as if it
2
had the same goal (knowledge) as does theoretical science.
2k
Whether or not Nowell-Sinlth's conception of the goal of moral
discourse is accepted, his book well illustrates the impor¬
tance of coming to a decision about the purpose of the kind of
discourse investigated before attempting to explain its logi¬
cal structure. The broad distinction he draws between
theoretical and practical science is fine enough for this dis¬
cussion, and the definitions he gives of the too kinds of
science will serve here as a point of departure. The purpose
of a theoretical science, he says, "is to enable us to under¬
stand the nature of things/-* and of a practical science to
provide "answers to practical questions, of which the most la-
it
portant are 'What shall I do?' and 'What ought I to do?1"
Answers to the questions raised in theoretical science "take
the form of statements, descriptions, generalizations, ex¬
planations, and laws/* Answers to the questions raised in
practical discourse "are decisions, resolutions, expressions
of intention,., an order, injunction, or piece of advice, a
sentence in the form 'Do such and such',"^
"The central activities for which moral language is used
7
are choosing and advising others to choose." This state¬
ment of purpose is Nowell-Smlth's ground for classifying moral
argument as practical discourse. Now the question arises as
to what kind of science the criticism of art is. Would it be
correot to say that the central activities for which critical
language is used are choosing and advising others to choose?
It would not seem at all strange to maintain such a view,
ibid the widespread practise of grouping moral statements and
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critical statements together as 'value statements' and con¬
trasting these with the descriptive (factual) statements of
theoretical science seems to imply this view. When criticism
is construed as a practical science, the critic's function is
taken to be the answering of such questions as, 'Is this play
worth the time and expense entailed by attending its per¬
formance?' and 'Should I buy this painting or use the money to
attend the festival at Salzburg?' It seems clear that much
critical writing, particularly of the kind published in news¬
paper reviews, is intended to fulfill this purpose of helping
the reader to decide whether or not to buy certain works of
art and whether or not to attend certain performances or ex¬
hibitions, But whether or not the giving of such practical
advice is the "central activity," the ultimate goal in terms
of which all critical discourse is to be understood, is an¬
other matter.
ibid It appears that much critical writing does not have
such a practical end in view. Some criticism is written
about performances that will never be repeated, and still
more is read by people who have no intention of making first
hand acquaintance with the works discussed. It is only on
a very trivial reading of much serious criticism of works of
high repute that one would say that the critics' main purpose
was to advise people to read those works, or to look at them,
or to listen to them. The value of Faust and of the Slstine
Celling and of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is so well estab¬
lished (i.e. generally accepted) that anyone who Is Interested
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in such matters and even slightly informed about them does not
need the recommendations of a critic to decide that they are
worth his time. Critical studies of these works by Buchwald
and WolffIn and Hoffman were not written in order to advise
the reader what he ought to do about them. Rather they are
all attempts to show by critical analysis by what means the
artists created works of exceptional value. This kind of
criticism would appear to belong with theoretical discourse,
the purpose of which, according to Howell-Sraith, "is to enable
us to understand the nature of things."
The short, often hastily written, reviews of contemporary
works, designed to influence the reader's attitude toward the
works and his choices between them, and the extended analyses
of works of established reputation, intended to increase his
understanding and deepen his appreciation of them, do not to¬
gether exhaust the field of critical writing, Stuart Gilbert's
study of Ulysses was assuredly intended both to make a diffi¬
cult and much misunderstood novel intelligible and to alter
the public's unfavourable attitude toward it by encouraging
an informed reading of the book. Such a work, and the
literature of criticism provides numerous examples, is attemp¬
ting to fulfill both a theoretical and a practical function in
some vague sense of these terms whioh includes, on the one
hand, explanation and, on the other, recommendation. But
does it fulfill either a theoretical or practical function in
Nowell-Smith's sense of the terms, which is, I think, the
generally accepted one? It seems to me that if the defining
2?
characteristics of theoretical and practical sciences are
derived, as they are, from considerations of the goals and
procedures of pure and empirical science and of ethics, criti¬
cism will be found not to fit very comfortably into either
class. If I am right about this, the function of critical
terms, the nature of critical statements, and the logic of
critical argument may be expected to differ from the function,
nature, and logic of the terms, statements, and arguments of
both pure and empirical science and of ethics. If these ex¬
pected differences are actually present, theories of aesthetic
evaluation which construe critical terms, statements, and argu¬
ments as being logically identical with the terms, statements,
and arguments of either natural science or ethics are bound
to overlook the peculiarities of critical discourse and
accordingly to fail to understand it.
Since it is most generally held that criticism is a form
of practical discourse, I shall be concerned here with dis¬
tinguishing critical discourse and moral discourse in terms of
purpose , In so far as moral discourse is taken to be repre¬
sentative of practical science, I wish to show that criticism
does not belong In the oategory of practical discourse, I
shall try to repudiate the claim, implied or stated in certain
theories to be examined, that critical argument and moral argu¬
ment attempt to answer the same kind of question. But I shall
not be arguing against the widespread view that criticism of
art can. and sometimes does fulfill a practical function.
There is little doubt that a critic may affect his readers'
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feelings or attitudes toward a work and also offer such advice
as will influence the choices that they must sometimes make
concerning works of art. A critic's remarks may also be in¬
strumental in improving a performer's technique; and a con¬
ductor or a choreographer or a stage manager may find criti¬
cal analyses of musical or dramatic works very useful. These
and many other possible events give sufficient reason for
accepting the common notion that critical writing may serve
some practical purpose. This notion is as harmless as it is
vague, and there is no sensible objection to be made against
it. But it has been made the basis of certain theories of
value discourse which are far from harmless, and against these
serious objections will be brought in this chapter.
There is a crucial difference between the sense of 'prac¬
tical' that is admitted here as correctly describing critical
discourse and the sense of the term as understood by the theo¬
rists whose views are to be discussed. The common sense view
that a irork of criticism may have practical effects of one kind
or another leaves room for a question about the truth or fal¬
sity of what the critic writes. It admits that a critic may
affect his readers' feelings or attitudes, but also shows an
interest in whether the persons so affected have been given
correct information about the work's value. It is not
supposed on this view that critical discourse can be fully ex¬
plained by a study of critical rhetoric. For after all ques¬
tions about the ©motive or persuasive power of critical
language have been answered, logical questions about how
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aesthetic evaluations are Justified remain. No attempt to
answer these questions is made by philosophers who construe
criticism as a form of practical discourse in the technical
sense of that term. They are content to show merely in what
x?ay critics do exert the influence necessary to accomplish
their practical purpose. When this extremely restricted no¬
tion of critical purpose is adopted as the controlling con¬
ception of the inquiry, most of the questions about criticism
that one might expect to Interest the logician are ignored.
Therefore it seems to me important to show that critical dis¬
course is not primarily or essentially 'practical' in the
generally accepted philosophic sense of that word.
But neither is criticism strictly a 'theoretical' subject.
It does not exhibit a number of those defining characteristics
of theoretical discourse peculiar to natural science, and its
concern with the value of things is alone sufficient to dis¬
tinguish it from non-normative inquiries into phenomena. The
merit of the theoretical view is that it takes seriously the
critic's claim to make assertions about the value of works of
art, thereby directing the inquiry into the logic of the argu¬
ments offered to support such statements. The theoretical
vlexf is dangerous when it leads those who hold it to suppose
that criticism should conform to the logical pattern of scien¬
tific discourse* Finding that critical statements do not
satisfy certain standards against which empirical statements
are tested, and that inferences within critical argument are
not made according to the rules to which the inferences of
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exact science are expected to conform, the philosopher may
conclude that as logical argument criticism is congenitally
defective. This result can be prevented by avoiding dogma¬
tism about the relative logical merits of different types of
discourse. There are certain logical differences betx«reen
scientific discourse and critical discourse, and these will be
discussed later in the thesis whenever It is found that con¬
fusion about them has been the cause of misunderstanding the
logical structure of critical discourse itself. Before pro¬
ceeding so far, however, the inadequacy of the practical vlexsr
of criticism as a hypothesis for analysing critical argument
must be shorn.
First it Is necessary to understand how a statement by
statement analysis of a critical argument would be conducted
according to the several specific forms of the practical view
now current in philosophy. If a passage of criticism is
understood to aim at arousing a certain emotion or feeling
about the work discussed, one or several of its statements
will be considered as indicating what emotion or feeling the
reader is to experience and the others as rhetorical devices
for exciting this emotion or feeling.® Or if criticism is
taken to be a device for invoking certain attitudes, then one
or several of its statements may be taken as expressing the
attitude which the rest of the statements, offered as reasons,
9
are calculated to invoke. If criticism is construed as a
way of giving advice, one or several of the statements will be
understood as prescribing what action is to be taken in regard
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to the work, or at least as providing grounds for inferring
an imperative, and the remainder as at once describing the
work and setting forth the standards by which all other work3
of a similar kind are to be judged,10
On all of these views the critic is taken to be a man pri¬
marily concerned with influencing behaviour, whether by-
arousing feeling, determining attitudes, or by offering ad¬
vice, This version of the critic's function is plausible.
To take an example, it does seem that F, R, Leavis's purpose
11
in calling Dickens's Hard Times a "masterpiece" is to en¬
courage some people to read the book and others, who have
already read it and dismissed it as being beneath critical
notice, to read it again. There seems to be nothing wrong
with saying that Leavis's criticism is intended to arouse in
his readers a feeling of admiration for the novel, or to in¬
duce a favourable attitude toward it, or that he is advising
readers that Hard Times merits serious study. There is, as
I have already admitted, little doubt that many essays in
criticism have the effect of promoting or discouraging commerce
with the works discussed, and that their authors intend them
to have such an effect. Whether there are exceptions to this
generalization about the function of criticism is a question
that need not be argued here. The decisive question is
whether the view of criticism as being essentially practical
in intention and effect, even if right as far as it goes, can
provide an adequate hypothesis for an analysis of the logical
structure of critical discourse. Or must the logician allow
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for the apparent fact that critics do make statements about
the value of works of art and do attempt to Justify these
statements by argument? The problem can be put concretely
by asking whether a practical interpretation of criticism or
one which takes into account the critic's claim to offer in¬
formation about the value of a work of art provides the most
illuminating answer to the question, 'Why did Leavis call
Hard Times a "masterpiece''?'
One answer worth considering, which is consistent with the
practical view of criticism, iss 'Because he is prescribing,
attempting to influence the behaviour of readers through
affecting their feelings or attitudes, and "masterpiece,"
being a potent item in the arsenal of critical rhetoric, is
well suited to the job'. An alternative ansi^er, also con¬
sistent with the practical view of criticism, would be: 'Be¬
cause he is answering the question he supposes readers of
literary criticism to be asking, namely, "What should I do,
i.e., read?"' The third, quite different way of answering
the question, attributable to reading critical works as argu¬
ments offered in support of aesthetic evaluations, is: 'Be¬
cause of all the reasons given in his discussion of the book*.
No two of these answers are mutually exclusive, and therefore
perhaps they are all admissible as providing the different
kinds of information appropriate to the several Interpre¬
tations that can be put upon the question, 'Why did Leavis
call Hard Times a "masterpiece"?' What must be decided now
is ^^^hlch interpretation provides the most fruitful conception
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for investigating the logical relations between the statements
of Leavis's argument,
The view that Leavis oalls Hard. Times a "masterpiece® in
order to invoke a certain feeling or attitude in the reader
implies the possibility of grouping all the statements of the
critical essay into one or the other of two classes. In one
class will be the statements that express the author's feeling
or attitude, and in the other the statements which are cal¬
culated to invoke this sane feeling or attitude in the reader.
This classification accords with the distinction, accepted by
those who hold the emotive or attitude theory, between pre¬
scriptive and descriptive propositions. Indeed, it is merely
another way of putting the distinction. As I shall try to
show in Chapter 4, the classifying must be done in a very
arbitrary manner, because the distinction corresj>onds to no
genuine difference between critical remarks. Searching for
statements which exhibit the defining characteristics of one
class and are at the same time devoid of those of the other,
one is at a loss to know where to put such a remark as, "In
fact, by texture, imaginative mode, symbolic method, and the
resulting concentration, Hard Times affects us as belonging
p
with formally poetic works." Despite this recalcitrance of
the critic's prose to the forms logicians would impose upon it,
I shall suggest, for the sake of the argument, candidates for
the two classes. Possible examples of statements which would
be taken as expressing Leavis's feeling or attitude toward the
book are; "Actually, the Dickenslan vitality is there, in its
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varied characteristic modes, which have the more force because
they are free of redundance: the creative exuberance is con¬
trolled by a profound inspiration,"^ "But Dickens's art,
while remaining that of the great popular entertainer, has in
Hard Times. as he renders his full critical vision, a stamina,
a flexibility combined with consistency, and a depth that he
14
seems to have had little credit for," And the following re¬
marks might be taken as calculated to invoke the same feeling
or attitude in the reader, "by calling attention," as A, J. Ayiar
1<
says, "to certain features of the work under review": J "The
philosophy is represented by Thomas Gradgrind, Esquire, Member
of Parliament for Coketown, who has brought up his children on
the lines of the experiment recorded by John Stuart Mill as
16
carried out on himself." "Bltzer, the model pupil, on the
button's being pressed, promptly vomits up the genuine article,
'Quadruped, Graminivorous, etc.j and 'Now, girl number twenty,
17
you know what a horse is'." Since these two remarks, which
do call attention to certain features of the work, namely a
character and a scene, seem not to be highly charged with
evocative power, I may add a third; "The irony, pungent enough
IS
locally, is richly developed in the subsequent action,"
This last remark seems better calculated to excite a feeling
or determine an attitude, but it is indistinguishable in kind
from the members of the other class.
The difficulty of even distinguishing the statements of a
critical argument on the lines indicated by an emotive or an
attltudinal theory diminishes confidence in the theory's
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ability to explain the connection between them. Two more re¬
lated difficulties follow. Apart from the ambiguous status
of many remarks which leaves their proper classification a
matter of profound doubt, there are yet other statements which
clearly do not belong In either of the classes provided by the
theory : "At the opening of the book Sissy establishes the
19
essential distinction between Gradgrlnd and Bounderby." "And
Mr, Sleary proceeds to explain that Sissy's truant father is
certainly dead because his performing dog, who would never have
20
deserted him living, has come back to the Horse-riding."
Surely neither of these statements express any special feeling
or attitude entertained by Leavis. Nor are they d esigned to
evoke any specifiable feeling or attitude in the reader.
What is to be done with them? Apparently they must be dis¬
missed as beyond the competence of the analysis. Other
statements make even greater trouble^ Not only are they un¬
accountable on the hypothesis being considered, they are
clearly at variance with the purpose ascribed to the essay
by the prescriptive theory of value discourse: "Criticism,
PI
of course, has its points to make against Hard Times."
"Again, his attitude to Trade Unionism is not the only ex-
22
pression of a lack of political understanding." These re¬
marks are ill suited to the end of inciting the feeling or
attitude appropriate to a "masterpiece." Either they must be
written off as inadvertent, or the hypothesis that was supposed
to account for them must be altered.
This is not the end of the disappointments involved in
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reading Leavis's essay as being essentially practical in in¬
tention and effect. Anyone who answers the question 'Why
did Leavls call Hard Times a "masterpiece"?' by saying, 'Be¬
cause he is attempting to influence the behaviour of readers
through affecting their feelings or attitudes' must be content
to leave Leavis's own feeling or attitude toward the novel un¬
explained. And, of course, on such a reading of the essay
Leavis's calling Hard Times a "masterpiece" does and must re¬
main wholly inexplicable. For any statements that might be
taken as accounting for the judgement will be assessed solely
for their ability to affect the feelings or attitudes of the
critic's readers. "What are accounted reasons for our
Caesthetic} judgements," Ayer says, "are reasons only in the
23
sense that they determine attitudes." Thus all hope of
finding within the argument reasons for the judgement must, on
this view, be given up. This is an implication which Ayer,
for one, is willing to accept: he would relegate the question
of why Leavis calls Hard Times a "masterpiece" to the psy-
ehologist or the sociologist. They may very well be the
experts best qualified to deal with the question, if, in fact,
the expectation of finding logical connections between the
statements of the argument is baseless. Before accepting
this defeat, the logician may adopt another hypothesis for
the analysis of the essay. But first there is another im¬
plication of the practical view of criticism to be drawn out.
A consideration of it should strengthen the suspicion that
there is something wrong with the hypothesis that a practical
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view of criticism provides.
On the emotive or attitudinal hypothesis, the test of
appropriateness for any statement is set in terms of its psy¬
chological efficacy. The question one asks about critical
remarks is, 'Does it have the intended effect of arousing in
readers the feeling or attitude entertained by the critic?'
The question of whether or not the critic's terms bear any
correspondence to the work's features is irrelevant to testing
the soundness of his argument, and so is the question of
whether what he says on the first page is consistent with what
he says on the last. The standards for Judging critical argu¬
ments will be very like those used for judging the efficiency
of other forms of propaganda. Any statement, however irrele¬
vant or misleading, will be considered admissible so long as it
is persuasive. The only restraint upon the critic will be im¬
posed by the consideration that if what he says is obviously
fantastic or incoherent, he will fall to induce in the readers
a feeling or attitude similar to his own. On this view of
the function of criticism, critics will be acclaimed for their
power of convincing other people, and not for making just
appraisals of works of art. As for Leavis, he succeeds or
fails as a critic to the extent that he persuades other people
not that Hard Times is a masterpiece but to have a feeling
about the novel or an attitude toward it which is like his own.
What such a feeling or attitude would be like remains obscure;
one can only say that it is the kind of feeling or attitude
that Leavis has tox?ard masterpieces; and since this theory
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permits us to say only that masterpieces are those things
which excite a certain unspecified feeling or attitude, it
proves, upon completing its circular course, most unhelpful.
Even if the above argument does not constitute a reductio
ad absurdum of the theory reviewed, it should at least provoke
some dissatisfaction with that theory. The discussion was in¬
tended to show that if a critical essay is read as a piece of
practical reasoning, serious obstacles are encountered, when
one attempts to give an account of the logical relations
holding between the statements. I am convinced that an emo¬
tive or an attitude theory can neither get around nor over
these obstacles. There is yet another theory, which also
takes criticism to be a practical science, to be considered.
The main contention of this theory is that value judgements
can best be understood if they are construed as imperatives.
On this view, Leavis's essay will be read as a piece of ad¬
vice. This version of the practical conception of criticism
encounters different obstacles when it attempts to answer the
question, 'Why did Leavis call Hard Times a "masterpiece"?•
and it will be instructive to consider them*
The view that Leavis's claim for Hard Times constitutes an
answer to his readers' presumed question 'What shall I read?'
encourages an analysis of the critical essay along similar
lines to those just explored. There are statements from
which an Imperative can be derived, and there are other state¬
ments which give the critic's reasons for offering the advice
that he does. The assertion 1 Hard Times is a masterpiece',
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unless qualified in some way (e.g. 'but it is obscene', 'out
of print', 'too difficult for you') is, on this view, equiva¬
lent in effect to the statement 'Head Hard Times', It is a
presupposition of serious literary criticism that its audience
prefers masterpieces to pot-boilers and will make the above
inference from simple indicative to imperative. 'Masterpiece'
happens to be the word applied to works of art judged to be
especially worthy of attention and its prescriptive force is
strong and obvious. Since bad advice can be given about
books as about other things, the critic's readers want to know
his reasons for recommending the novel so strongly. Implicit
in the statements which set forth these reasons are the stan¬
dards of excellence which the critic either supposes his
readers to accept or which he is trying to inculcate.
That remark about standards, useful in revealing the logi¬
cal ground of the requireraent that a critic should show some
consistency amongst the judgements he makes of various works
of art, raises the question of whether the standards or cri¬
teria used in aesthetic evaluation are of the same logical
character as those used in other contexts. The answer to
this question is dictated by the view one takes of the func¬
tion of criticism. If it is supposed that the aim of criti¬
cism is the guidance of choices, then critical standards will
be taken to be of the same formal kind as the standards accor¬
ding to which men or motor-cars are recommended. This is the
position of E, M. Hare, whose book, The Language of Morals.2**
may serve as the text for the discussion of this version of
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the prescriptive theory of critical discourse.
Hare understands the word 'good', as it occurs in such
statements as 'This is a good motor-car', 'He is a good man',
'This is a good picture', to have both an evaluative meaning
{its primary meaning) and a descriptive meaning (its secondary
26 On
meaning). As evaluative, 'good' commends or prescribes, 1
making clear the speakers' answers to the questions, 'Which
motor-car shall I choose?' 'Which man shall I choose?' and
'Which picture shall I choose?' Understanding its descrip¬
tive meaning depends upon acquaintance with the standards by
which the speakers judge the value of such things. To illus¬
trate, "If two Indian Army Majors of the old school had been
talking about a new arrival in the Mess, and one of them had
said 'He's an awfully good man', we could have guessed that
the subaltern referred to played polo, stuck pigs with elan,
and was not on familiar terns with educated Indians. The re¬
mark, therefore would have conveyed information to one versed
in the culture of British India. It would have been informa¬
tive, because officers of the Indian Army were accustomed to
award commendation or the reverse according to consistent
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standards."
The same kind of analysis is given of a car expert's
judgement, 'This is a good motor-car'. When asked why he
recommends the car, the car expert replies with a series of
statements describing the car's features, its high speed, sta¬
bility, economical operation, and so on. These descriptive
statements make knovm the speaker's standards in motor-cars,
standards which he must, In consistency, be willing to employ
in all his Judgements of motor-cars. "When I commend a motor¬
car I am guiding the choices of my hearer not merely in re¬
lation to that particular motor-car but in relation to motor¬
cars in general. What I have said to him will be of assistance
to him whenever in the future he has to choose a motor-car or
advise anyone else on the choice of a motor-car... The method
whereby I give him this assistance is by making known to him a
standard for judging motor-cars
Hare is prepared to extend this type of analysis to judge¬
ments of pictures: "Suppose that I say •The South Bank
Exhibition is very good*. In what context should I appro¬
priately say this, and what would be my purpose in doing so?
It would be natural for me to say it to someone who was won¬
dering whether to go to London to see the Exhibition, or, if
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he was in London, whether to pay it a vlsit.""^ He inter¬
prets critioal remarks in this way because he maintains that
"When we commend or condemn anything, it is always in order,
at least Indirectly, to guide choices, our own or other people's,
now or in the future."^1 Anticipating a difficulty hinted at
by the phrase 'at least indirectly', he proceeds: "In order,
therefore, to show that critical value-judgements are all ulti¬
mately related to choices, and would not be made if they were
not so related, we require to ask, for what purpose we have
standards."-^2 His answer to this question succinctly ex¬
presses the practical view of criticism: "We only have stan¬
dards for a class of objects, we only talk of the virtues of
b2
one specimen as against another, we only use value words
about them when occasions are known to exist, or are con¬
ceivable, in which we, or someone else, would have to choose
between specimens. We should not call pictures good or bad
if no one ever had the choice of seeing them or not seeing
them (or of studying them or not studying them in the way that
art students study pictures, or of buying them or not buying
them). n^3
Attemrjting to analyse Leavis's essay on Hard Times on the
interpretative principle provided by this view of the critic's
function, one notices a significant difference between the
nature of the criteria he uses and the criteria, as Hare
characterises them, used by the car expert or the moralist.
The statements which set forth the reasons for recommending
the car or the man, those which "refer to, and express accep¬
tance of, a standard which has an application to other similar
instances,"^ are, to use Hare's label,straightforward
descriptive statements: 'It has high speed combined with sta¬
bility on the road'. 'It affords protection from the rain'.
'It has overdrive and a self-lubricating mechanism'. 'He
plays polo'. 'He hunts wild boars'. 'He does not consort
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with the natives'. But Leavis's reasons for calling Hard
Times a masterpiece are not given in straightforward descrip¬
tive statementsj the statements of his reasons are couched in
words of potent evaluative force; "The confutation of Utili-
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tarianism by life is conducted with great subtlety." "Tom's
escape is contrived, successfully in every sense, by means
^3
belonging to Dickensian high-fantastic comedy,"^ "The pro¬
foundly serious intention is in control, the touch sure, and
the structure that ensures the poise unassertively complex.
Now if one tries to read the critic*s argument as being
analogous to those of the car expert and the moralist, Leavis
will be taken to have failed in his purpose. One asks for
his reasons for recommending Ha,rd Times and expects, in accor¬
dance with this prescriptive theory, statements of fact, But
one gets, instead, only further value judgements, The state¬
ments refer to standards (of seriousness, control, subtlety,
etc.} which are, as the theory requires, applicable to other
works of art. But they are, according to the distinction
maintained by the theory, value statements, not the statements
of fact whieh this theory interprets reasons for a judgement
to be. This is the case because the standards used by the
critic are different in kind from those used by the car ex¬
pert or the British Major of Hare's examples. A man's playing
polo is an observable event. And whether or not a motor-car
is equipped with over-drive is also a question of fact. But
whether a novelist has presented a scene with 'great subtlety'
is a question not of fact but of critical judgement. What¬
ever may be the relation of such a critical remark to the
judgement 'Hard Times is a masterpiece', it is not formally
identical with the supporting statements of 'This is a good
motor-car' or 'He is a good man',
It appears, therefore, that this version of the practical
view of criticism does not provide a satisfactory hypothesis
for explaining the logical relations between the statements of
Leavis's essay* Since this essay may be taken as a typical
piece of critical writing, some doubt must be felt about the
adequacy of the hypothesis and of the conception of criticism
upon which it is grounded. Unless it is supposed that Leavis
has provided no satisfactory reasons for his judgement, it
must be concluded that his reasons are expressed in statements
of a kind logically different from the statements in which the
car expert and the moralist of this logician's examples pro¬
vide reasons for their judgements, This conclusion seems to
be warranted by the comparison made above of the reasons ad¬
vanced in the three different realms of discourse. This for¬
mal difference between a critical reason and the other kinds
to which it was compared appears to reflect a difference be¬
tween the nature of critical standards and technical or moral
standards, as Hare conceives of them. In any case, an
examination of this work of criticism shows that the standards
or criteria used do not perform in the way required by the
theory considered. Those statements of the critical argument
which refer to criteria are logically dissimilar to the
corresponding statements of the theorist's models. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the question 'Why did Leavis call
Hard Times a "masterpiece"?' is unanswerable if his argument
is read as a prescription, a piece of advice, from which the
imperative 'Head Hard Times' is to be inferred, for the argu¬
ment is devoid of statements of the kind which this theory-
admits as reasons.
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The failure of Hare's theory to account for the logic of
critical argument must be explained, He assumes that the
kind of reasons which serve for guiding choices, for recommen¬
ding or commanding, serve equally well to support a critical
judgement, I have shoim this assumption to be dubious in
the extreme. It is perhaps significant that Hare provided
no analysis of even a hypothetical aesthetic judgement of the
kind he applied to judgements of motor-cars or men, If his
confidence in the logical similarity of the three kinds of
discourse is misplaced, an analysis of critical arguments
based upon his principles cannot fall to be misleading for
want of vital distinctions. The root error of his theory's
failure to account for the logic of critical argument is, I
am sure, the mistaken notion that critical writing can be ex¬
plained in terms of its choice-guiding function alone. If
criticism Is construed as a form of practical discourse, then
certainly it will seem that the critic's principal business is
to guide the choices of his readers in their dealings with
works of art, I am convinced that this is not the critic's
main function, and that to read his work as if it were can
only lead to confusion about the logical structure of the argu¬
ments he uses.
Hare says that "We only have standards for a class of ob¬
jects, we only talk of the virtues of one specimen as against
another, we only use value words about them, when occasions
are known to exist, or are conceivable, In which we, or some-
4G
one else, would have to choose between specimens." Now
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certainly an occasion In which someone might have to choose
between reading Hard Times and doing something else is con¬
ceivable. But how important Is this fact? Is it an in¬
cidental fact or is it crucial for determining the construc¬
tion to be put upon critical discourse? In my opinion It is
an unimportant, circumstantial fact that has been mistakenly
allowed at times to determine the entire conception of the
nature and function of criticism.
The ineptness of prescriptive theories becomes apparent
the moment one tries to conceive of critical statements per¬
forming the role assigned to them by logicians such as Hare,
Carnap, Ayer, or Stevenson. "But actually," Carnap writes,
"a value statement is nothing els© than a command in a mis¬
leading grammatical form. It may have effects upon the ac¬
tions of men, and these effects may either be in accordance
4l
with our wishes or not; but it Is neither true nor false."
A. J, Ayer presents the same view rather more timidly: "It is
worth mentioning that ethical terms do not serve only to ex¬
press feeling. They are calculated also to arouse feeling,
and so to stimulate action. Indeed some of them are used in
such a way as to give the sentences in which they occur the
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effect of commands." And C. L. Stevenson writes} "Both
imperative and ethical sentences are used more for encouraging,
altering or redirecting people's alms and conduct than for
simply describing them. Both differ in this respect from the
sentences of science. And in arguments that involve dis¬
agreement in attitude, It Is obvious that Imperatives, like
4?
ethical judgements, have an important place.
This theory of value statements may be given a final test
by attempting to use it to interpret a statement made by Eric
Blom about Ravel1s music: "He was above all an upholder of
French tradition, the tradition of economy, clarity, elegance
and reticence found - with exceptions, of course - throughout
Mt
the history of French music," Interpreting this statement
according to Carnap as "a command in a misleading grammatical
form," it must be asked what the reader has been commanded to
do. Surely the defining characteristic of a command is that
It makes clear what action must be performed If the speaker is
to be obeyed. What Blom would have the reader do, or that he
would have him do anything, is not made plain by this state¬
ment - perhaps because of its "misleading grammatical form"?
But no rearrangement of its "grammatical form" would enable
this statement to perform the function of a command. What
effect such a remark could have "upon the actions of men" re¬
mains very obscure. That it must be either true or false
seems, on the other hand, very obvious.
The terms "economy," "clarity,8 "elegance," and "reticence"
express Blom's opinion of the French tradition and of Ravel's
music, but they do not, as Ayer is committed to saying, ex¬
press his feeling. One must read further to discover Blom's
feeling about these characteristics of Ravel's musics Ravel
was, he says, In these respects an "out-and-out conservative,"
and this "makes him seem less vital and interesting than we
had thought him thirty years ago. We still expect him to
*4-8
sound daringly enterprising, and are put out to find him
nothing of the sort...." That is Blora's "feeling" - he Is
"put out," disappointed; but "economy," "clarity,*5 "elegance,"
and "reticence" do not express that feeling. These words
have another job to do; they are used to characterize a musi¬
cal style. They are not used to "arouse feeling" either, I
think. They might, of course, arouse feelings of anger or
animosity in readers who disagreed with Blom, but presumably
the critic did not "calculate" their having such an effect.
Nor are they used "to stimulate action." What can one do
about the "economy," "clarity," "elegance," and "reticence"
of a composer's style? One may admire these qualities or de¬
plore them, but this is not to act. And whether one admires
them or deplores them is Irrelevant to the work these words
have to do, namely to impart information about a style of
music.
An impartial reading of critical literature, then, does
not support the view that the purpose of critical argument is
to prescribe actions. Such may at times be the critic's, and
perhaps more often the reviewer's, intention, as I have al¬
ready said. But to read every critical argument as if this
were its end can only result in the sort of misunderstanding
exhibited by the theories considered in the last eighteen
pages. It seems likely that this view of criticism has been
imposed without regard for the peculiarities of critical dis¬
course for reasons that are cogent, if they are cogent at all,
only in moral theory. Certain philosophers, mainly occupied
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with problems of ethics, have found it expedient to stress
the presumed fact that the aim of moral arguments is to guide
choices. Since moral arguments are instances of evaluative
discourse, it is supposed that what holds true of them must
also hold true of critical arguments, which are also Instances
of evaluative discourse. The fallacy of distribution in¬
volved in the supposition has gone undetected with unfortunate
results for critical theory.
One has only to read the first page of Leavis's essay on
Hard Times to see that he is not setting out to guide his
readers' choices of books, nor with advising or commanding
them to do anything. He has a very different assignment.
Beginning from the question "If, then, it is the masterpiece
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I take it for, why has It not had general recognition?" he
argues the inadequacy of the criteria used in "the traditional
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approach to 'the English novel'," and proposes alternative
criteria by which to assess the aesthetic value of the book.
The remainder of his argument is mainly an attempt to show
that Hard Times satisfies these criteria. He is not attemp¬
ting to persuade people nor to command them to choose Hard
Times for their summer reading. He is presenting a critical
discussion of the book designed to support his aesthetic judge¬
ment of it. No action on the part of the reader is expected
to follow his study of the essay. He may change his opinion
of the book, agreeing with Leavls that it is a "masterpiece"
and not "a very minor thing," "slight and insignificant," that
Leavis says it is generally taken to be.^ But a change of
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opinion is not an action, nor is it a choice in the sense in
which choice is usually associated with an action. The
reader is not advised to choose Hard Times in preference to
David Copperfleld. as one might be advised to choose a
Cadillac in preference to a Lincoln, or to choose to fight
rather than to run away. The essay raises no question of
choice, and this is typical of much critical writing. It
does, however, raise a question "of the virtues of one speci¬
men as against another" (of the virtues of Hard Times as
against Dickens's other novels^0), and this is also typical of
much critical writing.
Moral argument and critical argument, then, are dis¬
tinguishable in terms of function. Failure to recognize the
distinction results in error about the import of critical
statements. Taken as logically equivalent to moral state¬
ments, they are transformed so that they will fit the logi¬
cian's model. Taken as they actually occur in critical argu¬
ment, they do not fit the schema derived from moral discourse.
The statements 'Head Hard Times', 'You ought to read Hard
Times', 'You ought to read Hard Times rather than David
Copperfield' quite clearly belong to a different realm of dis¬
course than does 'Hard Times is a masterpiece'* The first
three statements are certainly practical, but they are not ex¬
clusively critical. They are moral remarks which critical
reasons alone could not support. However tellingly Leavis
defended his claim for Hard Times. his critical analysis
would not in Itself justify any one of the three prescriptive
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statements. The advice they give introduces extra-aesthetic
considerations, for it proposes an action involving moral con¬
siderations. Remarks such as, 'But your grandmother is dying,
and you ought to be by her bedside', 'But David Coooerfleld
is more likely to improve your character', and so on, all
count against the advice given. But such remarks do not
count against the statement, 'Hard Times is a masterpiece*.
They belong to a totally different realm of discourse, viz.
discourse about morality, and are therefore irrelevant to the
critical judgement.
This same point was made by Stuart Hampshire in an article
which construes all value judgements as comparative judgements
and recommends their exclusion from criticism. The restric¬
tion he puts upon the term 'value judgement' seems to me un¬
warranted. He apparently assumes that the only point of com¬
paring the value of two or more things is to help one to de¬
cide which of them is to be chosen. This assumption is a
legacy from theories which view critical discourse and moral
discourse as logically identical in character. In breaking
away from this view, Hampshire has, I think, taken a wrong
course through supposing that comparisons of value always in¬
volve moral considerations through being connected with choice.
But what he says about the distinction between practical ad¬
vice and critical remarks is consistent with the view that I
am advancing:
Judgements of this second kind may be taken as
practical advice that certain things ought to be
read, seen, and heard, and the advice must in¬
volve some reference to the whole economy of hu¬
man needs and purposes; but at this point the
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critic has actually become a moralist, and
the arguments supporting his recommendations
are the subject-matter of ethics. 'Is this
thing more worth attention than other objects of
its kind?' is one question, and 'What is the
peculiar arrangement of elements here and what
are the effects of this arrangement?' is another.
Host aesthetic theories have involved a confusion
of answers to these two very different questions;
no positive answer to the second by Itself en¬
tails any answer to the first. One would need
to add some further premises about changing human
needs and interests; and there is no reason to
assume that all works of art satisfy the same
needs and interests at all times and for all
people.51
It must be concluded, therefore, that the prevalent view,
that critical arguments are necessarily connected with choice,
is mistaken. "To praise is not to choose," Howell-Smith
writes, "but it is connected with choosing in that it would be
odd for a man to choose the thing he was prepared to praise
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less highly or not at all." What is Leavis committed to
choosing through having praised Hard Times? He chose to read
the novel, otherwise he wouldn't have praised it; and after he
read it, he chose to praise it. But this triviality does not
represent the kind of connection between critical praise and
choice which the prescriptive theory requires. And it has
never been shown, so far as I know, that there is any other
logically significant connection between the two activities.
It is not surprising, therefore, that theories of criticism
which depend upon some such connection have failed to provide
a fruitful hypothesis for inquiries into the logic of critical
argument.
I must now try to show that a more efficient instrument
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for logical analysis is provided by a conception of criticism
as argument designed for formulating and Justifying aesthetic
evaluations. On this view, the critic is understood to be
making assertions about the value of works of art which re¬
quire Justification, and the analyst is expected to give an
account of the logical characteristics of this kind of Justi¬
fication. The problem is not merely to show by what means
the critic can affect his readers' responses to a work, but to
describe the logical conditions that must obtain in order for
him to provide them with cogent argument about it. Of course
the reader must not expect to find a complete logical analysis
of a critical argument at this point. There are many problems
that would have to be solved before such an exercise could be
profitably undertaken. All that I can attempt here is to in¬
dicate the general lines of a logical analysis based upon a
conception of critical argument as consisting of a set of
statements all purporting to make correct assertions about
works of art and logically related in ways not yet determined.
Beading Leavls's essay on these lines, he is seen to have
two related problems. He must account for his own Judgement
that Hard Times is a masterpiece and explain its previous lack
of critical recognition: "If, then, it is the masterpiece I
take it for, why has it not had general recognition?"^ Having
announced his assignment, he then gives his first reason for
the claim he makes for the book: "Yet, if I am right, of all
Dickens's works it is the one that has all the strength of his
genius, together with a strength no other of them can show -
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that of a completely serious work of art,"** This reason is
Itself a value judgement with a complicated function. The
allusion to Dickens's other works establishes the sphere of
reference within which the discussion will take place and im¬
plied comparisons be drawn. It also makes plain that
Dickens's genius is to be assumed; Laavis is not obliged to
support this verdict, for he is urging his Judgement of Hard
Times against contrary judgements by other critics who
acknowledge the author's genius but not the relative worth of
this particular work. The statement also Introduces the
criterion against which the implied comparisons are to be made:
seriousness.
The statement determines the character of the discussion
that follows. Leavls must clarify the meaning of 'serious¬
ness' in this context and then show that the work is serious
in the required sense. in order to do this he must elicit a
set of operational terms from the clarification of 'serious¬
ness' which will serve to begin the critical analysis of the
novel. He must argue the importance and appropriateness of
the criterion he is using and show the Inadequacy of the cri¬
terion used by the critics with whose judgement of Hard Times
he disagrees. He sets out immediately to do this:
The answer to the question asked above seems to
bear on the traditional approach to 'the English
novel'. For all the more sophisticated critical
currency of the last decade or two, that approach
still prevails, at any rate in the appreciation
of the Victorian novelists. The business of the
novelist, you gather, is to 'create a world', and
the mark of the master is external abundance - he
gives you lots of 'life'. The test of life in his
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characters (he must above all create 1living!
characters) is that they go on living outside the
book, Expectations as unexactlng as these are not
when they encounter significance, grateful for it,
and when it meets them in that insistent form where
nothing is very engaging as 'life' unless its rele¬
vance is fully taken, miss it altogether. This is
the only way in which I can acoount for the neglect
suffered by Henry James's The Europeans. which may
be classed with Hard Times as a moral fable -
though one might have supposed that James would en¬
joy the advantage of being approached with expecta¬
tions of subtlety and closely calculated relevance.
Fashion, however, has not recommended his earlier
work, and this (whatever appreciation may be en¬
joyed by The Ambassadors) still suffers from the
prevailing expectation of redundant and irrelevant
'life'.55
Every statement here is open to extensive analysis; the
ramifications of some are vast and their relationships complex.
I shall consider only two phrases, and they are crucial: "the
prevailing expectation of redundant and irrelevant life," the
criterion which Leavis imputes to those who approach the
English novel in the traditional way, and "expectations of
subtlety and closely calculated relevance," Leavis's own cri¬
terion of serious art which he is to use in his analysis of
Hard Times. He argues that his adversaries' criterion is un¬
exacting, insensitive to novels which require a close reading
if the relation of each part to the total design is to be de¬
tected, The importance of the criterion that he advocates is
that it serves as an interpretative hypothesis for revealing
the significance of the various parts of tightly constructed
novels, 'Subtlety' and 'closely calculated relevance' are the
features he values and the ones whose presence in Hard Times he
seeks to reveal by citing and discussing the episodes and
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characters and dialogue of the novel. The justification for
using this criterion lies in Its appropriateness to the moral
fable as he defines it: "I need say no more by way of de¬
fining the moral fable than that in it the Intention is pe¬
culiarly Insistent, so that the representative significance
of everything in the fable - character, episode, and so on -
is Immediately apparent as we read."^
Leavls, then, on the first page states his evaluation of
Hard Times and reveals the criterion he Is using to judge it.
The remainder of his argument is concerned with showing that
the novel satisfies the criterion and is therefore a master¬
piece. The function of each of the ensuing statements is
the same, namely, to advance the intention of the argument by
showing the novel to be possessed of those features and com¬
binations of features which his judgement, based upon the cri¬
terion, imply that it has. The relevance of any statement is
tested by asking whether or not it does this, i.e., whether It
Is consonant with the evaluative intention of the statements
with which it Is associated and whether It actually refers to
any discernible feature of the work. On this view, therefore,
the logical connection between the statements of a critical
argument is understood in terms of their mutual coherence as
determined by the evaluative Intention of the entire argument.
This hypothesis must now be tested by asking whether those
statements which proved recalcitrant to the practical view of
criticism can be accounted for when construed as components
of a reasoned argument offered in support of an aesthetic
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judgement.
One of them was: "Actually, the Dickensian vitality is
there, in its varied characteristic modes, which have the more
force because they are free of redundance: the creative
exuberance is controlled by a profound inspiration."^ This
statement refers back to the reason Leavis gives in his first
paragraph for acclaiming Hard Times a masterpiece: "Yet, if
1 am right, of all Dickens's works it is the one that has all
the strength of his genius, together with a strength no other
KQ
of them can show - that of a completely serious work of art."-'
The statement in question reaffirms his earlier assertion that
the novel has "all the strength of his genius," and the term
"vitality," taken as a collective noun for the predicates of
the sentence immediately preceding: "satiric irony," "the large
and genial Dickensian way," "melodrama, pathos and humour,"
particularises the claim made by "strength." The statement
also supports the claim that Hard Times has "a strength no
other of them can show," namely seriousness in the form of
closely calculated relevance, a quality detected in the first
two chapters through observing their lack of redundance. The
remark also offers a tentative explanation ("profound inspi¬
ration") of this quality, of how, for once, Dickens constructed
a completely serious novel, writing; with "closely calculated
relevance," "free of redundance." In the following paragraph
Dickens's "inspiration," his total artistic conception, is ex¬
plained and compared with his usual way of conceiving a novel.
The function of this statement, therefore, Is to support
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Leavis's judgement by introducing predicates tfhich ascribe to
the work discernible qualities consonant with the criterion
used and to further the critical analysis by proposing an ex¬
planation of how the artist managed to construct a work having
these qualities.
The second remark with which the emotive and attitudinal
theories had trouble is also plainly consistent with the
evaluative intention of the argument: "But Dickens's art,
while remaining that of the great popular entertainer, has in
Hard Times. as he renders his full critical vision, a stamina,
a flexibility combined with consistency, and a depth that he
seems to have had little credit for."$9 Again the double
claim is made that Hard Times shares in the virtues of
Dickens's other novels and has one virtue peculiar to itself.
The criterion of seriousness provides three more concepts for
the critical interpretation of a passage which Leavls cites
by way of illustration: these are "stamina," "flexibility com¬
bined with consistency," and "depth," His argument for stamina
consists in analysing the scene quoted to show how the novelist
>
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makes a point ("against harmful tendencies in education" )
dramatically. Arguments for "flexibility combined with con¬
sistency" and "depth" follow, but they need not be examined
here. What is to be noticed about this statement is that it
advances the critic's aim (to support his judgement) by giving
an impression of the work which is consistent with the im¬
pression given by the preceding statements. At the same time
it characterizes the work in a more particular way than did
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the preceding statements which called it "masterpiece" and
"serious." It thereby provides a more exact notion of the
features of the work to be discovered by analysis. The in¬
terpretative value of such a statement stems from its ability
to serve as a kind of hypothesis for the detection of eriti-
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cally relevant features.
Such is the interpretation put upon critical statements
when they are construed as the instruments of reasoned dis¬
course about the aesthetic value of works of art. The most
general remark that can be made here about their function is
that they are used to show that the work is possessed of the
kind of features that the critical judgement implies it to
have. And all that can be said now in general terms about
the logical connections between the statements is that these
are relations which are teleologically determined by the aim
of critical discourse, which is to characterize a work of art
in terms of value. Compared with theories which take the
function of critical statements to be commanding, or the ex¬
pression or the evocation of feelings or of attitudes, and
which construe their connections externally, in term's of their
psychological impact upon the reader, my view lacks simplicity.
In return for the sacrifice of elegance, it offers, I think,
an interpretative hypothesis adequate to the complexity of
critical discourse.
Chapter 2
The Object of Critical Assertion
An account of the logical structure of critical argument
must be based upon an understanding of what, in general, criti¬
cal statements are about. Critical statements of appraisal
are clearly intended to be about what are usually called 'works
of art'. And a leading tenet of the view that critical judge¬
ments can be objective is that this intention is realized in
some cases: some critical statements are, not only ostensibly
but actually, about the works that are being evaluated. It
might be supposed that anyone prepared to defend this tenet
would find himself holding a position that was never attacked.
But this is not so. Distinguished writers have denied this
contention, maintaining that critical statements are not about
the material objects accessible to the public in galleries and
libraries, nor about the physical events which occur in concert
halls and theatres, but that they are about other things which
are usually called by philosophers 'aesthetic objects'.
An aesthetic object differs from what is called in common
parlance a 'work of art' in that it is dependent upon the ex¬
perience of an individual spectator. The value of an
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aesthetic object Is determined not only by what the artist
has made but also by the nature of the response made to the
work by each individual who comes in contact with it. Da
Vinci painted only one Mona Lisa, but there are as many aes¬
thetic objects connected with this work as there are people
tfho have contemplated it. A critical judgement made about
any one of these aesthetic objects does not refer to any other
aesthetic object. Each critic who formulates an evaluation of
that painting really talks about something with which he alone
can be acquainted. Critical statements are therefore subjec¬
tive in one important sense. For to say that the statement
of a critical judgement is objective is, in this sense, to im¬
ply that it is about an object whioh can be examined by any ob¬
server who wishes to teat the correctness of the statement.
In my opinion critical theory should be rid of this artifi¬
cial distinction between the physical objects produced by
artists and performers and the aesthetic objects of critics'
experiences. It gives a specious sanction to diverting the
reference of critical statements from public to private objects,
and thereby fosters the Illusion of warranting a subjectivist
view of critical judgements. There is no binding reason for
granting this distinction. It may be utilized in any inquiry
where it facilitates analysis without distorting the phenomenon
to be explained. But it is neither useful nor harmless when
posited in an inquiry into the logic of critical argument;
rather, as I shall try to show in this chapter, it obstructs an
understanding of the logical character of critical statements
62
and of their relationships.
Aesthetic evaluation invites three quite different kinds
of investigation, viz. psychological investigation of aesthetic
experience, metaphysical inquiry into the nature of art, and
logical analysis of the statements made by critics about works
of art. The psychologist may find it convenient to postulate
a distinction between the physical object (a work of art de¬
scribed purely in terms of its physical properties) and the aes¬
thetic object (the same work of art described as the valued ob¬
ject of an experience). The same distinction may facilitate
the speculations of a metaphysician who is trying to answer the
question, 'What is art?' But no such psychological or meta¬
physical questions need be raised in a logical study of critical
discourse which takes critical assertion as its datum. This
inquiry does not aim at making any discoveries about critics'
experiences nor about works of art that cannot be Inferred from
critical writing. The present concern is with what critics
write about works of art when evaluating them, and not with
what happens to critics in the presence of those works. Since
the critic is considered here to be the expert on the subject
of art, all extra-critical speculation as to what art is might
have been excluded from this thesis. However, some of these
philosopher-psychologists and metaphysicians have presumed to
illuminate criticism by answering the question of just what
kind of thing a critic refers to when he uses the nam© of a
work of art. Mistaken answers to this fundamental question
ensure their failure. It will be necessary, therefore, to
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examine arguments representative of these two approaches, psy¬
chological and metaphysical, in order to show that the physical
object/aesthetic object dichotomy is fatal to any attempt to
understand the principles of criticism.
The tenability of the physical object/aesthetic object di¬
chotomy, then, need not be categorically denied* All that I
wish to accomplish is its abolition from theory of criticism
designed to explain the logic of critical discourse. There is
no reason to suppose that a distinction which is pragmatically
justified by psychological investigations of aesthetic ex¬
perience, or by metaphysical inquiries into the nature of art,
is also useful for a logical study of critical argument. On
the contrary, I think that it can be shown that the distinction
is otiose and misleading when postulated within the context of
a study of critical assertion. Certain problems about the
reference of critical remarks whose resolution has been thought
to depend upon this distinction are, when clarified, more
readily solved without recourse to it. Further, theories that
assume the distinction give a false answer to the question of
what critical statements are about. For, as I shall try to
show, critical statements are neither about what philosophers
call 'physical objects', nor about what they call 'aesthetic
objects'; nor are some about one such thing and some about the
other. They are all about what are ordinarily called 'works
of art', and any analysis that does not take this fact into
account can hardly fail to yield a mistaken view of critical
discourse. It is therefore important to get rid of this
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distinction which engenders a misrepresentation of what it is
that critics write about.
This same dichotomy is to ba found in philosophical litera¬
ture where neither an analytical distinction required for psy¬
chological Inquiry nor the satisfaction of any special meta¬
physical Interest can account for It. In these cases it is
the statements made about works of art that give rise to the
problem which the distinction is invoked to resolve. This
problem of discovering what kind of entity the name of any
work of art designates is a purely theoretical one, having no
counterpart in critical practice. If in the course of ordi¬
nary conversation or of critical discussion someone speaks of
Hamlet, or of Haydn's London Symphony. or of De Latour's The
Prisoner, it rarely occurs to anyone to ask what is meant by
these names, to what these titles refer. Such a question
might be asked If, for example, it were uncertain whether a
critical comment on Hamlet referred to the production currently
running at the Old Vic or to the motion picture of several
years ago. But this practical problem of communication would
be resolved independently of the theoretical issue of whether
critical remarks are about physical objects or about aesthetic
objects. The philosophical question about the true identity
of Hamlet is not asked because there is a real difficulty in
understanding what a critic is talking about when on some par¬
ticular occasion he uses the name 'Hamlet', Philosophers ask
the question in order to discover what kind of thing is desig¬
nated whenever the name 'Hamlet' is used. Since the name is
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variously used to refer to a number of quite different kinds of
things, the philosopher's question is wrongly put, and his
attempts to answer it are attempts to locate a phantom,
The quest for the undiscovered Hamlet has its parallel in
the other arts, and reflects a state of mind ripe for the pro¬
duction of certain theories about the ontological status of
works of art to be encountered in a moment. The Haslet prob¬
lem, and the problem raised by questions about whether Haydn's
lO^th symphony is the musical notation printed in the score,
the movement of air columns, sounds heard, or the listener's
mental events, and whether De Latour's painting is just pig¬
ment on canvas or a visual construct made with its aid by the
eyes and brain of the spectator, can. be put to rest by showing
that if the problem were genuine our talk about these works
would not be understood, which it is. The proposed solution
is simple, merely recalling the reader's attention to what he
must suppose to be the case concerning the use of the terms in
question in order for talk about works of art to be intelli¬
gible. Its chief merit is that it shows certain sophisticated
metaphysical theories about the nature of works of art and
man's experience of them to be unnecessary and misleading, and
thus clears the way for an understanding of criticism.
The terms 'Hamlet', 'The Prisoner', 'Symphony 104'f and all
other names of works of art can, each of them, refer at
different times to any one of a number of different things or
events. To what exactly any such term refers In any instance
of its use is made clear by the context in which it appears.
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A review of a performance of Haydn's London Symphony by the
Hallef Orchestra would not leave the reader to wonder if the
revie*wer was discussing the Halle' Orchestra's performance, or
Beecham's recording of some year's ago, or Haydn's score, or
the reviewer's own experience on a certain occasion. If there
should be any doubt about what a writer is referring to when he
uses the name of a work of art, if, for instance, it is not
clear whether he is discussing a newly printed edition of
Hamlet or a certain stage presentation, this obscurity is not
attributable to any inherent difficulty about the identity of
Hamlet, but to the writer's failure to make clear what he is
talking about.
The lesson to be learned from this is that we need no
special ontological knowledge about works of art in order to
understand critical remarks. All that is required in this re¬
gard is that we know what particular thing or event the critic
is talking about, a condition which is almost always fulfilled.
We should be aware of theorists who attempt to interpose be¬
tween us and the work of art such fictional entities as make
more difficult than need be an understanding of critical
communication. Writers who invoke the physical object/aes-
thetic object dichotomy in order to resolve problems arising
from reflection upon our way of talking about works of art are
theorists of this kind. I shall first examine some of their
arguments, and then proceed to the work of the metaphysicians
and philosopher-psychologists,
The problem under review is not one raised by works of such
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doubtful value that their right to b© regarded as authentic
works of art remains problematic. This philosophical question
of what a work of art is cannot be answered by critical judge¬
ments. It Is not a question of what particular things have
sufficient aesthetic value to merit the honorific title 'work
of art'j nor is it even the more general question of what kind
of features anything must have in order to be classified as a
work of art. Two or more people might agree on the aesthetic
value of a certain work, and also agree on the set of criteria
by which such a work should be judged, and nevertheless dis¬
agree about what a work of art really is. Perfect critical
harmony is compatible with complete philosophical disagreement
about the kind of thing to which the term 'work of art' refers.
This same philosophical difference might be found amongst
people who were In accord concerning the kind of articles that
should be considered works of art. Even after It has been
agreed that cartoons, mobiles, furniture, fabrics, pottery, and
other border-line items should or, however excellent of their
kind certain specimens might be, should not be called works of
art, the philosophical problem will persist untouched. Since
solving it would be of no help in deciding which classes of
things are properly called 'art', nor which members have artis¬
tic value, it may fairly be asked how this problem came into
philosophical prominence, I shall answer briefly by stating
two perplexities which emerge after even a few moments reflec¬
tion upon our way of talking about works of art.
Works of art of some kinds exist as single items, others in
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numerous replicas which are in no important way distinguishable
from one another, Rembrandt's Christ at Baiaaus exists within
its frame at the Louvre, and Le Penseur on his pedestal at the
Rodin Gardens, Copies or reproductions of such works can be
made, and when the technique of mechanically reproducing them
has been sufficiently Improved, the replicas may, as Andrcf
Malraux predicts, come to be regarded from a purely aesthetic
point of view as quite as valuable as the originals. But at
the present time works of pictorial and plastic art are con¬
sidered, usually, to be most aesthetically valuable in their
unique and original form, and It is customary, indeed morally
and legally obligatory in most countries, to acknowledge a dis¬
tinction between them and the reproductions made of them. It
is, then, generally accepted that the names Christ at Emmaus
and Le Penseur are each rightfully applied to one object and
to one object only, and that they must be qualified when applied
to copies or reproductions of them.
The Identity of a poem, or of any published literary work,
cannot be fixed in the same way. Libraries abound with copies
Paradise Lost, and no one hesitates to denote by this title
a great variety of objects (printed editions) whose physical
characteristics (typographical, e.g.) vary from one another and
from the original manuscript. Although the prototype of all
of these copies can be traced by going back through a series of
editions to John Milton's manuscript, as all reproductions of
Rembrandt's painting can b© traced back to the canvas at the
Louvre, no one regards the original script of the poem as
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having other than museum value. The literary or aesthetic
value of the poem attaches equally to any accurately printed
text, In so far as it can b© said to attach to such a material
object at all. Some philosophers are very reluctant to admit
that the aesthetic value of Hilton's poetic conception is em¬
bodied in the words he put on paper In the same sense as the
value of Rembrandt's conception is embodied in pigment or
Rodin's in bronze. "No one," Benedetto Croee observes, "calls
the book which contains the Divine Comedy. or the score which
contains Don Giovanni. beautiful in the same sense in xvhich the
block of marble which contains Michael Angela's Hoses, or the
piece of coloured wood which contains the Transfiffuration. is
metaphorically called beautiful." Other philosophers do not
find in the distinction Croee makes here any difference of
philosophical significance, believing that the work of art
vrhich is valued, whether literary, musical, plastic or pictorial,
2
is something apart from its material embodiment. They agree,
however, that there is a problem concerning literature of jus¬
tifying the use of a single name to designate indiscriminately
any one of a multiplicity of similar objects. 'What or where
is the real Paradise Lost?' is the aesthetlclan's question.
It Is when we ask what we intend to refer to when we use the
name of a literary work that we realize most forcibly that the
objects to which we attribute aesthetic value are not the same
as the physical objects which we actually encounter on library
shelves.
The second perplexity emerges from reflection on music and
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the dramatic arts. A musical composition or a play can in
some sense or other exist in the mind of the composer or drama¬
tist, in a score or scenario, in a performance, or in the act
of perception and appreciation of a spectator. Which one of
these things or events is, really, the music or the play? To
which can such names as The Enigma Variations and Corlolanus
be properly applied?
Such are the perplexities that have inspired some contem¬
porary aesthetic views, for example those advanced by C. I,
Lewis in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation:
Consider, for example, what entity it is which
is termed 'Beethoven's Fifth Symphony'. A musical
composition is not a physical object: any particu¬
lar rendition of it is a physical entity of its
own complex sort; but between the rendition and the
thing itself, there is an obvious difference. The
rendition may not, and presumably will not, realize
exactly the musical Intention of the composer or
the esthetic possibilities represented by the com¬
position. And in the case of" a sonnet or other
product of the literary art, there is an even wider
gap between the thing itself and the apprehension
of it. Here we must ordinarily provide our own
rendition; and in so doing we may not only miss a
part of the intended meaning but inadvertently in¬
troduce certain grace-notes and variations of our
own. Also, that most complex of all esthetic
things, the drama, is in some of these respects
like music, and in others like poetry; but at
least it is clear that a drama cannot be identified
with any physical object.^
Lewis argues that it would be wrong to suppose that no
similar distinction between the aesthetic object and the physi¬
cal work Is required in the case of a painting, a cathedral,
or a piece of sculpture. It is not the painted canvas or the
hewn marble that is the object of aesthetic contemplation and
evaluation, but something which is common to this canvas or
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piece of marble and to the various reproductions that have been
or could be made of either. This "thing itself," the real
work of art, is distinct from the material object which in¬
corporates it.
It would seem that if a distinction between a musical com¬
position and any particular rendition of it is admitted, then
a similar distinction must in consistency be admitted between
an architectural design and its execution by craftsmen. Al¬
though Lewis does not develop this argument, his mention of
k
"a cathedral" at this point suggests he would accept it; and
the analogy between composition, score, performance and design,
drawing, construction would seem to be a fair one. But if
one goes this far, it would seem that in consistency one must
go even further and admit a comparable distinction between any
human conception or design and its material realization, for
example, between the engineer's plan for a bridge and the
structure made according to that plan. The engineer's idea
of how the bridge should be built, his drawings, and the com¬
pleted structure may all come in for criticism. The bridge
may have been well or poorly conceived, the drawings may or
may not convey the conception adequately, and the structure
may be characterized by good workmanship or by bad. It is im¬
portant to make clear whether one is talking about the engineer's
conception or hie workers" execution of it when saying, 'This
is a good (or bad) bridge'. But it would be very odd to say
that the statement, 'This bridge is very poorly constructed;
the workmanship is shoddy', was not really about the bridge
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Itself but about a rendition of it. And in certain cases it
would b© equally odd to say that a criticism of the design was
not really about the physical construction. Anyone saying,
♦This bridge Is too narrow for the traffic it must bear, and
too low for the shipping that must go under it1 may certainly
be speaking with direct reference to the physical structure (he
may even be standing on lt}# or with direct reference to any¬
one of a number of similar structures built according to the
design in question. Of course, he might also be speaking xfith
reference to the engineer's drawings, or with reference to a
plan presented by the engineer in conversation. But there is
no inherent reason why his statements could not be about the
physical construction and not about "an abstract entity here
embodied or approximated to."5 Although there is admittedly
room and sometimes need for a distinction between a plan and
the thing made according to it, it does not follow that the
thing cannot be the object of critical observation and judge¬
ment even when it is the value of the design that Is in ques¬
tion. The terras 'too low* and 'too narrow' may take the
bridge, the physical construction, as their referent just as
surely as the terms "poorly fitted* and 'insecurely rlvetted'.
Similarly, a composer's work may be criticized by reference
to a particular performance of it. That the composition may
be given many performances, each of them providing music
crities with an opportunity for appraising the composer's
talent, provides no grounds for saying that the critical
statements are not about the real composition but only about
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a rendition of it. The evaluation of a rendition requires a
judgement of an orchestra's performance comparable to the
judgement made of the bridge-builders' workmanship. But this
same rendition may be the object of a critical appreciation and
judgement of the composer's achievement, just as the completed
bridge was the object studied in the evaluation of the archi¬
tect's design. The accomplished critic might, of course, have
based his judgement upon a study of the score instead of upon
his hearing of the performance. But this possibility no more
gives grounds for saying that his remarks are about "an entity
which itself is abstract and ideal,"^ and not about what he
heard, than the possibility of appraising an architectural de¬
sign by a study of drawings gives grounds for saying that the
evaluation of the architect's work actually based upon an in¬
spection of the completed structure is not really about that
structure but about an "abstract entity."^
If a musical composition were neither what is written down
in musical notation nor what is played by musicians, no critic
could ever say anything about it. But it happens that a musi¬
cal composition just is the sort of thing that is written in
symbols of a certain type and performed on instruments of a
special kind. These are its modes of existence. Considered
as an object of critical judgement, it makes no sense to attri¬
bute to it some publicly inaccessible mode of being. To do so
is to remove in theory a condition of the objectivity of aes¬
thetic judgements which obtains in practice.
"A sonnetLewis claims, "cannot be identified with any
7h
physical individual. Not only is it one and the same thing
which we and our neighbor may read in different books, but
what is essential to the thing presented is not physically
there on the printed page, but only conveyed from one mind to
another by a pattern of physical symbols... Even the rhythm
and cadence of the language used, which lie within the aesthetic
phenomenon, are not presented to the eye but only associated
8
with what is physically present." And Harold Osborne has
recently written that "a very little thought even at the common-
Q s *
sense level"7 is enough to dispose of the naive view that a
work of art is a "material thing with specific qualities and
attributes - a statue as a piece of carved stone or wood with
the attribute of beauty, a picture as a piece of pigmented can¬
vas, and so on."10 He points out that there is no material
object which corresponds to a work of literary or musical art:
A poem Is a specific set of words, which need not
even become audible for the poem to be appreciated.
A musical work is a set of musical sounds", which
may be recorded on paper or on a gramophone disc,
actualized by performance or merely imagined in
memory. Musical and literary works of art are often
recorded in a physical medium, but the physical re¬
cording is never identical with the work of art.
There may be many thousands of printed copies of
the same poem, but the excellence of the poem Is
the same whether they are well or badly printed.
There may be many printed scores and many gramo¬
phone records of the same musical composition, but
the musical composition is something different
from any one of them. Nor should we try to define
a work of art as the class of all recordings which
ar8 commonly called recording of that work of art.
Por a recording is always a recording of something
which exists independently of all its recordings
and prior to most of them."11
I am unable to imagine what it would be like to find a
poem, "a specific set of words," which existed independently
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of any recording in a physical medium «— taking spoken words
as one instance of such 'recording1. Agreeing that poems
can exist in the minds of poets, or in the memories of other
persons, it is not there that we ever find them. A musical
composition that has its being independently of a score, a
performance 'live' or recorded, or of anyone's memory is an
equally elusive phantom, "It is like the score of music
rather than the rendition," Lewis says of the poem. "Yet
this poem is actual," he admits, "as against those as yet un¬
dreamt of, solely by the fact that this language-pattern has
12
its concrete and physically occurrent instances." Is this
"concrete and physically occurrent language pattern', this
which is printed here in the book, not the 'actual' poem, the
actual thing which becomes the object of critical judgement?
If the poems and musical compositions in the embodiments
in which they are always encountered are not identical with
the ttfork of art, but something different from it, what, exact¬
ly, is this work of art that maintains its independence of all
its physical manifestations? It is, Osborne decrees, "an en-
13
during possibility of a specific set of perceptions." But
if there is to be "a specific set of perceptions," there must
be something to perceive. And it is just those things that
Osborne has rejected as being "something different" from the
work of art that are perceived. It is incomprehensible how,
on this line of reasoning, a work of art ever could be per¬
ceived.
But of course it is not really the work of art that is
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perceived, according to Osborne. What is perceived are the
words printed in a book or the sounds of music. And the work
of art is neither of these, nor, changing his mind within the
space of a single paragraph, is it the "enduring possibility
of a specific set of perceptions"; rather it is "a charac-
1^
teristlc set of sense-perceptions."
This reasoning strikes me as being most unsound, and
Osborne's speculations become even more dangerous as he pro¬
ceeds. Before following him further, the problem raised by
the ubiquity of certain works of art should be settled.
First, the fact that a number of nearly identical things
are each denoted by the same name and the totality of them by
the same name is by no means a peculiarity of art. I have
just now read a book review in which the writer discusses Ivy
Compton-Burnett's novel, Mother and Son. In the same magazine,
a writer of advertising copy speaks in praise of the 1955
Packard Clipper, Although both writers speak of their sub¬
ject in the singular, I am sufficiently aware of the habits of
publishers and automobile manufacturers to realize that there
is more than one volume stamped Mother and Son .and more than
one automobile bearing the name 'Packard Clipper'. How many
there are of either, or just which specimens the writers had
in mind, would not be information at all helpful for under¬
standing what they have to say. If someone read that the
English pound sterling was worth two dollars and eighty cents,
it would be stupid of him to inquire which note, exactly, was
worth that amount, and equally stupid of him to ask the
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publican who demands a shilling for a glass of ale which
shilling piece he would like. It so happens that the fortunes
of all English pound notes are decided together at the money
exchange, and each one is of the same value as every other one.
For certain purposes, for most purposes, it makes no difference
which one of the hundreds of thousands of shilling pieces in
circulation is used. Similarly, whatever copy of Mother and
Son the reviewer used would have the same value as any other
copy, and for the purposes of the review it makes not the
slightest difference which copy he read. The existence of
numerous copies of a literary work, therefore, constitutes no
difficulty for the practitioner or reader of literary criti¬
cism, and no difficulty about the reference of its name. It
just happens, as it does with cars and currency, that the same
name and the same statements apply with equal felicity to a
great number of almost identioal objects.
This discussion may sound so trifling that the Importance
of the point I am trying to make will be slighted. The point
is this. The fact that there are many copies of a literary
work, and that it is a matter of indifference which is used
for the purpose of evaluation, has been taken as grounds for
arguing that the value of the work cannot attach to any of th©
copies, and that therefore none of the copies, nor all of them
together, can be called the work of art. The same facts
might have been taken, as I have taken them, as showing that
the value attaches equally and Impartially to everyone of the
copies, and that any one of them, therefore, may properly be
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designated as the work of art, The chief merit of my conten¬
tion is that it certifies a® the work of art the very thing
that a critic perceives and experiences and writes about, The
chief defect of the counterargument, of one such as Osborne's,
is that it falls to do this, Rightly insisting that if a
thing is a copy, it must be a copy something, Osborne is un¬
able to say of what a printed poem or novel is a copy, because
he will not deal In such trifling commodities as authors%
manuscripts and proof sheets, 1 am quit© willing to engage
in such low commerce in order to avoid substituting a phantom
for a fact. Once printed books are resigned to limbo, and
the true work of art situated in the insubstantial sense-
perceptions of individual minds, difficulties of great magni¬
tude for a theory of criticism are abroad,
Osborne's error is a tenacious one, enjoyed in oosmnon by
philosophers who find little els© to share. Raving distin¬
guished the 'real* work of art from any object which would
ordinarily be called a work of art, Osborne moves with the
metaphysicians and philosopher-psychologists straight to the
view that works of art dwell in a mental realm, "It Is not
the material object of paint and canvas which is beautiful,"
he says, "but the set of visual impressions to which it gives
rise under suitable conditions,"3*-* Refusing to acknowledge
the reference of critical remarks as they are given, h© camps
on the fertile ground of subjectivism with Croce and
Collingwood, with Richards and Pepper, Leon, Aberorombie,
Dewey, and with many other philosophers who construe the work
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of art as a construction of the percipient's imagination. Be¬
fore examining some of their theories, the remainder of the
argument offered by Osborne in support of the position may be
consideredi
The recording is not the work of art and we do
not ascribe beauty to the material recording...
When we speak of a work of art we refer, then to
an enduring possibility of a specific set of per¬
ceptions. We say that the work of art is
actualized when somebody reads the poem ade¬
quately or when the piece of music is adequately
performed to a competent audience. And as we do
not ascribe beauty to the recording, so we cannot
without doing violence to the language ascribe
beauty to any of the immediate physical ante¬
cedents of the set of aural impressions which
occurs when a piece of music is actualized. We
do not ascribe beauty to the bodily movements of
the orchestra, to the resultant sound waves, to
the titillation of the aural mechanism or to the
consequent cerebral excitation. Por the purposes
of criticism and aesthetics, at any rate, the
work of art must be identified only with a charac¬
teristic set of sense-perceptions, and to this
only beauty must be ascribed.1®
The conclusion is that the work of art is to be identified
with "a characteristic set of sense-perceptions," but not with
"sound waves," "the titillation of the aural mechanism," or
"the consequent cerebral excitation." Osborne is right, I
think, about what he denies; but I doubt the truth of what he
asserts. To what, in fact, is beauty usually ascribed by the
critic who speaks admiringly of Vaughan William's Pastoral
Symphony? It is ascribed to the music; and the terms "music,"
"the work of art," and the name "Pastoral Symphony" all denote
the same thing, namely what is heard. What is heard is ad¬
mittedly not sound waves or aural titillation or cerebral ex¬
citation - the antecedent, casual events of the experience of
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hearing. But neither is "a characteristic set of sense-per¬
ceptions" what is heard; and therefore "a characteristic set of
sense-perceptions" is no more identical with the music or the
work of art or Pastoral Symphony than is "the bodily movements
of the orchestra,8 "the resultant sound waves," "the titina¬
tion of the aural mechanism," or "the consequent cerebral ex¬
citation."
Osborne says that "The recording is not the work of art
and we do not ascribe beauty to the material recording," and
his notion of "material recording" Includes the composer's
score, the orchestra's performance, and the listener's memory
of the music he has heard. Then he asserts: "When we speak
of a work of art we refer, then, to an enduring possibility of
a specific set of perceptionsBut surely this statement
misrepresents what we do refer to when we speak of a work of
art. To what is Neville Cardus referring when speaking of
Sibelius's Seventh Symphony?
Four movements may clearly be discerned in
Sibelius's Number Seven: first a slow adagio
ending with the repetition of the ascending
scale-passage that begins the work; then we have
a bridge passage, with palpable sequences for
oboes and clarinets; this transition changes to
six-four time, and now the symphony goes into
its scherzo, which broadens to an allegro with
the accented notes of the one unmistakably lyri¬
cal melody of the work. The fourth movement is
heralded by strenuous imitative figures which re¬
call the race into the finale of the Second
Symphony...
These statements apply equally well to any published score
of Sibelius's Seventh Symphony or to any performance of it.
Cardus may have had one of these scores before him as he wrote,
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or he may have had some particular performance that he had
heard in mind. Sens© perceptions of some kind, obtained by
looking at a score or listening to an orchestra, were a
necessary condition of Ms making these remarks. But he is
not referring to these sense perceptions; rather he is making
use of them In order to refer to what they are perceptions of.
Nor is he referring to "an enduring possibility of a specific
set of perceptions" which is neither score nor performance but
a theorist's invention whioh no critic ever actually encounters.
It must be recognized that critical remarks refer to a public,
observable object or event and not to the sense perceptions
which are a condition of such assertions being made.
In addition to the fact that the name of a literary work of
art can apply to any one of numerous, somewhat different ob¬
jects, and that the name of a theatrical or musical work can
apply to either scenario or score or to a performance, there is
the perplexing consideration that as an experienced object the
same work of art may differ from one percipient to another.
Making due allowance for the accidents which befall works of
art, the beheading and dismemberment of statues, the fading and
cracking of canvasses, the atrocities committed by freebooting
editors, the transcription of old music for new ensembles, and
so on, one may say that as physical structures works of art
present throughout certainlelatively lengthy periods of their
careers the same face to all men. Considered independently of
the idiosyncrasies of individual spectators, a work of art may
be said to possess in its own right certain objective physical
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characteristics which do not depend upon any contribution
from the percipient* The difficulty is to see how a work of
art could be considered independently of th© idiosyncrasies
of any spectator. In order to become an object of considera¬
tion, of discussion, appreciation, or criticism, a work of art
must be experienced. It therefore becomes an object of some
Individual's experience. Since the nature of this thing as
experienced depends not only upon the properties of the work
just mentioned but also upon the sensibility, technical skill,
background, knowledge, mood, and countless other psychological,
cultural, and physiological characteristics of the percipient,
it cannot be supposed that one person's object-as-experienced
is the same as another's, This consideration is the most
serious of the three. It poses the question of what the work
really is by putting the choice between this physical object
hanging on the wall and this thing which has its being in some
person's perceptual experience. Contemporary philosophers
have been almost unanimous in identifying the work of art with
the second of these.
I may hazard an explanation of how aestheticlans have thus
managed to confuse the work of art with what occurs in the
minds of those who experience it. Although the aesthetic ex¬
periences presupposed in making critical judgements of works
of art are a complicated phenomenon which Is not well under¬
stood, most readers will, I think, let the following general
remarks on the critic's qualifications pass unchallenged. The
expert critic presumably has an acute sensitivity, native or
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developed or both, to works of art, which is not possessed in
the same measure by all men. This is not to deny, of course,
that there may b© many connoisseurs who are not professional
critics. It is only to say that the professional critic of
deserved reputation has a talent for discerning aesthetic
values which is at least as specific as the physician's gift
for discriminating amongst diseases. The expert critic also
has wider than common experience in the field of art within
which he professes to make dependable judgements. Granted
these qualifications, the professional critic may be expected
to recognise aesthetic values in objects which would be un¬
appreciated by persons lacking his sensibility, training, and
experience.
One might say, speaking loosely of such cases, that the
critic discovered a work of art where unqualified persons saw
none. And then one might say, speaking even more loosely,
that it is the imaginative power of the critic which has
brought this unvalued object to life as a work of art, both
for himself and for his readers to whom he interprets the
work. This sort of loose talk finally end.s in the conviction
that works of art really only exist as the imaginative pro¬
ductions of spectators who have responded appropriately to phy¬
sical objects which, apart from any such response, are not
really works of art at all. It is forgotten that in order to
have any sort of acquaintance with any object, and to say any¬
thing about it, one must have some experience of it. "For
art-," writes Lascelles Abercromble, who rejects the notion
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that works of art are "invariable objects," "and for aesthe¬
tics generally - objects do not exist, but only experiences!
xs
at least objects only exist as occasions of experience,"
'For science', one might say, 'natural objects only exist as
occasions of experience', meaning that the scientist can talk
only about ifhat he encounters in experience. But it would be
strange to conclude from this that natural objects do not exist.
However, many philosophers who would not say that a statement
affirming that an object is red is really about an object
brought into being by the perceiver and not about something
existing independently of him are nevertheless committed to
saying that a critical statement attributing a so-called value
feature to a work of art is about an object produced by the
spectator's imaginative activity, or even about the spectator's
experience, and not about something existing independently of
him. For example, John Dewey writes that "The real work of
art is the building up of an integral experience out of the in¬
teractions of organic and environmental conditions and ener¬
gies,"^ laying the ontological basis for the view that criti¬
cal remarks are about experiences and not about what are or¬
dinarily called 'works of art'. "It has been repeatedly in¬
timated," says Dewey, "that there is a difference between the
art product (statue, painting, or whatever), and the work of
art. The first is physical and potential; the latter is
20
active and experienced."
More is contained in such utterances than the laying down
of a linguistic convention for the use of the term 'work of
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art1. A metaphysical claim is being made concerning the na¬
ture of the entity that critical remarks are about. Ad¬
mission of the claim would have consequences of supreme impor¬
tance for theory of criticism; for it would be tantamount to
admitting that critical statements, unlike the statements made
about things other than art, are not about objects. To the
extent that this peculiarity of critical remarks is supposed
to derive from the highly specialized character of the ex¬
periences required for making them, it is easily seen to be
illusory.
However many people there may be who are incapable of the
experience necessary for judging the value of a work of art,
their incompetence no more implies that the expert critic
creates the valuable object than does the inadequacy of colour
blind people imply that the reliable observer creates the
coloured object. When there is no experience of the kind
generally called aesthetic, there will be no recognition of
the aesthetic value of the object. But there Is no reason
to suppose that when there is recognition of the aesthetic
value of an object, that this valued object, the work of art,
must be something apart from, and. in addition to, that same ob¬
ject which might have gone unvalued. Objects in the world of
art, as In the world of nature, are experienced, and some of
these are valuable. But no new objects are produced by the
experience in question. It is remarkable that the multipli¬
cation of entitles beyond necessity in aesthetic theory has
escaped Oakham1s razor for so long. When it is applied, the
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aesthetic object {the work of art) does not survive in isola¬
tion from the physical object (the thing that the artist has
made). Since my own parsimonious view of what a work of art
is cannot recommend itself on grounds of popularity, some
further arguments for the generous notion that each work of
art is really two objects will have to be considered.
Taking the high road of speculative philosophy Benedetto
Croce also arrived at the place where the physical object and
the aesthetic object part company:
Aesthetic activity, distinct from the practical
activity Is always accompanied by it in its mani¬
festations. Hence, its utilitarian or hedonistic
side, and the pleasure and the pain which are, as
it were, the practical echo of aesthetic value and
disvalue, of the beautiful and the ugly. But phis
practical side of the aesthetic activity has in its
turn a physical or psychophysical accompaniment,
which consists of sounds, tones, movements, combina¬
tions of lines and colours, and so on.
Does it really possess this side, or does it only
seem to possess it, through the construction which
we put on it in physical science, and the useful
and the arbitrary methods which we have already
several times set in relief as proper to the empiri¬
cal and abstract sciences? Our" reply cannot be
doubtful, that is, it must affirm to the second of
the two hypotheses.21
Criticism is concerned with the aesthetic value of physical
objects or ©vents called 'works of art'. Croce's theory can
have no bearing upon this enterprise. His theory has to do
with 'aesthetic activity', with imagination, and -with distin¬
guishing this from certain other categories of human (spiritual)
activity. His aesthetic theory is essentially indifferent to
painted canvasses, written books, played music, and the like:
The complete process of aesthetic production can
be symbolized in four stages, which are: a, im¬
pressions j b, expression or spiritual aesthetic
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synthesis; c, hedonistic accompaniment, or
pleasure of the beautiful (aesthetic pleasure);
d, translation of the aesthetic fact Into physi¬
cal phenomena (sounds, tones, movements combina¬
tions of lines and colours, etc.). Any one can
see that the capital point, the only one that is
properly speaking aesthetic and truly real, is
in b, which is lacking to the merely naturalistic
manifestation or construction also metaphorically
called expression.22
Surely "any one can see" that what comes under 'b' is of
no more importance than what cones under 'a', 'c', and '&' for
a theory which attempts to deal with "the complete process of
aesthetic production." But Croce is not really Interested in
aesthetic production understood as the creation of works of
art; he is concerned to give "aesthetic activity" a place in
his system and to show its relation to the other categories or
modes of spiritual activity. indifference to "sounds, tones,
movements, combinations of lines and etc." disqualifies his
theory for illuminating criticism which is concerned with just
such phenomena.
For Croce, art is intuition, and "Every true Intuition or
representation is also expression."^ The term 'expression'
is used in two senses: to designate the inner activity of in¬
tuition, and, occasionally, in accordance with ordinary usage,
to refer to setting forth one's artistic conceptions in sym¬
bols for the purpose of communication. 'Expression* connotes
not only verbal expression but also expression In line, colour,
tone* etc. as well; it does not usually carry the implication
that any word need be spoken or written, any line dram, or
any sound produced; all that is required to certify the
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presence of an intuition is that it be expressible externally.
The externalization of an intuition is for the purpose of re¬
cording it, of communicating it. Though Croce wishes to mini
mize the importance of this externalization and of the tech¬
nique involved in communication, he nevertheless makes such
externalization the test of the value of the intuition.
Leonardo, he says, possessed the Last Supper intuitively be¬
fore he began to paint.But to a person who claims the in¬
tuition of a masterpiece, Croce says, "here is a pencil, draw,
2*5
express yourself.8 J If art, intuition, expression, is an
inner spiritual activity, how can such a test of the value of
the intuition be decisive? And if it can in this case be de¬
cisive, then it must also be decisive in the case of Leonardo.
What, then, justifies the dismissal of technique as an in¬
tegral part of artistic creation? When technique and its
products have been dismissed, nothing remains for criticism to
work with.
In the externalization of his aesthetic vision, according
to Croce, the artist moves within the sphere of the practical.
The production of physical beauty (paintings, statues, and the
like) for the purpose of preserving or communicating an in¬
tuition is regarded by Croce as an activity distinct from aes¬
thetic activity per se. Technique is therefore considered to
relate to the externalization of the work of art, not to its
creation (its expression or intuition). A technique of ac¬
tual artistic creation (intuition, expression) is unthinkable,
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since aesthetic activity "is a primary theoretic activity,"
antecedent to any knowledge which might be of service to the
practice of art. But if one's Interest in aesthetics is an
interest in art, and not, as with Croce, an interest in con¬
structing a speculum mentis, he will be concerned mainly with
this process of externallzation.
The futility of this distinction between the Internal work
of art (intuition) and its external!nation is manifest xthen
Croce considers the relation of aesthetic activity and morality.
Art qua art (i.e. qua Croce's understanding of it) is
Immune to judgements of utility or morality; but the physical
work of art is subject to such judgements, since its production
Involves an act of will. But the moral judgements of an
artist's inner conceptions do not constitute a problem, since
such judgements are Impossible, the conception not being avail¬
able for inspection. Admittedly, attempts have been made to
exercise thought control; but a person's thoughts cannot be
judged unless they are expressed by words, gestures, facial
expressions, actions, or in some similar, external way. Simi¬
larly, an artistic conception must be externalized before it
can be judged. Therefore, art, in the only form in which it
can be made available for inspection and judgement, is yielded
by Groce to judgements of utility and morality. Maintaining
in theory the existence of pure aesthetic activity, Groce has
nonetheless excluded the possibility of an aesthetic judgement.
For as soon as aesthetic activity produces something for criti¬
cal inspection and judgement, that thing becomes the object of
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moral judgement:
Finally, it Is only from the point of view of
a clear and rigorous distinction bettireen the
true and proper aesthetic activity and the prac¬
tical activity of externallzation that we can
solve the complicated and confused questions as
to the relations between art and utility and art
and morality. ~ *
We have demonstrated above that art as art is in¬
dependent both of utility and of morality, as also
of all practical value. Without this independence,
it would not be possible to speak of an intrinsic
value of art, nor indeed to conceive an aesthetic
science, which demands the autonomy of the aes¬
thetic fact as its necessary condition.
But it would be erroneous to maintain that this
independence of the vision or Intuition or Inter¬
nal expression of the artist should be 3imply ex¬
tended to the practical activity of externaliza-
tion and communication which may or may not
follow the aesthetic fact. If by art be under¬
stood the externalizatlon of art, then utility
and morality have a perfect right to enter into
it; that is to sajj, the right to be master in
one's own house. '
Having construed the physical work of art as a stimulus
O A
for the reproduction of the original intuition, and the aes¬
thetic work of art as a kind of mental event, Croce is faced
with the plain fact that the referent of critical terms is a
material work of art and not an inner experience. He counters
the difficulty by alleging that critical usage Is elliptical:
Monuments of art, the stimulants of aesthetic
reproduction, are called beautiful things or
physical beauty. This combination of words con¬
stitutes a verbal paradox, for the beautiful Is
not a physical fact; it does not belong to things,
but to the activity of man, to spiritual energy.
But it is now clear through what transferences
and associations, physical things and facts
which are simply aids to the reproduction of the
beautiful are finally called elliptically beauti¬
ful things and physical beauty. And now that we
have explained this elliptical usage, we shall
ourselves employ it without hesitation,'
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I do not find this argument persuasive. In order to de¬
fend his distinction, Croee pretends to expose an error in¬
herent in the customary way of talking about works of art.
The fact that he Is then content to go on talking about them
In the same old way arouses suspicion. When Croce tries to
deal with the problem of critical judgement, doubts about the
legitimacy of his distinction become conviction that It is un¬
tenable, For after having disparaged the physical work of
art as an unessential appendage to the aesthetic one, he is
forced to recognize it as absolutely essential to the critical
process. He construes it as merely a stimulus to the re¬
production of the genuine aesthetic work of art. If he meant
by this only that an aesthetic experience presupposes the re¬
ception of some kind of physical stimuli, and that a critical
judgement presupposes an aesthetic experience, there could be
no objection. But he means a good deal more than this. He
means that the critic is concerned with two objects, a physi¬
cal or material one and an aesthetic or mental one, and that
it is the latter which is judged. If he is right about this,
then he ought to be able to provide an intelligible account of
the critical process which is consistent with the distinction
he has put forward. M that, I think, he has failed to do.
When the entire aesthetic and externalizing pro¬
cess has been completed, when a beautiful ex¬
pression has been produced and it has been fixed
in a definite physical material, what Is meant by
.Iud^lrLP: it? To reproduce it in oneself, answer
the critics of art, almost with one voice.30
One must ask what Groce means by "it" here. If "it" is
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the thing made by the artist, it will, on this view, be judged
by a moralist, not by an art critic. And if "it" is not what
was made by the artist, the critic's remarks will be of doubt¬
ful relevance. However, we may momentarily concede for the
sake of argument Croce's view that what is to be judged is
the intuition (the internal expression), the physical work
serving merely as a stimulus to reproduction. He says: "that
the activity of judgement which criticizes and recognizes the
beautiful is Identical with what produces it. The only
difference lies In the diversity of circumstances, since in
the one case it is a question of aesthetic production, in the
other of reproduction. The activity which judges is called
taste; the productive activity is called genius: genius and
taste are therefore substantially Identical.
This view appears to identify critical activity with
having an aesthetic experience, and reduces criticism to the
pronouncement, 'It's beautiful (i.e. expressive)', or the re¬
verse, supported by an autobiographical report. But surely
the aesthetic experience is the presupposition of critical
work, and (when It occurs) is followed by analysis of the
'physical' work of art. Can it be supposed that a contem¬
porary criticism of, say, a Shakespearian play or a Bach
cantata depends upon the critic's reproducing the creative ac¬
tivity of Shakespeare or of Bach? How would the critic know
he had succeeded in doing so? Because he found the play or
the music beautiful? But that is what he wanted to deter¬
mine. It seems that according to Croce, If the critical
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activity of reproduction Is a success, then the work of art
must be also. For if the work Is a failure, is not expressive,
then the critic will surely fall to reproduce what has not in
the first place been produced. From this it follows that all
bona fide critical judgements must be favourable. If the
critic should ever encounter a work of art that was not
'beautiful* ('expressive'}, he would be deprived of the ex¬
perience which Groce identifies with judging, A theory that
renders adverse critical judgements unaccountable renders it¬
self unacceptable.
Like Croce, whom he greatly admired, R. G, Collingwood de¬
veloped his aesthetic theory in the belief that the question,
'What is art?' could be answered by showing how artists create
works of art.^ By 'artistic creation' Collingwood does not
mean, any more than does Croce, the actual painting of can¬
vasses or the actual writing of books, but some far more
mysterious mental or spiritual activity which is said to pre¬
cede the handling of the artist's materials,33 This meta¬
physical conception of what a work of art 'is* would not, of
course, be of any assistance to a critic who had to decide,
for Instance, whether a canvas submitted to an exhibition was
a work of art or not, much less whether it was a good work or
a bad one. Nor does Collingwood's theory of how works of art
are created in the mind of the artist illuminate critical dis¬
cussions of artistic composition which are always expressed in
terms of technique, in terms of how certain materials are
fashioned, in terms of the relations of notes or of tones, and
9k
the like. This indifference to the physical structure of
works of art leads Collingwood, as it did Croce, to the view
that the term 'work of art' is properly applied not to physi¬
cal objects such as painted canvasses but to mental events.
The misunderstanding underlying Collingwood's divorcement of
the aesthetic object (the work of art as experienced) and the
physical object (the painted canvas or sculpted stone) becomes
apparent as soon as one considers the actual sequence of in¬
tellectual events as they occur within the critical process.
The term 'work of art' is assigned to a thing because it
is observed to be a thing of a certain kind, not because it
is discovered that an activity of a certain kind was respon¬
sible for its production. A theory of artistic creation is
no more necessary or helpful in deciding whether a given thing
is or is not a work of art than a theory of automotive design
is necessary or helpful in deciding whether a given thing is
or is not an automobile. A critic would take a statue or a
concerto or, in general, a work of art as evidence that ac¬
tivity of a certain kind, sculpting, composition or, in
general, artistic creation had occurred. He would not need
to produce an aesthetic object by reduplicating the creative
activity of the artist in order to discover that there was a
work of art in the vicinity. The work of art is already
there, and would have to be there, before the kind of aesthe¬
tic experience Croce and Collingwood describe could occur.
It is not true to say that by beginning and remaining with
creative activity Croce and Collingwood put the cart before
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the horse. They abandon the horse altogether. Since what
they discount as mere physical objects are what critics refer
to as works of art, they show themselves to be poorly po¬
sitioned for answering the fundamental question of what criti¬
cal statements are about.
Colllngwood argues that since a work of art is produced by
the imagination of the artist, the work must be an imaginary
object, not a real one. "If the making of a tune is an in¬
stance of imaginative creation," he writes, "a tune is an
imaginary thing. And the same applies to a poem or a paln-
"ih,
ting or any other work of art."-' The complexity of
Collingwood's theory does not disguise the logical point that
his separation of the work of art from "a bodily or percep¬
tible thing, ... a painted canvas, a carved stone, a written
paper, and so forth,and his identification of it with the
36
"activity of the artist,"-' is based upon a case of process-
product ambiguity.
The mistake is inspired by the somewhat common-place
thought that when an artistic conception is embodied in some
publicly accessible work, that i?ork will fall to convey what
the artist had in mind to anyone incapable of interpreting the
work. This is no surprising circumstance that puts criticism
in a peculiar positlonj whatever is to be written about re¬
quires to be experienced with comprehension; but the compre¬
hension does not, as Colllngwood thinks, manufacture the en¬
tity concerned:
The artist as magician or purveyor of amusement
is necessarily a craftsman making real things,
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and making them out of some material according
to some plan. His works are as real as the
works of an engineer, and for the same reason.
But it does not at all follow that the same is
true of an artist proper. His business is not
to produce an emotional effect in an audience,
but, for example, to make a tune. This tune is
already complete and perfect when it exists
merely as a tune in his head, that is, an imagi¬
nary tune. Next, he may arrange for the tune to
be played before an audience. Now there comes
into existence a real tune, a collection of
noises. But which of these two things is the
work of art? Which of them is the music? The
answer is implied in what we have already said:
the music, the work of art, is not the collec¬
tion of noises, it is the tune in the composer's
head. The noises made by the performers, and
heard by the audience, are not the music at all;
they are only means by xtfhich the audience, if
they listen intelligently (not otherwise), can
reconstruct for themselves the imaginary tune
that existed in the composer's head.37
There is a difference between hearing music and imagining
that one is hearing music for which this theory makes no
allowance. There is something so odd about saying that what
a man at a concert hears is noise and what he imagines is
music that one must find it difficult to admit Collingwood's
view of what a work of art is. This is just as well; for
no one could consistently hold both that works of art exist
sporadically in the imaginations of individual subjects and
that critical statements are objective; for the second claim
implies, for one thing, that they are about objects accessi¬
ble to everyone who may wish to test the correctness of such
statements,
There is more than one way to consider a work of art. A
critic's business is to judge it, and he considers it from the
point of view of an interest in its aesthetic value. Another
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man may have to pack it, move It, Install It in a church, or
examine it for finger prints, and he therefore takes the same
kind of interest in it as he would take in an object which no
one would call a work of art and which he had to deal with in
one of these ways. What we have here are two ways of looking
at an object, not two objects. This is the simple point that
I have been trying to make,-*® It is one that may easily have
been lost sight of in following the tortuous windings of
theories that are based upon forgetting it. Of the numerous
eminent philosophers of recent years who have advocated the
physical object/aesthetic object dichotomy, Stephen C. Pepper,
by stating the position in its simplest form in Principles of
Art Appreciation, most clearly betrays the confusion out of
which the distinction has arisen:
What the spectator perceives is not canvas and
pigments but colors and shapes and a highly com¬
posed representation of a woman and her two
children. The latter is the object of his per¬
ception. This object, which is the actual object
of his contemplation, and which he wishes to
understand and appreciate fully, we shall call
the aesthetic work of art.
The aesthetic work of art is, as we have said,
the direct object of his perception. The physi¬
cal work of art is not literally the object of
his perception. But it is very important for
his perceptions, because it is what guides the
spectator in determining what is relevant to his
perceptions.39
It is not difficult to see how Pepper, who is conscientious¬
ly concerned to help people appreciate works which an Inade¬
quate knowledge of the structure of visual art has prevented
them from appreciating, is led to this view. That a particu¬
lar work of art considered as pigment adhering to canvas can
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be for one person a source of exquisite pleasure and for
another an object without significance is for Pepper a dis¬
concerting fact to be explained and altered. As a person of
sensitivity, with catholic taste and considerable technical
knowledge of visual art, Pepper supposes that the Renoir he
appreciates must be a different object from the Renoir that
another person observes without interest, appreciation, or
comprehension. But clearly the object at which Pepper and
the other man look are one and the same. The distinction to
be drawn is not one between an aesthetic object and a physical
object, but one between Pepper's sensitivity, catholicity, and
knowledge and the other man's insensitlvity, narrowness of
taste, and ignorance of technique. And it is upon this
latter assumption that Pepper proceeds throughout the remain¬
der of his book, no further use being made of the physical
object/aesthetic object distinction, the author's concern
being quite properly and exclusively to supply the reader with
the knowledge he requires in order to appreoiate works of
visual art.
The invention of a bogus entity does not damage Pepper's
book, for the usefulness of his instruction does not depend
upon the validity of the distinction in question. However,
the theories of the other philosophers discussed in this chap¬
ter, as well as those of Samuel Alexander, Dewitt Parker,
Bosanquet, and a host of others, do depend upon the legitimacy
of the physical object/aesthetic object dichotomy. Their in¬
sistence upon it has radical implications for theory of
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criticism, for it determines their answer to the fundamental
question of what critical remarks are about. By having
accepted this distinction between the physical object and the
aesthetic object, they are committed to the consequent dis¬
tinction between the physical features and the value features
of works of art. However the so-called physical object and
the so-called aesthetic object are conceived, and the relation
between them construed, it follows from the view that each
work of art as experienced constitutes two objects that each
work of art is also constituted of two kinds of features.
Quite simply, the physical features belong to the physical
work of art, i.e. to a material object constructed by the ar¬
tist, and the value features to that which exists only in the
awareness of a perceiving individual. The physical features
are the so-called objective properties of the material work of
art: the pigment, stone, or printer's ink, etc.: and the value
features are the subjective properties of the percipient's
experience: form, balance, rhythm, harmony, etc. This dis¬
tinction between kinds of features provides the ground for
that distinction between two kinds of critical terras from whioh
the problem of explaining how aesthetic evaluations can be
logically justified issues in an insoluble form. In the in¬
terests of solving this problem of logical justification, use
of the physical feature/aesthetic feature distinction in
critical theory should be discouraged. A brief consideration
of the implications of the distinction may convince the reader
that he gives up nothing but a nuisance when he discards it.
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To recapitulate: by 'value features' may be meant features
of a mental object Imaginatively produced during an aesthetic
experience which do not actually belong to the palpable object
made (written, painted, chiseled) by the artist, nor to any
copy of such an object, nor to any performance given in accor¬
dance with the artist's instructions. Unlike Leon,^ who
calls the physical object the 'work of art' and, in contrast,
that which the spectator imagines the 'aesthetic object', most
philosophers withhold the term 'work of art' from the object
produced by the artist, using it synonomously with 'aesthetic
object', The difference between these writers is merely
verbal; they are agreed on the cardinal point that in any case
of a work of art being perceived, there are two kinds of fea¬
tures, each one of which is the property of two distinct ob¬
jects or events. The physical features, as I have already
said, are those which belong to an object or event which
exists or occurs independently of the percipient, and the
value features are those which characterize an object or event
constructed in the mind of the percipient. Or, if one holds
that all material objects, in so far as there is awareness of
them, are constructed by the mind of the percipient, then the
physical features will b© said to belong to an object of con¬
sciousness which is perceived as any non-aesthetic object
might be perceived, and the value features to yet another ob¬
ject of consciousness constructed by the percipient's imagina¬
tion out of the material supplied by the first. This view
implies two alternative conceptions of the nature of works of
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art and of their creation. If the view is correct, either it
must be supposed that the artist constructs an evaluatively
neutral object which the spectator must endow with value. Or
it must be supposed that the artist constructs an object
possessed solely of physical features fashioned in such a way
that they will ensure that certain value features will charac¬
terize a competent spectator^ experience,
The first conception is, I am sure, demonstrably false,
although it is not hard to see how it could arise. Between
the relatively simple act of perception that underlies the
recognition that this part of a painting consists of blue pig¬
ment on canvas and this other part of orange, and the more so¬
phisticated act of understanding why these two patches of
colour have been so placed, there is a difference which dis¬
tinguishes the act of simply looking at a painting and
noticing certain obvious sensible features and the activity
of appreciating the painting aesthetically. The fact that
certain persons can look at a painting and identify patches of
orange and blue colour without understanding the artistic prin¬
ciples of organization that determined their inclusion and
relative placement, i.e. without appreciating their function
within the composition, leads to the view that the blue and
orange pigment belongs to the physical or material work of art
and the values of colour contrast and harmony to the mental re¬
construction of the physical work by a competent spectator.
Thus anyone who accepts the physical feature/value feature di¬
chotomy without accepting the second of the alternative
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implications mentioned above is committed to holding that a
painter applies colours to his canvas capriciously and in¬
discriminately , without regard to the artistic values of
colour harmony and contrast. This is so because it is the
so-called material work of art that the artist paints, not
the work of art that has its being in the consciousness of
the percipient, where, according to this view, values come in¬
to being. No one, of course, vrould maintain either this or
the equally fantastic notion of artistic creation in the other
arts entailed by holding that the value features do not belong
to the material work constructed by the artist. And yet the
view that there are physical features belonging to the material
work of art and value features belonging to the experienced
work, the two works being in any instance separate and dis¬
tinct although related, is widespread. The realization of
the absurdities about the nature of artistic creation entailed
by this position, and the fact that criticism itself makes no
use of such a distinction, should be enough to discourage it.
It say be thought that the physical feature/aesthetic
feature dichotomy can be salvaged by a slight modification of
the theory urged in its defense. Instead of arguing the
existence of two objects, of the thing created by the artist
and of an object existing in the consciousness of the specta¬
tor, it may be held that only the first exists qua object, and
that it is to this that the physical features belong. The
value features, on this view, will be said to belong not to an
object of consciousness but to the spectator's experience
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Itself, to the somewhat mysterious events which accompany and
succeed the perception of a work of art. This version may
entail a theory of artistic creation identical with the one
just discussed, and be for that reason just as unsatisfactory
as the argument it is intended to revise. Or it may be
taken as entailing the second of the alternative conceptions
of artistic creation mentioned above, namely that an artist
constructs a purely physical object designed to ©licit an aes¬
thetic experience characterized by certain value features, in
which case it may be discussed as being identical with that
h,0
contention.
The second alternative is less wide of the mark than the
first, but nonetheless unsatisfactory. It implies that there
are two views, a right one and a wrong one, that may be taken
of the nature of works of art and of their creation. The
first, supposedly the right one, maintains that the artist
makes an object which possesses only physical features, but,
when successful, so arranges these physical features that a
competent spectator perceiving the work will have an aesthe¬
tic experience character!sod by certain value features. The
other view, supposedly the wrong one, is that the artist con¬
structs a material object whose physical features are such,
and are combined in such a way, that the material object may
be said to possess in itself the value features. It sight
seem that the distinction between these two views is without
importance for theory of criticism. Whichever view is taken,
it follows that the work must be experienced in order for its
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values to be discovered., which is true, and that the features
of the material work must be cited as the cause or source of
the values attributed to the work, whether these values are
construed as actually attaching to the work itself or to the
percipient's experience of it. However, since the actual
reference of critical remarks implies that a work of art's
values really belong to what the artist creates, irrespective
of the character of this or that individual's experience of
the work, the view that aesthetic values are strictly the pro¬
perty of a spectator's experience should be accepted only un¬
der the pressure of irrefutable arguments. I do not believe
that such arguments have ever been put forth. It is certain¬
ly more in accord with the presuppositions of critical usage
to claim that a work's values are embodied in the work to be
discovered or perceived by whatever spectator has the requi¬
site knowledge and sensitivity for appreciating the work.
Critical presuppositions may, of course, be ill-founded, but
concerning the locale of aesthetic values I do not think that
they are.
In Types of Aesthetic Judgement, E. M. Bartlett states the
problem as "how far the aesthetic object is identical with the
work of art in the sense of a literal, material object, and
how far it consists of mental constituentsBy 'mental
constituents' she means those supplied by the spectator. Her
approach to the problem is intelligent; beginning from the
"common-sense point of view that the artist...constructs an
object of one kind or another," she wishes "to consider these
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objects first of all solely from the point of view of the
artist. In all the current discussions of objective and
subjective, mental and material, and so on, (she continues^},
there does seem to me to be a real danger of forgetting that
after all the chief thine; that we do in the appreciation of
art is to look at pictures or statues, hear music, recite
poetry or read novels, and that these objects are the result
of a specific activity on the part of the artist." This Is
a timely reminder, a word of caution to anyone who holds the
view that the artist constructs the physical features of a
work of art while the spectator by the use of his Imagination
supplies the value features. It is one thing to say that a
spectator must use his imagination, as he must use his eyes
or ears and intelligence, to appreciate the value of a work
of art; but it is another thing to say the value of the work
depends upon the spectator using his imagination or ears or
eyes or intelligence. The second contention takes altogether
too much away from the artist, who not only puts pigment on
canvas but also puts it on in such a way that the picture will
have aesthetic value. ^
Lf.
Principles of Literary Criticism. I. A, Richards
argues that the value features ('form', 'balance', 'design',
'unity', 'texture', 'rhythm', 'harmony', are among the fea¬
tures he mentions^), to which reference is made in the state¬
ment of a critical judgement, are features of the critic's
inner experience, and that the physical features {'pigment',
'print', 'marble', and so on), to which reference is made in
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a descriptive statement, are features of the work of art.
This distinction facilitates another between critical remarks,
which are said to be about experiences, and technical remarks,
which are said to be about works of art considered as objects.
Since what Richards would have us believe, that critical re¬
marks are not about works of art and that remarks about works
of art are not critical remarks, runs counter to our customary
notion of what critics write about, we must ask how Richards
arrived at this strange and novel conclusion and whether it is
worthy of assent.
The reader will remember that In Principles of Literary
Criticism Richards offers an account of the experience which
culminates in aesthetic judgement in the form of an outline to
be filled in by psychology and physiology when these sciences
are sufficiently developed to explain the complex and obscure
events of aesthetic experience. It is these events, Invol¬
ving the sense organs, neurones, synapses and brain, emotions
and attitudes, which Richards tries to describe as fully and
accurately as present psychological and physiological knowledge
permits. For the purposes of his inquiry, the work of art is
regarded as a stimulus, i.e. as a cause of the experience to
be explained. In order to distinguish cause from effect,
stimulus from experience, Richards regards the work of art in
a way quite different from the way in which a spectator would
regard the work, and he describes the work in terms quite
different from those a spectator would use to describe what
he had seen or heard or read. The work of art is reduced to
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Its humblest properties, of canvas and pigment, printer's Ink
and paper, stone or marble, and the like; and certain other
features, balance, texture, rhythm, and so on, .are said to be
features of the critic's experience, fallaciously projected
into the work because of widespread ignorance of what we are
talking about. Having made this split between what hangs on
the gallery wall or stands on the library shelf and what the
visitor to the gallery or the reader experiences - another
version of the physical object/aesthetic object dichotomy «»
Richards is enabled to discuss value in psychological terms.
Though the tactical reason for this distinction is plain,
the grounds offered are totally inadequate to support it.
This deficiency is not attributable to carelessness or over¬
sight but to what I consider the Inherent impossibility of
convincingly defending the distinction within the framework
of a theory of criticism.
We may begin by considering Richards' allegation that "all
our natural turns of speech" mislead us concerning what we are
talking about?
It has to be recognised that all our .natural turns
of speech are misleading, especially those we use
in discussing works of art. We become so accus¬
tomed to them that even when we are aware that they
are ellipses, it is easy to forget the fact. And
it has been extremely difficult in many cases to
discover that any ellipsis is present. We are
accustomed to say that a picture is beautiful, in¬
stead of saying that it causes an experience in us
which is valuable in certain ways. The dis¬
covery that the remark, 'This is beautiful', must
be turned round and expanded in this way before it
is anything but a mere noise signalling the fact
that we approve of the picture, was a great and
difficult achievement,^
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The bald statement, 'This is beautiful', is, indeed,
little more than a 'mere noise' when deprived of its context.
I have yet to encounter this statement in critical literature,
although it is common enough in philosophical writing about
criticism - a discrepancy which perhaps accounts for philoso¬
phers finding it 'misleading'. But if this statement were
used as Richards suggests, it would certainly have to be taken
as being about a work of art. It could be considered to be
about the effect of a work upon the speaker only if the
speaker himself made this clear by saying;, "This music gives
me a beautiful feeling', for Instance, It appears that the
'progressive rediscovery of what we are talking about' has
led Richards to deprive a simple statement of its natural
reference. Any statement about a work of art containing the
word 'beautiful' may be suspect, because of the difficulty of
supporting the statement by reference to the work. But it is
by reference to the work that the speaker must attempt to jus¬
tify his statement if challenged.
Even among those who have escaped from this de¬
lusion CRichards continues] and are well aware
that we continually talk as though things
possess qualities, when what we ought to say is
that they cause effects in us of one kind or
another, the fallacy of 'projecting' the effect
and making it a quality of its cause tends to
recur. When it does so it gives a peculiar
obliquity to thought and although few competent
persons are nowadays so deluded as actually to
hold the mystical view that there is a quality
Beauty which Inheres or attaches to external ob¬
jects, yet throughout all the discussion of works
of art the drag exercised by language towards
this view can be felt..,. Such terms as 'construc¬
tion', 'form', 'balance', 'composition', 'design',
'unity', 'expression', for all the arts; as
'depth', 'movement', 'texture', 'solidity', in the
criticism of painting; as 'rhythm', 'stress',
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'plot', 'character', In literary criticism; as
•harmony', 'atmosphere•, 'development', in music
are Instances. All these terms are currently used
as though they stood for qualities inherent in
things outside the mind, as a painting, In the
sense of an assemblage of pigments, is undoubtedly
outside the mind. Even the difficulty of dis¬
covering, in the case of poetry, what thing other
than print and paper is there for these alleged
qualities to belong to, has not checked the ten¬
dency .
But Indeed language has succeeded until recently
in hiding from us almost all the things we talk
about. Whether we are discussing music, poetry,
painting, sculpture or architecture, we are forced
to speak as though certain physical objects - vi¬
brations of strings and of columns of air, marks
printed on paper, canvasses and pigments, masses
of marble, fabrics of freestone, are what we are
talking about. And yet the remarks we make as
critics do not apply to such objects but to states
of mind, to experiences,
A certain strangeness about this view is often
felt but diminishes with reflection. If anyone
says that 'The May Queen' is sentimental, it is
not difficult to agree that he is referring to a
state of mind. But if he declares that the masses
in a Giotto exactly balance one another, this is
less apparent, and if he goes on to discuss time
in music, form in visual art, plot in drama, the
fact that he is all the while talking about mental
happenings becomes concealed. The verbal appara¬
tus comes between us and the things with which we
are actually dealing..,. So it becomes natural to
seek for the things these words appear to stand
for, and thus arise innumerable subtle investiga¬
tions, doomed ab initio as regards their main in¬
tent to fallure.
A page later Richards remarks: "We shall endeavour in what
follows to show that critical remarks are merely a branch of
psychological remarks and that no special ethical or metaphysi¬
cal ideas need be introduced to explain value.But an
enormous metaphysical assumption is Implicit In the passage
quoted above. How, It must be asked, is it to be decided
what is outside the mind and what is inside the mind?
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Richards wishes to say that the pigments of a Giotto are out¬
side the mind and that the balance of masses in the Giotto are
inside the mind. But there is no evidence for the pigments
being there, outside the mind, that does not derive fro® inside
the mind. Both the perception of pigment and of balance are
mental ©vents. Until some grounds are offered for denying
the objective status of balance while accepting that of pig¬
ments, both must be accepted on the same level as features per¬
ceived during the spectator1s experience of a work of art,
Clearly, then, any statement about the nature of a work of
art presupposes that the work has been experienced: the poem
has been read, the picture seen, the music heard* It has
been generally supposed that some distinction ought to be
drawn between purely descriptive statements and statements
which express an ©valuation of the work. If this supposition
is endorsed, the ground for such a distinction must b© care¬
fully determined. The ground implied In I. A. Richard's
account Is that the descriptive statements are about a physi¬
cal object which is 'out there' in the world and that evalua¬
tive (critical) statements are about events inside the per¬
son, ©vents caused by the physical object. This ground is
plainly inadequate to support the required distinction.
Either kind of statement depends upon the feature mentioned
In the statement having been experienced. A statement about
th© size, colour, or material of a painting is quite like a
statement about its balance, harmony, or composition in th©
respect that both statements depend upon the paintings having
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been peroeived by the person making the statement. It has
always been supposed outside of aesthetic theory that both
statements are about the work of art* Richards would like to
correct this view by pointing out that the first statement is
about the work of art and the second about the spectator's
experience. But both statements are about the work of art,
although experience or perception of the work is a necessary
condition of either statement being made.
The lesson to be learned from this objection to Richards'
argument Is that the reference of a term is not determined by
the psychological conditions presupposed by its use. It may
be that the perceptions required to apply a certain type of
predloate (an empirical one) to a work of art consist of a
fairly rudimentary kind of sense experience, and that the
application of another type of predicate (a critical one) de¬
pends upon a more sophisticated kind of experience. It does
not follow from this that one type of predicate refers to a
physical feature belonging to a public object, whereas the
other type refers to a different kind of feature belonging to
an object constructed by the mind of the observer.
This false inference yields the conventional distinction
between two kinds of terms, descriptive and evaluative, used
in critical statements about works of art. Unless this dis¬
tinction is retained out of sheer thoughtlessness, It must
claim to be grounded in a genuine dichotomy in the work of art
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Itself. When it Is admitted that no genuine dichotomy be¬
tween physical feature and value feature exists within the
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work of art, the argument for two corresponding kinds of
terms (and, therefore, for txtfo kinds of statements) will have
to be forfeited, and with it the main obstacle to showing that
there are logical connections between the statements of any
acceptable critical argument.
If works of art are taken to be those things which are
made by artists and studied by critics, no work of art can be
said to possess physical features and value features. Rather
they possess the features which are constituted of the physi¬
cal materials out of which the work is created, and these same
features have a certain aesthetic value within the context of
that particular work. Thus, what are supposed to be refer¬
ences to value features and what are supposed to be references
to physical features are in fact references to exactly the
same features.
It is, of course, possible to discuss the features of a
work of art In purely physical terms, omitting any reference
to the aesthetic value of these features. Such a discussion
might have to do with the cost of the material, its dura¬
bility, weight, or chemical composition, with a work's dimen¬
sions, and so on. Information of this kind may, of course,
be critically relevant; whether a statue is made of clay or
wood or marble can make a difference to its aesthetic value.
But the possibility of making statements about a work of art
which are quite indifferent to aesthetic value must be ad¬
mitted. The admission is without Importance, however. For
such statements have no place in critical discourse. A
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purely factual analysis and measurement of the physical sound
produced by a string quartet would not count as music criti¬
cism. Conversely, critical discussion of the features of
'works of art are always evaluative in character, offering not
merely factual statements about the physical structure of a
work's material but rather assertions about the aesthetic
value of this material and its arrangement. From the point of
view of criticism, every feature of a work of art is a value
feature; and every value feature coincides with some physical
feature fashioned by the artist out of his material.
It is humiliating to return from this long excursion into
aesthetic theory without any trophies of the order of those
brought back by more ingenious explorers. Nothing has been
discovered to compare with the "abstract and ideal entity"
(Lewis), "the characteristic set of sense-perceptions" (Osborne),
"the building up of an integral experience out of the inter¬
action of organic and environmental conditions and energies"
(Dewey), "expression, or spiritual aesthetic synthesis" (Croce),
"imaginary objects" (Collingwood), "a system of norms of ideal
concepts which are intersubjectlve" (Wellek), and other rare
specimens captured and identified as the long sought work of
art proper. We have come back to the starting point empty-
handed, to the common sense view that works of art are to be
found in libraries and galleries, in concert halls and
theatres. This is a disappointingly ordinary view of what
works of art are, but examination of more sophisticated
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alternatives does not suggest that there is any vulgar error
involved In It. The conception of works of art as objects
accessible to any observer who wishes to check the correctness
of critical statements made about thee is of great service to
theory of criticism, What must be remembered is that works
of art differ from other objects in that they have aesthetic
valuej this is a matter of definition, a matter of what is
meant by the term •work of art1, Works of art can be do-
scribed in the same factual way as other objects by anyone
disposed to ignore what is special about then. But critics
are intent upon just this aspect, aesthetic value, and there¬
for© they describe works of art in terns of value, They do
not write alternately about physical features and aesthetic
features, unwittingly mixing remarks about two quite different
kinds of thing, They write about on© kind of thing, about
the aesthetic value of physical features, and therefore, some¬
times at least, write coherently, This point, so laborious
to make because of the plethora of aesthetic theory to the
contrary, had to be established before the following study of




This study of critical terms begins with an argument
against the usual method of classifying predicates. It pro¬
tests against the common practice of drawing a sharp distinc¬
tion between descriptive terms and value terms. This distinc¬
tion provides a most unsuitable basis for understanding the
function of critical predicates, and It Is at the root of
certain important misconceptions of the logical relationships
holding between the statements of critical discourse. The
implications of the distinction will be exposed and shown to
be unacceptable, and an alternative system of classification
will be proposed. Two merits are claimed for the new scheme.
It takes aocount of the actual function which predicates must
perform in critical assertion, and it provides the grounds for
explaining the logical connections between the statements of
critical argument.
The preceding chapter provides the groundxrork of the argu¬
ment to be developed here. If works of art were constituted
of two distinguishable kinds of features, physical features
and value features, then one might expect the language used
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about works of art to employ two correspondingly distinct
kinds of modifiers. An examination of some representative
arguments for this distinction between features showed them
to be lacking; in cogency. Further Inquiry into the nature
of works of art led to the conclusion that the distinction
was otiose and misleading. A major support for the clear-
cut distinction between descriptive terras and value terras was
thereby removed.
A descriptive terra denotes (refers to or stands for) a
physical feature or group of physical features, i.e. an em¬
pirical property or group of such properties. ♦Marble',
'blue pigment', 'sonnet', 'cadenza', and 'dome' are examples,
A value term denotes, if it denotes anything at all (or refers
to or stands for, if it refers to or stands for anything at
all), a value feature or group of value features, i.e. a non-
empirical property or group of such properties - qualities or
characteristics which are not actually observable but which a
critic may judge to be present. 'Graceful', 'rich', 'moving',
♦brilliant', and 'impressive' are examples* According to the
view that I am opposing, the descriptive term provides no in¬
dication of the aesthetic value of the physical feature de¬
noted, and the value term provides no information about any ob¬
servable physical property. Descriptive terms and value terras
are distinguishable by their referents and occupy separate
classes. But if the distinction between referents is itself
illegitimate, what grounds can there be for maintaining this
distinction between terms?
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It may be argued that the value term has no referent within
the work of art at all. The attribution of such characteris¬
tics as gracefulness, richness, brilliance, or impressiveness
to a work of art constitutes a deception on the part of cri¬
tics. Such terms really refer to their own experiences, as
Richards would say, or to a construct of their Imaginations,
as Groce and Collingwood would say. These attempts to divert
the intended reference of critical terms have already been
dealt with and, I think, shown to be unsuccessful. A different
sort of attempt to sustain the distinction has been made by
certain members of what may be called the school of logical em¬
piricism. They argue that value terms have no referents at
all. Their function is to express the critic*s feeling about
a work or attitude toward it, or to influence his reader's
feeling about the work or attitude toward it. These are not
views that I wish to accept, and I shall present my strongest
objections to them in the next chapter. However, the ground¬
work may be laid here for the refutation of emotive and atti¬
tude theories. What is required now is a convincing argument
for the view that the referent of all critical predicates is
the work of art.
Works of art do not consist of physical features and value
featuresj rather they consist of physical features which have
value. The thousands of tiny dots of pigment with which
Seurat covered his canvasses to a depth of three layers are,
I take it, among the physical features of his paintings.
Working according to a theory derived from his study of
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traditional painting, optics, and the psychology of percep¬
tion, Seiirat arranged these points of coloured pigment in a
way calculated to produce an aesthetic surface of great sensuous
charm. The subtle colour gradations he effected are highly
valued features of his work, But colour gradations (value
features) can be distinguished from the bits of coloured pigment
(physical features) which are graded only by the thoughtless
kind of abstraction that would posit parallelism as an entity
or quality independent of any pair of lines that might be
parallel. Seurat's colour organization in A Sunday Afternoon
on the Island of La Grande Jatte is, after all, the organiza¬
tion of bits of coloured pigment, and any critical reference to
this esteemed colour composition is inescapably at the same
time a reference to the physical material he used in composing
his picture. To speak more accurately by ridding my language
of all taint of this false abstraction which separates value
from what is valued, I should say that any critical remark
about Seurat's colour composition is a remark about the aes¬
thetic value of the physical features.
There are not, therefore, two kinds of features providing
separate referents for two kinds of terms. And even if for
such metaphysical reasons as were discussed in the last chapter
two kinds of features were posited, the distinction between
terms could not be maintained. For many of the terms which
would ordinarily be taken as descriptive would find no corre¬
sponding physical feature. If a poem as a physical object is
construed as printer's ink; on paper, then descriptive terms
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such as 'epic', 'iambic', 'sonnet", etc. do not refer to the
physical object. For acquaintance with the printed marks on
paper would allow the use of only such descriptive terms as
•or. 4 to '120 photogravure plates', 'white vellum', '.8
type', etc. Presumably none of those who advocate a distinc¬
tion between descriptive terms and value terms would want to
impose such a restriction upon the range of reference of des¬
criptive terras. But if their range is extended, the force of
the distinction is lost, because the distinction between
'printed marks on paper' and 'poem' is blurred, The genre,
metre, and subject of a poem can be stated in evaluatively
neutral terms. But the use of such terms presupposes an ex¬
perience of the poem of the same kind as is required for the
assignment of value predicates. The observation of purely
empirical properties {printer's ink and paper) is not a
sufficient condition for the description of a poem.
It must be concluded, therefore, that most of the terms
used to describe works of art in an evaluatively neutral way
refer to the same object, to the same complex of features, as
the terms which express critical appraisals of them. If any¬
one chooses to consider the work of art which is denoted by
critically irrelevant terms {'or, 4 to *, '8 type', etc.) as
an object distinct from that denoted by critical predicates
('sonnet', 'rhythmic', etc.). he Is free to do so. Such a
decision is without importance for theory of criticism. What
it is important to recognize is that most of the terms which
would be classified as descriptive ('sonnet', 'quatrain',
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'rimed1, etc.) and those which would be classified as evalua¬
tive ('moving1, 'deeply felt', 'subtle', etc.) refer to exact¬
ly the same kind of feature. Whether these features are con¬
strued as belonging to a material object or to a mental con¬
struct is a less urgent matter than the artificial division of
these features*
It must not be inferred from the language of the two pre¬
ceding paragraphs that I have been conceding the distinction
which I set out to oppose. I have been trying to show that
if the distinction between descriptive terms and value terms
is accepted on the grounds of a corresponding distinction be¬
tween physical features and value features, many terms which,
on this view, are plainly not evaluative do not fit into the
descriptive class either. In order to expound and criticize
a certain theory of predicates, I have been forced to use the
language of that theory, speaking of 'evaluative!/ neutral
description', 'descriptive terms', and 'value terms'. But
certainly I do not accept the view of predicates that is
usually implied in the use of these words. 1 must now try to
make my position in this respect quite clear.
Examining a list of critical predicates compiled at random,
one would notice certain terms that were apparently better
suited to descriptive than to evaluative purposes and others
that were apparently better suited to evaluative than to des¬
criptive purposes. But with what degree of assurance could
the terms be so classified by inspecting them out of context?
If one's purpose is to understand these terms as they function
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In critical discourse, then the system of classification must
be adapted to the characteristics which they exhibit in use.
The classification of critical predicates is therefore an em¬
pirical task, and it would be only by chance that an a priori
judgement would label them correctly.
Of the eight words, * dark-green1, •mottled', •yellow',
'linear', 'creative•, 'rich', 'enhanced', and •rhythmic', the
first four appear to be descriptive and the last four evalua¬
tive. Consideration of a critic's use of these and similar
words will show their character and relationships to be far
more complicated than these labels would indicate. In an
analysis of Gruhewald's Crucifixion. Albert Barnes writes;
The figure of Christ - somewhat El Grecoesque -
is of a general dark-green interspersed with brown
and with ivory light, and presents a series of
mottled color-chords. The face and legs of the
Saint on the right are reddish-brownish yellow,
they are modeled with light and shade, and have a
rather wooden stiff solidity.... The distinctive
trait is that color is used creatively; in each
of the figures the actual hues as well as the
manner of handling are different. The headdress,
face, and hair of the kneeling figure are rich in
color-chords of green and ivory-pink shot with
light, and her salmon-pink gown is enhanced by
flowing, rhythmic, linear patterns.
Would it be correct to say that Barnes uses the words "dark-
green, " "reddish-brownish yellow^" "salmon-pink," etc. solely
to describe the colour of various parts of the canvas, as a
botanist might use the same words to describe the parts of a
plant? Or do these words also make an implicit claim for the
aesthetic value of the artist's use of colour? I think that
they do; for one of Barnes's reasons for saying that Griinewald
uses colour "creatively" is that "in each of the figures the
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actual hues .., are different," Alternatively, to say that
Gruhewalfi's use of colour is 'creative', which is certainly to
evaluate, is not merely to praisej it is also to describe a
composition in a highly general way as combining a variety of
hues and techniques, which are features described in greater
detail by the colour words and by such terms as "mottled color-
chords ," "modeled with light and shade," and "color-chords
shot with light." Similarly, "rich" is evaluative, ascribing
to the work a feature of greater aesthetic value than would
'drab', 'dull', or 'pallid'. But it Is also descriptive,
characterizing by a highly general term a colour surface whose
hue, brilliance, and saturation is more particularly described
by other words, A study of the other critical adjectives in
this passage would reveal a similar ambiguity which prevents
them from behaving as the two-part system of classification
requires. Perhaps most striking of all in this respect Is
"El Grecoesque," a word clearly intended to describe a style
of figure painting by likening it to the work of a well known
painter, but at the same time, surely, intended by so compli¬
mentary a comparison to evaluate it.
Even this superficial analysis of four brief critical re¬
marks shows the importance of studying critical terms in eon-
text, It also suggests two further objections against the
descriptive term/value term distinction. Anyone who maintains
the distinction may assume that any critical adjective must
consistently perform either a descriptive or an evaluative
function in all instances of its use. And he must assume
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that in any particular context a critical adjective performs
in either a descriptive or an evaluative way. Both assump¬
tions are groundless.
It seems to me that the first assumption is required for
the classification of predicates independently of their appear¬
ance in any particular context. Presumably anyone who says
that 'good', 'beautiful*, and •great', for instance, are value
terras and that 'bronze', 'Etruscan', and '5th Century', for in¬
stance, are descriptive terms means that the words in the first
group are always evaluative and those in the second always
descriptive. If he conceded that 'beautiful' may sometimes
be used descriptively and '5th Century' evaluatlvely, his dis¬
tinction between kinds of terms would be lost and his classi¬
fication without point. But this shifting of terms from one
class to the other is an event which must be recognised if two
separate classes of terms are recognized. Consider the am¬
biguous status of the predicates 'marble' and 'bronze' in the
following statement: 'Praxiteles' Satyr is marble and Duchamp-
Villon's The Horse is bronze'. Whether 'marble* and 'bronze'
are to be construed as descriptive predicates or as value
predicates depends upon the context in which this statement is
made. Suppose that workmen are assembling an exhibition of
sculpture and have been told to group the works according to
the materials of which they are made. If one of them asserts
that 'Praxiteles' Satyr is marble and Duchamp-Villon's The
Horse is bronze', he is using these adjectives in a purely
descriptive way to denote the physical properties which
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determine where the works are to be placed. These same ad¬
jectives may perform quite a different function in the context
of a critic's discussion of the exhibition. Suppose that the
critic agrees with Stephen C. Pepper's evaluation of sculptural
materials:
Marble ... has dignity without coldness. It
is the choicest in feeling of all the traditional
materials. Its fine grain, its pure color
usually white or ivory, its crystalline sparkle,
make it a material of rare sensuous charm..,,
Bronze, however, ... is the medium that invites
open composition and dramatic subjects,... More¬
over, the metal emotionally suggests movement
and activity.,.. Thus marble and bronze, the two
choicest materials of large — scale sculpture,
are in strong contrast with each other. The one
invites stability and quietness, the other ac¬
tivity and drama.2
If the critic accepts this view of the aesthetic characteristics
of bronze and marble, his use of the terms 'bronze' and 'marble'
in the statement 'Praxiteles' Satyr is marble and Duchamp-
Villon's The Horse is bronze* may very well be Intended to
make a claim for the value of the two works. The assumption
that any term which might serve as a critical adjective must in
every instance of Its use be always either descriptive or
evaluative is clearly false.^
The falsity of the second assumption, that in any statement
a critical predicate must perform either a descriptive or an
evaluative role, can be shown in the same way. This absolute
disjunction between functions is essential to a clear-cut dis¬
tinction between descriptive terms and value terms. If it
were conceded that some critical predicates must play both a
descriptive and an evaluative role in the same statement, it
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would have to be admitted that no class had been provided for
these predicates - a serious omission. And it is just this
concession that must be made. Consider how the term 'imagi¬
native' is used in the following statement:
His interpretation of Brahm's Concerto was
imaginative.
Clearly the word 'imaginative' is used both to describe and to
evaluate the violinist's performance. It happens that imagina¬
tive playing is admired and unimaginative playing is notj
therefore, to call a performer's style 'imaginative' is to
praise it in a certain respect, to express admiration for it,
and to claim that it has a characteristic superior in value to
playing which is correct but stilted and conventional. The
word also serves to describe the playing, providing information
about what the playing was like, distinguishing it from other
performances which might be described as mechanical, dull, or
perfunctory.
A preliminary statement of the negative aspect of my view
of critical predicates can now be asserted in three propositions.
The descriptive term/value term classification of predicates
fails to account for the actual characteristics exhibited by
critical predicates in use. The view that the descriptive/
evaluative function of critical predicates remains constant re¬
gardless of context is mistaken. And the view that a critical
predicate must either describe or evaluate but not do both at
once is also mistaken.
One barrier against understanding the behaviour of critical
predicates is the notion that all descriptive adjectives must
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denote some specific property or particular feature of a thing.
If this notion were correct, it would be necessary to find for
every meaningful critical predicate of descriptive power a
separable and identifiable feature or property to which it re¬
ferred. Since no such properties can be found for which such
critical terms as 'beautiful', 'moving', and 'rhythmic' stand,
some other function must be assigned to these terms in order
to distinguish them from adjectives suoh as 'pigmented',
'diorite', 'Middle C. But once it is recognized that a term
can describe without denoting a particular physical or material
property, my view that a single terra can be both descriptive
and evaluative may seem more acceptable.
The double role here assigned to predicates is not a
peculiarity of critical writing alone. In moral discourse
also terms such as 'honest', 'loyal*, 'sincere*, 'brave', and
•gooa*, which would be classified on the old lines as value
terms, have descriptive force. They provide information
about the kinds of acts which the person to which they are
applied has been observed to commit in the past; and they are
predictive, indicating what kinds of acts the person is likely
to commit in any situation in the future. An objection may
be made against the phrase 'kinds of act*. What can be in¬
ferred about the past or future acts of a man denoted as
'loyal and brave'? Simply the tautology that he has done
loyal and brave deeds in the past and will probably continue
to do them. The words give too little biographical infor¬
mation of a specific kind to count as a description, and the
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question of whether or not the prediction has been fulfilled
will be as much a matter of dispute as whether the terras were
correctly applied In the first place.
The objection misses two crucial points. In any context
in which they are likely to be used, these words will give a
far more specific indication of the acts which a person has
committed in the past and is likely to commit in the future
than will the words standing alone. The statement 'General
Gordon was very brave during the battle of Khartoum' suggests
the commission of certain acts that would not be inferred from
the statement 'On her first visit to the dentist, little
Margaret was very brave'. As the context of such terms en¬
larges, the exact nature of the information they are intended
to convey becomes clearer.
The second point overlooked is that what is taken to be a
special difficulty about so-called value predicates must, if
it Is a genuine difficulty, also infect so-called descriptive
predicates. The predicate of the statement 'In Winter, the
North Shore Road Is dangerous' is surely descriptive. It
states a characteristic of a certain road at a particular sea¬
son. But the information It provides about the condition of
the road (whether, for instance, it is in the path of ava¬
lanches, full of pot-holes, icy, or whatever else) is no more
specific than the information provided by the word 'brave' in
the statement 'Sir Lancelot was brave'. If the test of a
terra's being descriptive is that it must denote (refer to or
stand for) a particular observable property, then such words
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as 'dangerous', 'Inefficient', 'complicated', etc, must be ex¬
cluded from the descriptive ©lass along with 'honest', 'loyal',
•brave', etc. Surely no one would want so to exclude them,
much less to put them in a class of 'value terms*',
Obviously the requirement that a descriptive term must de¬
note a directly observable property is too strict. No one
examines a man called 'loyal' nor a sculpture group called
'balanced' for special properties as a chemist might examine a
substance called a 'carbohydrate', But neither does anyone
check the accuracy of calling a man 'strong* by examining him
for strength featuresj rather he observes the physical feats
which the man is able to perform.
To understand exactly what adjectives such as these mean in
any instance of their use one must know the standards of loyal¬
ty or strength or goodness entertained by the writer. The
strongest Pygmy may be weak compared with a Tartar of only
average strength. The standards of loyalty accepted by one
society may be far more stringent than those accepted by an¬
other. Nevertheless, it is possible to decide by observation
whether, according to the standard employed, the term is
correctly applied, A term such as 'loyal' is sufficiently
constant in its denotation of a person who habitually commits
certain specifiable acts that the correctness or incorrectness
of applying the word in a particular case can be judged.
Similarly? the terms of critical discourse need not denote
special properties in order for the correctness of their appli¬
cation to works of art to be verified. Works of art which are
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said to be 'moving', 'boring', 'well-constructed', or 'beauti¬
ful' do not have special properties corresponding to these
terms. Howell-Smith has observed, "It is not the amuslngness
of the play that amuses me but the jokes and situations in
it." Nor is it the delightfulness of a vase that delights
me, nor the movlngness of a poem that moves me, nor the charm
of a sonata that charms me. When such terms are carefully-
used, however, their contexts do imply a set of observations
relevant to determining the correctness of their application.
The characteristics cited must be accounted for in terms of
the shape and colour and texture of the vase, of the rhythm
and diction of the poem, of the harmonic structure of the
sonata.
As with moral terms, one must know something of the stan¬
dards which dictate a particular writer's use of critical
terms, But this reservation does not apply exclusively to
what have been called value predicates. Even such a modifier
as 'long', which would usually denote a physical characteristic
of an object in a non-evaluative way, must be applied according
to a standard which Is variable. Nor is there a special ob¬
servable property of length. Rather 'long' characterises
the whole - as does 'moving', 'boring', or 'beautiful'.
In my view, then, it is misleading to separate critical
predicates by hording them into one or the other of two logi¬
cally distinct classes. The remainder of this study in criti¬
cal semantics is intended to support my view that countless
critical terms are hybrids, serving at once a descriptive and
130
an evaluative purpose. Many crltioal predicates will not fit
into either the one or the other of the two classes admitted
by the older theory until they have been forcibly deprived of
certain meanings intended by their authors. What is required
is a conception of critical predicates that allows for the fact
that the ratio of descriptive and evaluative power is not con¬
stant for all terms and also for the fact that these predicates
are homogenous in kind regarding their referent, import, and
function.
A conception of critical terms as constituting a continuous
range rather than as occupying one or the other of two classes
represents, I think, a useful innovation. The terms at one
end of the range will be primarily descriptive and those at the
other primarily evaluative, but none of them will be construed
as being wholly devoid of either descriptive or evaluative
force. The greatest stumbling-block to understanding their
function and therefore their connection in critical argument
will thereby be removed. And the necessity for holding on©
theory to explain the use of what have been misleadingly called
descriptive terms and another to explain the use of what have
been called, also misleadlngly, value terms villi be obviated.
It is upon the old two-class distinction between modifying
terms that the almost universally accepted distinction between
statements of fact and statements of value is grounded. This
distinction between statements gives weight to that philosophic
scepticism about the validity of critical argument which was
discussed in the Introduction. The problem of critical
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statements Is the subject of the next chapter* Here I wish
to point out only that the distinction between terns is essen¬
tial to the one between statements* If the semantic dichotomy
can be broken down, then the notorious gap between what are
taken to be two kinds of critical statements will be easily
bridged. The problem of terms is therefore urgent. Upon
proving their ability to perform a dual role of description and
evaluation depends the central argument of the next chapteri
that current misconceptions of the logical structure of criti¬
cal argument arise from assuming a false distinction between
logical kinds of critical statements.
Discussing the terminology of contemporary architectural
literature, Katherine Gilbert observes that "there can be no
doubt that the architects who use the words Intend them to
apply to real architectural designs, for description and/or
appraisal. The words do not compose a * literary' or * subjec¬
tive1 characterization of architectural facts, but are clearly
taken to refer to properties that Inhere in those facts.
Seaantlcists approaching this double situation of words and
shapes would agree that the words are Intended to describe and
to evaluate architectural facts. They would assume that a
verbal design parallel to the visual design was being construc¬
ted."^ By showing that the same critical term may be applied
by different writers to buildings antithetical in conception
and style, Katherine Gilbert makes the worthy point that since
a critic's language embodies his own sense of aesthetic values
and not standard, impersonal meanings, it Is important for a
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reader to check "the values associated by the authors with the
terms."6 Concerning the duality of critical terms, the
suggestiveness of her essay lies in her discussion of the word
'clean'. This word, she notes, is a favourite with Frank
Lloyd Wright: "his ultimate sign of approval."? Taking only
one of the various meanings distinguished, it will be observed
that the word has sufficient descriptive power to b© taken as
denoting, for Instance, a modern home {of the kind built by
Prank Lloyd Wright) and not the residence of one's Victorian
grandfather:
Its first value involves expulsion: ejecting the
irrelevant. All architectural elements are then
termed Irrelevant that have no basis in actual
human need but are lifted out of a bygone culture
for sentiment or ornament's sake, through literary
allusion, secondary meaning, or inertia: offering
what was once fitting form for an epoch's habits
after the habits are dead. "This clearing; away of
the historic debris, this stripping to the skin,
was the first essential mark of the new architec¬
ture. "8 Architecture that is 'pure,* then, in
deed and intention outs away the fatty excresenees
of the traditional styles, the classical orders,
cornices, and embellishments. Prom inner equip¬
ment disappear old carved furniture and heirloom
silver and china. The purists of architectural
language throw out the moldy rhetoric of Roman
banks and Gothic churches. Nuances of color con¬
taining the impurities of gray reflect for them a
feeble and lingering fancy for dimly remembered
shadows and compare poorly with clean heraldic
colors.
First of all, then, 'clean' as an honorific term
In architectural writing means relevance, and it
becomes synonomous with 'logical.' A specific,
practical purpose confronts the designer and his
business is to build solely for that end. Her©
the value involved is concrete, practical, and
verifiable. All the group of kindred terms that
expand the idea of good logic belong with 'clean,'
and dirt, as in the proverb, means something out
of place. Close calculation, clear statement of
what Is wanted, and computation controlled by the
limited, tangible, conscious goal sum up the in¬
tention.®
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A statement denoting a building as •clean', therefore, can
be verified by anyone who knows what the term implies as surely
as one describing it as built of red brick. As description,
the statement is adequate: it signifies that a building has
certain observable features and not others, thereby dis¬
tinguishing it from buildings of another style. As evalua¬
tion, it is adequate: it signifies the kind of architectural
features that the critic values, and it bears an implicit
reference to a body of aesthetic theory where the critic's
reasons for his criteria of architectural values are expounded.
The descriptive function of such words will, I think, be
conceded. Any dissatisfaction felt about their evaluative
role must arise from the mistaken notion that this is played
independently of the descriptive role. But this is not the
case; here one word must serve two turns simultaneously, for
there is only one kind of feature to which a critical remark
can refer. Works of art do not have physical features and
value features. They have physical features which have value
or lack it. Consequently any term referring to a feature of
a work of art may serve both to describe and to Judge that
work. Many words, of course, do not fulfill a double role
very satisfactorily. To say only that a statue is beautiful
is not to describe it very well; nor is to say only that it is
made of terra cotta to make clear the speaker's evaluation of
it. But such laconic remarks are not sent alone into the
world by competent critics.
Admittedly it is not always easy to decide whether or not
13^
a critical predicate has been used correctly. 'Clean' is one
of those words which belong about half way along the scale of
terms, and therefore its descriptive and its evaluative Inten¬
tion are equally clear. Terms of higher evaluative power pre¬
sent greater difficulties. As their descriptive power di¬
minishes, the difficulty of assessing their appropriateness
through observation increases. The observations relevant to
making such an assessment are simply impossible for people
lacking critical judgement. The selection of appropriate
terms with which to characterize works of art requires a special
gift peculiar to critics; and some technical knowledge of the
structure of works of art and of the critical vocabulary Is pre¬
requisite to understanding critical discourse. Similar re-
marks might be made about the qualifications for doing scien¬
tific work or for understanding it.
In the simplest, purely descriptive forms of scientific
discourse, the correctness of each of the terms used to denote
the empirical properties of an object can be checked inde¬
pendently of other statements by which other properties are de¬
noted, Critical writing differs in this respect from pure
descriptive writing. The meaning of a critical term (i.e., the
characteristics) which it ascribes to a work with the implicit
or explicit reasons for the ascription) can often be understood
only after a study of the conceptual scheme of the critical
argument in which it appears. For the critical terras within
any single argument are mutually dependent, each getting its
meaning from the context of the whole. Often the reader could
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not know what a critic means by a term if he had only the
statement in which it occurs before him. He must consider
the entire argument before he can form any opinion about the
critic's use of terms and, consequently, about the critic's
judgement. This peculiarity of critical discourse accounts
for much of its complexity. The more difficult aspects of
the relationships between terms will be considered later. At
this point the principle of the mutual dependence of critical
terms can b© illustrated by reference to a passage of relative¬
ly simple criticism.
In Art Through the Ages. Helen Gardner discusses the con¬
tinuous frieze which runs around the top of the cella wall in¬
side the Parthenon. The passage quoted follows a description
of the figures represented and an explanation of the events
which the frieze commemorates:
The cavalcade of mounted youths is filled with
rhythmic movement and spirited action. The back¬
ward glance of some of the youths gives a balance
to the general forward movement of the procession;
and the infinite variety in the poses of the
youths and the horses frees it from any feeling of
monotony. There is a flat background with no dis¬
tance and no unnecessary details. We have, in fact,
all the essential elements of a procession of
spirited youths expressed with a naturalism tem¬
pered by decorative fitness. Notice how the
figures just fill the space; how the heads,
whether the figures are standing or mounted, are
on a level; how the flanks of the horses form a
central band of largely unbroken surface, and their
legs beat a rapid rhythm in the lower third of the
panel.,,. On the slab representing the jar-oarrlers
the insistent motif of a youth carrying a jar upon
his right shoulder is repeated, making a design of
decorative quality, ease, and grace of rhythm that
is readily felt but only understood when one ob¬
serves the subtle variations that occur in the
pose of the head, the arms, and the hands, and in
the arrangement of the drapery.10
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The balance attributed to the composition is reflected in
the statement made about it: "The backward glance of some of
the youths gives a balance to the general forward movement of
the procession..'Backward glance' and 'forward movement'
seem to be straightforwardly descriptive. But would these
features have been noticed and recorded by an observer who was
not interested in balance? Probably not; for they support
the claim that the work is balanced. 'Balance* is a charac¬
teristic relevant to determining the value of a composition.
(Whether one prefers balanced or unbalanced compositions makes
no difference to the relevance of this feature to making a
judgement.) Since balance is a sculptural feature almost uni¬
versally approved, it must be inferred that Miss Gardner's
ascription of the term expresses a favourable judgement of the
work in this respect. If she disapproved of balance, presum¬
ably she would have said so in order to forestall the most
likely inference. 'Balance' is evaluative, but it also des¬
cribes the relationship between the attitude of the riders and
the movement of the procession in the same way as 'parallel'
describes the relationship between two lines. In short,
'balance' describes the frieze by attributing to it a valued
characteristic, the presence of which is accounted for in
terms of other observable features.
The claim that the composition is free from monotony, a
valuable characteristic, is supported by the observation that
the poses of the youths and the horses are Infinitely varied,
that none is a replica of any other. Clearly the 'infinite
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variety' ascribed to the poses of the youths and the horses
is Intended to be a term of praise as well as of description.
And 'freedom from monotony' reinforces both Intentions of 'In¬
finite variety's describing the visual effect and assessing it.
It might seem that the observations relevant to determining
whether or not the poses are infinitely varied are of a more
direct and immediate kind than those required for deciding
the question of monotony. The ratio of descriptive power of
'infinitely varied' is higher than that of 'free from monoto¬
ny' . But in fact both questions must be settled by exactly
the same set of observations, for the logic of this argument
is to advance the variety of poses as the cause of a lack of
monotony* The descriptive power of the term 'monotony' de¬
pends upon the fact of what most people do find monotonous -
for instance, a frieze in which all the figures in a long pro¬
cession are indistinguishable from one another. Its evalua¬
tive power depends upon the fact that most people do not value
monotony, (Anyone who did so, of course, would find the term
equally informative.) Its use is Justified by the remarks
about the individuality of the poses of horses and riders.
Its appropriateness would certainly be questioned if it
appeared in this context? 'The total lack of variety achieved
by making each horse and rider an exact replica of every other
frees the work from any feeling of monotony', It happens that
people do not associate lack of variety with freedom from
monotony.
The term 'decorative fitness' functions in a similar way.
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Obviously a terra of high evaluative power, it also provides
descriptive information of a very general kind about the
arrangement of the figures. This information must "be supple¬
mented by more particular, detailed remarks, and these follow
in the next sentence. These remarks provide descriptive in¬
formation, but their intention is to defend the us© of the
term 'decorative fitness', and in this respect their function
is evaluative. Their point would have been most obscure with¬
out the clue provided by 'decorative fitness1. The remark,
"the heads, whether the figures are standing or mounted, are on
a level," ra&ght be taken as unfavourable criticism if the
reader did not know that this distortion was being; cited to
explain how the sculptors achieved decorative symmetry.
Further analysis would raveal similar relationships between
"a design of decorative duality" and "the insistent motif of a
youth carrying a Jar upon his right shoulder is repeated," be¬
t-ween "ease and grace of rhythm" and "the subtle variations
that occur in the pose of the head, the arms, and the hands,
and in the arrangement of the drapery." But enough has been
said to suggest the complexity of the contextual relationships
between the terms of even a relatively simple passage of criti¬
cism , Clearly, no theory of terms which separates them by
assigning to some one function and to others another is tenable.
If critical argument is to be made intelligible, the nature and
function of predicates must be explained in terms of their
mutual dependence. An attempt must now be made to provide
just such an explanation of the nature of this relationship.
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The higher the evaluative power of a term applied to a
work of art the clearer the indication of the nature of the
critic's response to the work. If a oritic calls a work
'pleasing', 'delightful', and 'amusing', readers infer that he
has been pleased, delighted, and amused by it. Upon such in¬
ferences they base their predictions of what their own response
is likely to be. This predictive value of critical adjectives
derives from their dual reference. They tell something about
both the critic and the work: that the work is such as to
elicit a response of a certain kind from a particular* critic,
or, to put it the other way about, that the critic is the sort
of person who responds in a certain way to such a work of art.
If a reader finds that he is frequently displeased, disgusted,
and bored by works that a certain critic calls 'pleasing', 'de¬
lightful', and 'amusing', then he must conclude that this cri¬
tic's statements are without predictive value for him. It
would have to be supposed in such a case that either the
reader's or the critlO's responses to works of art were pe¬
culiar or abnormal. If the vast majority of readers found the
critic's predictions unreliable, only a revolution in the
audience's taste would restore the critic's reputation.
The test of the reliability of critical predicates is not,
however, the purely subjective one of agreement between the
emotional responses of various spectators. Whether critical
adjectives are being used appropriately or not is a question
for Intellectual judgement. Anyone who termed King Lear
'highly amusing' or Love for Love 'profoundly moving' would
IkO
exhibit deficiency in understanding plays or incompetence in
the use of English words or both* There are sufficiently
strict conventions for judging the appropriateness of responses
to works of art and for the use of words to characterize the
works to which these responses are made that it can be decided,
in many cases, whether or not a work of art is aptly charac¬
terized. There are, admittedly, difficult cases, but the fact
that some critical adjectives have high evaluative power does
not constitute an insuperable difficulty. 'Amusing* and
•moving' are words with evaluative force, but it would be
possible to decide, as in the Instance just given, whether or
not they correctly described the works to which they were
applied. However great a critical adjective's evaluative
force may be, it will, if appropriately used, convey informa¬
tion about the nature of the work. One may legitimately infer
from it that the work has properties or features or charac¬
teristics of a certain general kind. It is the function of
critical adjectives of higher descriptive power to indicate
more precisely just what these properties or features or
characteristics are.
There is no denying the occurrence, even the prevalence, of
critical writing destitute of descriptive significance. One
may encounter passage after passage of criticism phrased in
such language that no means are available for ascertaining the
appropriateness of the terms assigned to the works discussed.
Critical language is literary, not scientific language; its
terms are not so clearly and precisely defined as are those of
lfcL
scientific discourse; the conventions governing their use are
not as rigid. Nevertheless, critical language is capable of
a precision sufficient for its purpose. By using words care¬
fully, critics can provide reliable information about the works
they discuss* But literary language has its dangers in criti¬
cism as elsewhere; when the well turned phrase is preferred to
intelligibility, criticism becomes untrustworthy. The critic
who writes with verve, with elegance, grace, and wit, but in
such a way that no one can decide whether what he says about a
work is correct or mistaken, may make an excellent contribution
belles lettres. but he will say nothing to the purpose of
evaluative criticism.
The American music critic, James Huneker, has been praised
as a virtuoso of style, said the folloxdng statements of his
have been quoted in support of the verdict:
"In his gallery of psychological portraiture
Strauss becomes a sort of musical Dostoevsky.
He divines Maeterlinck-like the secret tragedy
of existence and paints with delicacy, with
great barbaric masses, in colors that glow,
poetic and legendary figures."
"This fZ.arathustral is the vastest and most diffi¬
cult score ever penned. It is a cathedral in
tone, sublime and fantastic, with its grotesque
gargoyles, hideous flying abutments, exquisite
traceries, prodigious arches, half Gothic, half
Infernal, huge and resounding spaces, gorgeous
facades and heaven-splitting spires - a mighty
musical structure,"
"Handel's music is like a blow from a muscular
fist,,., Mozart-,,, made sonatas as God carves
the cosmos
Such comments may have epigrammic worth, and serve the useful
purpose of inciting the reader's Interest in the works
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mentioned. But they do not sake any assertion which an
examination of these works would serve to substantiate or re¬
fute. The author of such remarks could never make the claim
that Tovey once did: "I may say that no statement is made in
any analysis of mine which the reader cannot verify for him-
1 p
self by following it in the score,t,*Wj
The point here is not to object to figurative language as
such. It is a critic's privilege to write as opulently as he
pleases; and, further, certain critical purposes are well
served by evocative, colourful, imaginative language. But the
provision of reliable information about the features of works
of art is not one of them. If a critic is to offer a literally
significant critical description of a work of art, he must talk
about it in terms whose appropriateness can be ascertained by
others,
It is the case that some critics sometimes do not talk in
this way. But it does not follow from this that no critic is
ever able to talk Informatively and objectively about works of
art. It is quite wrong to infer from the unreliability of
some writing about art that all critical terms of evaluative
force are descriptively vacuous. This unwarranted inference
lends credence to the fallacious view that whereas the predi¬
cates of empirical science are dependable for purposes of des¬
cription, the predicates of criticism serve merely the subjec¬
tive purpose of expressing or evoking feelings, emotions, or
13
attitudes. There are differences between scientific dis¬
course and critical discourse which are important and
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interesting, but it is a mistake to contrast them as discourse
which, on the one hand, must be either correct or mistaken and,
on the other, discourse concerning which no meaningful question
of correctness can ever be asked. There is an important dis¬
tinction to be drawn within criticism itself, vis, between
critical writing which employs terms the appropriateness of
which can be determined and critical writing which does not.
It may appear that some distinction should be drawn be¬
tween those predicates which attribute some feature to the vrork
of art itself and those which claim that the work is capable of
producing a certain effect in the spectator. 'Graceful1,
'balanced', 'well constructed', 'unified' are examples of the
first type, 'moving', 'amusing', 'charming*, 'pleasing' of the
second. The terras of the second group do make more obvious
than those of the first the fact that the person using them
has experienced some responsive feeling toward the work. But
I doubt that any distinction of logical importance is indi¬
cated by this difference. The kind of Justification required
for using the terms of either group is the same. The fact
that everyone in the audience at the Odeon last night laughed
frequently does not constitute a critical reason for calling
His Hlffht Out amusing. The term must be justified by refer¬
ence to the play itself, to its events, situations, characters,
and speeches, just as 'well constructed* would be defended by
an analysis of a mural and not by an examination of the spec¬
tators.^
Elements of Critical Theory.^-5 however, Wayne Shumaker
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distinguishes between "descriptive terms" such as "wooden,"
"unmotivated," "contrived," "frigid," "Involved," "confused,"
which, he says, "can be tied to an objective correlative," and
"critical adjectives" such as "interesting," "charming," "de¬
lightful," "repulsive," "deplorable," "displeasing," and,
supereminently, "good" and "bad," "valuable" and "valueless,"
the "correlatives of which are subjective." "Each of the des¬
criptive terms can be made responsible to a readily acceptable
definition, and the appropriateness of its use in the context
can be established by definition." But terms of the second
group "describe human attitudes - attitudes, clearly, with
value Implications - rather than objective properties dis¬
coverable in literary documents."
Shuraaker's distinction is perhaps not groundless; he may
be right in saying that it is easier to get agreement on how
the terms of the first group are to be used in literary criti¬
cism than on how terms of the second group are to be used.
But this difference does not warrant any logical distinction
between the referents of the two groups of terms. What is
involved here is a difference in the degree of strictness of
the conventions governing the use of words in a certain kind
of context. His own remarks imply this explanation. He
says, "It is true that one large aim of value studies is to
determine the objective characteristics of the good and the
valuable, the bad and the valueless, so as to make possible a
confident discrimination between the good and the nongood.
The aim, however, has not become an accomplishment, at least
1^5
so far as literature is concerned." But he continues, "While
waitliig for the achievement of a consensus about the objective
correlatives of literary goodness or value, we must, there¬
fore, regard 'good' and 'bad,' 'valuable* and 'valueless* as
belonging with words that denote value attitudes and not with
words that describe objective properties." But surely dis¬
agreement about which features characterize literary works of
aesthetic value does not determine the logical status of the
terms used in reference to these worksj nor would the resolu¬
tion of these differences alter the logical status of the
terms in question. Furthermore, there is a significant
difference between calling a critic's attitude toward a book
'deplorable' and calling the book Itself 'deplorable* which is
overlooked in Shumaker's analysis.
The crucial problem for any theory of critical predicates
must now be raised in its most difficult form. Any question
about applying a descriptive term to a work of art can be
settled by observation. Although mistakes can be made in the
observation of a work's sensible properties, there is no room
for disagreement of a philosophically Important kind about such
facts as the colour of a certain segment of a painted canvas,
the material of which a statue is made, or the key in which a
passacaglia is written. Even when verification does not de¬
pend upon observation of a particular sensible property, the
conventions for the use of words to describe works of art are
as strict as in any other field of description. The term
♦portrait' (when unqualified, as by 'pen' or 'musical', for
instance) is correctly applied only to paintings which take
one or more human beings as their subject. All this is ob¬
vious enough. What seems not to have been so obvious is the
Importance of distinguishing between purely descriptive terms
and critical terms of high descriptive power. A purely des¬
criptive term used with reference to a work of art denotes
some sensible property or group of properties which is open to
observation of the same kind as is required for the description
of anything else found in the world, A term of high descrip¬
tive power may denote the same properties or group of proper¬
ties, but It implies that the property or group of properties
has a certain aesthetic value within the work of which it is a
part. Both the use and the confirmation of these terms re¬
quire not only empirical observation but critical observation:
on© must be able not only to make accurate observations but al¬
so to understand the aesthetic function of x^hat is observed.
In practice, this requirement is not always difficult to
satisfy| whether a term of high descriptive power {*balance',
for instance, as used by Helen Gardner above, p.135) has been
correctly assigned to a work is a question that can b© decided
with as high a degree of certainty as any other question that
must be answered on the basis of observation. Terms of
higher evaluative power cause more difficulty; the closer to
the evaluative end of the scale that a term occurs, the more
difficult it is to determine what observations are relevant to
deciding whether or not the critic is right in applying it to
the work. Not only are there no directly observable.
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particular sensible properties corresponding to these terms -
no properties of arausingness nor of unity that can be pointed
out -, but the conventions governing their use are less rigid,
more complicated and debatable, and less easy to specify than
the conventions controlling the use of terms at the descrip¬
tive end of the scale.
In the past a great deal has been made of the unequal
corriglbillty of various terms and of the differences between
the rules governing their use. The attempt to account for
these differences has been the occasion of the two-class
theory of predicates against which I have been arguing. Now
it may seem that my notion of a graduated scale of predicates
is no better equipped to solve the difficulty. But this Is
not the case, as I shall try to show.
The main contention behind the scale of terms theory is
that no genuine critical predicate is wholly devoid of either
descriptive or evaluative intention and power. The reason
for saying that terms at the descriptive end of the scale have
evaluative intention is provided by the fact that they appear
in an argument designed for evaluation. This reason Is
sufficient. If a writer's intention is to evaluate a work of
art, then his description of It, and therefore the terms he
uses to describe it, must be construed as advancing that in¬
tention or be rejected as irrelevant. The reason for saying
that terms at the descriptive end of the scale have evaluative
force is the fact that they are selected by a critic because
they are relevant to his discussion of a work's value. This
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reason is sufficient. Any stetoaant, and therefor© any predi¬
cate, with which an evaluative argument can dispense must be
regarded as either irrelevant or otiose. Any statement, and
therefor© any predicate, which is essential to an evaluative
argument must have some degree of evaluative force however
this force is exercised. One© an adjective is put into the
context of a critical argument, it la no longer purely des¬
criptive, The use that a critic makes of it destroys its
neutrality.
At this point it iaay be remarked, perhaps by way of objec¬
tion, that all 1 am doing here is to lay down a linguistic con¬
vention to govern the use of the tens •critical predicate'.
This way of characterizing my theory of terms would not be alto¬
gether inaccurate, although it would be misleading if taken to
imply that I ara merely stipulating a definition without regard
for the actualities of critical writing. What 1 ara offering
is a description of critical predicates, or a definition of
*critical predicate*, which I believe to be to conformity with
the logica3- character of this class of terras, When 1 say, for
example, that an adjective which does not advance a critic's
evaluative intention may not be considered a genuine critical
predicate, I ara not forcing the facts to fit an arbitrary
definition! rather 1 ara defining 'critical predicate' in such a
way as to allow for the commonly neglected fact that there is a
legitimate and important distinction to be drawn between scien¬
tific and critical descriptions of works of art. Critics and
scientists have quite different ends to attain by the use of
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language, and this difference in purpose manifests itself in a
difference between the logical import of a critical adjective
and a purely descriptive (empirical) one. Since what dis¬
tinguishes the two kinds of terms is the evaluative force which
is carried by critical predicates and is absent from empirical
ones, an acceptable definition of 'critical predicate* (a
correct description of critical predicates) must include
evaluative force among the defining marks of a genuine critical
predicate.
Similarly, to define 'critical predicate' in such a way as
to exclude terms wholly devoid of descriptive force is not to
make an arbitrary gesture for the convenience of a theory. I
believe that many critical predicates which have been construed
as descriptively vacuous are genuinely informative, and that it
is proper to define 1 critical predicate' in such a way as to
admit only those terms which do serve to describe works of art
in respect to their aesthetic value. In this way critical
predicates can be distinguished from terms whose function is
purely emotive or prescriptive, as some writers suppose ethical
terms, for example, to be. The definition also provides the
grounds for a distinction between authentic critical terms
which really do contribute to a critical description of a work
of art and pseudo - critical terms which are perfectly un-
informative. It is Important to make this distinction in or¬
der to correct the not uncommon branding of all critical
predicates of high evaluative power as gratuitous.
The claim for the descriptive power of terms which occur
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toward the evaluative end of the scale depends upon showing
that the aptness of their use can he tested by observation.
The difficulty is that such terms are often so general, de¬
noting no specific sensible properties, that no particular ob¬
servation seems to be relevant to determining the correctness
of their application. The difficulty is raised by a mis-
understending, There are not two separate sets of observa¬
tions, one set for descriptive terms and another for value
terms, required for testing the soundness of a critical argu¬
ment. Only one set is required. Just what observations this
set comprises will be Indicated by the terms of higher des¬
criptive power. When critical predicates are construed as
being successively related through their position on a
graduated unbroken scale, It Is understandable that the charac¬
teristics ascribed to the work by terms along one segment of
the scale can be recognized by the observation of features de¬
noted by terms elsewhere in the scale.
Although observation of a work of art is, therefore, always
involved in the corroboration of a critical discussion of it,
observation does not presuppose a one-to-one correspondence be¬
tween predicates and properties. In order to understand the
internal logic of critical arguments a principle of coherence
must be introduced. For the correctness of the use of terms
of higher evaluative power Is a function of their relation to
other terms which occur closer to the descriptive end of the
scale. When it is understood that the criterion of the use
of many critical predicates is their consonance with the other
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predicates Included within the argument, the inadequacy of a
correspondence theory and the pointlessness of the objection
raised by it are obvious enough. Construing all the predi¬
cates of a critical argument as being connected by their mutual
performance of a single function provides the needed principle
for judging the eongruity of any predicate with all the others.
It follows from this principle that the appropriateness of any
term within the context of a particular argument can always,
In theory, be determined.
To sum up my theory of terms; In critical writing there
is no gap between the predicates of the kind implied by their
customary designation as ♦descriptive' and 'evaluative'. The
nature of the logical relations between predicates must be ex¬
plained if the structure of critical arguments is to b© under¬
stood. A relation of correspondence is Involved In the use
of critical predicates, but it does not in itself explain the
relationships between them. The classification of terms
according to their relative degree of descriptive-evaluative
power permits the Introduction of a principle of coherence.
This supplementary principle is what is required to explain
the use of critical predicates and the nature of the logical
relations between them.
The logical coherence of a critical argument depends upon
the consistency of meaning of its predicates. When a reader
of criticism refers to predicates of high descriptive power in
order to get sore precise and detailed information about the
features which terms of high evaluative power Imply the tfork
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reviewed to have, he must rely upon all the terms being con¬
sistent in their descriptive implications. Similarly, unless
the evaluative Import of predicates of high descriptive power
were consistent with that of terms at the other end of the
scale, their confirmation would provide no support for the
more explicitly evaluative terms. The condition necessary to
this principle of coherence governing the relations between
the predicates of cogent critical argument is provided by cri¬
teria of value.
Criteria of value will be discussed more fully in the
final chapter. It is sufficient at this point to say that
they provide readers with grounds for inferring the critic's
meaning from the terms he uses, Anyone acquainted with Frank
Lloyd Wright's criteria of value, for example, will be able to
infer from his critical use of the word 'clean' that the
building referred to has certain recognizable features which
Wright values. Whenever that word occurs in a passage of
criticism by Wright, or by anyone else who is known to accept
his criteria, the reader will be able to judge whether it is
used consistently with both the predicates of higher descrip¬
tive power and of higher evaluative power.
Persuasive arguments have been put forth for the necessity
of distinguishing between the meaning of 'good' and the criteria
16
for its application. A person can understand what is meant
(in one sense of 'meaning') by 'good' in the statements 'This
is a good whaleboat', 'This is a good portrait' without knowing
anything about the criteria used for judging whaleboats or
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portraits* He will understand that the whaleboat and the
portrait are being commended, and, if he wishes to add to his
fleet or to his collection, that he could do worse than to buy
either of these. He will understand, in short, that the
speaker means to praise the boat and the picture and not to
condemn the one as unseaworthy and the other as incompetently
painted. Knowing only that 'good' is a word of commendation,
the argument runs, a person can understand what is meant by
applying the adjective to any object, even though he is totally
ignorant of the features that make such an object a good one of
its kind.
This analysis seems to be correct as far as it goes. But
it goes only far enough to show what is common to all uses of
•good', .i.e., to explain its commendatory function. To under¬
stand what a critic means by 'good* In any particular context,
information of another order is required, viz., information
about the criteria implicit in his reasons for praising the
thing. A knowledge of the dictionary meaning of 'good* is a
necessary condition for grasping a critic's conclusion, but it
is hardly sufficient for following his argument. Criteria are,
to use a phrase of current philosophical jargon, part of the
'contextual background' of critical statements. It is by
reference to them that the transitions from predicate to predi¬
cate are to be explained. And it is in terms of them that
what a critic means by calling a work 'good' must be explained
also. If one wishes to know only what 'good' means regardless
of context, then its meaning can be distinguished from the
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criteria for Its application. But if one wishes to know what
a critic means by 'good* in a particular context, then criteria
cannot be excluded from the explanation.
B. M. Hare illustrates that logical peculiarity of value
words which is sometimes described by saying that they are the
17
names of 'supervenient' or 'consequential' properties. He
considers two pictures, P and Q,, one of which is an exact
replica of the other, and notes that one cannot say n'P is ex¬
actly like Q, in all respects save this one, that P is a good
picture and Q, not. From the logical impossibility of
saying of two paintings that they are identical in all respects
except that of their 'goodness', it follows, apparently, that
the goodness of a painting depends upon other discernible
characteristics, and that the term 'good' is logically depen¬
dent upon (is entailed by) the other terms used to denote the
work's features. But Hare will not accept this inference.
He contrasts the logic of 'good* with that of 'rectangular' in
order to show that the conditions of entailment present in the
latter word are missing from the former. It cannot be said
of two paintings that B'P is exactly like 0, in all respects
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save this one, that P is a rectangular picture and Q, not,"
if 'all respects* is intended to include the measurements of
its angles. 'Rectangular' is synonymous with 'rectilinear
and right angled'. Therefore, if one picture is rectangular
and the other is not, the angles of one picture must differ
from those of the other, in accordance with the meaning of
'rectangular', and the statement about their sameness is
self-contradictory, *0006,* as applied to a painting, differs
from 'rectangular' In that there are no definable characteris¬
tics of good paintings of such a kind that In any instance the
goodness of a painting follows analytically from a statement
of its characteristics. I.e., the statement 'This painting
has characteristics a, b,,,n' does not entail the statement
"This painting is good' as the statement 'This figure Is recti¬
linear and all Its angles are of ninety degrees' entails the
statement 'This figure Is rectangular'.
This difference in the logical situation of 'good' and
•rectangular' is explained in terms of meaning. Such is the
meaning of 'rectangular' that it is entailed by a certain
statement about a thing's angles. Such is the meaning of
'good' that it is never entailed by any statement or series of
statements about a thing's features. Apart from the mistaken
assumption already disposed of that the Inference to 'good'
must be made from a set of purely factual premises, Hare's
argument depends upon a sense of the term 'meaning' which must
be questioned. If one accepts his view of what 'good' means,
then his argument will appear very damaging to the theory of
critical Implication to be presented In Chapter 5, By intro¬
ducing a distinction between two senses of the word 'meaning',
however, the theory can be protected.
There are at least two different questions that may be
asked about the meaning of a word. One may ask for a defi¬
nition of a word or one may ask what a writer means by it. The
second question is open to several Interpretations, but the
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relevant one here Is equivalent to asking a writer what reasons
he has for using the word in a particular context. To ask a
writer to define one of his terms is in some cases to ask for
information of a different kind than that requested when asking
him his reasons for using a certain word on a particular
occasion. It happens that the definition of some words con¬
stitutes the reason for using it, Thus the reason for calling
a thing rectangular is that It is rectilinear and all of Its
angles are of ninety degrees. In the case of other words,
♦good', for instance, their definition does not constitute the
reason for using them, or at least it constitutes a very impre¬
cise and therefore poor reason. For words that must perform
in a great variety of dissimilar contexts new reasons must be
produced upon each occasion that they are used.
On the assumption that it is a definition which must al¬
ways constitute the reason for using a word it is impossible to
justify the use of certain words (e.g., 'good') on the grounds
of their meaning. For then it is required that the same rea¬
son be offered to justify each use mad© of any one of them.
This is the assumption that Hare makes. Consequently, when he
considers the meaning of 'good' he looks for a definition which
will hold regardless of context as the definition of 'rectangu¬
lar* does. He asks if there are "'defining characteristics'
of a good picture,"20 how, in general, a good picture should be
defined. He does not ask what characteristics this picture
has that leads this critic to call it good, what reasons the
critic has given for concluding his argument with this word.
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Since a critic's reasons for calling works 'good' are in every
case different, what he means by 'good' is in every case
different also. What critics mean by 'good' cannot be under¬
stood by looking at a model derived from geometry where the
reason for calling a thing rectangular is always the same.
Having adopted this model, Hare asks for a definition, 'What
is the meaning of "good" in general?' instead of for reasons,
'What does he mean by calling this particular picture "good"?'
If by the meaning of a term is understood its definition,
then a critic's remarks do not entail his value judgement. A
word such as 'good' is applicable to so many dissimilar things
and events that its definition must be made so general that no
constant set of characteristics of a specific nature can be in¬
ferred from it. Its definition provides no adequate criterion
for the correctness of its use. However, if by 'meaning' is
understood the reasons a writer has for using 'good', then the
notion of entailment can properly be Introduced to describe the
relation between statements with predicates of high descriptive
power and statements containing predicates of high evaluative
power such as 'good'. In valid critical arguments statements
of the former kind entail statements of the latter kind because
the former statements constitute the reasons for the latter.
Apart from the former statements, the latter are meaningless in
the sense of 'meaning' relevant to interpreting words in use in
critical discourse. Considered together in the context of a
single argument, a critical predicate is said to be entailed
by those which constitute the reasons for using it, and which,
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therefore, on this view, constitute Its meaning.
It does not seem to me, therefore, that a highly general,
wholly abstract account of what any particular predicate al¬
ways means Is likely to contribute much toward an understand¬
ing of critical discourse. However, many such discussions of
so-called value predicates, 'good' and •beautiful' especially,
have been offered as contributions toward value theory. Even
in the arguments of philosophers who think that the naturalis¬
tic attempt to define 'good' In non-evaluative terms is mis¬
guided, the quest for a philosophic definition of 'good', for
its meaning Independent of any particular instance of its use,
is apparent, The allegedly decisive question raised by these
arguments Is about what the speaker has in mind whenever he
uses 'good' or 'right' or some such word. The assumption is,
apparently, that there is some mental constituent common to all
cases in which people judge things good or right or valuable in
some other way. Thus W. D, Ross argues on this ground against
the definition of 'right' as 'more evolved' proposed by the
evolutionary doctrine of ethics: "There is really no resem¬
blance between the characteristic which we have in mind when we
say 'right' or 'obligatory' and that which we have in raind when
21
we say 'more evolved',.." And G. E, Moore, who was, of
course, clearly aware of the difference between saying what
'good' means and what good is, affirms, "My business Is solely
with that object or Idea, which I hold, rightly or wrongly,
that the word 'good' is generally used to stand for."22 And
ten pages later he remarks, "But whoever will attentively
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consider with himself what is actually before his mind when he
asks the question 'Is pleasure (or whatever it may be) after
all good?' can satisfy himself that he is not merely wondering
whether pleasure is pleasant. And if he will try this experi¬
ment with each suggested definition in succession, he may be¬
come expert enough to recognize that in every case he has be¬
fore his ralnd a unique object..,.*23
C, D. Broad admits that it might be "extremely difficult"
to Justify the assumption "That there is a certain one charac¬
teristic which the person who asks the question what 'good' or
some other name (N) means is thinking of whenever he uses the
word M In certain kinds of contexts/2** or "that all or most
other people who speak the language of the questioner correctly
are thinking of the same characteristic as he is thinking of
whenever they use the word I in the same kinds of context."2-*
For the sake of his analysis of G, B. Moore's conception of a
non-natural characteristic, however, he supposes that the
assumption can be Justified, And throughout the remainder of
his discussion he repeatedly raises the question of what a
P A
person 'has in mind' whenever he uses the word 'good'. °
Confining the discussion to critical remarks, it seems
apparent that what a person 'has in mind* when he calls works
of art 'good' is not necessarily the same in every case. For
what he will have in mind, presumably, are the features of the
*rork that he is Judging. And these features are not in every
case the same, Therefore, if what he 'means' by 'good' is a
question of what 'he has in mind' when he calls works 'good',
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it must not be supposed that he means the same thing every
time he uses the word. It may be supposed, however, that In
every such case he means to express a favourable judgement of
the work. And one thing that he always 'has In mind* on these
occasions is the intention of expressing such a judgement. In
so far as this intention can be formulated in words, 'This is
good1 serves as well as any synonymous formulation, On a
familiar sense of 'meaning', the question 'What do you mean by
calling this work "good"?' may be taken as equivalent to the
question "Why do you call this work "good"?' or 'What reason do
you have for calling this work "good"?' Thus if one wishes to
understand what critics mean by the judgements they make in the
sense of underslanding what reasons they have for these judge¬
ments, the question of what they mean whenever they judge a
work to have a certain kind of value is beside the point. For
the answer would never explain what reasons a critic had for
any particular judgement, and what it explains about judgements
in general is too obvious to require any explanation. There
may be other senses of 'meaning' that would render an investi¬
gation of the meaning of predicates such as 'good' mors profit¬
able. But such investigations would not, as far as I can see,
elucidate the logic of critical discourse. For in so far as
this particular logical problem is a problem of meaning, it is
a problem of the meaning of terms in context. And this prob¬
lem cannot be solved by reasoning which stays aloof from all
particular contexts.
If It is correct to say that the common factor approach to
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critical predicates Is unprofitable, then it seems also correct
to say that it is likely to be misleading. For if the ana¬
lysis of 'good1 fails to provide a satisfactory statement of
what is in the speaker's mind whenever he uses 'good', the ana¬
lyst is tempted to make up for this deficiency by supplying the
constant. Broad mentions past failures to discover an equiva¬
lent for 'good' in non-evaluative terras: "And all analyses of
goodness in purely non-ethical terras ... seem to most people
to be too complex to be correct analyses of what they have in
mind."2''' On the next page, expressing a vlew that he has not
decided to accept personally, he adds: "It may be that the ex¬
planation is simply that the name of the original characteris¬
tic has acquired a certain interjeetional, rhetorical or emo¬
tional force which is lacking in the phrase that expresses the
pQ
analysis," Even if it ifere true that 'good' always had
' inter jectional, rhetorical, or emotional force', this part of
its meaning, that common to all uses, is the least interesting
logically. And, as I tried to show in Chapter 1, the view
that value predicates express emotions rather than judgements
does not constitute any advance nor provide any useful hypo¬
thesis for explaining the logic of critical arguments. Even
if the reader is satisfied that 'good' expresses a favourable
judgement, or if he is satisfied that it expresses ©motion, he
still wants to know In any particular instance what it means
in the other sense, in the sense of the reasons that justify
its use, And what the logician wants to discover is In what
sense of logical justification reasons of this kind can ever
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be said to justify such usage. But It will be impossible to
discover this once the critic's predicates have been subjected
to the surgery that severs their descriptive from their evalua¬
tive function*
Writers expressly concerned with problems of the aesthetic
judgement also persist in the quest for definitions. In the
Introduction to his recent Aesthetics and Criticism. Harold
Osborne says of the critic that "when he makes statements of
the form 'this is good', he is, ostensibly at any rate, utter¬
ing an objective judgement about the work of art, Yet his
statement will remain indeterminate and no more than a meaning¬
less conglomeration of vrords until it is known what he means by
'good1 as applied to works of art."29 in Herbert Head •a The
Meaning of Art, the title of which advertises the author's con¬
cern with abstract meanings, one encounters at the beginning
the phrases "Definition of art" and "Definition of beauty"
standing as chapter headings. "There are at least a dozen
current definitions of beauty," Head says, "but the merely phy¬
sical one I have already given (beauty is a unity of formal re¬
lations among our sense-peroeptions) is the only essential
one..,.It is worth noting that the original definition
to which he refers mentions not 'beauty' but 'the sense of
31
beauty'. This phrase, borrowed perhaps from the title page
of a book by Santayana,^ like the phrase 'what one has in mind'
in the theories considered above, reflects the psychological
direction of the inquiry, Lascelles Abercrorable pursues the
same course, and his work is interesting as a characteristic
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example of failure to find a common factor definition of a
critical term leading to a subjectivlst standpoint. He asks:
What is this sense of beauty? Is it the sense of
some quality persisting through all the multitu¬
dinous forms which beauty can take? If so, no
wonder aesthetic science has so far been puzzled
to account for it. But - here brevity requires
the airs of dogmatism - beauty Is not a quality of
things. The sense of beauty Is the sense of our¬
selves passing the final aesthetic judgement on
certain crucial forms of pure experience. By vir¬
tue of it we completely experience the complete
judgement of experience. This may not greatly di¬
minish the puzzle of beauty: but It at least shows
us where to look for its elucidation - in our¬
selves, It absolves us from the difficulty of
taking beauty as a thing perceived: the difficulty,
namely, of showing what is the factor common to
the infinite variety of 'beautiful perceptions',33
Having distinguished 'beauty' and 'the sense of beauty1,
Abercromble concerns himself with the latter, attempting to
state the conditions under which the sense of beauty is ex¬
perienced. What he says about these conditions which underly
the difference between aesthetic judgements and moral or scien¬
tific judgements seems to me to be sound. The question is
whether he is right In supposing that an investigation of the
experiences which people have In the presence of beautiful
works would dispose of problems about the nature of beautiful
works themselves. I think that he is wrong about this; for
the kind of event which introduces the term 'beauty' into dis¬
course can be approached by investigating either the experience
or the thing experienced. These investigations, as I mentioned
in Chapter 2, are respectively psychological and critical.
Both are legitimate, but "the final aesthetic judgement" ('This
is beautiful' - a critical remark) is passed upon the thing
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experienced, not upon the experience itself, which Is merely
a condition of making the judgement.
Abererombie supposes that unless the problem of beauty is
construed as a psychological problem It can only be solved by
finding some factor which is common to all things called
'beautiful'. The difficulty of isolating such a quality and
characterizing it in terms which are at one© sufficiently spe¬
cific to make the recognition of the quality in any instance
possible and sufficiently general to be applicable to works of
art of all kinds is at last widely recognized and probably in¬
superable.*^ But it does not follow from construing the predi¬
cate 'beautiful' as applying to works of art rather than to
experiences that the so-called problem of beauty can only be
solved by discovering some quality shared by all beautiful
things. Such an awkward entailment derives from making the
problem of beauty an abstract problem, remote from any particu¬
lar use of the word 'beautiful', 'Beautiful' is a common term
of critical usage, and its meaning, as a word used in writing
about art, is to be understood by a study of the contexts in
which It appears. There seems to be no reason for supposing
that the term always means the same thing;. If by 'meaning'
here is meant the artistic factors (i.e. features) ascribed to
a work by the term, apparently it does not. But to make
'beautiful' refer to the percipient's experience rather than to
the thing he perceives is not the only way around this diffi¬
culty. To understand what a critic means by 'beautiful' in
any instance of his using the term is, as I have said, to
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understand his reasons for predicating it of a work of art.
These reasons are expressed in terms which refer to the par¬
ticular work he is considering, and it is not to be expected
that they will be applicable to every other work, What
•beautiful* means is what a critic on some particular occasion
means by it; to ask him what he means by calling a work
•beautiful* Is to ask him what reasons he has for doing so -
at least this is the only intelligible and answerable question
about beauty in relation to criticism of art that I can think
of. This Is not to deny the legitimacy of psychological in¬
vestigations of that experience which one has in the presence
of works of art which one calls beautiful. 'Is there some
factor common to all such experiences?' may very well be a
question that the psychologist must consider. But if a
writer chooses to deal with things rather than with experiences,
he cannot say what beauty is without citing those features
which make a particular work of art beautiful. Since some of
the works within restricted fields do share features in common
(balance, rhythm, unity, e.g.) it is possible to generalise to
some extent about what makes works of a certain kind beautiful.
But such generalization can hardly be carried to the point of
setting forth the defining characteristics of all beautiful
works of whatever kind. Nor is there any need for a defini¬
tion of such incluslveness. If the context of the problem
about beauty is set by an attempt to understand criticism, then
what must be Investigated is how the term 'beautiful' functions
in critical statements, how it is related to other terms in the
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same argument, and what are the determining conditions of its
correct ascription to works of art.
It may now appear that this Inquiry Into critical terms
is leading to paradoxical conclusions. It is held that in
the sense of 'meaning' relevant to understanding critical argu¬
ment, predicates are to toe defined In terms of the reasons
given for their use. Apparently, then, every time that a cri¬
tic uses a predicate such as 'good' or 'beautiful' he redefines
it, making it stand for adjectives which he has predicated of
the work during the course of his argument. In this case, It
seems that a critic could never be wrong in calling a work
'good* or 'beautiful'. For he simply makes these words mean
Just what his argument requires that they should moan. Nor
would he be contradicted by another critic who called the same
work 'bad* or 'ugly'} for toy 'good' and 'beautiful' he does
not mean what the other critic means tout is using the words in
a sens© peculiar to himself.
This objection results from equivocation on the two senses
of 'meaning' already distinguished. What must be meant toy
saying that 'a critic could never be wrong in calling a work
"good8 or "beautiful"' is that in respect to these terms a
orltlc could never toe convicted on grounds of usage of mis¬
using language. And this is so; for neither common usage nor
the lexicographer provides an adequate criterion for determin¬
ing whether such a term is correctly or incorrectly applied to
a work of art. Admitting: this, however, does not commit one
to the view that a critic could never toe wrong in any sense
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applying the terms in question to a work of art. If one
should substitute ♦bad* or 'ugly1 for these terms in the con¬
cluding statement of almost any piece of criticism, they would
appear 30 incongruous with the predicates of the logically
prior statements that any reader would certainly conclude that
something had gone wrong with the argument. Critical predi¬
cates of high evaluative power neither are nor are they taken
here to be gratuitous, irresponsibly inserted into the con¬
cluding statements of critical arguments and immune to correc¬
tion because related analytically to other predicates as a
symbol is related to its defining terms. It is held that part
of what a critic means by calling a work 'good' or 'beautiful*
is that the work is possessed of the features attributed to it
by predicates which belong closer to the descriptive end of the
scale. Thus one way that a term of high evaluative power can
be tested is by observing the work to see if it is possessed
of the specified features. After this test has been made,
questions about the adequacy and relevance of the criteria by
which these particular features are associated with terms like
'good' and 'beautiful' arise. The fact that discussion of
these questions does not always settle them to everyone's
satisfaction does not argue that there is no distinction be¬
tween the use of a critical predicate justified by cogent argu¬
ment and an arbitrary use of it, What does follow from the
version of meaning advocated here is that the question of
whether or not a critic is right in assigning a predicate of
high evaluative power to a work of art is equivalent to the
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question of whether the reasons Included in his argument
justify Ms use of the term. But this question cannot be
answered until the notion of Justification as It applies to
critical arguments has been clarifiedj and this clarification,
in turn, depends upon a clearer conception of the logical
structure of critical argument than has so far been made avail¬
able . She present attempt at clarification may now bo ad¬
vanced by turning to a study of critical statements.
Chapter ^
Critical Statements
My theory of critical terms provides the lever for ridding
critical discourse of the traditional distinction between state¬
ments of fact and statements of value. Once the distinction
between descriptive predicates and value predicates has been
disposed of as illegitimate, no grounds are left for maintain¬
ing the corresponding distinction between statements. This
consequence obviously follows, and it is of extreme importance.
When the traditional dichotomy between the statements of criti¬
cal argument has been eliminated, the traditional problem about
their logical relationships can be solved. I shall therefore
try to support the view of critical statements implied by my
theory of predicates by adapting the arguments of the last
chapter to a study of critical assertion. I shall exhibit the
erroneous presuppositions involved in the attempt to apply the
distinction to critical discourse, and show by reference to
critical literature that it is not in fact applicable. Then I
shall set forth the problem of the logical relations between
the statements of critical argument as it is understood by cer¬
tain philosophers who assume the distinction in question. The
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proposals they make for solving the problem will be examined
and shown to be solutions to an artificial problem created by
their own unnecessary logical distinction between kinds of
statements and to depend for their apparent cogency upon this
same mistaken distinction, A statement of the problem of the
logical relationships of critical argument consonant with the
nature of the remarks actually made in critical literature will
be provided and a solution to the problem offered. The theory
in which this proposed solution is embodied will then be tested
by applying it in the logical analysis of a critical argument.
A statement of fact may be defined as a statement which
asserts a potentially verifiable proposition about a thing or
event, its predicate describing a physical feature (empirical
property) or group of physical features or some observable re¬
lation between two or more such features. Examples are: 'George
de la Tour's Hadelaine reeentante is almost completely monochro¬
matic' . 'The colours used are in the key that is nearest to
the blacks and grays and whites of pure tone*. 'All the lower
part of the picture Is of the darkest tint and almost undetailed' .
Such statements provide the kind of information about a work of
art that would be useful for purposes of identification.
A value statement expresses a judgement of the worth of a
thing or event or of some part of either, its predicate de¬
noting, If it denotes anything at all (referring to or standing;
for, if it refers to or stands for anything at all), a value
feature (a non-empirical property) or group of value features
or some aesthetically valuable relationship judged to hold
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between two or more of the work's features. Alternatively, a
value statement may be taken as expressing the writer's feeling
or attitude toward the work's desoribable properties. Examples
are: 'These single beauties contribute to the transcendent
beauty of the whole'. 'This Madelalne rer?entente is the finest
achievement of his spiritual powers, here active at their high¬
est pitch and in perfect harmony'. 'Certainly this is one of
his greatest picturesj perhaps his greatest of all: unques¬
tionably a masterpiece'. Suoh statements provide information
about the effect that the work has had upon the writer.
According to the view that I am opposing, the descriptive
statements assert nothing about the aesthetic value of the fea¬
tures described, and the value statements provide no informa¬
tion about any observable feature. Consequently, the two
kinds of statements are distinguished by reference to the prin¬
ciple of verification. Since the descriptive statements are
about observable properties, their truth can be empirically
verified. The observations required for testing the correct¬
ness of the proposition asserted by 'Georges de la Tour's
Madelalne repentante is almost completely monochromatic' are
implied by the statement Itself and they would provide evidence
as conclusive as empirical evidence can ever be. As the value
statements are not about any observable property, they imply no
empirical test of their correctness. Acquaintance with the
facts of the painting would not guarantee the statement 'These
single beauties contribute to the transcendent beauty of the
whole'.
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The diverse functions assigned to critical remarks must be
questioned by examining the critical argument from which the
six sample statements were borrowed:
In this picture...de la Tour has realized the
colour-stealing power of night: it is almost com¬
pletely monochromatic. The colours used are in
the key that is nearest to the blacks and grays
and whites of pure tone; they are the "shadowy"
tints from darkest umber ("ombre") to ivory, with
but the pale gold - untouched by red yet not clear
yellow - of the flame. Only on the illumined
right shoulder and sleeve there is a tinge of gold¬
en pink, and of reddish gold below the right wrist
and just touching the breast. Varying tones of
old ivory are in the pale tints of Madelaine's
face and of her white blouse; palest and most
ochrelsh on the illumined right sleeve and the
edge of the left where it has slipped from her
bare shoulder; brightest and nearest to white
where a gleam of light touches her cheek. Her
heavy hair, almost black, falls loose over her
shoulders; one narrow slip of light shines through,
where it lies along her back.
Darkest umber is the colour of the skull, of the
side of the book on which it stands and of the
deeply shadowed hand that touches it.
The background, empty night, is little less dark
than the solid masses of the objects seen against
it; only there is a dull glow of golden-brown in
the darkness round the flickering flame.
A gleam touches the yellowish wooden frame of the
mirror. All the lower part of the picture is of
the darkest tint and almost undetailed, enhancing
the effect of mystery: the darkness Is broken
only by a patch of dim light on the floor, below
the just seen edge of the cloth that hangs over
the table.
How few and hoxf simple are the formal elements of
this most moving picture; how masterly the placing
of them together; how simple yet how arrestlngly
lovely the few details; the delicate transparency
of the sleeve faintly revealing the form of the
arm within it; the simplified silhouette of the
hand dark against the illumined sleeve; its ele¬
gant form, slim fingers semi-transparent at the
edges, and the half-unconscious sensitive touch of
them on the skull: single beauties that contribute
to the transcendent beauty of the whole,
... £T]his Hadelaine reoentante l3,,.the finest
achievement of his spiritual powers, here active
at their highest pitch and in perfect harmony.
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Here are his characteristic mysticism, his subtle
psychology, his power of revealing emotion and of
evoking emotion both sympathetic and aesthetic;
lastly his immaculate chastity of portrayal. Cer¬
tainly this is one of his greatest pictures; per¬
haps his greatest of all: unquestionably a
masterpiece. 2*
The so-called statements of fact of this argument are, as
their definition requires, verifiable by observation. But
they appear not to describe a 'physical feature' (empirical
property), if such a feature is understood to be distinct (much
less separate) from a 'value feature'. For the whole point of
the remark in each case is to call attention to the aesthetic
value of the feature described. Pumess states that the
picture "is almost completely monochromatic" In order to support
his judgement that "In this picture...de la Tour has realized
the colour-stealing power of night," a statement clearly in¬
tended to appraise the artistic achievement of a painter of
night-pieces. The 'statement of fact', then, is not evalua-
tively neutral, but is used to show that the painter's artistic
aim was realized in the composition. It would certainly be
possible to make a purely descriptive (evaluatively neutral)
statement about the Madelaln® re-pentante. but such a statement
would not form part of a critical appraisal of the ivork. The
statements 'Hadelaine repentante is painted on canvas, is 6^- X
52 Inches. It dates from circa. I650, and is now owned by the
Louvre' are statements of fact that might appear in an exhibi¬
tion catalogue. But such statements would be critically
irrelevant, and their intention of providing purely factual
information quite different from the intention of any of the
1?4
statements made by Furness in this critical study of the work.
1 do not wish to suggest that philosophers who base their
theories upon a logical division of critical remarks into
statements of fact and statements of value hold that the state¬
ments of fact are critically irrelevant. Far from advocating
such an absurdity, they are principally concerned with explain¬
ing the way In which these statements can be said to support a
critical judgement. What I disagree with throughout this chap¬
ter are their explanations, and what 1 want to show is that the
kind of explanation they think it necessary to give would be
required only if certain critical remarks were logically iden¬
tical with the superficially stellar remarks of'other kinds of
discourse. Throughout I am concerned with showing that ©very
statement in a critical argument has some degree of evaluative
force, and that a clear-out logical distinction between state¬
ments of fact and statements of value does not therefore apply
to critical discourse. For instance, the statement 9 all the
lower part of the picture is of the darkest tint and almost un¬
detailed* might, in certain contexts, be construed as s purely
descriptive statement asserted Ho provide the kind of informa¬
tion about a work of art that would bo useful for purposes of
identification'. But here the point of describing a certain
area of the canvas is to reveal its aesthetic value within the
composition, as the dependent clause indicates: "enhancing the
effect of mystery,9 Such a statement will appear to be purely
fact stating only when considered out of context. Its lack of
terms of the kind conventionally considered evaluative does not
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argue the statement's logical identity with the statements of
empirical discourse* It merely shows that a critic cannot
say everything that he wants to say about a work of art at once.
Keeping in mind that his intention is to give an account of an
object whose every feature has aesthetic value, every state¬
ment that he makes about a feature can be understood as saying
something about the work's value.
A consideration of the so-called value statements of
Fumess's argument again shows the distinction to be unsatis¬
factory, They certainly do express his critical judgement of
the parts of the composition, or of the whole painting, that
they are about. But they are not about any features that are
distinguishable from the features that the so-called descrip¬
tive statements are about. The statement (paraphrased) "These
single beauties contribute to the transcendent beauty of the
whole" refers to the same features that the preceding state¬
ments of the paragraph are about, the subject referring to the
"formal elements" just listed, the predicate to the whole com¬
position. And the statement does provide information of a
certain kind about the features dealt with, of precisely the
kind that one would expeet from a man writing a critical
appraisal of a work of art, namely information about the ar¬
tistic value of the features. The reliability of this infor¬
mation may be tested, as must the reliability of the informa¬
tion provided by any other statement of the argument, by the
observations of other spectators.
Admittedly no amount of empirical observation will serve to
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verify the statement "Certainly this Is one of his greatest
pictures,».unquestionably a masterpiece," if by 'empirical ob¬
servation* is meant simply staring at the pigment adhering to
the canvas. One does not expect significant remarks about
natural phenomena from a man who gazes idly at some particle
of the universe in total Ignorance of the laws and methods of
natural science. Nor is anyone who is ignorant of the princi¬
ples of painting in a position to decide upon the correctness
of the comparative judgement expressed in Furness's concluding
statement, But anyone competent in the subject, who follows
this argument by reading each statement as providing observa¬
tional details about the work, and has in mind the critical
analyses made of de la Tour's other canvasses elsewhere in the
book, will be in a position to test this statement by his own
observation of the painting. Standing alone, the statement
does not make clear exactly what observations would be relevant
to confirming or denying the judgement. Bead in context, the
statement involves no such difficulty, for the statements with
which it is associated are all about those features which have
determined the oritic's judgement.
The fact that these statements are not about empirical pro¬
perties as such (properties observed without regard for their
aesthetic value) constitutes no reason for denying them a de¬
scriptive function. Since a painting consists of physical
features whieh have aesthetic value within the composition, it
can be made the subject of a purely factual description or of a
critical description. A chemist's remarks about the chemical
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composition of the pigment on the canvas would take the form
of pure statements of fact. But a critic Is interested in the
aesthetic value of the features that he observes, and therefore
all the statements of his description have a reference to value.
But such statements are nevertheless descriptive In that they
provide Information about the nature of the work criticized;
"How few and how simple are the formal elements of this most
moving picture; how masterly the placing of them together; how-
simple yet how arrestingly lovely the few details,,.9 Such
statements are distinguishable from the chemist's statements by
their concern with value, and from so-called value statements
(which are said to be about non-natural properties or to be the
expression of someone's feeling or attitude) in being about a
painting's observable features, They are not 'descriptive' in
the sense of the term applied to the statements of natural
science, for the critic's interest In a painting is of a
different kind than that of a scientist, but they nevertheless
fulfill a genuinely descriptive fraction, viz. the function
that one would expect a statement about the aesthetic value of
a physical feature to fulfill.
It may be argued that if two chemists are in possession of
all the relevant facts which a complete analysis can provide,
they can only disagree about the chemical composition of the
painting if at least on© of them makes a logical error In in¬
ferring the conclusion from the statements of fact. Two cri¬
tics, on the other hand, may recognize the same set of facts
about a painting's observable features and, without either of
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th©m committing any logical error, reach contrary conclusions
about its value, It follows that however rigorous a critic's
reasoning may be, statements based upon the observation of a
painting do not guarantee a conclusion about its value as
statements about its erapirloal properties guarantee a conclu¬
sion about its chemical composition. It must be concluded,
therefore, that there is a logical gap between the statements
which describe a painting's features and statements which ex¬
press a critic's Judgement of the painting. This argument
Hisses the point that the critics* statements about the work's
observable features are not statements of fact as are the
statements of the chemists. A painting provides no facta in¬
dependent of considerations of value for them to observe. All
the statements throughout their arguments are concerned with
the value of the 'facts' described. And if their observations
are the same and are expressed in identical statements, it is
impossible (in a sense yet to be defined) that their concluding
statements about the work's value should not agree. If such a
case of disagreement were ever found, it would also be found
that at least one of the critics had concluded his argument
with a statement that was inconsistent with his preceding ones.
This is a view which requires the support of the entire chapter.
I am content if at this point the reader agrees that the analogy
between critical discourse and scientific discourse is a false
one, depending upon the mistaken assumption that critical
statements about a work's observable features arc of the same
logical character as scientific statements about its empirical
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properties. If the reader* concedes this much, he may feel
some scepticism about the view of the non-valid character of
critical argument inferred from this analogy. And I shall try
to show by the end of this chapter that his scepticism is well
founded.
The interim conclusion is that the distinction between
statements of fact and statements of value is seen to be in¬
applicable to critical discourse when all critical remarks are
read In view of the function that they must perform in the con¬
text of critical argument. Each critical remark has some
evaluative force, or it would have to be considered irrelevant
to the critic's purpose of arriving at a judgement of the
work's value. And each must also have some descriptive force,
or it would have to be considered inconsistent with the critic's
intention of making a coherent set of remarks based upon his
observations of the work's features* It may be, it probably
is, the case that many critical arguments contain irrelevant
and inconsistent statements* But a theory of criticism re¬
quires some grounds other than the Incidental mistakes of cri¬
tics for its basic logical distinction.
The conclusion reached in the preceding chapter about the
descriptive term/value term classification of value predicates
applies, as would be expected, to the corresponding distinction
between critical remarks as statements of fact and statements
of value* A classification of statements based upon this logi¬
cal dichotomy fails to account for the dual role they must per¬
form in critical discourse, namely to describe and to evaluate
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at once. For this reason, the typical critical remark "In
this picture...de la Tour has realized the colour-stealing
power of night" fits neither the descriptive nor the evaluative
class of statements. For it both describes the colour tone of
the painting and evaluates the artist's success in achieving
one of the things he set out to do. The examination of
Fumess' s criticism of the Hadelalne repentante also showed
that critical remarks do not behave in the consistent manner re¬
quired by the conventional manner of classifying statements.
Their function is determined by the function of the discourse
in. which they appear, and therefore if the classification of
such a statement as "All the lower part of the picture is of
the darkest tint and almost undetailed" is based upon an in¬
spection of the statement out of context, It is as likely to be
wrongly classified as not - even if the two classes provided by
the traditional view were exhaustive and correctly defined.
In the context of a critical argument designed for appraisal
every statement has evaluative force in so far as it is consis¬
tent with the purpose of the argument of which it forms a part.
In some other context the same statement (i.e., a grammatically
identical sentence) may qualify as a pure statement of fact;
but this consideration is irrelevant to determining the logical
character displayed by critical remarks In use.
It seems likely that this misleading distinction between
kinds of critical remarks derives from the analogous distinction
usually presupposed In ethical inquiries. Most philosophers
concerned with the logical problems of evaluative discourse
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have worked mainly with reference to ethics, and apparently
most of them have assumed that answers to questions about the
meaning and function of moral terms and statements and about
the relations between statements of moral discourse would
serve as answers to analogous questions about critical dis¬
course. The fundamental difference between moral discourse
and critical discourse discussed in Chapter I shows their con¬
fidence about this to be misplaced. Therefore the claim, im¬
plied or stated in many philosophic discussions of value, that
critical argument can be understood in terms of the logical
structure of moral argument must be rejected. It is perhaps
not too much to say that the development of the theory of cri¬
ticism, in so far as it is concerned with logical problems, has
been arrested by the preoccupation with the problems of ethics
coupled with the unwarranted assumption that their solution
could be adapted with little or no modification to the analo¬
gous problems of aesthetics. This tendency has discouraged
the scrutiny of criticism as a logically unique form of argu¬
ment, thoughtlessly admitting notions considered necessary to
understanding moral discourse which bring nothing but confusion
to theory of criticism. Perhaps the most disastrous of all
such notions is the distinction between statements of fact and
statements of value.
I am not concerned here with the legitimacy of this distinc¬
tion in the field of ethics. But I do want to show that even
if the distinction is indispensable to an understanding of moral
argument, it does not follow that it is also indispensable to an
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understanding of critical argument. On the contrary, when the
differences between moral discourse and critical discourse are
understood, it becomes evident that whatever usefulness the dis¬
tinction may have for ethics, aesthetics can do batter without it.
The distinction between statements of fact and statements
of value, so much insisted upon in contemporary discussions of
value, is, among other things, a device for exposing the so-
called naturalistic fallacy, G, S. Moore and the Intultionlsts,
for instance, rely upon It in their arguments against the
naturalistic tendency to equate the concepts and statements of
ethics with those of some other, non-normative subject, Their
arguments against theories which depend upon an unacknowledged
transition from statement of fact to statement of value are
said to be derived from Hujne,^ who was himself, of course, a
'naturalist* in the field of ethics. In the Treatise Hume
observes:
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an
observation which may perhaps be found of some im¬
portance. In every system of morality which I
have hitherto met with I have always remarked that
the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary
way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a
God, or makes observations concerning human
affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find,
that instead of the usual copulations of propo¬
sitions, is, and Jls not. I meet with no proposition
that is not connected with an ought, or an ought
not. This change is imperceptible; but it is, how¬
ever, of the last consequence. For as this oupht
or oug&fc not expresses some new relation or affir¬
mation, it is necessary that it should be observed
and explained; and at the same time that a reason
should be given for what seems altogether incon¬
ceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction
from others that are entirely different from it.3
It may very well be correct to say that from a factual
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description of what is the case concerning human nature, God,
or the universe, or whatever else, no conclusion can be validly
deduced about what a man ought to do, If value statements are
construed as *ought ' and 'ought not' statements, their deduc¬
tion from "is1 and 'is not' statements (descriptive statements)
appears to be illegitimate. What is to be noticed is that
•ought' and 'ought not1 statements, the characteristic conclu¬
ding statements of moral discourse according to this argument,
are by no means typical of critical discourse, Criticism is
not primarily concerned with answering practical questions,
and therefore it is not susceptible to the alleged fallacy of
deducing a concluding statement about the way people ought to
act toward a work of art from a set of statements in which
there is, admittedly, no 'ought1 present.
Clearly, then, critical argument is immune to the natura¬
listic fallacy in the form in which Hume detected it in moral
systems. And there is, therefore, no need to distinguish the
statements of critics as statements of fact and statements of
value in order to forestall a fallacy which is peculiar to
moral discourse.
Once Introduced, the distinction persists in discussions of
the aesthetic .Judgement because logicians do not trouble to ex¬
amine the statements actually asserted in critical discourse,
They invent their own examples Instead, usually taking some
such statement as *This Is beautiful' as the typical critical
remark, contrasting it with a typical descriptive remark such
as 'This is red', Considered independently of context, the
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two statements of course appear to provide satisfactory ex¬
amples of the two preconceived logical categories. But when
critical arguments are examined, it is found that their state¬
ments cannot be classified as the distinction requires without
denying them some part of the dual function that they must per¬
form in context.
If the logical dichotomy that I am opposing were warranted,
then in a typical piece of critical writing there would be
found a conjunction of statements of fact and statements of
value. The factual statements would describe the work of art,
and the value statements would express the writer's judgement
of it. Assuming that criticism is a rational and coherent
form of discourse, it must be supposed that all the statements
within a single argument have some kind of connection with on©
another, and usually it is supposed that the descriptive state¬
ments are intended to support the value statements. But it is
not easy to see how & statement could provide any support for
another statement which is of a logically distinct kind. The
logician's assignment Is to give an account of the connection
between the statements of critical argument that will explain
the way in which statements of fact support statements of
value. His conception of the nature of this logical problem
is determined by his supposition that critical remarks are
classifiable as either statements of fact or as statements of
value. This conception may now be set forth.
In order to understand the logical structure of critical ar¬
guments, the relation between statements of fact and statements
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of value must too explained. But this relation is Inexplica¬
ble in terms of any of the accepted rules of inference.
Stated in its most general terms, the philosophers1 challenge
to the critics takes the form of Showing that the descriptive
statements and the value statements are not connected In such
a way that the latter can be said to be deduced from the for¬
mer nor that the former can be said to be evidence for the
latter. In other words, critical argument does not soot the
requirements of either deductive or inductive Inference. In
pressing the first charge of aaa secmltur. logicians find it
convenient to represent critical argument a® syllogistic in
form,1* This is done by representing the critical process in
the following ways
(1) All works of art having properties x, y and z are
valuable,
(2) This work of art ha® properties xt y and s,
(3) This work of art is valuable.
If it ia supposed, then, that critical argument is a form
of deductive argument, the descriptive statements will be con¬
strued as providing the minor premise of a syllogism of which
the conclusion is the value statement. The suppressed major
premise would have to be a universal proposition to the effect
that all works of art having certain stated properties have a
certain kind of value. On this view, the criticism of 4© la
Tour discussed above would be re-oast somewhat m follows:
Hajor Premise All works of art which are almost completely
(Supplied) monochromatic, being dark and almost un¬
detailed in the lower part, with few and
simple formal elements, etc.. etc. arc
valuable, unquestionably masterpieces.
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Minor Premise . This ifork of art is almost completely mono-
(Description) * chromatic, dark and almost undetailed in
the lower part, with few and simple formal
elements, etc., etc.
Conclusion . This work of art is valuable, unquestionably a
(Value State- ' masterpiece.
ment)
No one, of course, would expect Furness to commit himself
to that universal statement. However, it may be objected that
the example is poorly chosen. The features here attributed to
all works called valuable are altogether too particular. What
is required is the statement of a general criterion such as
Mathew Arnold, for instance, proposed for poetry: "that the
substance and matter of the best poetry acquire their special
character from possessing, in an eminent degree, truth and
seriousness5 if the substitution of this kind of statement
would settle one problem, it 'would raise another. The major
premise must mention such characteristics as can be properly
included in the purely descriptive statement that the minor
premise is required to be. 'Truth and seriousness in an emi¬
nent degree1, as Arnold is using the phrase, or as anyone else
might use it in relation to poetry, would not serve as the
predicate of a purely descriptive statement. Nor can I think
of any statement of a general criterion of any form of art that
sets forth the approved features in purely descriptive terras.
Although the first example appears decidedly odd, I don't see
how a more satisfactory one could be provided; and in any case
it will serve to illustrate the logical difficulties involved
in critical discourse construed as deductive argument.
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Whatever may be the content of the generalization which stands
as the critic's major premise, he will be asked to explain how
he arrived at this universal proposition.
Clearly no such statement can be analytic as is 'All effects
have causes', and therefore true by definition. For the par¬
ticular properties described could become associated with works
of art only through the two having been encountered together in
experience. Nor can the statement be self-evident, as is 'All
coloured things are extended', apprehended, in Aristotle's
phrase, by Intellectual intuition. It is inconceivable that a
thing should be coloured and have no extension. But it is not
Inconceivable that a work having the properties in question
should be a bad work, a failure and not a masterpiece. The
presence of other properties could affect the value of the work
in a way that no property could affect a thing's having to be
extended if it is coloured.
It appears that the critic must have arrived at his major
premise through a process of inductive generalization. Having
observed that all paintings encountered in the past having the
properties specified in the description were valuable paintings,
the critic concludes that the universal proposition 'All paint¬
ings having properties x, y and z are valuable paintings' must
be true. But this universal proposition cannot have been
reached through perfect Induction, through a complete enumera¬
tion of all valuable paintingsj the fact that de la Tour's
Hadelalne repentante. which has just now come up for judgement,
had not been observed to have the properties in question until
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after the universal statement had been made proves this* Or
if it is supposed that the Madelajne repentante was one of the
instances examined in formulating the generalization, then it
must have been evaluated independently of the generalization,
in which case this evaluation requires for its defense some
form of argument other than the deductive one here described.
Therefore it must be supposed that the major premise repre¬
sents an inductive generalization based upon the critic's ex¬
perience of a restricted number of instances. And the force
of the critic's conclusion or Judgement is thereby weakened.
Granting the accuracy of his observation of the relevant pro¬
perties, the lack of a necessary connection between the pro¬
perties and the value associated with them in the major premise
deprives his conclusion of certainty. However frequently and
consistently the critic finds certain properties and value
present together in works of art, he will not see (or intuit)
that the former entail the latter. It is this lack of
necessary connection which distinguishes the universal propo¬
sition In question from others such as 'All effects have
causes', in which the predicate is covertly contained in the
subject, and 'All coloured things are extended', the recogni¬
tion of the truth of which follows upon an analysis of the con¬
cepts employed. If it is held that the subject and predicate
of the second statement are not necessarily but only contin¬
gently connected, then the difference between the propositions
'All coloured things are extended' and 'All paintings having
properties x, y and z are valuable' can be expressed as a
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difference between the degree of likelihood of two possible
occurrences. That the creation of a work of art having the
specified properties and being nevertheless valueless is a
less Improbable event than the appearance of an unextendad
coloured thing will, I think, be conceded. With this con¬
cession the discussion moves into the realm of probability, of
induction in its commonest form. And now it must be asked how
the major premise could be established on purely empirical
grounds.
What distinguishes the proposition 'All works of art having
properties x, y and z are valuable' from propositions such as
'All men are mortal® is precisely the value judgement implicit
in the predicate of the former. The first universal statement
expresses a generalization based upon a series of particular
statements of the sort 'This work of art having properties x, y
and z is valuable'. This statement, in turn, can be analysed
into 'This work of art has properties x, y and z' and 'This
work is valuable'. The force of the empiricist's argument
against value judgements having the same objectivity as genuine¬
ly descriptive statements, or the same strong claim to poten¬
tial truth or correctness, derives from his ability to show
that these two statements, 'This work of art has properties x,
y and z' and 'This work of art is valuable', are fundamentally
different in kind. Their differences preclude their being
validly combined in a generalization of the kind required for
the deductive argument outlined above. These differences also
show that the first kind of statement ('This work of art has
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properties x, y and z') does not provide any grounds, guarantee,
or evidence for the second kind of statement ('This work of art
is valuable*). The argument runs as follows.
The descriptive statements, those asserting that the work
has certain properties, can be proved true or false. That is
to say, the proposition that a work has certain empirical pro¬
perties can be verified by anyone who cares to examine the
work. But a value statement cannot be verified in this way,
for the value term does not describe any observable property.
A value statement, then, is not true or false in the same way
as is a genuine descriptive statement. One may agree with a
critic's description of a work and yet dissent from his judge¬
ment of its value without self-contradiction. For a descrip¬
tive statement does not entail a value statement.
Nor does the descriptive statement provide evidence for the
value statement. For if the presence of certain properties is
cited as the reason for the judgement of the work, it is im¬
plied that these properties are the cause of the value the work
is said to possess. In general, saying that x is the cause of
y implies the possibility of establishing the existence of x
and y independently of one another. For in order to speak
meaningfully of one thing being the cause of another, it must
be possible to say what in principle it would be like to find
each one of the things separately, even though it is not possi¬
ble In fact so to find them. In the case of the work of art,
it must be possible to distinguish the properties cited as the
cause of the work's value from whatever it is that the value
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terra refers to. But this is, of course, an impossible demand.
Although the value statement appears to refer to the work of
art, there are no specific value properties to be observed
which are distinguishable from the kind of properties mentioned
in the descriptive statements. So it is impossible to dis¬
tinguish the evidence, the observed features, from what, the
value, the evidence is supposed to be evidence for. Therefore,
the relationship between descriptive statements and value state¬
ments cannot be construed as evidential.
It might seem that the logicians have deprived the critics'
arguments of the sanctions of inductive and deductive inference
and thereby uncovered a logical flaw at the foundations of cri¬
tical discourse. But this is not so. The logicians have
merely revealed a flaw in their conception of critical argu¬
ment. They suppose that critical arguments are composed of
statements of fact and statements of value, but this, as I am
trying to show, is not the case. The theoretical distinction
is misleading, having no counterpart in critical practice.
And the problem raised about a logical gap between the state¬
ments of critical argument by analyses which assume the dis¬
tinction Is an artificial problem. And the theories dedicated
to solving this problem are consequently otiose.
The writers whose views will be disoussed in the next twenty
odd pages would see no difficulty in accounting for those cri¬
tical remarks which they take to be statements of fact. They
derive their basic logical conceptions, of the meaningfulness
of statements, of verification, of valid inference, from their
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analyses of scientific discourse. And any statement of criti¬
cal discourse which was purely descriptive would he formally
like any other descriptive statement; its logical behaviour
would not differ in any important way from that of the state¬
ments of natural science. And so it could be given the same
logical treatment as a statement which occurred in scientific
discourse. But what these writers take to be value statements
do not occur in scientific discourse, and they cannot be accoun¬
ted for by a logical theory which is based upon that form of
inquiry. But since they do occur (according to these writers),
they must be given some kind of elucidation. Certain attempts
at clarifying them may now be considered.
On the grounds that a meaningful statement is one which can
in principle be shown to be true or false, it has been held
that since value statements are not in principle verifiable
they are meaningless and do not make genuine assertions at all.
They are pseudo-statements, sentences which appear to state
something about an object or event but which really merely ex¬
press the speaker's feelings about it. The rigour of this
early positivist argument has been ameliorated by some later
analysts who are unwilling to maintain that the only meaningful
statements are verifiable ones. C. L, Stevenson, who "finds
much more to defend in the analyses of Carnap, Ayer, and the
others, than ... to attack,8^ has questioned the view that all
empirically unveriflabia statements have no descriptive mean¬
ing,^ and wishes to avoid "any dogmatism about 'the' meaning of
ethical Judgements80 and to temper "the paradox!cal contention
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that ethical judgements are 'neither true nor false1,(Pre¬
sumably he would wish to extend these reservations to aesthetic
judgements, which are given the same treatment as moral judge¬
ments by Caraap and Ayer.) Ten years after the publication
of Language. Truth and Logic. Ayer admitted flaws in his argu¬
ment for verification as a criterion of meaning and, without
surrendering "the criterion of veriflability as a methodologi¬
cal principle,"1® made an important concession in his new in¬
troduction to the book: "In putting forward the principle of
verification as a criterion of meaning, I do not overlook the
fact that the word 'meaning1 is commonly used in a variety of
senses, and I do not wish to deny that in some of these senses
a statement iaay properly be said to be meaningful even though
11
it is neither analytic nor empirically verifiable." In an
article three years later he further qualified his doctrine,
conceding that "the view, which I still wish to hold, that what
are called ethical statements are not really statements at all,
that they are not descriptive of anything, that they cannot be
either true or false, is in an obvious sense incorrect"here
Ayer explains that he holds to this view, because to do other¬
wise, to apply the term 'statement' in accordance with common
usage, Is "logically misleading."13
In view of these modifications, it would be unfair to
suggest that all philosophical analysts and logical positivlsts
still contend that value statements are meaningless since they
entail no observations that could empirically verify them.
However, since the earlier writers who did argue this thesis
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drew the distinction between statements of fact and statements
of value in a strikingly sharp and clear way, their writings
provide excellent texts for a discussion of the legitimacy of
that distinction.
In Philosophy and Logical Syntax. Rudolph Carnap remarks;
The function of logical analysis is to analyse
all knowledge, all assertions of science and every¬
day life, in order to make clear the sense of each
such assertion and the connection between them.
One of the principle tasks of the logical analysis
of a given proposition is to find out the method
of verification for that proposition. The question
is; What reasons can there be to assert this pro¬
position j or; How can we become certain as to its
truth or falsehood?1^"
Three comments are in order. Here Camap seems to imply that
discovering the method of verifying a proposition will clarify
its sense, that is, presumably, its meaning. Moritz Schllck
is apparently urging the same view when he writes that "The
i«
meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification." J
Making the meaning of a statement dependent upon the possi¬
bility of verification supports the contention that statements
which are not verifiable are, in some special sense, meaning¬
less. That Carnap is using the notion of meanlngfuIness in a
restricted sense is indicated by his qualifier "theoretical,"
as when he says, "What gives theoretical meaning to a propo-
16
sition is ... the possibility of verification," and "Thus
this statement is not verifiable and has no theoretical sense."
A. J. Ayer protects himself in a similar way by the modifiers
"literal" and "factual." These qualifiers reflect the fact
that when Ayer or Carnap say that certain non-analytic
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statements are meaningless they mean that these statements are
not meaningful In the same sense as are the statements of em¬
pirical propositions, Despite their intentionally limited
conception of aeanlngfulness, their writings carry the constant
suggeatlont and sometimes the claim, that non-eraplrloal state¬
ments not only differ from empirical ones in regard to the way
in which their meaning is to be determined, but that they are
also devoid of maning in any eons® of that notion whatsoever.
But their arguments for verifiabllity as a criterion of meaning
cannot support so general a claim. The criterion, being do-
rived from empirical discourse, Is only useful for distinguish¬
ing the genuine fro® the counterfeit amongst statements which
purport to be empirical, And even in this realm of discourse,
verification is a test far the probable truth of a proposition
and not for the oeanlngfulness of a statement,3"^ Indeed, it
seems Impossible that anyone could devise a method for verifying
a proposition the meaning of which he did not already understand.
The second point about this paragraph is that Carnap seems
to imply that a statement of the method of verification would
answer the question, "What reasons can there be to assert this
proposition?" But this would not always be the case: a state¬
ment of the method for verifying a proposition would not always
be equivalent to a statement of the reasons for asserting the
proposition, To us© one of Caroap'g own examplesi the state¬
ment 'Place this object near a magnet and it will be attracted1
asserts a "perceptive proposition" for verifying the statement
'This object is made of iron', But the observed behaviour of
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the object In a magnetic field may not have been the reason
for making the statement} the reason may have been that the
object was observed to have an atomic weight of 56* The
point is important. For Carnap holds that no reasons. In the
sense of predictive observational statements, can be given for
a value statement. And his position seems to rest partly up¬
on this dubious supposition about the equivalence of reasons
and methods of verification. On his view, the only reasons
that could be given for asserting a critical judgement, for in*
stance, would b© psychological or sociological reasons - em¬
pirically verifiable statements about the critic's psychological
make-up or about the sociological factors which determine his
preference. But such explanations of a critical assertion,
made in terms of psychology or sociology, must be distinguished
from th© aesthetic justification of a critical assertion, made
with reference to th© work. It is reasons of th© second kind
that critics customarily provide. It might b© thought that
these reasons are predictive observational statements, veri¬
fiable by any spectator who examines th© work, This view
seems to a© not altogether wrong, but it must be qualified,
for aesthetic reasons are not pure statements of fact} their
assertion involves a judgement of the value of th© fact, and
their verification requires not only empirical observation but
critical judgement on th© part of the spectator. As I have
been trying to show, this peculiarity of critical remarks re¬
flects the Inseparability of what has been mistakenly analysed
into physical features and value features, Keeping In mind
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the nature of the things about which critical remarks are made,
one sees that there is no problem about these remarks to be
solved by a theory which deals exclusively in empirical state¬
ments and value statements. Some critical remarks seem to me
to provide reasons in a quite acceptable sense, although fchay
do not satisfy Carnap's requirement of being pure empirical
propositions, nevertheless, they are all about the work
judged, as the statement of atomic weight is about the piece of
iron, and they must be defended by reference to the work and
not by reference to the peculiarities of the critics tempera¬
ment or background.
The third point is raised by Carnap's final question: "How-
can we become certain as to its truth or falsehood?" and the
suggestion that when a method of" verification is found certain¬
ty about the truth or falsehood of a proposition is attainable.
However often independent spectators examine a work of art and
confirm a critic's judgement of it, it cannot be said that they
have "become certain" of the correctness of the judgement - un¬
less, of course, 'certainty' is understood in the sense of
'conviction'. If 'certainty' is understood in this sense,
then there is as much certainty about the Brolca's being great
music as about the facts stated by most empirical propositions.
If it is not used in this sense, but in an objective sense,
still critical statements and empirical statements are in the
same case in this respect: the reasons given for them do not
constitute any certain guarantee of their correctness nor does
the agreement of independent observers. Disagreements amongst
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critics do not in themselves provide any reason for supposing
that their Judgements are any less well founded than those of
empirical scientists. In neither field is the method em¬
ployed designed to provide certainty about the conclusions.
For Caraap meaningful discourse is coextensive with natural
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science, and therefore the statements of natural science pro¬
vide the model of meaningful statements:
Every assertion P in the wide field of science
has this character, that it either asserts some¬
thing about present perceptions or other ex¬
periences, and therefore is verifiable by them,
or that propositions about future perceptions are
deduclble from P together with some already veri¬
fied propositions.<dl
It is this "character" of an assertion that determines
whether or not it has meaning;
What gives theoretical meaning to a proposition
is not the attendant images and thoughts but the
possibility of deducing from it perceptive pro¬
positions, in other words, the possibility of veri¬
fication.22
Speaking of an assertion from which no "perceptive pro¬
position" could be deduced, Carnap says, "In that case our re¬
ply is; your assertion is no assertion at all; it does not
speak about anything; it is nothing but a series of empty
words; It Is simply without sense."23 It is, in short, what
Carnap calls a "metaphysical"2^ proposition, a proposition which
is non-verifiable, because it entails no statement of what will
be observed if the proposition Is true. There is no way to
determine (empirically) whether it Is true or false; and if a
meaningful assertion is one that is either true or false, meta¬
physical assertions must be rejected as meaningless. Carnap
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construes all value statements as metaphysical assertions and
therefore as devoid of theoretical sens®.
Camap claims that his logical analysis of the moral judge¬
ment "Killing is evil"2^ applies to all value statements. His
conclusion, "Thus this statement is not verifiable and has no
theoretical sense,"26 ±s also supposed to apply to all value
statements. His analysis^however, depends upon construing
every value statement as a "command in a misleading grammatical
form."2® However plausible this interpretation of moral state¬
ments may be, It makes nonsense of critical statements, as 1
tried to show earlier.
Despite the generality claimed for his conclusions regarding
value statements, Carnap's analysis is confined to moral state¬
ments, Had he attempted to apply it to critical statements,
he would, I think, have seen the need to modify his theory.
He would have found countless critical statements that would
be made unintelligible if read as commands in a misleading
grammatical form. And he would have found countless critical
statements that were neither statements of fact nor statements
of value but a third kind of statement, combining a descriptive
and an evaluative function, which eludes an analysis that
operates with a two-class system of statements. But there is
no evidence In Camap• s work of his having considered that there
might be important logical differences between the statements of
moral discourse and the statements of critical discourse. Nor
Is there any evidence of his having examined critical discourse
to see whether or not its statements belong to either one or
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the other of the two types of statements which he distinguishes.
He assumes that findings based upon an analysis of moral state¬
ments serve to explain the logical character of critical state¬
ments, and he also assumes that all these statements will fit
into either one or the other of the two classes that he has
provided. His conclusion must be appraised in view of these
assumptions, both of which, in my opinion, are wrong.
Distinguishing between assertion and expression, Carnap
concludes that all metaphysical statements, which include all
value statements, assert nothing, although they may have an ex¬
pressive function. "Metaphysical propositions are neither
true nor false, because they assert nothing, they contain
neither knowledge nor error, they lie completely outside the
field of knowledge, of theory, outside the discussion of truth
or falsehood."2^ But they are, like laughing, lyric-, and
music, expressive. With this conclusion the groundwork is
laid for the development of the emotive and attitude theories
soon to be considered.
But first an alternative solution proposed by G. E. Moore
and certain intuitionists may be reviewed briefly. They
attempt to bridge the alleged gap by arguing that no gap exists;
their argument depends upon showing that value statements are,
in a sense, descriptive statements. These statements, unlike
the statements of natural science, do not denote empirical
properties; rather they denote non-natural features. But this
expedient does not remove the difficulty created by distinguish¬
ing critical remarks as statements of fact and statements of
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value. For whether it is said that some of the statements of
a critical argument are descriptive and some are not or that
some of the statements describe empirical properties and some
non-natural properties, in either case criticism is left with
two sets of statements of fundamentally different kinds.
There is no reason to suppose that if all of a critic's state¬
ments of one kind, say those about a work's empirical proper¬
ties, were accepted, that it follows that all of his statements
of the other kind, those about the work's non-natural features,
would be accepted in consequence. However one assesses the
contribution of these theories toward solving problems of
ethics, they leave the problem of aesthetics (in the form in
which they have raised it) standing.
Their problem and their failure to solve it are attribu¬
table to the same mistake. Their problem is created by the
assumption that critical discourse is composed of two logically
distinct kinds of statement. They do not question this
assumption nor examine criticism to see whether or not the
assumption is well founded, whether or not it is correct to
speak of any critical remark as simply describing an empirical
property. All the old trouble-making notions are preserved
in their theory and a new one about non-natural characteristics
is introduced.
Distinguishing between natural characteristics and non-
natural characteristics is another way of expressing the physi¬
cal feature/aesthetic feature dichotomy. I am not suggesting
that it was formulated for this purpose; it was., I believe,
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first introduced by O. E. Moore in Prlnclpia Ethlca^0. and it
has since re-appeared most often in discussions of ethics.
But Moore himself and C. D. Broad-^ also give the impression
that if the notion of a non-natural characteristic is a useful
notion at all, it will be as useful for explaining what the
value predicates of aesthetic judgements stand for as for ex¬
plaining what the value predicates of moral judgements stand
for. Although an ethical inquiry was the occasion for intro¬
ducing the distinction between natural and non-natural charac¬
teristics, it is nevertheless the case that this distinction,
when applied to works of art, is interchangeable with the dis¬
tinction between a work's physical features and Its value fea¬
tures. The arguments of Chapter 2, therefore, can be taken as
applying here.
An analysis of value statements based upon an emotive
theory appears to dispose of Moore's non-natural quality by
showing that value predicates are not the names of any charac¬
teristics of the things denoted by the subject term. Value
predicates provide no information about the subject but serve
to express or to arouse emotion or to issue commands. If the
emotive theory were correct and applicable to criticism, it
would follow that whenever a critic passed judgement upon a
work it would have to be supposed that he was feeling a certain
emotion about it. But It seems at least possible that a cri¬
tic might make a remark about a work's value when he felt no
particular emotion about the work at all. But the emotive
theory is not disposed toward recognizing any exception to its
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generalization. Having equated the evaluative function of a
critical remark with the expression of emotion, every instance
of a critical remark being asserted is Interpreted as an in¬
stance of an emotion felt. However calm and detached a cri¬
tic's remarks may appear, his use of a term of evaluative force
is taken as an indubitable sign that he has undergone an emo¬
tional experience of some kind. The fact that critical state¬
ments make clear the writer's opinion of the work's value but
often leave his emotion a matter of conjecture does not dis¬
courage these theorists. According to them, critical remarks
assert not verdicts or opinions or judgements or appraisals but
emotions. The fact that critical literature abounds in such
dispassionate assertions as "The movement, for Tchaikovsky, is
one of unprecedented richness of ideas, development and
orchestration,"-^ is unaccounted for by this theory.
If the emotive theory is accepted, it must also be supposed
that the effectiveness of critical writing depends upon the
reader having a certain feeling when he hears such words as
'good*, 'beautiful', etc. applied to works of art. What reason
is there for rejecting the most obvious construction that can
be put upon a critical remark, that it is asserted in order to
Inform the reader of the critic's judgement of a work's value,
in favour of the view that it is Intended to arouse the reader's
emotions? The reason must be that it is supposed that it is
only by exciting his reader's emotions that a critic can
communicate his judgement and win acceptance for it. But this
is not the case; for on© can understand critical remarks
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without having the emotions stirred by them, and even agree
with them without having any special feeling toward the work
evoked. The view that agreement in judgements of value must
depend upon a similarity between emotional experiences is with¬
out evidence to support it. Is It impossible for two or more
people whose emotional experiences on a certain occasion
differ to assent to the proposition 'That is good'? I don't
see how the defense of an affirmative answer to this question
could avoid a petitlo prlnclpli. namely that their assenting
to the same judgement argues agreement amongst their emotional
experiences. What reason is there for holding that agreement
on judgements of value depends upon a coincidence of emotional
experiences? The reason is that emotions are expressed and
aroused by assertions of value judgements. But this is just
what the theorists In question are required to show.
The emotive theory of value fails to account for the logic
of critical statements because it is grounded upon the errors
and over-sights that I have been trying to expose throughout
this thesis. It ignores the possibility of there being impor¬
tant differences between moral discourse and critical discourse,
assuming that an explanation of moral statements will take
account of critical statements. It does not examine actual
instances of either kind of discourse, but treats hypothetical
assertions of its own invention, overlooking the importance of
context In determining the logical character of the statements
made in argument. It works with the two class system of state¬
ments, never questioning the legitimacy of the distinction
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between statements of fact and. statements of value. Even when
the dual nature of the statements used In argument about value
Is recognized, these statements are subjected to an analysis
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which yields a factual and an evaluative component,Thus
transformed, critical remarks can be treated in part as the
statements of empirical science are treated, and what is left
over can be given a psychological explanation. What Is ex¬
plained by this kind of analysis is not a critical remark as it
functions in argument but a hypothetical statement which has
been mutilated by the logician's arbitrary translation. All
of these deficiencies are evident in the work of A. J. Aysr.
The emotive theory of value presented in Language, Truth
and Logic is explicable with reference to the verificationist
principle expounded by Ayer in that same book. The principle
of verification is supposed to provide a criterion for deter-
mining whether or not a statement is literally meaningful.
Every non-analytic statement requires "that some possible
sense-experience should be relevant to the determination of
its truth or falsehood."35 Any statement which fails to satis¬
fy this requirement is held by Ayer, as by Carnap, to be "meta-
physical,"-^ and "being metaphysical, it is neither true nor
37
false but literally senselessIt might be supposed that
sense-experience was indeed relevant to determining the truth
or falsehood of statements made about the value of works of
art. But Ayer denies this, maintaining "that in so far as
statements of value are significant, they are ordinary 'scienti¬
fic' statementsj and that in so far as they are not scientific,
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they are not in the literal sense significant, but are simply
expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false.8^
Ayer's analysis is restricted to ethical statements. How¬
ever, he believes that "What is said about them will be found
to apply, mutatis mutandis. to the case of aesthetic statements
also."39 Just how his comments about moral statements could
be applied to critical statements remains obscure. He con¬
siders the statement fXou acted wrongly in stealing that money*
in order to show that the normative term adds no information
about the action that would not be provided by the pure state¬
ment of faot *Xou stole that money'. ® The normative term
serves merely to express the speaker's feelings about the ac¬
tion. Whether or not this interpretation of ethical state¬
ments is acceptable, it clearly misrepresents critical state¬
ments. How could one break up such a statement as this one by
James Soby about John Harin's painting into a factual element
and an emotive (normative) element: "As early as 1910, in
water colors of the Tyrol, he had attained that remarkable con¬
trol of translucence which remained one of his most dis-
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tingulshed characteristics"? It cannot, of course, be done;
for the phrase "remarkable control of translucence," which is
certainly normative, Is also informative. If it were omitted,
Marin's water colours would be less adequately described: one
would be told less about the features of this painter's work;
and this, rather than being told less about Soby's feelings,
would constitute the important reduction in meaning. If Ayer
had troubled to examine critical writing, he would not have
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maintained that 11A valuation is not a description.. .at ail,"
nor that it is equivalent to a statement of fact asserted "in
a peculiar tone of horror, or written...with the addition of
some special exclamation marks.8^
According to Ayer, discourse about value is composed of
two kinds of assertion. There are genuine statements asser¬
ting empirical propositionsj these are meaningful statements of
fact, verifiable as are any other empirical statements. There
are also statements of value, pseudo-statements which sometimes
appear to make assertions but which really serve to express the
speaker's feelings. They are not verifiable because they
assert no fact. Their funotion is to arouse feeling in the
hearer or to exhort him to action through carrying the effect
of a command. Argument about questions of value is therefore
reducible to argument about questions of factj since only state¬
ments which express genuine propositions can be in contradic¬
tion, it is only on points of fact that there can be genuine
disagreement. If agreement about value does not follow upon
agreement about the relevant facts, only persuasion by rhetoric
can settle the dispute. Thus the function of value statements
is to be understood in terms of their emotive power: "It
is...possible to influence other people by a suitable choice
of emotive language; and this is the practical justification
Lh,
for the use of normative expressions of value.
Ayer's conception of the problem of discourse about value
is determined by his acceptance of the principle of verifica¬
tion as a criterion of meaning. Transposing this principle
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derived from a logical analysis of empirical science to criti¬
cal discourse, critical argument is made to yield two classes
of statements: genuine or factual statements and pseudo- or
value statements. The problem of the connection between the
statements of critical argument is taken to be insoluble in
logical terms because some of the statements are meaningless.
These statements are explained in terms of their emotive po¬
tency and a psychological account is given of their function in
argument. But the problem as Ayer conceives of it is an arti¬
ficial problem. For critical remarks do not fall into these
two logically distinct classes: those which state facts about
works of art sand those which express critics' feelings. Having
thus misconstrued critical statements, his conception of criti¬
cal argument could not fall to misrepresent the problem of its
logical structure. There is, therefore, no reason to accept
his emotive theory of values as a solution.
As we have already said, our conclusions about
the nature of ethics apply to aesthetics also. Aes¬
thetic terms are used in exactly the same way as
ethical terms. Such aesthetic words as "beautiful"
and "hideous" are employed, as ethical xfords are
employed, not to make statements of fact, but sim¬
ply to express certain feelings and evoke a cer¬
tain response. It follows, as in ethics, that
there Is no sense in attributing objective validi¬
ty to aesthetic judgements, and no possibility of
arguing about questions of value in aesthetics,
but only about questions of fact. A scientific
treatment of aesthetics would show us what in
general were the causes of aesthetic feeling, why
various societies produced and admired the works
of art they did, why taste varies as it does with¬
in a given society, and so forth. And these are
ordinary psychological or sociological questions.
They have, of course, little or nothing to do with
aesthetic criticism as we understand it. But that
is because the purpose of aesthetic criticism is
not so much to give knowledge as to communicate
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©motion, The critic, by calling attention to cer¬
tain features of the work under review, and ex¬
pressing his own feelings about them, endeavours
to make us share his attitude towards the work as
a whole, The only relevant propositions that he
formulates are propositions describing the nature h -
of the work. And those are plain records of fact, 5
This paragraph exemplifies nearly all of the defects of
theory which I have born trying to expose throughout this
thesis. The greater part of my argument can be summarized by
a line by line analysis of this passage,
"As we have already said, our conclusions about the nature
of ethics apply to aesthetics also," The grounds of this
assertion are left unexamined, Mo statements of aesthetic
judgements, not oven hypothetical ones, are considered, The
claim that his analysis of moral statements accounts for criti¬
cal statements as well is left undefended,
8 Aesthetic terms are used In exactly the same way as ethical
terms,n This assertion is not supported by an examination of
how aesthetic terms function in the context of critical argument,
"Such aesthetic words as •beautiful' and •hideous' are em¬
ployed, as ethical words are employed, not to make statements
of fact, but simply to express certain feelings and evoke a
certain, response,* It Is true that aesthetic terms are not
used to make statements of fact; but the most likely alterna¬
tive view of their function Is not that they ar© used emotive¬
ly. On the contrary, they are used to make assertions about
the value of things, and such assertion does not necessarily
presuppose "certain feelings® on the part of the speaker nor
need it ©Holt an. emotional response from the hearer. At
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least Ayer's counter-claim is not self-evident; nor does an
inspection of critical statements consistently reveal evidence
of emotion felt by the speaker; nor do many critical statements
appear any better suited to excite emotion than do the state¬
ments of empirical science.
"It follows, as in ethics, that there is no sense in attri¬
buting objective validity to aesthetic judgements, and no
possibility of arguing about questions of value In aesthetics,
but only about questions of fact,® Sinoe the above premise
misconstrues the function of aesthetic terms, this conclusion
drawn from it must also be rejected. The distinction made
here between questions of fact and questions of value is an ab¬
straction which has no counterpart in critical discourse where
questions of fact and questions of value are inseparable.
Since there is no legitimate distinction to be drawn between a
work of art's physical features and its value features, nor be¬
tween descriptive terms and value terms, it is misleading to
distinguish between questions of fact and questions of value in
regard to criticism. From the point of view of criticism,
there are no statements of fact to be made about a work which
are independent of considerations of value; and there are no
statements of value which do not refer to facts, i.e., to ob¬
servable features. All aspeots of the fact/value dichotomy
are accepted by Ayer without question. Neither works of art
nor the terms and statements used about them are examined in
order to see whether the distinction has any basis in actuality.
"A scientific treatment of aesthetics would show us what
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in general were the causes of aesthetic feeling, why various
societies produced and admired the works of art they did, why
taste varies as it does within a given society, and so forth.
And these are ordinary psychological and sociological ques¬
tions." These remarks point to the need of distinguishing be-
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tween genetic and normative inquiries. A genetic Inquiry
into a critical response attempts to explain that response on
psychological grounds. The critic's enjoyment or approval is
taken as a fact to be explained, and the explanation takes the
form of a causal argument. A normative inquiry gives reasons
for the critic's judgement by reference to the work itself.
The first kind of inquiry is concerned with explanation, the
second with justification. Ayer is aware of this distinction;
but having equated meaningful discourse with empirical dis¬
course, he must classify all critical remarks as being either
statements of fact or pseudo-statements. A critical judgement
can be explained, for an explanation would be composed of
genuine statements; but a critical judgement cannot be justi¬
fied, for arguments about value contain statements which are
literally meaningless. Since Ayer means by 'literally meaning¬
less' only 'non-empirical', his argument against the possibility
of justifying critical judgements need not be taken seriously;
for critical discourse does not pretend to be empirical dis¬
course, and its statements are not subject to the same test of
meaningfulness.
"They ^psychological and sociological questionsJ have, of
course, little or nothing to do with aesthetic criticism as we
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understand it. But that is because the purpose of aesthetic
criticism is not so much to give knowledge as to communicate
©motion.® The assignment of this purpose to aesthetic criti¬
cism is attributable to the discovery that critical statements
differ logically from the statements of empirical science.
The discovery is important, but the inference mad© from it
about the status of critical statements has little to recommend
it except its efficacy as a way of putting an and to inquiries
into the logical connections between such statements. Since
critical statements are certainly intended to express judge¬
ments of value, not ©motions, Ayer's conception of their pur¬
pose should be accepted only if a closer inspection of them
than he has attempted reveals that they are incapable of ful¬
filling their ostensible purpose.
"The critic, by calling attention to certain features of
the work under review, and expressing his own feelings about
them, endeavours to make m share Ms attitude towards the work
as a whole,® As a description of critical procedure, this
statement contains a grain of truth. It would be rendered
fairly accurate by substituting * judgement1 for 'feeling' and
for 'attitude',
"The only relevant propositions that he formulates are pro¬
positions describing the nature of the work. And thee© are
plain records of fact,® Critical descriptions differ from the
descriptions of empirical science because of their concern with
the value of the things described, Plain statements of fact
about works of art would be critically irrelevant, and they do
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not appear In the context of discourse about the value of works
of art. If all critical statements except those asserting
"plain records of fact" were rejected as Irrelevant, Ayer would
be left with little to explain.
Some revision of this argument against prescriptive theories
is required In order to do justice to Charles L. Stevenson's
Ethics and Language and "Interpretation and Evaluation in
Aesthetics."^ Stevenson's views on evaluative argument were
initially derived from an analysis of moral discourse} the
general conception of discourse about value developed in Ethics
and Language had clear implications for theory of criticism,
and these were partially worked out In the subsequent article.
A detailed exposition of the extended and complicated ana¬
lysis of Ethics and Language would involve a lengthy digression
from the main course of my argument. However, since Stevenson's
general theory of evaluation is given more adequate expression
in the ethical work, and since his discussion of aesthetic
evaluation Is made to depend heavily upon the earlier study, it
would be neither fair nor prudent to ignore it. All that I
wish to show here is that despite important differences be¬
tween Stevenson's views and method and those of the writers
just considered there are grounds for suspicion that a theory
of criticism derived from the analysis of Ethics and Language
would result in a misconception of critical argument very
similar to the one that I have been describing. This is a
suspicion that we shall find confirmed upon turning to his
study of critical argument. Transposing an ethical analysis
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into terns of theory of criticism involves a risk of misrepre¬
senting even an author who stresses the similarity between the
two types of discourse. Stevenson's explicit study in aes¬
thetics can, however, serve as a guide. Therefore, 1 shall
paraphrase his ethical theory as if he had originally oast it
in terms of aesthetics.
The twin concepts with which Stevenson works throughout his
book are reasons (beliefs) and attitudes. Statements of aes¬
thetic Judgements are apparently to be understood as statements
which assert the speaker*s attitude toward a thing or event and
which have, at least potentially, the effect of inculcating in
some other person the same attitude toward the thing or event*
Seasons are statements of the facts which have determined the
speaker's attitude and which if accepted as true and relevant
by other persons will tend to indue© agreement between their
attitudes and his. The distinction between descriptive state¬
ments and value statements is preserved her® in a disguised and
mitigated form, Statements of the reasons for a Judgement are
essentially descriptive statements, although they may contain
terms of evaluative force. Statements of a Judgement are con¬
strued as being essentially emotive, although they may contain
terras of descriptive power. The ©xplioit recognition of the
duality of at least some of the statements used in evaluative
discourse represents, according to my own view, an important ad¬
vance upon the other theories so far considered. But by Bis-
naming the evaluative element of such statements, Stevenson
perpetuates the misleading suggestions of the earlier writers.
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Throughout he uses ♦emotive' synonymously with 'evaluative',
or rather in key places he replaces 'evaluative' with 'emotive'.
(In the article, lack of space prevents him from discussing the
emotive aspects of critical terms, and he refers the reader to
Ethics arid Language^®.) It appears to follow from this that
a critical statement could be analysed into a descriptive com¬
ponent and an emotive component. But this way of characteris¬
ing critical statements seems either to deprive them of all
evaluative force or to identify the evaluative force with the
statements' emotive force; and undoubtedly it is the second
contention that Is intended. But it seems to me that the only
reason for this identification of evaluative force and emotive
force is that it facilitates a psychological explanation of the
relation between the statements of critical argument. This
reason Is acceptable enough, pragmatically, to anyone who wants
a psychological explanation of how one man can affect the atti¬
tude of another by rhetorical means. But such an explanation
is an alternative to an account of the logical structure of
critical argument.
This line of Inquiry may provide very interesting informa¬
tion about how a critic manages to persuade other people to
prefer the things he does. But it cannot explain the logical
structure of critical argument, for the possibility of there
being a logical connection between the statements of critical
argument Is rejected at the outset. And this possibility is
rejected because the view that some of the statements of such
an argument assert facts about a work of art and other
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statements assert a Judgement of Its value (i.e. express an
attitude) sets the problem even for this study which repeated¬
ly easts doubt on the legitimacy of the distinction.
In 8Interpretation and Evaluation in Aesthetics,8 the
essence of which can be stated in a paragraph, Stevenson
attempts to answer the question, "What can a critic reasonably
b© understood to mean, then, when he predicates this or that
aesthetic terra jb£ & work of art - when h© says (to talc® new ex¬
amples) that it is •satirical' or that it 'expresses nostalgia*
or that 'its perpendicular planes set up an internal tension'
or that 'in spite of Its artistic imperfections, it achieves
sublimity'?"^0 His answer is that any such statement "has the
same meaning as "The work of art appears Qs (to have the appro¬
priate quality^ when observed in the proper way',8^1 Stevenson
supposes that what is required now is a definition of 'proper'
as it is used in the formula 8'This work of art is Qe (actually
allegorical, unified, beautiful, or whatever els©3 * has the
same meaning as 'This work of art appears QB (allegorical, uni¬
fied, beautiful, or whatever else} when observed in the proper
way* ,"^2 He argues that 'proper* is not a purely scientific
term, but rather a normative one, and therefor©, in his view,
a term with imperative force, To assert a critical Judgement
is in effect to command the reader to observe the work of art in
a certain way, for example, to read some pom as an allegory,
arid thereby experience it as having a certain quality. Scien¬
tific reasons can be offered to encourage the reader to obey}
It might be urged, for example, that an alternative approach to
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the poera Involves an anachronism. But suoh reasons are not
logically related to the critical Judgement {command)j they are
causally, psychologically, related to It, functioning to de¬
termine the critic's decision and to Influence that of his
readers.&
There are a number of objections to this argument; three
of them will serve to refute it. There ar© no grounds for in¬
terpreting a critical statement such as 'This poem is allegori¬
cal' to mean 'This poem appears allegorical whan observed in
the proper way' that would not warrant interpreting an empirical
statement suoh as 'Tills penny is brown' to mean 'This penny
appears brown when observed in the proper way*. Stevenson
would say that in the latter case the 'proper way' can be speci¬
fied with scientific exactness, whereas in the former case it
th,
cannot.This contention is not only dubious but beside the
point. The point is that on Stevenson's line of reasoning any
and ©very empirical statement could be construed as an impera¬
tive, Therefore he has failed to distinguish critical state¬
ments from empirical ones, which is what he intended to do by
'proving' critical statements to be imperatives.
In any case the proof fails. Stevenson set out to eluci¬
date the meaning of critical statements with predicates such
as 'allegorical', 'unified*, and 'beautiful*.55 What ho has
shown is that some other kind of statement (which might contain
the word 'proper') about how to confirm a critical remark may
have imperative force. This is interesting but beside the
original point.
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If a critic were asked what he meant by saying 'This poem
is an allegory', he might begin by defining 'allegory', When
it was established that the meaning of this word was under¬
stood, presumably he would then give his reasons for saying
that the poem in question was allegorical. These reasons
would be expressed in the form of statements about the poem's
features, and they would be calculated to show that the poem
had the defining characteristics of an allegory. In other
words, these statements would be intended to provide evidence
for the judgement, and they would have to be logically related
to the statement 'This poem is an allegory' if they were to ful¬
fill this intention. To say that 'This poem is an allegory'
means the same as 'This poem appears to be an allegory when read
in the proper way', and that this translation means the same as
'This poem appears to be an allegory when read as an allegory',
and that this version is equivalent to 'Go and read it as an
allegory' does not really go very far toward explaining what a
eritic means "when he predicates this or that aesthetic term
of a work of art."56 Thus a patient consideration of
Stevenson's analysis discloses no reason for revoking the objec¬
tions of Chapter I against the Implausible view that a critical
remark asserting a work of art to be poignant or unified or
beautiful is, despite appearances to the contrary, in reality
an imperative in disguise.
Stevenson's difficulties follow from his having inherited
the heterogenous view of critical argument; the conventional
distinction between statements of fact and statements of value
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reappears in his work in various guises, as a distinction be-
*>7
tween statements of reasons and statements of attitudes,-" be¬
tween primary and secondary reasons,5® between interpretative
and evaluative statements,^ and between primary reasons and
imperatives* Although Stevenson recognizes that in practice
critical remarks are not thus clearly differentiated, he thinks
that in order to understand them it is necessary to reduce them
to the two basic types acknowledged by convention* But this
reduction creates a problem by cutting the critic's remarks off
from one another and destroying the logical links which connect
them in actual argument. However much one may admire the
theory advanced by Stevenson to solve this problem, it must not
be forgotten that the problem itself does not inhere in criti¬
cal argument but in that false conception of it which is based
upon the two class system of critical statements. Stevenson
understands that critical judgements are not characteristically
supported by sets of exclusively factual statements. Criticism
differs from empirical science, and therefore, Stevenson con¬
cludes, its judgements cannot really be informative, as empiri¬
cal propositions arej they must be imperatives, as, Stevenson
holds, ethical judgements are, and the reasons adduced to
support them must be related to them "causally rather than
logically Although critics are not scientists, if their
judgements are to be even partially rational prescriptions,
they must be 'guided by' a "carefully organized body of empiri¬
cally verified primary reasons.Thus statements of critical
judgements depend ultimately upon factual statements which,
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being of a different type, cannot be logically connected with
them. By preserving the fiction of a purely factual component
in critical argument, Stevenson loses sight of the point that
the statements which give reasons for a judgement also express
value judgements, not empirical descriptions of facts but cri¬
tical judgements of the aesthetic value of facts* Having for¬
feited the chance of showing that critioal reasons and judge¬
ments are logically related he must content himself with showing
how the former may be psychologically efficacious in getting
the recommendations implicit in the latter adopted. The exi¬
gencies of this programme require him to characterize critical
statements as serving to issue commands and not, as an Inspec¬
tion of the remarks actually asserted by critics shows to be
the case, to provide critical information about the aesthetic
value of works of art.
The oongrulty of description and judgement is the key to
the logical structure of critical argument. A critic's des¬
cription of a work of art and his terminal judgement of its
value are normally compatible because his description involves
evaluation. In giving a description of a work of art, the
critic is preoccupied with the aesthetic value of what he des¬
cribes, He does not merely record his empirical observations
but gives an account of the work's features in terms of their
aesthetic value.^ There is, therefore, no leap from factual
statements {of reasons or beliefs) to value statements (emotive
expressions of attitude) requiring?: a psychological theory to
connect them. A coherent piece of critical writing is unified
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by the critic's persistent concern with the aesthetic value of
what he observes. His judgement of a work of art is inferable
from his description of it, because his selection of terras for
describing the work is determined by considerations of value.
There is no leap from statements recording a critic's empiri¬
cal observations to statements expressing Ms judgementj for
critical statements are not empirical statements: they incor¬
porate an evaluative element. The pattern of critical argu¬
ment shows transitions from statements of high descriptive
power to statements of high evaluative power* These transi¬
tions are explicable in the light of the coherence imposed by
the critic's exclusive concern with the aesthetic value of a
work's observable features. This concern is satisfied by the
circumstance that from the point of view of criticism the fea¬
tures of a work of art are not divisible into physical features
and value features; all are simply critically relevant features
concerning which there is no distinction to be made between
what Is observed and what is evaluated.
If critical statements are taken as constituting a graduated
scale progressing from statements of high descriptive power and
low evaluative power to statements of low descriptive power and
high evaluative power, It is seen that there is no logical gap
between them in the context of a single argument. The notion
of critical argument as consisting of two logically distinct
kinds of statements does leave a gap and therefore room for a
theory audi as Stevenson's which bridges the gap by external,
psychological means. But this kind of connection and this
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kind of theory are required only because critical remarks have
been misconstrued through ignoring either the dual role that
they all perform in argument or the implications of this for a
logical theory of critical discourse. When the descriptive/
evaluative distinction between critical statements is posited,
a gap between there appears and an emotive view of 'value'
statements suggests itself as an expedient for repairing the
breach. Even when the duality of actual critical statements
is recognized, as by Stevenson, the abstract logical distinc¬
tion exerts its influence, raising an artificial problem about
the connection between the statements of critical discourse.
An accurate conception of critical statements is prerequi¬
site to an investigation of the logical structure of critical
argument. The defective two-class system must therefore be
replaced by a conception of critical statements based upon the
theory of predicates presented in the preceding chapter.
According to this view, neither the descriptive power no£ the
evaluative power of all the critical statements within a single
argument is equal, but neither are any of the statements, in
so far as they are consistent x^ith the purpose of the argument,
completely devoid of either descriptive or evaluative force.
Each critical statement must be construed as belonging some¬
where on a continuous range of statements which progresses
from statements which are primarily but not exclusively des¬
criptive to statements which are primarily but not exclusively
evaluative. So construed, no critical remark will be classi¬
fied as belonging to a kind which is logically distinct from
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any other statement with which it is associated in critical
discourse. This conception of critical statements supplied
the groundwork for the preceding examination of certain
theories of value, and it will also provide the basis of the
proposals that I have to make about the logical structure of
critical argument in the next chapter. This view of critical
statements can now be supported by reference to a typical piece
of critical writing.
Tracing the development of de la Tour's use of chiaroscuro,
S. M. M. Furness shows how in b'Extase d'un molne a technical
problem involved in painting night scenes is resolved. The
description of the feature in question, the illumination, not
only provides information about the painting that can be con¬
firmed by observation but also tells why the lighting is dis¬
posed as it is in this composition:
The source of light, a candle, is partly hidden
by a small iron screen, or reflector, fixed to the
stage at such an angle that the light is partly
shut off from the face and figure of the uncon¬
scious monk, whose contorted position further pro¬
duces shadows that Interrupt and break up the
illumination. The face and raised hands of the
other and the book lying open on his knees are
fully Illumined.
This disposition of the light has two effects; it
contributes to the uniquely dramatic expressive¬
ness of the whole picture, and particularly of the
fallen figure; and it marks symbolically the con¬
trasted physical and spiritual states of the two
Brothers - the perturbation of ecstasy In the one,
the mingled awe and thankfulness in the other who,
unsharing, witnesses it.
In a word, the effect of the chiaroscuro, almost
superseding colour, in this picture, is expressly
psychological, and is in harmony with the mystical
import of the subject. It belongs, without doubt,
to a very advanced stage in de la Tour's use of
light and of darkness as primary elements or
materials of his design.
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Clearly, the lighting in this picture is at once a fact ana. a
value, an observable, describable physical feature presented
as the solution to an artistic problem. By treating the fea¬
ture in terms of its aesthetic value, Fumess discovers the
nature of this problem and is therefore able to understand
(appreciate) de la Tour's solution. In relation to this fea¬
ture, his description not only tells what is in the painting
but also why it is therej since the reasons he offers are from
an aesthetic point of view satisfactory, his remarks imply a
favourable critical judgement, at least in regard to the light¬
ing of the picture.
What appears to be the main difficulty about critical argu¬
ment is that it cannot be decided by observation whether cer¬
tain statements rightly characterize the work of art about
which they are asserted. It must be admitted that statements
of high evaluative power do not usually, in themselves, clearly
imply the observations relevant to determining their correct¬
ness. In itself, the statement "In a word, the effect of the
chiaroscuro, almost superseding colour, in this picture, is ex¬
pressly psychological, and is in harmony with the mystical im¬
port of the subject" leaves some doubt as to the observations
that might confirm the judgement it asserts* But this diffi¬
culty is not insuperable, nor is it peculiar to critical dis¬
course. It can be shown that when any critical statement is
understood in relation to the other statements which support
it, the context will make plain what observations are required
in order to test the statement. In the present oase, the
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claim that de la Tour's use of chiaroscuro Is "In harmony with
the mystical Import of the subject" must be understood In the
light of the Interpretation of the artist's subject given in
the second, paragraph, and it must be tested by the specific ob¬
servations indicated by the statements of high descriptive power
given in the first. This mutual dependence of statements is
characteristic of scientific discourse also; not all of the
statements of natural science are observational statements by
any means. Many of them are meaningful only in relation to
the other statements with which they are associated in exposi¬
tion; and many of them are not directly verifiable, but rely up¬
on other statements which are amenable to empirical tests.
The attempt to describe critical argument as resting upon a
sound and respectable intellectual basis should not be dis¬
couraged because the observations relevant to supporting its
judgements are not pure empirical observations, The assertion
of critical statements presupposes critical judgement, and cri¬
tical judgement requires a technical knowledge of the art with
which the critic professes to deal. Technical competence is
also required in natural science, where simple perception, how¬
ever accurate, unaided by theory and uncontrolled by hypotheses
would yield few informative remarks. That critics are con¬
cerned with a particular aspect of the things that they write
about, namely with aesthetic value, raises no barrier against
discriminating between cogent critical argument and the re¬
verse. It is only if one supposes that observation from the
point of view which is appropriate for verifying empirical
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propositions Is the only legitimate kind that critical state¬
ments will be regarded m recalcitrant to the test of observa¬
tion. Since critics do not describe physical properties as
such, do not report facts, no on© should despair because their
statements cannot be subjected to the same kind of tost as oan
statements which do. To make the observations necessary to
deciding qpon the correctness of a critical Judgement requires
critical Judgement, But this is only to say that a certain
kind of expertaess Is required for an intelligent reading of
critical literature. Different kinds of expertneae are essen¬
tial for understanding other kinds of discourse, The important
differences between critical discourse and other kinds provide
no reason for saying that critical assertion is based exclusive¬
ly upon taste or caprice or emotion or any other subjective fac¬
tor not present in the formulation of other kinds of propo¬
sitions, Such a conclusion results from the attempt to submit
critical remarks to Inappropriate tests and the quite arbitrary
claim that only the teats of correctness employed in pure and
empirical science can distinguish true assertion from false and
valid inference from invalid,
411 critical statements characterise a work of art's obser¬
vable features from the point of view of aesthetic value, They
are distinguished from empirical statements in that the kind of
Information they provide is not factual but rather information
about the aesthetic value of things. They are distinguished
from rhetoric and imperatives and expressions of ©motion in
that they claim to make defensible assertions about objects.
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Ana the"/ aro distinguished from statements about imperceptible
non-natural features In that they are about the observable fea¬
tures of works of art,65 The observations upon which critical
statements are grounded involve aesthetic judgement (Just as
diagnostic statements based upon observation of a patient re¬
quire nodical Judgement5, and reasoned agreement or disagree-
meat with a critical statement also demands aesthetic Judge¬
ment, Thus the assertion and testing' of critical statements
ultimately depends upon observation in a straightforward sense
of that word, although not upon the simple perception of sensi¬
ble properties without regard for their aesthetic value* The
supposed, difficulty that certain critical statements (those
which are called here statements of high evaluative power) do
not indicate what observations would be relevant to testing
then is overcome by construing then in relation to those other
statements (called here statements of high descriptive power),
with which thoy are joined in critical argument, which do en¬
tail the relevant critical observations. Having disposed of
the misleading' logical distinction which out critical state¬
ments off from on© another, critical arguments can now be con¬
ceived of as homogenous, coherent units; the internal logical
relations between critical statements can be described, and
the work of art can b© restored to its rightful place as the
referent of critical assertion. Although a detailed analysis
designed to test my theory of critical argument is reserved for
the next chapter, jay conception of critical statements may b©
given additional support here by examining a short critique of
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Vermser's The hove Letter.
The passage is from Part Four ("Aftermath of the Absolute")
of Andrrf Malraux's The /oioes of Silence.He is discussing
Seventeenth Century hutch painting in terms of the effect upon
art of the Reformation and the Enlightenment, attempting to
show how revolutionary changes in the "Socio - religious" con-
ception of the world was reflected in the characteristic style
and subject matter of the hutch school"If he was to make
good, the Protestant painter of those days needed either to
display genius or to make shift 'with values of a non-spiritual
order: to belong to the aristocratic school of English painting
or to the bourgeois school of contemporary Holland. Thus he
applied himself to exploring a world, still in the making, of
the non-religious, and this was the contribution that he made
68
to European art." Malraux accounts for the failure of many
Dutch painters (Lastman, Elshelmer, Boel and Aert de Gel&er,
for instance) after Rembrandt to achieve more than a minor ex¬
cellence in terms of "the fewness of subjects and their repeti-
fciveness.*^ "Their realism had a narrow range; apart from
landscape, all they did was to raise to a slightly higher level
the tavern picture, the conversation piece, the dinner-party or
gay-life scene,... What they depicted was the hollowness of the
world, though, as is the way with an art which aspires to
decorate the home, they camouflaged its hollowness with the
anecdotal and the sentimental."The grounds of this judge¬
ment lie in the contextual background of Halraux's history of
art. In order to fully understand the meaning of (the reasons
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for) these remarks, on© must master the conceptual scheme of
his exposition. This is too complicated to formulate in the
space available here, but some notion of the point of vim-? from
which Malraux criticizes the Vermeer must be given.
Malraux has been arguing that with the weakening of the re¬
ligious impulse that had inspired the greatest Italian art,
painters had to find some new set of values to serve as the
dominant stimulus of their art. The values Implicit in the
Dutch painting which h© judges to be less than great were the
social values of the burgher society of Holland, He charac¬
terizes these works as charming, anecdotal, and sentimental,
and wishes to show that the best of Yermeer's work is distin¬
guished from them on all three counts because Veriaeer had rea¬
lized "that the depletion of a world devoid of value can be
magnificently justified by an artist who treats painting it¬
self as the supreme value."^ What he attempts to show about
the painting he criticizes is that Yermeer was not primarily
concerned with recording a charming seen© of Dutch home life,
nor with suggesting a sentimental story, but rather with
making a composition whose value is Independent of its merits
as illustration or its suggestiveness of real-life situations.
Neither Malraux's historical explanation of the new style
and subject matter which appeared in Holland in the Seventeenth
Century, nor his judgement of the representative painters of
that school are here in question. Nor, for that matter, is
the criterion of value implicit in his discussion of this pic¬
ture in question. In order to test the strength of Malraux1s
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argument that this canvas exemplifies "the transfiguration of
the world into painting"^2 (i.e., a dominant concern with for¬
mal values) and that it shows how "Vermeer ushered in a new
phase of arfc,"^ one would have to range far over the history
of art and over aesthetic theory. The adequacy of the cri¬
terion he uses would invite discussion If the cogency of his
argument for the value of The Love Letter was in question here.
But at this point I wish only to Illustrate the view of critical
statements that I have been presenting, and to support my descrip¬
tion of them by showing how they perform in Kalraux's argument,
The scene is framed in an abstract foreground, the
left part of which (despite the oblique line) links
up with the curtain, the chair and the wall, which
blend into each other almost indistingulshably. The
Intimlsts would have treated this spatial recession
corridor-wise, according to the canons of a set per¬
spective and with graduated values; Vermeer uses the
wall at the back as a backeloth defining the picture
space. Between the two planes, back and front,
treating this space as a cube, he paints the servant -
to whom the broadness of the style and the intensity
of the tones impart the solidity of a caryatid - and
the woman playing the lute, whose paradoxically mass¬
ive lightness and almost bovine gaze make us forget
that her face is constructed like the faces of the
Young Woman with a Water Jug and the Woman Weighing
Pearls. The tile's extending from the door to the
two women and harmonizing so well with the slippers
and domestic objects which create a ifell-defined
depth, might symbolize this architecturally ordered
schema. The letter has no importance, and the woman
none. Nor has the world In which letters are dor
livered; all has been transmuted into paintingJ*
The first sentence might be taken as expressing descriptive
propositions, and assuredly it does describe certain features
of the work. But it describes them from a particular point of
view, from the point of view of an observer whose perceptions
are controlled by his interest in the aesthetic relationships
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of what he observes. Malraux does not report facts based up¬
on observation of empirical properties; his remarks presuppose
a judgement of the value within the composition of the features
to which his remarks refer. His characterization (description
and evaluation) of the relation of the left foreground to the
right involves a judgement which requires, for one thing, a
technical knowledge of colour harmony. The statement "The
scene is framed in an abstract foreground," which certainly im¬
parts descriptive information, does not make the kind of asser¬
tion that an empirical scientist would make - much less the
kind of statement that would be made in order to express or to
arouse emotion or to issue a command. It provides information
relevant to deciding upon The hove Letter's value and to dis¬
tinguishing it from certain other realistically pictorial works.
The second sentence draws out this critically relevant impli¬
cation of the first by Illustrating the difference between
Vermeer's style and the others1. The term 'abstract', as used
here, is a critic's adjective; whether or not it is correctly
used must be settled by observation; but the observer must have
sufficient technical knowledge of painting to be able to dis¬
tinguish between an abstract treatment and one employing
illusionist perspective. In order to appreciate the evalua¬
tive significance of the statement, he must understand Malraux's
conception of the development of painting well enough to know
that the term 'abstract' denotes a feature of the painting
marking a new stylistic departure which reflects the introduc¬
tion of a new conception of the kind of value that painting
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must sew©*
The statements of the first sentence, then, have both des¬
criptive and evaluative for00, and their correctness may be as¬
certain©!! by any observer possessed of an understanding of the
concepts used in Halraux1 s critical history of art and of the
technical knowledge required for understanding the formal re¬
lationships of a composition. The descriptive power of these
statements le obvious enough; it is their evaluative foroe that
might he overlooked through neglecting the function assigned to
them in this contest, namely to distinguish Vomoer1s style
from that of his contemporaries and predeoeasors by showing
that he anticipated developments- which culminated In the "modern
art®^5 0f our own time. On the other hand, whereas the evalua¬
tive force of "all has been transmuted into painting" is clear
enough, the remark may seem to b© lacking descriptive power.
The remark expresses approval of Verseer's not having subordi¬
nated the purely painterly concern with the formal values of
his composition to literal representation and anecdotal interest.
The statement's descriptive power derives from the context;
road out of context, the statement not only fails to provide
any descriptive information but also to sake any intelligible
assertion whatsoever. Interpreted against its contextual
background, this concluding remark is seen to be a compendium
of the particular descriptions and evaluations provided by the
preceding remarks. In itself, it appears to entail no observa¬
tions relevant to testing its appropriateness. Taken in con¬
junction with the statements of higher descriptive power from
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which it is derived, it leave® no doubt as to the characteris¬
tics of the painting to which it refers, One must first
understand that by this statement Malraux means that in build¬
ing up the picture Veraeer has not been distracted by con¬
sideration of realism, charm, or sentimentality from giving
that highly stylized rendering of his subject which the formal
design of his composition, requires. Thus the statement, when
clarified, can certainly be tested by the observations of any¬
one capable of making discriminations between the style of
Vermeer and that of Bool, say, or of Aerfc d@ Qelder. Assis¬
tance is given for ascertaining: just what observations are rele¬
vant to the concluding statement by the statements of higher
descriptive power which precedes "he paints the servant - to
who® the broadness of the style and the intensity of the tones
impart the solidity of a caryatid" is an example.
The higher the descriptive power of a critical statement
the more specifically are the observations relevant to testing
it indicated. The higher the evaluative power of a critical
statement the more clearly is the critic's appraisal of the
work revealed. Critical statements are not, however, distin¬
guishable in a clear-cut way as performing on© or the other of
two different functions, that of providing information about
the work of art and that of providing, information about th©
critic's appraisal of it, Statements of high descriptive
power are th© result of critical judgement; th© features that
th© critic chooses to mention and the way that he characterises
them are determined by Ms evaluative, not purely fact-reporting,
f$k
procedure» His value judgements are implicit in his descrip¬
tions . On the other hand, statements cf high evaluative
power are equally about the work of art. they are based upon
critical observations of works of art (i.e., observations di¬
rected and controlled by an Interest in the aesthetic value of
what is observed), and they are to be confirmed by the critical
observations which they, in conjunction with the statements of
higher descriptive power from which they ar© derived, entail.
The descriptive import of the statements which support them is
implicit in them, as in natural science particular descriptive
statements are implicit in an empirical generalization. Those
statements which comprise descriptive and evaluative power in
nearly equal degree - those which, according to the operative
metaphor of this theory, fall midway on the descriptive-evalua¬
tive scale - best illustrate th© dual function, of all critical
statements and the way that it is combined, in a single remark.
Kalraux*t paragraph supplies an example of such a statement:
"The tiles extending from the door to th© two women and har¬
monizing so well with th© slippers and domestic objects which
create a well-defined depth, might symbolize this architec¬
turally ordered schema.*
4 description of the logical structure of critical argu¬
ment may now b® given on th© basis of the foregoing conception
of critical statements. The problem is simply to explain how
the statements of a piece of critical writing are related,
Bidding critical discourse of the misleading distinction
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between statements of fact and statements of value has removed
the main obstacle to solving this problem. The logical prin¬
ciples involved in coherent critical argument can now be ex¬
plained by showing how transitions are made from statements of
high descriptive power to statements of high evaluative power.
Chapter 5
Critical Argument
This inquiry into the logical structure of critical dis¬
course is designed to set forth the conditions underlying the
inferences made within critical argument. References have
been made to most of these conditions in the previous chapters,
and the main point of this chapter is to bring these scattered
remarks together in a brief and coherent explanation of how-
statements of high evaluative power can be inferred from state¬
ments of high descriptive power. The key to this explanation
of critical inference is provided by a principle derived from
the conception of critical statements as constituting a con¬
tinuous range rather than as occupying one or the other of two
logically distinct classes. According to this principle,
evaluations are implicit in statements of high descriptive
power, and descriptions are implicit in statements of high
evaluative power. The logical coherence of a critical argu¬
ment is a function of the consistency of its statements. And
the question of whether one statement is consistent with an¬
other in the same argument can be analysed into the question
of whether the descriptive element and the evaluative element
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of the first statement is consistent with the descriptive ele¬
ment and the evaluative element, respectively, of the second.
In so far as it Is ever possible to decide whether or not the
meanings of different statements of whatever kind are consis¬
tent, it is also always theoretically possible to decide
whether the meaning of two or more critical statements are con¬
sistent. This means that it is theoretically possible to de¬
termine whether a statement in which a critical judgement is
explicitly asserted is consistent with another statement in
which the judgement is implied. And thus it is possible to
describe the relations between critical statements as logical
relations, and to exhibit the conditions which permit of a
distinction betiAreen valid and invalid inference in critical
discourse.
Either one or the other of two contradictory assumptions
may underlie any expression of dissatisfaction with the cogency
of critical argument. A writer may object that some particular
critical judgement has not been justified. Or he may complain
that no critical judgement whatever can be justified. In the
first case it is implied that critical judgements can in princi¬
ple be justified, but in the second case just this claim is ex¬
pressly denied. It will be Instructive to ask with what an
'unjustified' critical judgement Is being contrasted in both
cases.
In the first case it is quite obviously being contrasted
with critical judgements supported by logically adequate argu¬
ment. It Is Implied that in the rejected argument the
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statements advanced to support the Judgement are untrue or
irrelevant, or that the criteria of value to which appeal is
made are Irrelevant or inadequate, that the statements are in¬
consistent, or that the argument is in some other way defec¬
tive. Such allegations have point only if the possibility of
constructing a critical argument free of these defects is ad¬
mitted. And this admission must be freely made by anyone who
argues seriously about the justification of any particular
critical judgement.
But anyone who denies the possibility of logically justi¬
fying any critical judgement is plainly not contrasting the
'unjustified' critical judgement with any other critical judge¬
ment. He is, apparently, contrasting it with judgements of
quite a different kind about which he thinks it is proper to
speak of logical justification. His charge that critical
judgements are logically incorrigible is based upon the dis¬
covery that critical arguments do not exhibit certain logical
characteristics recognized as essential to cogent reasoning in
other fields of discourse. This discovery is certainly in¬
teresting, but it does not warrant restricting the notion of
logieal justification to certain chosen fields of discourse.
The view that whereas a scientist's or a mathematician's argu¬
ment may be cogent a critic's can at best be merely convincing
rests uneasily upon preference for certain sets of logical
rules to the exclusion of all others. There is a difference
between rational and irrational talk by critics and the notion
of logical justification is indispensable for marking it. It
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Is not easy to believe that anyone who reads critical litera¬
ture as expert discourse on the value of works of art doubts
that this is a genuine and important difference. It is aban¬
doned only by philosophers disposed to insist upon the
superiority of methods quite inappropriate for criticism.
The logical dogma that sanctions appraising all kinds of
argument according to the standards derived from one has caused
needless anxiety not only about the respectability of critical
discourse. The so-called 'problem' of induction as sometimes
formulated is a product of this pernicious reasoning. In re¬
cent times more than one writer has argued the polntlessness
of objecting that inductive inference does not satisfy the re¬
quirements of deductive inference,"*" It is equally beside the
point to complain that critical inferences are not made accord¬
ing to the rules governing the inferences of either empirical
or exact science.
Describing the long history of attempts to 'justify' induc¬
tion, Max Black remarks on the neglect of what Is meant by
'justification'. !!It should have been made clear," he says,
"for instance that 'justification' is a relational notion,
whose exact specification varies with the type of standard of
justification to which appeal is to be made. Where no stan¬
dard of justification is acceptable, the notion of justifi¬
cation becomes vacuous; where divergent standards are accepted,
different, but not necessarily conflicting types of justifi¬
cation will be sought."2 He points out that from Hume onward
scepticism about justifying induction arose from the Inevitable
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failure to show that Inductive inference satisfies a deductive
standard of justification, and asks "what reasonable ground
can be given for arguing from the mere difference of two things
to the lesser cognitive value of either term of the inequa¬
tion?"^ This is the question that must be asked of philoso¬
phers who would exclude discourse about aesthetic value from
the realm of meaningful, informative, objective assertion be¬
cause it does not conform to the logical pattern of discourse
of some other kind. Black attributes the persuasiveness of
sceptical arguments against the possibility of justifying induc¬
tion to equivocation between "'justification1 in a 'common' or
'everyday' or 'practical* sense to that of 'justification' in
some 'strict* or deductive sense.Precisely this kind of
equivocation accounts for the plausibility of the claim that
critical statements about a work's value are, unlike scien¬
tific statements, neither right nor wrong. When representa¬
tive arguments for this view were considered in the last chap¬
ter (pp. 194-195), it was found that by 'meaning', 'signifi¬
cance', 'having sense', neither Carnap nor Ayer meant what is
ordinarily meant by these terms but were using them in a
technical sense appropriate for contrasting genuine empirical
statements with pseudo-empirical statements. Since critical
statements happen not to be empirical statements at all, these
terms, in this technical sense, have no application to criti¬
cal remarks. Nor is the standard according to which they
would be applied relevant to critical discourse.
What is required is a standard for critical argument by
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reference to which justified critical judgements can he dis¬
tinguished from unjustified ones. Almost nothing has been
done toward providing such a standard, and one of the main
causes of this omission is the unreasonable discouragement
that has followed the discovery that critical argument does not
satisfy the standards of totally different kinds of argument.
To attempt to lay down the rules for cogent critical argument
would be an ambitious project, and if it Is not to take the
form of arbitrary legislation, it must be preceded by a patient
study of the logical structure of extant criticism* It is
commonly believed (and it seems most unlikely that the belief
is wholly groundless) that not all arguments for critical
judgements are equally cogent. An attempt to discover the
logical characteristics which distinguish cogent critical argu¬
ment from its opposite would appear to be a legitimate assign¬
ment for philosophical aesthetics. The modest contribution of
this thesis to such a project consists in pointing the need of
investigating criticism as a unique form of argument, removing
some elementary confusions between it and other forms of dis¬
course, and in describing some of its more rudimentary charac¬
teristics,
The character of any description is determined by the pur¬
pose for which the thing or event is described. The kind of
information that a writer wants to provide about a thing deter¬
mines what features it is relevant for him to deal with and the
kind of language appropriate for denoting them. A critical
description of a work of art characterizes the work's
Zk-2
observable features in terras of value. The selection of fea¬
tures for mention, and the terms used to characterise them,
are determined by the critic's Intention of communicating his
aesthetic judgement of the work of art discussed. Therefore,
every feature of a ivork of art mentioned by a critic is men¬
tioned because it is taken to be relevant to the question of
the work's aesthetic value.. And the language used about these
features, although often deceptively 'factual' in appearance,
bears a constant reference to the aesthetic value of what it
denotes.
Critical literature provides countless illustrations of the
evaluations implicit in statements of high descriptive power.
In the following paragraph, the writer's value judgement is not
explicitly stated, but it is unmistakably implicit in his cri¬
tical description:
The Moscow vysofcnye 2da.nla or "tall buildings"
bear a marked resemblance to New York's 1913
Woolworth building, but to Woolworth Gothic the
Soviet architects added ornaments borrowed from
classical sources, and some of their own devising.
Thus all eight vysotnye carry tall spires mounting
garlanded Eed Stars and as many Doric and Romanes¬
que pilasters, rococo arches, turrets, flying
buttresses, roof-pergolas, asparagus-shaped domes,
gingerbread plaques and ferro-concrete statuary as
the construction will stand.5
All of the statements in that paragraph are perfectly satis¬
factory as description. Everything that they assert about the
Moscow buildings is open to confirmation by any observer who
understands the architectural terms employed. Nevertheless,
the writer's aesthetic judgement of the buildings is clearly
implied by his description of them. The features of the
2^3
buildings that he has chosen to mention and the terms he has
applied to them have been determined by his purpose of communi¬
cating his critical judgement. These statements clearly imply
an unfavourable critical judgement. Such statements are able
to imply an aesthetic judgement because they are based upon
observations made from the point of view of a preoccupation
with aesthetic value. The critic's evaluations are implicit
in his statements of high descriptive power. That they are
so is a necessary condition of critical inference.
An understanding of this first condition of inferring a
statement of high evaluative power from statements of high de¬
scriptive poi^rer is essential to an accurate conception of the
structure of critical argument. It yields an explanation of
the logical relations between statements, which inquiries
operating with a false notion of critical statements found an
insoluble problem. The problem was to show how statements of
high evaluative power, statements which explicitly assert the
critic's judgement of a work's value, could be derived accord¬
ing; to any logical principle from statements of high descrip¬
tive power, statements which record the critic's observations
of the work. So long as the latter kind of statements x?ere
taken to be statements of fact, the assertion of pure empiri¬
cal propositions, their ability to provide the grounds for the
assertion of a value judgement remained logically unaccountable.
But when it is recognized that these statements are making
covert assertions about the aesthetic value of what is observed,
it can be understood that the statements of high evaluative
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power Inferred from them are merely rendering explicit the
evaluations implicit in them. From the critical description
of the Moscow buildings quoted above, for instance, statements
of higher evaluative power can be inferred. 'These buildings
are imitative of outmoded styles, incongruously incorporating
the features of many styles, and periods', 'They are excessive¬
ly decorated', are examples of statements which assert the cri¬
tic' s aesthetic judgement of the buildings more explicitly and
which are consistent with the evaluative Import of his pri¬
marily descriptive remarks.
In Chapter I I argued against the view that a statement
from which no imperative can be derived is not genuinely
evaluative. Since being expounded by Carnap, Ayer, and
Stevenson, this view has more recently been put forth by P. H.
Nowell-Smlth and R, M. Hare, Both of them have inherited the
principle (inspired and sustained by a failure to distinguish
between the function of moral statements and of critical
statements) that all value statements provide an answer to the
question, 'What shall I do?'^ Since Hare's objection to the
kind of solution I am proposing to the problem of the logical
relationship of critical statements depends upon this princi¬
ple, it will be convenient to consider his argument again here.
In The Language of Morals the logical problem of evalua¬
tive discourse is posed in this fashion. From an argument
consisting of purely factual statements no Imperative can be
derived; the argument provides no "reason for doing some¬
thing,"'' and is therefore not evaluative. On the other hand,
2^5
an argument that begins from a supposedly self-evident moral
principle is in no better position to conclude with an impera¬
tive j in the major premise which states the self-evident princl-
pie the predicate must function as a value term, and in the
minor which asserts something to b© the case it must function
as a descriptive term. A deduction from such premises in¬
volves a fallacy of an ambiguous middle term and is therefore
invalid.
Hare then discusses attempts, of which my theory of criti¬
cal implication is an instance, to go between the horns of this
dilemna by way of a principle of inference less rigorous than
the traditional one of logical entailment.^ His explanation
of the genesis of this type of theory is applicable to the one
I am developing here: "Let us first glance at the history of
this type of theory. It Is, I think, clear that its immediate
origins are to bs found in the attack by writers of the verlfl-
cationist school upon ethics Qand aesthetics} as a branch of
philosophyThe method of the theories he has in mind
differs from my own, and the differences are worth noting.
"The theory is intended to save ethics £aesthetics} from this
attack by showing that moral Qcritical} judgements are, after
all, good empirical propositions, only their method of verifi¬
cation is different from, and somewhat looser than, that of or¬
dinary fact - stating sentences. Thus they are indeed inferr¬
able from observations of fact, but in a looser way."*1-0 1
wish to maintain not that critical judgements are "good empiri¬
cal propositions" but that they are statements of a unique
2^6
kind, and not that they are "inferrable from observations of
fact" but rather that the phrase "observations of fact" used
with reference to critical discourse is misleading when con¬
trasted with 'judgement of value'. Nevertheless, Hare's argu¬
ment is worth considering here. It reveals in a striking
manner, although unintentionally, that Important difference be¬
tween moral discourse (as he conceives of it) and critical dis¬
course which rules out an objection which might otherwise be
brought against my theory.
A statement, however loosely it is bound to the
facts, cannot answer a question of the form 'What
shall I do? * * only a command can do this. There¬
fore, if we insist that moral judgements are nothing
but loose statements of fact, we preclude them from
fulfilling their main function; for their main func¬
tion is to regulate conduct, and they can do this
only if they are interpreted in such a way us to
have imperative or prescriptive force. Since I am
not concerned here with moral judgements as such,
I shall leave till later the question 'How is the
prescriptive force of moral judgements related to
the descriptive function which they also normally
have?' I am concerned here with the more funda¬
mental problem of what sorts of reasoning can have
as their end product answers to questions of the
form 'What shall I do?' .... Here it will suffice
to show why, although prescription and description
may be combined in the same judgement, description
is not and never can. be prescription. In other
words, I am going to give reasons for holding that
by no form of inference, however loose, can we get
an answer to the question 'What shall I do?1 out
of a set of premisses which do not contain, at any
rate implicitly, an imperative."11
If critical arguments were construed as concluding with a
"prescription" (a command), Hare's objections would be as
telling against the notion of critical implication as they are
against the notion of evaluative inference Introduced into
ethics. (Just how telling is beside the point, since the
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oogenoy of the moral theories he discusses is not in question.)
But the "main function" of criticism is not 8to regulate con¬
duct ," and a theory of Inference designed to explain the re¬
lations of the statements of critical discourse is Immune to
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his attack. The view that the aim of all moral argument is
to arrive at an imperative may be an useful hypothesis for the
study of the logic of moral discourse. But a logic founded
upon this view could not explain the structure of critical argu¬
ments . For they have a different aim, and their study requires
another hypothesis.
The transitions from statement to statement within a criti¬
cal argument, then, do not involve inferring statements of one
kind from a set of statements of a logically distinct kind.
They involve rendering more and more explicit the evaluations
implicit in those statements which are essentially descriptive
in import. One of the standards that a critical argument must
satisfy, therefore, requires that the evaluation of a work of
art asserted in the statements of high evaluative power be con¬
sistent with the evaluation implied in the statements of high
descriptive power,
A passage from Tovay's criticism of William Walton's Viola
Concerto may now be examined for evidence of the condition
which I have described as underlying critical inference:
The concerto begins with two bars of orchestral
introduction,,,. The viola enters with a broad
lyric melody in A minor. The collision between
C sharp in the accompaniment and the C natural in
the melody is bold, but it is resolved in the
classical way. Nevertheless it is destined to
become an unresolved thing in itself mid, as such,
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to be the initial and final motto of th© whole
work.... Clot's first appearance.,.is at high
pitch In the course of a sequence that sweeps
round a whole enharmonic circle of keys. But
th© figure soon detaches itself as an individual
actor in the drama, and claims derivation from
the first two notes of Cthe introductory melody
in A minor}*
What may be conveniently called the second sub¬
ject, ..first appears in D minor.
Its essential feature is the colling of a se¬
quential figure across the rhythm and across the
harmony at ©vary sort of angle. Its transforma¬
tions are shorn in every subsequent canlabile that
is not derived from [[the introductory melody in
A minor}, Another new figure originates most of
th© rapid passages in th© sequel, and from it, if
we wish to us© classical terminology, the develop¬
ment may be said to begin, introductory
melody} becomes fierce in an entirely now rhythm
which, sometimes reduced to monotone and ragtime,
alternates dramatically with developments of £th©
second subject} , which steadily grows in beauty
and pathos. As the drama unfolds, the motto,♦,
asserts Itself. Th© last phase of th© develop¬
ment is introduced when the viola makes its ©sit
with Cthe new figure which followed the introduc¬
tion of the second subject}, and the orchestra,
entering.,.in ominous agitation on th© dominant of
C sharp minor, rouses Itself to tragic passion,
and with gram classioal breadth works its way
round to the home dominant, and so to a pathetic
slow decline in which the later figures of the
main theme...are heard solemnly augmented.
Over the still reverberating dominant pedal th©
viola re-enters with a two-part version of the ...
introductory bars, expanded into a short cadenza
and leading to the return of [the opening melody
in A minor). While the viola breaks into a
running accompaniment, the melody, softly delivered
in a higher octave, makes a single, simple state¬
ment rounded off with a pathetic cadence, and the
viola adds a line of ooda alluding to ([the second
subject in D minor} and ending with the motto.
The whole movement must convince ©very listener as
a masterpiece of form in its freedom and precision,
besides showing pathos of a high order,A3
The favourable judgement of this movement explicitly asser¬
ted in Tovey's concluding sentence is implicit in his critical
description of it. Evidence of each of the ©valuations of
2^9
this triadic judgement can be discerned in the preceding state¬
ments of higher descriptive power. The predicate ("a master¬
piece of form in its freedom and precision") ascribes to the
movement as a whole general characteristics which have been de¬
termined by certain particular features. Thus the critical
point of certain statements made about particular features be¬
comes apparent only when it is realized that they are intended
to evaluate these features as contributing toward the entire
movement as "a masterpiece of form in its freedom and pre¬
cision." In the statement "The collision between C sharp in
the accompaniment and the C natural in the melody is bold,"
the predicate "bold" ascribes to the feature cited a quality
that is compatible with a movement judged to have the aesthetic
value Tovey assigns to it. One could not infer without contra¬
diction from that statement that the form of the movement was
'academic* or 'inflexible*. Nor could one infer from the re¬
mark that the dissonance "is resolved in the classical way" that
the form of the movement was characterised by 'slackness' or
♦looseness' or 'want of technical competence'. In describing
the nature of the resolution that Walton effects, Tovey Implies
the factor of preoision.
An examination of Tovey's other statements of high descrip¬
tive power shows that they all function in the same way. They
characterize some feature of the concerto in terms which are
consistent with the descriptively vague (because highly general)
but evaluatively powerful terms applied to the form of the move¬
ment as a whole by the statement of highest evaluative power.
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Tovey's critical description of the motto's first appearance
being "at high pitch in the course of a sequence that sweeps
round a tuhole enharmonic circle of keys" is consistent with
his critical judgement of the movement as being; "a masterpiece
in its freedom." This evaluation is implicit in the primarily
descriptive remark and also in these: "It's essential feature
is the coiling of a sequential figure across the rhythm and
across the harmony at every sort of angle." "£The introductory
melody 3 becomes fierce in an entirely new rhythm which, some¬
times reduced to monotone and ragtime, alternates dramatically
with developments of fthe second subject} The compati¬
bility of the evaluative import of all Tovey's statements is
evident throughout the argument. The judgement of the move¬
ment "as a masterpiece of form in its precision" merely renders
explicit an evaluation implied by Tovey's previous remarks of
higher descriptive force: "Its transformations are shown in
every subsequent cantabile that is not derived from £the intro¬
ductory melody in A minor} " [Tjhe orchestra ... with grand
classical breadth works its way round to the home dominant."
Similarly, Tovey's judgement of the movement as "showing pathos
of a high order" is inferable from the evaluative element of
foregoing statements: "[T}he orchestra, entering.,. in ominous
agitation on the dominant of C sharp minor, rouses itself to
tragic passion, and with grand classical breadth works its way
round to the home dominant, and so to a pathetic slow decline
in which the later figures of the main theme ... are heard
solemnly augmented." "While the viola breaks into a running
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accompaniment, the melody, softly delivered in a higher octave,
makes a single, simple statement rounded off with a pathetic
cadence..,"
This analysis is intended only to reveal a necessary con¬
dition of cogent critical inference. The satisfaction of this
condition is not in itself sufficient to guarantee the cogency
of any critical argument. However, any critical argument that
does not satisfy this condition (which requires that the evalua¬
tions asserted in its statements of high evaluative power be
consistent with the evaluations Implicit in its statements of
high descriptive power) can be rejected as Involving aaIf-con¬
tradiction. The logical rule made available through an under¬
standing of this condition may serve, therefore, to discredit
a critical argument but not to sanction one.
The analysis invites a series of objections. It may be
argued that the rule is useless because there is no test
available for distinguishing between critical arguments whose
statements are consistent in their evaluative implications and
critical arguments whose statements are not. Because of the
imprecision and flexibility of ordinary language, the question
of whether the implications of two different statements are the
same or not is not a question that can ever be answered with
assurance m any particular Instance. It will almost always
be possible to make a fairly plausible claim for the consis¬
tency of the evaluations implied in on© statement with those
implied in another. But there will be no way to prove either
this contention or its contradictory. Argument on such a
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question cannot be expected to rise above the level of incon¬
clusive disputation about the meaning of highly ambiguous words.
This objection does not rest upon secure semantical ground.
Ordinary language is admittedly flexible and, compared with the
language of exact science, even imprecise. But the flexi¬
bility and imprecision of the language used in criticism ('ordi¬
nary' language for the most part) is not so radical as to make
it impossible to determine whether two statements are consis¬
tent or not. The words 'beautiful1, 'splendid', 'superb',
•exquisite', 'sublime', 'ugly1, 'repulsive', 'wretched', 'offen¬
sive', and 'pedestrian' are all 'flexible' in that they may all
be used in an innumerable number of contexts and applied to an
unlimited variety of things or situations. And they are 'im¬
precise', potentially, in that the fine distinctions in meaning
between some of them may be blurred by careless use, or in that
any one of them may be used injudiciously upon occasion.
Nevertheless, if all of these words were predicated (in the
above order) of one thing or event, it would be possible to
recognize the first five assertions as being compatible with
one another and the last five as being similarly compatible,
and also to recognize any one of the first five assertions as
being incompatible with any one of the last five. There is,
therefore, no defect inherent in the language that critics use
to prevent discrimination between arguments whose statements
are consistent and those whose statements are not.
It might be argued that an insuperable barrier against
showing that the statement of a critical judgement and its
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supporting statements are logically related Is Illustrated by
Tovey ' s argument and that ay analysis has missed the point of
It. Even if it oould be shovm that the evaluative import of
all Tovey*s statements are consistent, it does not follow that
the critical judgement explicitly asserted in his concluding
remark is warranted by his preceiling remarks or that it could
be inferred from them. The claim made for the value of the
concerto in Tovey's concluding sentence certainly appears to
be stronger than any entailed by his previous remarks, And
It seems that a reader who agreed with all the other statements
might dissent from th© last without contradicting himself. If
this possibility is admitted, the claim that the statement of
highest evaluative power is implied by (or inferred from), or
In any way logically derived from the statements of high de¬
scriptive power, must, apparently, be forfeited.
This objection is based upon a conception of critical argu¬
ment contrary to the one maintained throughout this thesis.
Specifically it is based upon a theory of logical consequence
ouch as Abraham Kaplan lucidly formulated in his essay "On
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the So-called Crisis in Criticism8:
Among the facts described are some which are
the defined equivalents of the appraised value
character. The aesthetic value of th© object
consists in its possession of certain properties,
so that the statement that it has those proper¬
ties entails that it is aesthetically valuable,
The premise cannot b© affirmed and the con¬
clusion denied without contradiction.l5
Kaplan's clear statement of what anyone holding an entailment
theory of the logical relationship between critical statements
is committed to brings the alleged weakness of my argument in¬
to sharp focus. I wish to maintain that there is a logical
relationship! an implicative relationship, between the state¬
ments of a critical argument which permits the inference of
statements of high evaluative power from statements of high
descriptive power. 1 am trying to describe some of the con¬
ditions upon which these inferences depend, and to formulate
certain rules of critical inference by which invalid critical
argument can be distinguished from valid. But I am forced to
admit that what Kaplan calls the 'premise' (certain statements
of high descriptive power) may be affirmed and that what he
calls the 'conclusion' (certain statements of high evaluative
power) may at the same time be denied without contradiction.
This admission seems to preclude calling the relationship be¬
tween such statements 'implicative' or 'inferential'.
The defense consists in pointing out that although assent
may be withheld from certain statements while those from which
they were inferred are granted, no statement which is incom¬
patible with the inferred statements could be asserted which
would not also be inconsistent with the statements already
affirmed. What is implied by a set of statements of high des¬
criptive power, or what is legitimately inferable from it, is
not one particular statement of high evaluative power but
rather an indefinite number of statements of high evaluative
power, any one or more of which may be admitted on the basis of
their consistency with the evaluative implications of the pri¬
marily descriptive statements. Denial of a statement of high
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evaluative power inferred from statements of high descriptive
power which are affirmed Involves contradiction only if the
denial entails giving assent to some other statement of high
evaluative power which is incompatible with the first. The
possibility of denying a statement (♦This is not a masterpiece,
but it is certainly very good1) and, without contradiction,
conceding the statements from which it was inferred marks the
difference between syllogistic and critical inferences. This
difference is overlooked in Kaplan's formulation of the logical
entailment theory.
He takes the concluding statement of a critical argument to
b© a deduction from the preceding ones; but this, according to
my view, Is not an apt characterization of its function in the
argument, What is asserted by the last sentence is not a con¬
clusion deduced from a set of promises j the final statement
performs a function logically indistinguishable from that per¬
formed by all the other statements in the argument. It pro¬
vides critical information about the concerto, i.e. it describes
the work in terms of value; but so, according to my view, do
all the other statements. The statement in question, then, is
not related to the others in the same way as a conclusion
arrived at by deductive inference is related to premises. It
is nevertheless logically related to them as part of a coherent
argument, subject to a criterion of consistency which requires
that its evaluative import be compatible with that of the
other statements with which it is Jointly asserted. The no¬
tion of logical compatibility as applying to the statements
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which are asserted within a single argument but which are not
distinguishable as premises and conclusion seems to me to be
perfectly legitimate and indispensable for understanding the
structure of critical argument.
The possibility to which this objection against construing
critical argument as having a logical structure appeals may
therefore be safely admitted: a reader might without contra¬
diction agree with all the statements of Tovey's analysis ex¬
cept the last. But this admission does not commit one to the
view that the statements of a critical argument are not logi¬
cally related, but only to the view that they are not related
as premises to conclusion. It is open to any reader to agree
with some of Tovey's statements and to disagree with others on
the grounds that they make too strong a claim for the aesthetic
value of the movement. Such disagreement raises no logically
interesting question so long as both of the differing evalua¬
tions can be asserted in statements which are consistent with
the prior critical description. To say that the first move¬
ment of Walton's Viola Concerto is 'well constructed' or shows
'considerable technical competence' is quite as consistent with
Tovey's statements of high descriptive power as to say that it
is "a masterpiece of form." What is precluded by the logical
requirement in question is the assertion of statements the
evaluative implications of which are inconsistent.
That one or more of Tovey's statements should make a
'stronger' claim than certain others for the value of the move¬
ment discussed is in accord with the view of critical assertion
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presented here. If the statements within a critical argument
are understood as constituting a continuous range and as
differing in their relative degrees of descriptive and evalua¬
tive force, it is to be expected that some statements will ex¬
press the critic's evaluation more clearly, explicitly, and
forcibly than do others. It does not folloTw from holding
that a critic's evaluations are implicit in his primarily des¬
criptive remarks that his statements of higher evaluative
power do not state his assessment of the work's value with
greater directness, force, and precision. Obviously they do.
If statements of high evaluative power were related to state¬
ments of high descriptive power as conclusions are related to
premises, then they could contain no more evaluative content
than is present in the primarily descriptive remarks. But the
relation in question is not of this kind. It is a relation
between statements all of which are committed to performing the
same dual function of describing and evaluating a work of art,
i.e. of describing it in terms of value. It is perfectly con¬
sistent with the performance of this dual function that the
evaluative force of some statements should be greater than that
of others.
The complaint that the consistency of the evaluative import
of all the statements within a critical argument does not
guarantee the correctness of the inferences from statements of
high descriptive power to statements of high evaluative power
Is therefore without point. For the logical progression of a
critical argument is not such that rules of inference derived
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from other realms of (liscourse can be applied to criticism
without modification, Nevertheless, critical argument is con¬
formable to logical rules which can b© formulated; and the
standard of consistency as set forth here is on© of them. In
making transitions from statement to statement within an argu¬
ment, the critic Is moving toward m over more explicit and com¬
prehensive assertion of his ©valuation of the work* Assessed
In terms of what It is that the critic wants to communicate by
discussing a work of art, his argument must satisfy the standard
of consistency or fail of its purpose, Thus the relation of
any critical statement to the others within the same argument
can properly be described as a logical relation; and the re¬
quirement that Its evaluative implication be consistent with
the evaluative implication of the other statements with which
it is asserted is a logical requirement.
The suggestion that any serious piece of critical writing
could ever fail to satisfy this condition may eaem odd. How¬
ever careless a critic's observation, and however eccentric
his Judgement, he might be expected to keep the evaluative im¬
plications of all Ms statements about a single work consis¬
tent , at least throughout the course of a single argument.
But in fact it is by no means Impossible to find passages of
criticism in which this rule of cogent argument is violated.,
Hlotcoho's paragraph In Beyond Good and Evil on the Prelude
to the Roistersinror o£ MmZ-fam* Is an example:
Once again I have heard Elchard Wagner's Over¬
ture to The Melstorslagor anew - It is magnifi¬
cent, overladen!, difficult, and lata art that
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arrogantly expects a living knowledge of two
centuries of music in order to be understood -
it is an honor to Germans that the expectation
has not been disappointed! What essences and
what forces, what seasons and what points of the
compass are not mingled here! Now it appears
archaic, now unfamiliar and overnew; it is as ar¬
bitrary as it is pompously conventional; it is
not infrequently roguish, and still more frequent¬
ly coarse and crude; it has fire and force and at
the same time the flaccid, sallow skin of fruits
that ripen late. It streams on broad and full;
and suddenly [[there is] a moment of inexplicable
pause, like a hiatus between cause and effect ...
but presently the old stream of pleasure sweeps
and broadens out again - the stream of manifold
pleasures, of old and new delight, a very large
factor in which is the artist's delight in. him¬
self, which he refuses to conceal, his surprised,
happy discovery of the masterfulness of the de¬
vices he is employing, his net?, newly acquired,
untried artistic devices, as he seems to be trying
to tell us. On the whole, no beauty, no southera-
ness, nothing of the delicate clarity of the south¬
ern sky, no grace, no dancing, hardly any desire
for logic; even a certain clumsiness, that is
actually emphasized, as if the artist wished to
tell us, "it is part of my intention"; a cumber¬
some costume, something wilfully barbaric and os¬
tentatious, a scintillation of pedantic and
venerable trinkets and tags; something German,
something many-sided, formless, and Inexhaustible
in the German manner; a eertain German strength
and exuberance of soul that is not afraid to hide
Itself under the refinements of decadence, that
perhaps first feels thoroughly at home among the
refinements of decadence,*"
This paragraph is quoted by Max Graf as an example of "pro-
17
ductive ... discussions of works of art," and contrasted with
IS
the "unproductive" comments of Eduard Hanslick on the same
work. By virtue of their poetic force, Mletzche's remarks may
very well be "productive" of a mood, of Impressions and ideas
similar to those which he experienced when listening to the
Overture. But if read as reasoned discourse about the aesthe¬
tic value of Wagner's music, his comments are very likely to
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produce bewilderment in the minds of most readers. There are
conventions governing the use of critical predicates which are
generally enough recognized and sufficiently well established
to permit of a distinction between terms which are compatible
with one another and those which are incongruous when applied
to a single work of art. Of course these conventions depend
ultimately upon the sanction of criteria of value. Criteria
are often subjects of controversy, and good reasons can be
given for altering them. But it is difficult to imagine a
defensible set of criteria of musical value that would render
Nietzche's use of terms consistent in their evaluative impli¬
cations. As the passage stands, the reader can only wonder
what reasons (what criteria) Nietzche could possibly have for
claiming that music which is overladen, pompously conventional,
coarse, crude, without beauty or grace, almost without logic,
and rather clumsy, wilfully barbaric and ostentatious, pedantic
and formless and decadent is also magnificent. Hansllck's
judgement may have been faulty, but at least his statements are
consistent in the value they ascribe to the work:
The Overture is not at all calculated to produce
a favorable state of mind in the audience. One
after another, it crumbles the leitmotives of the
work into a flood of chromatic passages and se¬
quences, finally to fling them in inextricable
confusion into a veritable ocean of sound. A com¬
position painfully mannered and positively brutal
in its effect,*9
The obscurity of Nietzche's critical intention illustrates
the importance of this condition of coherent critical argument
which requires that the evaluative Implication of all the state¬
ments of an argument be consistent. This criterion is alone
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sufficient to determine the coherence of a critical argument
in a particular respect, It Is not, of course, sufficient to
determine the cogency of a critical argument in all respects.
For this purpose additional criteria must be introduced,
A perfectly coherent critical argument nay lack cogency be¬
cause it fails to satisfy another condition necessary to objec¬
tive and informative discourse about works of art, The state¬
ments mad© about a work of art must be open to a tost of
correspondence as well as of coherence, They must entail some
means of discovering whether or not what they assert about a
work of art corresponds to the features of that work. In
other words, the statements of a critical argument must not
only be consistent in the sense defined above but they must
make assertions the correctness of which can be confirmed by
observation. Mo such restriction is imposed by theories of
critical argument which rest on psychological foundations.
It is compatible with a view of critical statements as being
about experiences, about emotions or attitudes, or as being
rhetorical assertions devised to evoke ©motions or attitudes
or to influence behaviour to maintain that a critical argument
may be wholly satisfactory in being coherent (consistont in the
amotion or attitude expressed or in the ©motion or attitude or
action that it attempts to elicit) although bearing no corre¬
spondence to the work discussed. Indeed, on any such view
there can be no question of correspondence at all, slnoe criti¬
cal statements are taken not to be about works of art but
either to be about something ©Is© or not to be about anything
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at all.. But -when critical arguments are construed as they
are here as consisting of a series of logically related state¬
ments about works of art, no such lack of connection between
what is asserted and what is observable can be permitted,
A further condition necessary to correct Inference under¬
lies the correspondence of the statements of a critical argu¬
ment to a work of art. This condition requires that the des¬
criptive import of all the statements throughout a critical
argument be consistent. Unless the condition were satisfied,
it would be Impossible in most cases to determine whether the
characteristics ascribed to a work of art belonged, to it or
not. Statements of high evaluative power, which assert the
critic's evaluation most clearly and explicitly, are, from th©
point of view of description, most vague and general, How¬
ever, such statements do have some descriptive force. To
borrow an example from Tovey's analysis above, the statement
'The first movement of Walton's Viola Concerto Is a masterpiece
of form in its freedom and precision, besides showing pathos of
a high order' asserts that the movement has a certain kind of
structure and a certain emotional quality which distinguish
it from concerto movements of another description. Similarly,
the primarily evaluative statement "Phis building is an. example
of derivative traditionalism' would provide sufficient des¬
criptive information to enable anyone who understood how the
term 'derivative traditionalism1 is used in discussions of
architecture to recognise which building was meant if it were
©rooted nearby other buildings of another description, eay of
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the kind called 1 functional1, But the descriptive information
provided by either of these two statements, especially of the
first, is not precise, detailed, nor explicit; and the des¬
criptive force of many statements of high evaluative power is
even weaker. Unless the reader brings to such a statement a
very exact notion of the characteristic features belonging to
any work to which the predicate is correctly applied, he will
require the more concrete information provided by statements
of higher descriptive power in order to understand just what
features are being attributed to the work. Even so, he will
require this more specific kind of information in order to de¬
cide whether the descriptively weak predicate of the primarily
evaluative statement is correctly applied, This requirement
is particularly urgent in the case of predicates whose denota¬
tive meanings do not approach the degree of standardisation
displayed in current usage by * functional*, for instance, or
by * derivative traditionalism*, But the requirement ©an only
be satisfied If the descriptive intention of the critic's re¬
marks are consistent throughout his argument,
The descriptive information implicit in statements of high
evaluative power is rendered explicit toy the statements of
higher descriptive power from which they are derived. State¬
ments of high evaluative power repeat covertly and in highly
general terms the critical description explicitly asserted in
particular, concrete terms in other statements, What is re¬
quired of a primarily evaluative statement is that the charac¬
teristics which it Implies a work to have be those which are
26b
ascribed to the work by statements of higher descriptive power.
If this requirement is met, it is possible to discover the des¬
criptive Import of a statement of high evaluative power and
therefore to determine whether or not that statement corre¬
sponds to the work about which it is made.
Prom the point of view of critical description, the logi¬
cal progression of the critic's argument is from statements
which describe specific features of a work in terms of value to
statements about the general characteristics of the work as a
whole. The progressive reduction of the descriptive power of
critical statements as their evaluative force increases is a
function of their expanding generality. The difficulty of
testing the correspondence of critical statements to what they
are about Increases proportionally as their generality in¬
creases. This difficulty can be overcome in critical argument
only if the descriptive import of all the statements within a
critical argument is consistent. When this condition is
satisfied, statements of high descriptive power will elucidate
the descriptive implications of statements of high evaluative
power, l.e, they can. be read as rendering explicit the des¬
criptive implications of primarily evaluative remarks. Then
by confirming the primarily descriptive statements made about
a work of art through a critical observation of the relevant
features, the correspondence of the implicit description of the
statements of high evaluative power to the work is also con¬
firmed. Further elucidation of the operation of the corre¬
spondence principle in critical argument is best given by
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reference to a passage of criticism.
The paragraph is taken from Carl Maria Ton Weber's criti¬
cism of Beethoven's Fourth Symphony:
There is no longer any question of clarity ana in¬
telligibility, of a display of feeling, as the old
composers, Handel and Mozart, supposed. No! Listen
to the recipe for the latest symphony, which 1 have
Just received from Viemia, and judge for yourself.
First we have a slow tempo full of short, abrupt
ideas, of which not one is allowed to have any con¬
nection with another! Every quarter of an hour,
three or four notes - that produces tension! Then
a hollow roll on the kettle-drums and mysterious
viola passages, all embellished with an adequate
quantity of complete silences and rests; finally,
after the listener, in utter suspense, has given
up the allegro, coses a furious tempo, in which
the principle object Is to prevent any leading
idea from making an appearance, so that the
listener is left ©von more in confusion; modula¬
tions from one key to another must not be omitted;
but they are nothing to worry over, all that is
necessary is.,.to run through the half-tones and
stop on the tonic of the key you want - that ends
the modulation. Above all. shun all rules, for
rules only fetter genius,20
Weber's opening remark assorts his judgement in terras whose
evaluative fore© is strong and direct; the symphony, to take
two of the three points, lacks clarity and intelligibility.
The remark is not wholly devoid of descriptive power; it im¬
plies that the work has certain features which distinguish it
from works composed according to the classleal rules of har¬
mony. The reader might infer from the remark that the modu¬
lations were not achieved by well defined bridge passages, and
that the connections between the exposition, the development,
and the recapitulation were obscure. But he la given only a
very general idea of the work's characteristics, and he re¬
quires further details in order to decide whether or not
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Weber's primarily evaluative remark is appropriate. These de¬
tails are supplied by the subsequent statements of higher des¬
criptive force which provide more particular information about
the work's features; the ideas (themes) of the opening move¬
ment are unrelated; the continuity of the allegro is broken by
irrelevant solo passages and periods of silence and is dis¬
rupted by a rapid passage in which no melody is discernible;
and so on. The consistency of the statements recording these
observations with Weber's primarily evaluative remark is
apparent enough; a work possessed of such features must lack
clarity and intelligibility. Whether or not these statements
correspond to the features they purport to describe can be con¬
firmed by observing the work. (If a critlo can show a re¬
lation between 'the short, abrupt Ideas' of the slow tempo, then
Weber's statement to the contrary must be rejected.) If these
statements are confirmed, then Weber's statement that the work
lacks clarity and intelligibility is confirmed also; for that
primarily evaluative remark expresses about the symphony as a
whole, in highly general terms, the descriptive information
provided by the statements of higher descriptive power that
Weber makes about the work's particular features.
This claim that critical arguments are in principle capable
of satisfying a correspondence test may be attacked at a crucial
point. It may be urged that since critical statements, accor¬
ding to the argument of this thesis, do not record empirical
observations, do not assert facts, all talk of confirming them
by observation is misleading. Since each critical statement,
26?
however high its descriptive power, depends upon an act of
evaluation, a critical Judgement, the correctness of the infor¬
mation it provides about a work cannot be determined simply by
examining the work. The consistency of the descriptive Import
of all the statements throughout a critical argument may pro¬
vide a condition necessary to testing the correspondence of
statements of high evaluative power to the works that they are
about. But the condition is insufficient to guarantee that
the test can be made; for this indirect method of testing such
a statement depends upon the possibility of confirming the
statements of high descriptive power to which it is related.
And these statements are in just as difficult a situation,
When any degree of evaluative power Is attributed to them, they
are removed from the class of statements whose members are
corrigible through observation.
The argument of the previous chapters should have removed
the ails understanding upon which this objection is grounded. In
order to complete the discussion of this topic, however, the
complaint may be dealt with here with reference to the example
at hand. It is true that the statements here called primarily
descriptive are not statements of fact based upon an observa¬
tion of empirical properties. They are statements making
assertions relevant to answering questions about the aesthetic
value of the features denoted, and they are based upon critical
observations mad© with the purpose of determining the work's
aesthetic value. When Weber asserts that the themes of the
opening movement of Beethoven's Fourth have no connection with
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on© another, he is not making a statement of fact, if by this
is meant an assertion which is grounded upon observations in
which critical judgement plays no part. As discussed in criti¬
cal writing, the themes of a symphony are not empirical proper¬
ties, nor are their relations empirical relations; they are
features relevant to the assessment of the composition's aes¬
thetic value. Neither listening passively to the sounds pro¬
duced during a performance, nor measuring these sounds with the
most refined accoustical instruments would yield a critical
description of these features. Critical assertion presupposes
a concern with the aesthetic value of what is observed and the
technical competence required for making the evaluations that
are Involved throughout the critical process. But the fact
that value judgements underlie critical assertion does not ren¬
der critical statements incorrigible. Not only is Weber's re¬
mark subject to correction by other critics whose description
of the movement might differ from his, but Weber's mistake, if
it is one, could be explained. It might be argued that, as
his mention of "the old composers, Handel and Mozart" suggests,
he is judging Beethoven's work by inappropriate criteria. He
describes Beethoven's symphony as failing to satisfy certain
rules of composition to which it was never intended to conform.
His observation was faulty; he looked for connections of a cer¬
tain accustomed kind between musical ideas; failing to find
these, he supposed there were no connections of any kind; and
so he misdescribed a certain feature of the work, Detection
of this error would deprive his statement of highest evaluative
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power of part of its support; and. if the other primarily des¬
criptive statements were also rejected, then the statement in
which he explicitly asserts his judgement would be rejected too.
Another objection that might be raised against my account
of critical argument will be more profitable to consider. It
may be pointed out that two quite incompatible critiques of
the same work may both be perfectly coherent and both pass the
test of correspondence. This possibility, which seems to be
embarrassing for a view of critical argument as conforming to
logical rules and as being grounded in a work's observable fea¬
ture, must be admitted. Two critics may each select quite a
different set of features for discussion. Their critical
descriptions of the features may both be correct and intro¬
duced into arguments which are both internally consistent but
which culminate in statements of high evaluative power ex¬
pressing conflicting judgements.
This possibility is not in the least embarrassing for ray
view of critical argument, but only for the view that critical
arguments conclude with judgements that are final and absolute.
But critical judgements are not final nor absolute. They are
frequently revised; no critic's verdict, however well suppor¬
ted, is Incapable of being reversed or qualified by further co¬
gent argument. This is the case because the references of a
critical argument are never exhaustive; however detailed a cri¬
tical analysis, it cannot mention every feature conceivably
relevant to determining the work's value, and therefore some
equally cogent argument that deals with the particular features
2?G
ignored by the other argument may terminate in statements of
high evaluative power that seem to be incompatible with those
of the first. Thus a painter may be praised by one critic
for his superb draughtsmanship and abused by another for his
weakness as a colourist. In such a oaa© the critics would not
be contradicting on© another, although one of them expresses a
favourable judgement of the work and the other an unfavourable
judgement. An appearance of contradiction arises only from
supposing that the critics must decide whether the painting Is
good or bad In some absolute sens©, whereas one argues that It
is valuable in a certain respect and the other that it lacks
value in a different respect.
The kind of disagreement cited as an objection to my view
of criticism does not damage it but rather serves as the basis
for explaining other critical phenomena. It reveals an Im¬
portant source of critical disagreement which, when understood,
accounts for contrary critical judgements without relegating
critical remarks to the class of pseudo-statements or their re¬
lations to the realm of the non-logical. It does not follow
from the prevalence of disagreement amongst critics about the
value of works that their assertions are not really about the
works they discuss and therefore not subject to correction by
independent observers. Nor does it follow that the statements
in which their ©valuations are explicitly asserted are not in¬
ferred in accordance with logical rules from the statements they
make about the features of the work. Critics may disagree
about the value of a work simply because they have each been
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discussing a different group of features.
Clearly, the more detailed and comprehensive a critical
analysis is, the more highly general are the statements of high
evaluative power that may he derived from it, A writer who
critically describes only the ornamentation of a building is
entitled to make statements about the architect's taste. But
his critical description would not support a judgement of the
building as being either a masterpiece or a dismal failure.
The assertion of such a judgement would require a discussion
of many other features for its support. There are, no doubt,
many critical arguments extant whose evaluative claims exceed
the descriptive information offered to support them, and these
are weak arguments. It ia not possible to state a priori
rules for distinguishing between critical arguments that are
strong and those that are weak In this respect. But the no¬
tion of a discrepancy between the relative degrees of an argu¬
ment's descriptive power and its evaluative power accounts for
certain cases of critical disagreement and indicates how they
can be settled, A critic who bases primarily evaluative
statements of high generality upon a critical description of
a very few features is subject to correction by another critic
who has analysed the work in greater detail and described more
of the relevant features.
The correction of judgement by a more exhaustive charac¬
terization of features in part explains the widening consensus
of critical opinion about works that have been the subject of
critical discussion over long periods of time. The literature
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of Shakespeare criticism is so enormous that it is unlikely
that further critical discussion will reverse those judgements
of the value of his major plays to which most critics now con¬
sent. Conversely, critical opinion diverges most widely and
most frequently about new works, because every critic's judge¬
ment is based upon a partial description. After a period of
exohanging critically relevant information, the work becomes
better understoodj more mature and seasoned judgements of It
are made and the margin of agreement widens.
Failure to provide critical descriptions adequate to support
judgements is, then, responsible for much weak critical argu¬
ment, The sources of failure are various. Grillparzer's
highly emotive comments on Weber1s Eurvanthe are unrestrained
by any sense of responsibility toward the features of the work
and undefended by critical analysis;
This music is horrible. In the great days of
Greece this subversion of all melody, this rape
of beauty, would have been punished by the state.
Such music is a criminal offense. It would bring
forth monsters if it were gradually to achieve
universal acceptance. This work can, please only
fools or idiots or scholars or highway robbers or
murderers.21
This kind of weakness in critical argument may at times have
less reprehensible and more complicated causes. Harold Osborne
has shown by reference to T. S. Eliot how confusion between
arguments designed to account for the excellences or defects of
a work and those intended to appraise its excellence or defec¬
tiveness leads to evaluations unsupported by reference to the
work' s features ,*
2?3
Mr, Eliot holds the somewhat dubious belief
that if a writer's mental reactions are spe¬
cially typical of his age, and if he has
succeeded in embodying those typical reactions
in his writing, then his works are particular¬
ly 'significant' and that writing which is in
this way significant has always a high level of
literary excellence or at any rate greatness. In
general he Is meticulous to keep psychology and
criticism distinct, although even he is liable to
occasional lapses, Thus ho tells us that
Jonson1s Catiline fails 'not because it is too
laboured and conscious, but because it is not con¬
scious enough; because Jonson in this play was
not alert to his own idiom, not clear in his mind
as to 'what his temperament wanted hiia to do*.
How these statements are inferences from the play
as we know it to certain mental processes pre¬
sumed to have happened in Jonson's mind when he
composed it, They may or may not be correct in¬
ferences, If they are correct, they may or may
not be the cause of certain features In the play
which Mr. Eliot judges to be artistic faults.
But the psychological causes which he infers are
not themselves qualities of the play, and the
attribution of causes for deficiencies cannot
tako the place of descriptive criticism which
could point to the alleged defects in the work,
Again he says of Blake: 'It is only when the
ideas become more automatic, come more freely
and are less manipulated, that we begin to sus¬
pect their origin, to suspect that they spring
from a shallower source', How if your purpose
is to understand the workings of Blake.'s uncon¬
scious mind, ideas which are thought to spring
from a shallower source will be loss significant
data than ideas which are thought to spring froia
a deeper source in the unconscious. It may also
bo true that in general the ideas of Blake which
spring from a source deeper in the unconscious
are those which are more highly manipulated, But
no inferences about the level of consciousness
at which ideas originated can take the place of
Judgement about the artistic excellence or de¬
fects of the poetry or supply the place of a
descriptive indication of what those defects are,
Inferences about psychological causation are not
germane to criticism. let few writers of criti¬
cism have maintained the distinction as meticu¬
lously as Eliot, Whenever on© reads that 'in¬
spiration has failed* or that 'the artist was in¬
sincere' , one should suspect that the critic has
failed in his task? he has judged that a work
of art is defective, has failed to find words in
2?k
which to indicate the deficiency descriptively
and had offered instead an inferred psychologi¬
cal cause of the undescrlbed defect, 'Xou can
spot the bad critic1, says Ezra Pound, 'when he
starts discussing the poet and not the poem1#22
Perhaps the figurative us© of language discussed in Chap¬
ter 3 (pp. iiso-1^2) 1® the major cause of descriptively weak
arguments, Pros the striving for literary effect, the attempt
to communicate the quality of an aesthetic experience instead
of to inform the reader about the nature of the work criti¬
cized, the us© of simile, analogy# and metaphor emerge terms
concerning which there is no possible way of deciding on ob¬
jective grounds whether or not they are appropriate to the work
to which they are assigned. F, L. Lucas's essay on Browning
is an example of critical writing in which a gap remains be¬
tween the statements made about the features of works and the
statements rendering the critic's judgement explicit which not
oven reference to criteria of value can bridge:
And, after all, to the author of things like The
Lost Mistress. Love among the Buins. A Toccata
&£ QqTMPPV-ft> |2£gte2SII ±£Z££71M2M l&J-jmi.,aa<l S&. much may be forgiven,
even his complete works. - For his poetry seems to
rae like the dry bed of an Alpine torrent down
which a flood of vast, untamed energy has roared
and foamed itself away, leaving a desolation of
dead and bleaching stones; yet here and there a
narrow channel whore a rush of waters still spins
and dancesA bright and living, towards its eter¬
nal goal.2?
Although the evaluative intention of such statements may b©
clear, they appear gratuitous, for neither on the basis of
linguistic conventions nor known criteria do the terms in which
they are couched seem to be implied by the terms of the prior
statements from which they supposedly derive.
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Another form of the defect also symptomatic of a weakness
for rhetoric can be found in arguments consisting almost wholly
of statements of high evaluative power. If the principal
function of all or nearly all the statements in a piece of
criticism is to render explicit the critic's evaluation of a
work, then it will probably be Impossible to discover the rea¬
sons for his judgement and to come to a decision about their
adequacy. The following is an example of critical arguments
which are Incompetent through giving insufficient information
about those features of the works which have determined the
critics' evaluations to enable readers to confirm the critics'
observations:
Stravinski's new ballet is a great event in the
musical world. I consider it as one of his
masterpieces, the product of true artistic ma¬
turity. It has a majestic serenity about it, and
Balanchlne's choreography fits it perfectly,
classical in style, treated from the modern as¬
pect - the Muses wear a special kind of tutu. The
decor was designed by M. Andre Bauchant, a French
painter belonging to a group Inspired by the
'douanier' Henri Rousseau. Actually he is ex¬
hibiting his works at the Magellan gallery at the
present moment. The settings are executed in a
fresh, naive, spontaneous style, which is a re¬
freshing change from the pseudo-Greek stuff that
we usually get in the theatre. And I think that
the choreography is really excellent.2^
Critical arguments are probably descriptively Inadequate in
other ways and for other reasons. But it Is not necessary to
enumerate and describe all the various forms of this general
kind of weakness. All that is being claimed here is that
there is a distinction to be drawn between critical judgements
which are justified by argument and those which are not.
That this distinction is genuine should be apparent from the
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fact that some critical arguments provide enough information
about the features of the work discussed to enable the reader
to confirm the critic's comments and that others do not.
The logical progression of critical argument has been des¬
cribed as a series of transitions in the direction of state¬
ments of increasing evaluative force. The logical ground of
these transitions must be more closely examined. The inquiry
can be started most easily by directing it toward a passage of
criticism which is simple in structure. The paragraph about
the yysotnve zdanla will do as a specimen.
When I discussed that passage earlier, I argued that state¬
ments of high evaluative power could be derived from it by
drawing out the evaluative implications of its primarily des¬
criptive statements. The progression from "Thus all eight
vysotnye carry tall spires mounting garlanded Bed Stars and as
many Doric and Romanesque pilasters, rococo arches, turrets,
flying buttresses, roof-pergolas, asparagus-shaped domes, gin¬
gerbread plaques and ferro-concrete statuary as the construc¬
tion will stand" to 'These buildings are excessively and in¬
congruously decorated' is an example of what I mean by a tran¬
sition from a statement of high descriptive power to a state¬
ment of high evaluative power. It seems to me to be in
accordance xfith good usage to term such a transition an 'in¬
ference* . Since the logical operation involved in it differs
from that performed in either inductive or deductive Inference,
such inference has been qualified by the term 'critical*,
Critical inference must now be explained in terms of how
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the transitions in question are made# I have said, concerning
the hypothetical judgement inferred from the critical descrip¬
tion of the Moscow buildings, that statements of high evalua¬
tive power merely render explicit evaluations implicit in state¬
ments of high descriptive power. But this notion of 'rendering
explicit' leaves the nature of the logical operation Involved
only vaguely characterized. It must be explained how one is
able to discover and to state evaluations which are present in
statements by implication alone. What are the grounds for
asserting that the author of this critical description implies
that 'These buildings are excessively and incongruously decora¬
ted' and, to go further, 'That they are badly designed, archi¬
tectural failures from an aesthetic point of view'?
Clearly, the inference presupposes a knowledge of the cri¬
teria used for judging works of architecture. The only grounds
for asserting tnat the specified evaluations are implicit in the
primarily descriptive statements are provided by the criteria
accepted by contemporary critics of architecture, 'Imitative
of outmoded styles' sums up in a general phrase the particular
observations recorded in the description; because of its pe^-
joratlve force, it asserts the evaluation more forcibly and ex¬
plicitly. And it derives its pejorative force from the his- I
J /
torloal fact that imitation, perhaps especially imitation of
antique styles, is a feature of architecture of which a modern
critic may be expected to disapprove. 'Incongruously incor¬
porating the features of many styles and periods' serves the
same function, repeating the descriptive information in terms
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of higher generality and gaining In evaluative power by the
term 'incongruously'. The justification for Introducing this
term Into the inferred statement is provided by contemporary
architectural criteria which hold that incorporating the fea¬
tures of many styles and periods in one building is incongruous.
The statement 'They are excessively decorated' functions In an
identical way and the grounds for inferring it are the same.
The transition to the statement of highest evaluative power can
be explained and justified In the same way. According to the
criteria in use, buildings of such a description would be
judged as 'badly designed, architectural failures from an aes¬
thetic point of view'* The inference of 'They are badly de¬
signed, architectural failures from an aesthetic point of view'
from 'These buildings are imitative of outmoded styles, incon¬
gruously incorporating the features of many styles and periods'
and 'They are excessively decorated' will not seem to involve
a logically unaccountable leap to anyone who is aware of the
criteria used in appraising works of architecture.
The role of criteria in the formation of critical judgement
and their function in critical argument have, I think, been mis¬
understood. At this point it is necessary to correct one mis¬
take about criteria which precludes an understanding of critical
inference. The mistake is a consequence of the distinction be¬
tween descriptive statements and value statements. Unless it
is supposed that there is no logical connection between the two
kinds of statement, criteria may be invoked as an intermediary,
third kind of statement to explain the connection between the
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other two. When assured of the truth of the statements which
describe a thing, how does one decide upon the truth of the
value statements made about it? By referring the descriptive
statements to a set of criteria which set forth the descriptive
properties generally acknowledged to belong to any one of those
things which has the value assigned. An illustration of this
procedure may be borrowed from a logician who accepts the des¬
criptive statement/value statement distinction and the inter¬
pretation of the role of criteria which this distinction
suggests;
...if we knew all the descriptive properties which
a particular strawberry had (knew, of every des¬
criptive sentence relating; to the strawberry,
whether it was true or false), and if we knew also
the meaning of the word fgood,' then what else
should we require to know, in order to be able to
tell whether a strawberry was a good one? Once
the question is put in this way, the answer should
be apparent. We should require to know, what are
the criteria in virtue of which a strawberry is to
be called a good one, or what are the characteris¬
tics that make a strawberry a good one, or what is
the standard of goodness in strawberries. We should
require to be given the major premiss.25
Construing the logical function of a set of criteria as ana¬
logous to that of the major premise of a syllogism leads to the
following misconception of the critical process. Statements
based upon empirical observation of a work of art are asserted.
These are used in conjunction with a statement of criteria for
the purpose of inference. A value statement is inferred. As
was shown in the preceding chapter, insuperable logical diffi¬
culties follow from this view. Briefly, since a statement of
criteria is not analytic, it must be taken as an inductive
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generalization based upon a series of value statements. From
an inspection of a number of things of a particular kind judged
to be good a universal proposition is asserted about what des¬
criptive properties such a thing will have if it is a good one
of its kind# But any doubt felt about the correctness of the
concluding statement of a particular argument will certainly
attach to the universal statement that sets forth the criteria.
If one questions the grounds for asserting 'This strawberry,
being large, red, juicy, firm, and sweet, Is good1, then h© must
also question the assertion *A11 strawberries that are large,
rod, juicy, firm, and sweet ar© good*. Construed as major
premises criteria are logically inadequate#
Since the statement 9 tea, it Is large, red, juicy, firm,
and sweet* seems a perfectly good answer to the question 'is
this strawberry a good one?', this logical predicament appears
to result from a misunderstanding. One suspects that cri¬
teria do not attempt to function as major premises, and this
suspicion was shown to be well founded in the preceding chapter.
Once having abandoned the distinction between descriptive
statements and value statements, one is no longer inclined to
construe criteria as universal propositions mediating between
them. If it were supposed that criteria of value had to
connect statements of fact and statements of value, then cer¬
tainly such a logical strain would be imposed upon them that
critical Inference would be inexplicable. But such is the
logical structure of critical argument that no such Impassable
barrier is raised between Its statements. When all the
281
statements of a critical argument are understood to have
evaluative force, all are seen to bear an implicit reference
to criteria. If the criteria were not operative at the be¬
ginning of the argument, when all the so-called 'descriptive
statements' are being made, the critic would not know whether
what he was saying was to the point or not. His remarks would
be made at random, only by chance having any bearing on the
question of the work's value. The cormoiseur of strawberries
is in the same position. He says that the strawberry is
large, red, juicy, firm, and sweet. He doesn't offer the
purely descriptive comment that it is a fruit of the genus
Fragaria, having small yellow seed-like achenes on its surface.
He is in a position to use words of evaluative force because
he is aware of the relevant criteria before he begins to des¬
cribe the strawberry.
It must not be supposed that I am confusing temporal with
logical priority. It might be urged that the speaker's prior
acquaintance with the criteria of value of the thing he is dis¬
cussing is beside the point. It is the place of criteria in
the logical structure of his discussion that is in question.
Indeed it is; but when the logical distinction between state¬
ments of fact and statements of value is dropped, it is seen
that criteria must not be construed as a third kind of state¬
ment introduced to connect the other two. If criteria are
assigned this place in an argument, the fact that all critical
remarks are evaluative in intention is obscured, and the cri¬
tic's reason for making those which have been misleadingly
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called 'descriptive' remains unintelligible. So-called 'des¬
criptive statements' are what they are logically, viz, covertly
evaluative, because a reference to criteria is involved in
their formulation. Criteria are implicit in all the statements
of a critical argument, for they are implicit in the argument
as a whole, controlling the development of the argument from the
beginning. Criteria give a critical argument its cohesion,
determining the relevance of each remark to the argument's fi¬
nal intention and the coherence of each remark with all the
others. The implicative force of critical statements is a
function of criteria, dependent upon the internal consistency
which the criteria inherent in the formulation of each state¬
ment lends to the argument as a logical whole.
Criteria of value, then, are operative at the beginning of
the critical process and are a factor in the formulation of
every one of the critic's statements. Just as the nature of a
critic's observations is determined by his preoccupation with
aesthetic value, so are the features that he describes and the
way that he describes them determined by the criteria of value
he uses in the evaluation of works of art. A set of criteria
is a necessary presupposition of making a critically relevant
statement. If a critic had no notion of the criteria relevant
to the evaluation of works of art of the kind that he attempts
to discuss, it would b© by chance alone that his statements had
any bearing upon the question of the work's value. To take an
example, it is because the critic of the Moscow buildings is
aware of a certain criterion of style that commits works of
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architecture that combine the features of many dissimilar
styles to the class of badly designed buildings that he men¬
tions the variety of stylas mixed in the construction of the
buildings he is discussing.
It is evident that acquaintance with the criteria of value
used In evaluating architectural works was a necessary condition
of discovering the evaluations implicit In this writer's state¬
ments of high descriptive power, Hie inferences made from the
critic's primarily descriptive remarks are explicable in terms
of a knowledge of criteria which are required for the Interpre¬
tation of critical remarks and for the construction of a criti¬
cal argument, This explanation can now be generalised to give
an account of how transitions from statements of high descrip¬
tive power to statements of high evaluative power are mad©.
The term 'criteria of value' stands for the critic's con¬
ception of the general characteristics of works of art of a
certain kind which distinguish those works which are valuable
from those which are not, A knowledge of the relevant cri¬
teria of value constitutes the theoretical aspect of a critic's
professional competence in a particular field of art, and the
ability to apply them in appraisal and argument his practical
exocriness. Disagreements amongst critics about which set of
criteria should be accepted do not imply that criteria are
'subjective' or in any other way logically inadequate. Physi¬
cists also sometimes disagree about certain theoretical princi¬
ples presupposed In discourse about physical phenomena, but it
does not occur to any one to complain that the principles lack
ZSk
objectivity, Disputcxi criteria are equally legitimate and
similarly indispensable to discourse about works of art. Cri¬
teria sire a factor to the critical process at its inception,
controlling the critic's observations in a manner analogous to
the control exerted upon a natural scientist's observations by
a hypothesis or a theory. They determine which features are
relevant to his argument and the terms appropriate to describing
them. A constant factor in critical argument, they account
for the evaluative implications of every critical statement.
Even statements of high descriptive power bear an Implicit
reference to them, for they provide a condition necessary to
making remarks which are relevant to a description of a work of
art in terms of value* They are an. essential factor to criti¬
cal inference. Having determined the assertion of statements
of high descriptive power, they govern the transitions road©
from these to statements of high evaluative power. These
transitions would be inexplicable without reference to cri¬
teria. Considered to relation to them, it is evident that toe
logical progression of a critical argument consists to the pro¬
gressively more explicit assertion of the evaluations ooneealed
In statements which are primarily descriptive to function.
Statements of high evaluative power are formulated with refer¬
ence to the same set of criteria as are the statements of high
descriptive power to the same argument. These criteria pro¬
vide to© required 'link' between to© statements of critical
discourse, to© logical ground of the transitions In question.
By reference to them, the evaluative import of primarily
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descriptive statements can be discovered, and statements of
high evaluative power inferred.
This conception of criteria as a condition of critical
assertion and inference can be illustrated by another passage
of criticism. Here Edward Crankshaw discusses the same
buildings, the 'tall buildings' of Moscow:
It is only at close range that the bogus Gothic,
the meaningless towers and ornamental features,
show up and look silly. And contemplating these,
or the remarkable replicas of classical facades
and collonades and pediments attached to cinemas
and clinics, the clumsy Soviet renaissance of so
many administrative buildings and apartment houses,
the acres of coarse and muddled decoration which
accumulate on the new facades, one wonders how the
positive explosion of constructive vitality repre¬
sented by all this building could coincide with a
perfect absence of creative spirit.
The anstver, of course, was Stalin, whose Idea of
good architecture was formed by a close study of
wedding-cakes, and whose ferocious and sustained
attack on formalism and cosmopolitanism, which
Included all the most exciting architectural
thought, drove the originals underground and
spread the blight of derivative traditionalism
over the face of all the land,,..2®
The evaluative power of the first paragraph of description is
plain enough. The criteria of value in which these assertions
are grounded, and by reference to which the inference that the
buildings display "a perfect absence of creative spirit" is ex¬
plained, are revealed in the second paragraph. The criterion
according to which the buildings were designed is termed "deri¬
vative traditionalism," a general term applied by contemporary
critics of architecture to buildings having certain stylistic
features, "meaningless towers and ornamental features,"
"replicas of classical facades and colonnades and pediments,"
and "coarse and muddled decoration" being among them. The
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criterion of value used by Crankshaw in his assessment of the
buildings is represented by the terms "formalism and cosmopoli¬
tanism" and, later in his argument, by "functionalism." By
reference to this criterion which, when stated, asserts in
27
highly general terms what architectural features are valuable, '
the implicit evaluative import of particular statements about
the specific features of the buildings becomes apparent. And
the reasons for the transitions from such statements to those
which assert more explicitly the critic*s Judgement of the aes¬
thetic value of the works are understood in the same way.
Criteria of value, then, are presupposed by critical argu¬
ment and provide a condition necessary to its logical pro¬
gression, Their part in aesthetic evaluation is extremely
complicated, but only their role in critical inference had to
be considered here. It is clear that they serve as the logical
link between the statements of oritical discourse, providing the
grounds for transitions from statements of high descriptive
power to statements of high evaluative power. By refej/ing a
statement of high descriptive power to them, its evaluative im¬
plications can be discovered and expressed in a statement of
high evaluative power. This latter statement must maintain
reference to the features denoted by the primarily descriptive
statements and express the critic's Judgement In terms consis¬
tent with the criteria that were employed in formulating those
primarily descriptive statements.
Thus criteria of value yield another standard of critical
argument. The structure of cogent critical argument is
23?
founded on criteria of value. If the same criteria were not
operative in the formulation of every statement made about a
work of art in a single argument, there would be no guarantee
of the argument's logical coherence. The logical relations
between the statements of a critical argument depend upon the
statements' reference to a common set of criteria. In the
absence of this condition, no inferences could be made from
statement to statement within an argument and statements of
high evaluative power would get no support of a logical kind
from statements of high descriptive power.
One should not expect too much of this standard. It
serves only to distinguish coherent and incoherent discourse
about works of art: a critical argument whose statements are
logically connected from a series of independent statements
about a work of art. Of course, a critical argument that is
coherent may be deemed defective in other ways. The criteria
employed may warrant the transitions involved but be repudia¬
ted as inadequate, inappropriate, derived from false aesthetic
theory, or in some other way unacceptable. Disagreements
about criteria of value are interesting, but they have no
bearing on that aspect of the logical structure of critical
argument considered here. In order to discover the evalua¬
tive implications of statements of high descriptive power and
thus the logical grounds of the transitions made within a
critical argument, it is not necessary to accept the critic's




Throughout this account of critical argument criteria of
value have been invoked as the factor upon which critical des¬
criptions and inferences depend for their cogency. The func¬
tions assigned to criteria were just those that had to be pre¬
supposed in order to explain certain features of critical dis¬
course, and the logical status of criteria themselves has so
far been unexamined. No feature of critical argument is more
elusive. In many critical arguments the criteria employed are
not explicitly asserted at all. Occasionally critics do ex¬
pound criteria of value during the course of an argument, but
more often a reader can only infer them from highly general re¬
marks made about the work under review, or from passing referen¬
ces to other works, or from key words known to signify accep¬
tance of a certain set of criteria. Since criteria of value
often appear in critical argument only implicitly, as un¬
expressed presuppositions, it seems likely that they usually
function in a correspondingly covert way in the critical pro¬
cess. This inference from the critic's argument to his aes¬
thetic experience is conjectural. But certainly it does seem
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unlikely that critics always have a fully formulated set of
criteria clearly in mind when they begin their critical
examinations of works of art. There seems to be little rea¬
son to suppose that critics form Judgements by mechanically re¬
ferring the observed features of a work to a formula which sets
forth the distinguishing features of valuable -works of art.
It might be expected that critical procedure would be a good
deal more sensitive, subtle, and complicated than that. What¬
ever may be the mode of operation of criteria within the cri¬
tical process, It is nevertheless the case that by accepting a
certain set of criteria a critic is committed to applying it
consistently to all works within the specified class that he is
dealing with. He may, however, encounter a work that does not
altogether satisfy his criteria and which he would nonetheless
evaluate in terms consistent with those he applies to works
that do. In this event he must modify his criteria in order
to account for the new- set of aesthetic considerations upon
which his Judgement is grounded. Conversely, if he Judges
certain works to be valuable by virtue of having certain
general characteristics, then he cannot pass a contrary Judge¬
ment on some other work also possessed of these characteristics
without adducing special reasons for the exception. This is
only to say that a critic is expected to show some consistency
amongst his Judgements, to have a point of view which, while
not inflexible, Is not forever vacillating, to have, in short,
some principles. The substance of these principles is cri¬
teria of value which discourage capricious and gratuitous
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critical judgements.
It is probably true, then, that the critic need not always
be fully aware of his criteria of value when criticizing a work
of art; nevertheless, as the expressible content of his sense
of what is valuable in a certain field of art, they exert some
control over his perceptions and thus on his selection of the
features to be discussed, as well as determining the succession
of inferences through which highly evaluative statements are
derived from primarily descriptive ones. The emanation of
criteria from experience has been described by Katharine
Gilbert, and she also makes the point that as part of a critic's
intellectual furniture criteria are operative during the criti¬
cal process, even when the critic does not acknowledge them in
his argument. She writes that the critic contemplates a work
of art "with a mind constituted for the time being by the ener¬
gies incorporated in it from many experienced objects. The
thing Is looked at by the hardly acknowledged light of almost
innumerable examples that have Instilled Into essence of criti¬
cal mind. And in this sense the critic measures his object by
something external to the object. In so doing, he does not
stretch it on a Procrustean bed, but - so we must allow him -
still measures it by a standard relevant, and on a properly
liberal interpretation, immanent."1 On the following page she
adds: "The critic with his strong native wit, then, passes
constantly and sensitively from poem to poem, fugue to fugue,
picture to picture, building up a sense of style. This sense
of style is at once an awareness of the defining marks and
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relations In kindred works and an operating norm in respect to
them."2
Critics are not always reticent about the criteria of value
they operate with} sometimes they state them unequivocally, and
argue in their defense. And even when the criteria used in
judging a work are not stated in the argument, it should be
possible to formulate them. The subject terra of such a state¬
ment refers to a class of works (to works of a certain kind
having a certain value, e.g. 'good tragedy1) and the predicate
to certain general characteristics. Such statements represent
the penultimate grounds of all critical judgements and contain
the locus of many critical disagreements ? The view taken of
criteria decides the view to be taken of critical argument and
judgement. If it is held that criteria of value are nothing
other than a critic's preference for works having features of
a certain general kind, and that the statement of criteria is
simply the expression of such a personal preference, it will
be concluded that after all the ground of a critical judgement
is the arbitrary one of personal preference, and that the cri¬
tic's reasons for the judgement he asserts are in the last re¬
sort subjective. It will be held on this view that the only
point of critical argument is to decide whether or not a par¬
ticular work actually has the features that a critic cites in
support of his judgement, When this has been decided, no
more can be done to reconcile his judgement with a contrary on©
asserted by some other critic who admits the presence of the
features but does not share his colleague's preference (or
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aversion) for them. Nor will there be any good reason for a
third person to accept one of these judgements rather than
another, for there will be no objective reasons for endorsing
one set of supporting criteria rather than the other. This
view of criteria, which implies that critical judgements rest
upon a subjective foundation, will be found upon examination
to have little to recommend it. Discussions of criteria are
plainly not always mere advocacy of personal preferences but
rather, in some cases, reasoned argument offered in defense of
a proposition to the effect that works having features of a
specified kind are valuable in a certain field of art. In or¬
der to discover how acceptance of any particular set of criteria
can be justified, it is necessary to understand the logical
character of the statements In which they are or could be
asserted,
I believe that a study of the genesis of criteria of aes¬
thetic value and of the transformations which they undergo in
critical practice will contribute toward an understanding of
them. Such a study will be facilitated by formulating a pre¬
liminary notion of the logical character of criteria which will
serve as the controlling conception of the inquiry. The con¬
ception which I shall propose and use here is suggested by the
following considerations. Since it is by reference to a cri¬
tic's criteria of value that the precise significance of the
terms which he applies to a work of art is to be understood,
it may be said that criteria of value perform a defining func¬
tion. In fact it may be said without unduly extending the
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meaning of 'definition' that when a critic states a criterion
he is stating a definition, stating what he understands the
term defined ('Decorative art,' for instance) to mean ("art
lacking in a certain value,... the depth of human feeling."5)
The subject term of a statement of a criterion denotes a cer¬
tain class of works and the predicate sets forth its defining
characteristics. Such definitions are obviously not tautolo¬
gies! the predicates cannot be derived analytically from the
subject terms. Rather the predicates designate the features
which belong to any work which in the speaker's judgement falls
within the subject class, A critic who accepted the criterion
would not apply the subject term without qualification to any
work to which the predicate was inappropriate. Neither will
these definitions be equatlonal, stipulations that for the pur¬
pose of discussion subject and predicate will be taken as equi¬
valent. They are Intended to assert what is the case. But
they are not empirical generalizations either; for what Is the
case here is not a matter of fact but a matter of the values
judged to belong to certain works. The common characteristics
of a group of works are being described in terms of value for
the purpose of defining that group. This kind of definition
may be called 'descriptive definition'.
The notion of a descriptive definition, of which Stephen C,
Pepper is the author, seems to me to be a sound one upon which
to build a conception of criteria. Pepper expounded the no¬
tion during the course of a series of lectures given at Harvard
University in 1944 and now published under the title: The
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Basis of Criticism in the Arts.^ Believing that "the problem
of criticism is ultimately the problem of the evidence for the
7
legitimacy of the criteria of criticism,"' Pepper treats this
problem by eliciting from four distinct schools of criticism
their alternative criteria of aesthetic value. Each cri¬
terion, adopted, by one of the schools as a basic standard of
critical judgement, embodies some highly general conception of
8
what a work of art is. Each defines the aesthetic field in
different terms, I.e. each of them imposes its own. conditions
which any object must satisfy in order to qualify as a work of
art. Prior to the formulation of any of these alternative
definitions, the aesthetic field Is circumscribed by a common
sense ostensive definition: the class 'works of art' is taken
to be composed of just those things that people have always
been content to call works of art. This vague, undiscrimina¬
ting test definition of the field is then refined by a des¬
criptive definition.
Pepper's theory is in many ways incompatible with the argu¬
ment of this thesis, "The judgments of criticism I shall be
seeking," he says, "will be based on facts. They will be fac¬
tual judgments of a certain kind purporting to be true. Being
empirical judgments, however, they will not claim to be certain,
9
but only probable to a degree justified by the evidence.9 This
way of speaking, this way of using the words 'facts', 'factual',
'empirical', 'probable', and 'evidence' seems to me misleading
for reasons I have already given. Nor does it seem to me that
Pepper's subsequent argument justifies this usage with its
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implication, which he affirms, "that evaluations of the beauty
10
of things should be judgments of fact." The criteria of
value he formulates certainly appear to Involve considerations
other than purely factual ones. As the concluding sentence
of his book suggests, It Is his opposition to subjectivism and
to scepticism about the possibility of justifying aesthetic
judgements which provides the motive for using terms borrowed
from empirical science: "With due consideration of personal
idiosynoracies of inheritance, and the influences of environ¬
ment and culture, there does not seem to be any insurmountable
reason according to our analysis why highly objective judge¬
ments should not be obtained not only of the aesthetic content
of a work of art but also of its aesthetic value."^ But it
is not necessary to provide criticism with the guarantees of
natural science in order to defend the objectivity of its
judgements against scepticism# Indeed, such strategy is like¬
ly to wreck the defense, as the weakness of such an argument as
the following attests. He says that "whenever the skeptical
point of view is probed to its roots, we unearth some idea to
the effect that judgements of art are entirely matters of per¬
sonal preference, to which is added the non seauitur that there¬
fore there is no factual basis for the judgments. This last
is an astonishing addition when we think about it. As if hu¬
man preferences were not facts, and as if they did not have a
firm basis in the structures of human behaviour and the human
12
mind."
This retort will not silence the sceptic. He argues that
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because critical judgements are based upon personal preferences
they are devoid of objectivity. He will not withdraw the
charge by being told that whether or not a certain critic pre¬
fers certain works to others is a question of fact. He is
well aware of this. The ground of his complaint is that
there is no way to show that the value a critic assigns to a
particular work does in fact belong to it. The only way to
answer him is to show him that his talk of 'facts' in this
context is inappropriate. The kind of fact he has in mind is
simply irrelevant to a critical discussion; the critic is not
making statements of fact, nor is he pretending to do so.
Pepper's talk of "empirically justifiable aesthetic judgments"2^
confuses the issue by implying that the critic must justify his
judgements by citing the kind of evidence (factual evidence)
that natural scientists are expected to provide in support of
their assertions. But this kind of evidence is useless for
the defense of a critical judgement. The sceptic is not wrong
to point out that critical judgements cannot be justified by
reference to facts. But he Is wrong to conclude from this
that critical judgements can't be justified in any way at all.
Enough has been said about Pepper's theory to make clear
that I do not accept it in its entirety. There is no need to
criticize it further, since I wish to borrow from it only the
notion of descriptive definition which is, 1 think, substan¬
tially sound. But even the use that I wish to make of this
notion differs slightly from Pepper's, The main point of his
inquiry in The Basis of Criticism in the Arts is to formulate
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four different descriptive definitions each of which serves
four different aesthetic theories as the ultimate basis of cri¬
tical judgement. Bather than beginning with an analysis of
aesthetic theory, and then showing hox* highly abstract concep¬
tions of aesthetic value are utilized in critical practice, I
prefer, in consistency with the procedure adopted throughout
this thesis, to begin with particular passages of criticism
and to examine the criteria of value that are asserted or im¬
plied in them. It will be found that these criteria are far
less general than those derived from Pepper's analysis; what is
descriptively defined by stating them will not be the entire
field of art but rather sub-classes of widely different ranges
of inclusiveness such as tragedy, romantic fiction, lyrical
music, visual art of sensibility, and the like. In other
words, the grounds of the arguments to be discussed first in
the following analyses are not the ultimate ones to which cri¬
tics might conceivably be pressed back by persistent argument
(a subject to be discussed later); rather they are those upon
which critics directly rely in particular Instances.
It must not be supposed that I assume either that the value
of works of art depends upon some feature, quality, or charac¬
teristic shared by all, or that I think critical evaluation must
base itself upon suoh an assumption. Undoubtedly such ques¬
tionable assumptions have infected much theorizing about aes¬
thetic value. Highly general conceptions of what constitutes
the value of works of art such as Pepper formulates as the basis
of criticism in the arts appear to involve the dubious claim
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that there Is some factor common to all works of art of value.
It seems to me certain that the criteria of value actually used
in criticism are far more detailed, specific, concrete, and re¬
stricted in their reference than any of the four descriptive
definitions formulated by Pepper. A fully formulated set of
criteria would specify a vast number of features as belonging
to any work which realized a high degree of artistic excellence.
Claiming that critical description and inference depend upon
criteria consisting of generalizations about the features which
characterize works of a certain kind, having a certain value,
does not commit one to the view that aesthetic evaluation must
presuppose some single feature common to all valuable works of
art. It is also worth mentioning here that It would be a
gross and misleading simplification to construe works of art as
being judged to be in an absolute sense either good (perfect)
or bad (worthless). Few works satisfy a set of criteria com¬
pletely or fail utterly to satisfy it; most satisfy it in cer¬
tain respects and to a certain degree. As understood here,
then, criteria of value neither Involve any assumption about a
common factor, nor do they yield absolute judgements. Some of
the aesthetic theories upon which criteria of value are grounded
may make some untenable claim concerning a common factor. But
they need not do this; and if one of them does, a reason may be
provided for denying a particular set of criteria its theo¬
retical support, but not for denying the possibility of justi¬
fying any set of criteria whatsoever.
Having forestalled a possible misunderstanding of what it
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is that statements of criteria claim to be common to works of
a specified class, an attempt may now be made to describe the
logical character of criteria by discovering the source and
method of their derivation and the kind of reasons that can be
given for accepting any one of them* Pepper's notion of des¬
criptive definition provides a very convenient way of conceiv¬
ing of them at the outset of the Inquiry.
Pepper's theory of descriptive definition is proposed in
opposition to the view which, he says, is currently held by
1
many writers, that definitions contain no truth reference.
He explains descriptive definition by contrasting it with two
other commonly recognized types, viz. ostensive and equatlonal
definitions. By giving an ostensive definition, "The symbol
to be defined, S, indicates by some agency such as pointing,
an object, or group of objects, or type of object. The symbol
is thereby said to be defined by that object.In order to
give this kind of definition of the term 'work of art', one
points out a number of things for which the expression 'work of
art' has come by convention to stand. Pepper symbolises os-
tensive definition in this fashion:
16
indicates
S . . ,—— —- 0
is ostensively defined by
Equational definition, which equates the symbol to be de¬
fined with a group of other symbols, is "a mere analytical con¬
venience,"1''7 allowing a 'writer to use one term throughout an
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argument to stand for several. Used correctly (as In mathe¬
matics), an equatlonal definition does not imply that the
referent of the symbol defined is the same as that of the de¬
fining terms, nor that people ordinarily mean the same thing
by the two terms of the equation. An ©quational definition
makes no assertion about the world whatsoever, and therefore
can be neither true nor false. Pepper symbolizes it in the
following way:
is equated with x
s — —-———— uv
is equationally defined by
A descriptive definition differs from an ostensive and an
equational definition by combining the features of both with a
third element. The symbol to be descriptively defined is os-
tensively defined by indicating the objects for which the sym¬
bol is conventionally used to stand. The symbol is then also
given a tentative equational definition; i.e., the objects de¬
noted by the symbol to be defined are described by stating the
characteristics supposed to.be common to them all. The third
factor in this kind of definition involves a reference from
the equational definition to the objects which constitute the
field named by the symbol. Thus the equational definition,
the statement of certain features belonging to all things to
which the symbol S is to be applied, is required to be appro¬
priate to the things for which the symbol S is actually used.
Conversely, whatever is admitted into the class of things for
which the symbol S is used must have the characteristics set
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out in the definition. This kind of definition is best under¬
stood by reference to Pepper's diagram which exhibits its
triadic structure and the relations between the three terms.
Aristotle's argument in the Poetics illustrates the method
of establishing a descriptive definition. 'Tragedy' is the
symbol to be defined. Aristotle first defines it ostensively
by reference to those poetic works traditionally accepted as
being tragedies, In the first few chapters of the treatise
he distinguishes these from works of various other poetic
kinds and notes certain features characteristic of tragedies
alone and thereby arrives at his definition: "Tragedy, then,
is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of
a certain magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of
artistic ornament, the several kinds being found in separate
parts of the play; in the form of action, not of narrative;
through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of the
O A
emotions." In those remaining parts of the work which are
concerned with tragedy, this definition is elaborated and the
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ostensive definition is at the same time amplified. In elabo¬
rating this definition, or, what is the same thing, in descri¬
bing in greater detail the character!sties common to all tra¬
gedies, Aristotle is not merely recording his observations of
the ostensive field. Throughout he makes evaluations in re¬
spect to the features isolated: "Of all plots and actions the
epeisodic are the worst,"21 and "The best form of recognition
is coincident with a Reversal Cof Intention"), as in the
22
Oedipus" are two among numerous instances. He is not,
therefore, merely stating what features a thing must have in
order to be called a tragedy. He is also stating which charac¬
teristics make a tragedy a good one and which do otherwise.
His statements of these characteristics, his criteria in other
words, proceed from the definition and are, in fact, an elabo¬
ration of It. But the elaboration is made with direct reference
to the objects which constitute the ostensive field. His cri¬
teria, then, are in no sense a priori or arbitrary. They are
derived from the tragic works read and staged in his own day.
Hence his use of criteria for judging tragedies does involve
circularity, viz. circularity of the kind that results Inevi¬
tably from the historical fact that the production of works of
art precedes criticism. Aristotle, like all critics, must
make judgements in order to formulate criteria for use In fu¬
ture judgements. But this kind of circularity could no more
be excluded from the critical process than from the procedure
of empirical science In which hypotheses for the interpretation
of observational data must themselves be derived from the
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interpretation of observational data.
Throughout the Poetics the description with which tragedy
is tentatively equated or descriptively defined (to use Pepper's
terras) is built up by critical examinations of the works to
which the term 'tragedy' refers. Evaluations are, as I have
said, involved in these examinations; for Aristotle is not ob¬
serving and describing facts but is analysing the works with
regard to the aesthetic value of certain features and describ¬
ing these features in terms of value: "But, of all recogni¬
tions, the best is that which arises from the Incidents them¬
selves, where the startling discovery is made by natural means.
Such is that in the Oedipus of Sophocles, and in the Iphigenia;
for it was natural that Iphigenia should wish to dispatch a
letter. These recognitions alone dispense with the artificial
aid of tokens or amulets."23 fhe criteria of good tragedy so
derived are not merely statements of what Aristotle happens to
prefer. When he thinks it necessary, he gives reasons for
asserting that certain features are valuable in this form of
art: "As therefore, in the other imitative arts, the imitation
is one when the object imitated is one, so the plot, being an
imitation of an action, must imitate one action and that a
whole, the structural union of the parts being such that, if
any one of them is displaced or removed, the whole will be dis¬
jointed and disturbed. For a thing whose presence or absence
makes no visible difference, is not an organic part of the
. _ „2kwhole."
The Importance of adjusting the tentative equational
30^
deflnitlon (the description) to make it appropriate to the works
which ostensively define 'tragedy' can be shown by reference to
the history of the Aristotelian 'rules' of tragedy. With the
publication of Trinc&vell's Greek text of the Poetics and
Pazzl's Latin version, Aristotle's treatise became familiar to
most cultured men of the Renaissance who took an Interest in
the artsj and, sponsored by Cornellie, Boileau, Dryden and
Pope, the Aristotelian conception of tragedy was accepted by
both French and English critics of the neo-classic period. It
is a historical fact that most literary men expected tragic
works of whatever period to conform to Aristotle's definition
and that they used the set of criteria set forth in the Poetics
as the basis of their judgements of this form of art. It is
now generally held that these criteria were inappropriate for
many of the works that they criticized, for these works were
not conceived according to Aristotelian principles. They
differed in important ways from Greek tragedy, but were not
necessarily failures for that reason. The insistence upon cri¬
teria which had been derived from a study of the Greek drama¬
tists was dogmatic and stultifying, for ultimately It could
succeed only in showing that modern plays had failed to be what
25
their authors had never intended them to be. What had
happened, of course, expressed In terms of the theory of des¬
criptive definition, was that the ostensive definition of
'tragedy' had had to be revised but critics had failed to adjust
their tentative definition or description accordingly. New
works, constructed on dramatic principles different from those
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used by Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, but making a claim
to the name 'tragedy', had been written. The ostenslye refer¬
ence of 1 tragedy' had been altered, and if relevant criteria
of value were to be available to the critic, the description
had to be changed also in order to accommodate these new works.
The first phases of this process of revising a descriptive
definition can be detected in the critical writing of the later
neo-classicists. Johnson, for instance, who in principle sub¬
scribed to the criteria of value inherited from Aristotle, in
practice recognised the aesthetic value of Shakespearian
tragedy. That he was by no means ready to break with the
current (Aristotelian) conception of the defining characteris¬
tics of good tragedy is everywhere evident in his work, as when
he says of Shakespeare's plots that "his plan has commonly what
Aristotle requires, a beginning, a middle, and an endj one
event is concatenated with another, and the conclusion follows
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by easy consequence." But the need of reconciling the dra¬
matic success of Shakespearian tragedy with Its infraction of
classical prescriptions led him to question the cogency of some
of these rules. His argument against the unities of time and
place well illustrates the revision of criteria and the kind of
reasons that are offered in arguments about criteria. He
first states the reason for making the unities of time and
place one of the criteria of good tragedy:
The necessity of observing the unities of time
and place arises from the supposed necessity of
making the drama credible. The oriticks hold it
Impossible, that an action of months or years can
be possibly believed to pass in three hours; or
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that the spectator can suppose himself to sit in
the theatre, while ambassadors go and return be¬
tween distant kings, while armies are levied and
towns besieged, while an exile wanders and re¬
turns, or until he whom they saw courting his
mistress, shall lament the untimely fall of his
son, The mind revolts from evident falsehood,
and fiction loses its force when it departs from
the resemblance of reality.
From the narrow limitation of time necessarily
arises the contraction of space. The spectator,
who knows that he saw the first act at Alexandria.
cannot suppose that he sees the next at Rome, at a
distance to which not the dragons of Medea could,
in so short a time, have transported him; he knows
with certainty that he has not changed his place,
and he knows that a place cannot change Itself;
that what was a house cannot become a plain; that
what was Thebes can never be Persepoll3.2/
Johnson then shows that this reason is unacceptable, adoption
of the criterion resting upon a false assumption: "It is
false, that any representation is mistaken for reality; that
any dramatick fable in its materiality was ever credible, or,
for a single moment, was ever credited."2® His argument
against the unities is as objective as any argument can be, and
whether or not one accepts it, at least his rejection of them
as criteria by -which to judge Shakespearian plays certainly
does not rest upon the expression of a personal preference:
The objection arising from the impossibility of
passing the first hour at Alexandria, and the next
at Rome, supposes, that when the play opens, the
spectator really imagines himself at Alexandria.
and believes that his walk to the theatre has been
a voyage to Egypt, and that he lives in the days
of Anthony and Cleopatra. Surely he that imagines
this may imagine more. He that can take the stage
at one time for the palace of the Ptolemies. may-
take it in half an hour for the promontory of
Aotium. Delusion, If delusion be admitted, has no
certain limitation; If the spectator can be once
persuaded, that his old acquaintance are Alexander
and Caesar, that a room illuminated with candles
is the plain of Pharsalla. or the bank of Granlcus.
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he is In a state of elevation above the reach of
reason, or of truth, and from the heights of
empyrean poetry, may despise the circumscriptions
of terrestial nature. There is no reason why a mind
thus wandering in extacy should count the clock, or
why an hour should not be a century in that calen¬
ture of the brains that can make a stage a field.
The truth is, that the spectators are always in
their senses, and know, from the first act to the
last, that the stage is only a stage, and that the
players are only players.... The lines relate to
some action, and an action must be in some place;
but the different actions that complete a story
may be in places very remote from each other; and
where is the absurdity of allowing that space to
represent first Athens, and then Sicily, which was
always known to be neither Sicily nor Athens. but
a modern theatre?
Johnson decided "By the authority of Shakespeare"3° to dis¬
pense with the unities as providing a criterion for the judge¬
ment of plays and he found reasons to justify this decision.
In other respects he was more conservative. From observing in
Shakespeare's plays features unaccounted for by Aristotle's
definition of tragedy, Johnson concluded that none of them,
however valuable as dramatic works, could properly be called
'tragedies'. While redefining the term descriptively, he
still felt some scruple about using it in any sense other than
the one sanctioned by Aristotelian usage. It Is instructive
to read his argument as typical of the first phase of descrip¬
tively redefining a critical term to make it conform to what is
actually found in the ostensive field:
Shakespeare's plays are not in the rigorous criti¬
cal sense either tragedies or comedies, but com¬
positions of a distinct kind; exhibiting the real
state of sublunary nature, which partakes of good
■and evil, joy and sorrow, mingled with endless
variety of proportion and innumerable modes of
combination....
Out of this chaos of mingled purposes and casual¬
ties the ancient poets, according to the laws which
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custom had proscribed, selected some the crimes of
men, and some their absurdities; some the momentous
vicissitudes of life, and some the lighter occurr¬
ences: some the terrours of distress, and some the
gayeties of prosperity* Thus rose the two modes
of imitation, known by the names of tragedy and
comedy * compositions intended, to promote different
ends by contrary means, and considered as so little
allied, that I do not recollect among the Greeks or
Romans a single writer who attempted both,^1
The classical definition of tragedy derived from Aristotle
was revised on the teals of auoh studies as this on© of
Shakespeare by Johnson, The necessity of altering the defini¬
tion, its elaboration as description, and the associated cri¬
teria was a consequence of the works actually being published
under the ma© of tragedy. The differences between these works
and those classed as tragedies on the basis of the old defini¬
tion accounts for Johnson's reluctance to extend the reference
of the torn to Incite© those new works, Nevertheless, in ana¬
lysing Shakespearian drama he was already engaged in revising
the descriptive definition of tragedy. ibid now, of course, no
one would say that King hear and Hamlet "are not in the rigorous
and critical sense" tragedies. The ostensive reference of
* tragedy1 has been extended to include those works and the des¬
cription of tragic works has been altered to accommodate them,
A more generalized theory of criteria of value may now be
based upon, this brief account of the derivation and revision
of the classical rules of tragedy. The assumption that what
has been found to b© the case with the criteria of tragedy
evolved from Aristotle's descriptive definition is similarly
the case with the criteria used in other fields of art can bo
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tested by examining a variety of critical arguments in order to
discover the logical character of the criteria stated or implied
in them. It seems that the notion of criteria as descriptive
definition is proving itself a useful hypothesis for the in¬
quiry. But since the notion is likely to encounter some re¬
sistance, possible objections to it must be anticipated and
answered.
Since a descriptive definition, the assertion of a criterion
or set of criteria, is neither descriptive in the usual (empiri¬
cal) sense nor a definition in any ordinary sense, it may be
asked what Justification there can be for using this term. The
term is, of course, sorely a semantical conveniencej it is ©ore
suggestive (and less cumbersome) than •statement of a criterion
or set of criteria1, for which it stands here, of the charac¬
teristics of this feature of critical argument. As a naming
term, it is intended to give a clue to what statements of cri¬
teria logically are. As for a descriptive definition not being
genuinely descriptive, it is the case that it is not logically
equivalent to a descriptive statement (or generalization) such
as would be admitted into the discourse of empirical science.
But there is more than one way to describe a thing, and to
describe in terms of value is not only quit© as defensible as
to describe in terms of empirical properties but it is to
describe in the only way that is critically relevant. Evalua¬
tive description is the typical mode of critical discourse.
It seems to m© that statements of criteria are descriptive in
this sense, that they state as generalizations in tors© of
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value what features belong to certain classes of works. As
statements of the form that might be given in answer to ques¬
tions such as 'What do you mean by "good tragedy"?', it would
seem that statements of criteria might be called a definition
without unduly straining the usual sense of 'definition'. The
view presented here, that in describing In general terms the
features of tragedy, Aristotle was in some sense defining 'tra¬
gedy', does not represent an altogether new way of speaking.
Corneille, for instance, when discussing the Poetics. said that
Aristotle "causes charm of discourse to enter into the defini-
tion of Tragedy.nJ And in his dialogue, An Essay of Dramatic
Poesy. Dryden has Lisidelus ask "how was it possible to be de¬
cided who writ the best plays, before we know what a play should
be?"-^ and then "to give the definition of a play"3^ as follows:
"A .1 ust and lively image of human, nature. representing its
passions and humours. and the changes of fortune to which it is
subject, for the delight and instruction of mankind."35
Lisideius remarks that what he has formulated is "rather a des¬
cription than a definition."^ According to the terminology
used here, what be has offered is a descriptive definition. As
a definition, it is only a genere et fine, as Crites objects,
requiring further elaboration to set forth the differentia
which will render this highly general statement of a criterion
into a set of criteria sufficiently detailed and particular for
distinguishing not only between which things are plays and which
are not but also between which plays are good and which are not.
It seems to me helpful to have a name for statements of
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criteria that is suggestive of their logical characteristics.
And it also seems to me legitimate to regard such statements
as definitions of a kind, namely of a descriptive kind, for
they assert what a critic means, in general, by the subject
term by asserting what features do belong to works to which he
is prepared to apply the subject term. In the preface to his
Mm t§&£&S£S M M:MMl Jm&z beavis speaks of hia "cri¬
terion of significance, ... •significance* being defined by the
generalities that 1 venture upon.®3? The generalities to which
he refers set forth the defining characteristics (JL.e., describe)
the works that he admits into the value class of poetry "that
is important by any serious standards,and at the same time
they serve to exclude "certain serious and intelligent verso-
writers whom,,,! have not dealt with because they seem to be
not poets,"39
If despite this confirmation found in the usage of critics
anyone still finds the ma© given here to statements of cri¬
teria objectionable, he is free to replace It by another. Un¬
doubtedly there are other ways of conceiving of criteria that
would facilitate a description of their logical structure and
function. 'Critical generalization', for instance, would not
be an inappropriate name; it would suggest the seemingly tena¬
ble thesis that criteria consist of generalizations based upon
a critical study of the features upon which the value of cer¬
tain kinds of works depends, The name would also connote the
faot that formulations of criteria are constructions of a kind
subject to the alterations required to account for new works of
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art which Introduce new aesthetic considerations. I prefer
the term 'descriptive definition' simply because it seems to me
to suggest more forcibly and precisely the genetic and function¬
al characteristics of criteria. Since criteria of value de¬
termine a critic's use of terms, it is by reference to them that
the meaning of his statements is explicable. Criteria of
value can be invoked to explain why the critic applied certain
terms of high evaluative power to a work, and thus they perform
a defining function. But they do not simply define in terms
of synonyms. They state what features a thing must have to
warrant a critic's predicating of it the terms in question.
Defining a term in this way requires a description of the
things to which the term Is applied. The term 'descriptive
definition' is therefore used here to designate criteria because
it connotes these two salient facts, that the sense given to
critical terms in a particular context must be defined by
reference to the criteria of value employed, and that this de¬
fining function is fulfilled by generalized critical descrip¬
tions of the works to which the terms are applied.
Despite the care taken to exhibit the uniqueness of descrip¬
tive definitions in respect to their purpose and method of for¬
mulation, it can hardly be expected that they will escape In¬
volvement in long standing controversies about definition. It
will very likely be asked on which side of the traditional di¬
vision of definitions descriptive definition belongs. Is it a
species of nominal definition or a new kind of real definition?
The answer, of course, depends upon how these two kinds of
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definition are themselves defined. In a recent book on the
subject, Richard Robinson has shown that both of these terms
have been applied to a great variety of defining procedures
differing from one another in their methods and purposes. In
a preliminary statement of what has been understood to be the
purposes of these two kinds of definition, he remarks:
The purpose of nominal definition is something to do
with nomina or words or signs or symbols. I cannot
describe it accurately at this stage, and later it
will become clear from its sub-divisions; but rough¬
ly the purpose of nominal definition is to report or
establish the meaning of a symbol. The purpose of
real definition, on the other hand, is nothing to
do with nomina or words or signs or symbols. It
is something to do with res or things.^0
It is clear from the account already given of descriptive
definitions that they do not suit the purpose of either nominal
or real definition, as Robinson conceives of it - or, more
accurately, they suit the purposes of both together, A des¬
criptive definition certainly does have "something to do with
nomina or words or signs or symbols"; as construed here, it has
to do with critical terms, and its purpose is to formulate the
determining conditions of their use. But a descriptive defi¬
nition also has "something to do with res or things," namely
with the works of art to which critical terms are applied, and
its purpose is to stipulate the features which a work must have
in order to warrant the predication of certain terras of it.
If by 'nominal definition' is meant what Robinson calls
'word-word definition', then descriptive definitions cannot be
construed as nominal definitions, but must be understood as
combining the functions of both nominal and real definition.
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If what Hoblnson calls 'word-thing definition1 is taken to be a
legitimate form of nominal definition, then descriptive defini¬
tion can be taken as a form of nominal definition and the dlffi-
Afrl
oulties attendant upon the notion of real definition avoided.
However descriptive definition be classified on the basis
of the traditional distinction between kinds of definition, it
must be understood as explaining the meanings of terms by in¬
dicating to what these terms are used to refer, This can be
accomplished in a statement of criteria only through the use
of other terms; but the point of formulating criteria, a des¬
criptive definition, is not merely to announce that the deflnlens
and the deflnlendum will be used as equivalent in meaning. The
point is to indicate what features a work of art to which the
deflnlenduta is applied may be expected to have, This distinc¬
tion between purposes may appear artificial. For a criterion
may be understood as requiring that a work to which the subject
term of its statement is applicable either must have certain
features or that certain other terras can be properly applied to
it. Since the only i*ay of indicating that a work does have
certain features is by applying certain terras to it, there
seems to be no significant difference between the phrases *raust
have certain features* and * certain other terms can be properly
applied to It', The key word of the second phrase is 'proper¬
ly*, with its implication that the assignment of critical
predicates requires justification in terms of the features which
a work of art actually possesses. The difficulty raised by
the consideration that the question of what features a work
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actually possesses can be answered only through the assignment
of yet more predicates is resolved in practice by the fact that
predicates of high evaluative power are inferred, by the media¬
tion of criteria from predicates of high descriptive power.
Statements of criteria conceived as descriptive definition,
then, servo a double purpose, They define things, good tra¬
gedy, masterpieces of musical form, significant contemporary
poetry, derivative architecture, in the sense of stating what
features belong to these things. They define terms, •good tra¬
gedy', 'masterpieces of musical form', 'significant contemporary
poetry1, 'derivative architecture', in the sense of stating what
any critic who accepts the set of criteria means by them,
'Means by' here means what features he Implies a work so-called
to have, or, alternatively, what other predicates he is in con¬
sistency prepared to apply to any such work.
Objection may be taken to a consequence of these remarks,
namely that identical terms may have quite different meanings
in the arguments of different critics. This theoretical possi¬
bility is not denied; but admitting It merely commits one to th©
now generally recognized principle that the meanings of words
are determined by the context in which they are used. Criteria
of value, as part of th© contextual background of a critical ar¬
gument, ar© instrumental in determining th© meaning of crucial
predicates, But total anarchy in the use of critical predi¬
cates is in practice averted because there is in fact wide
agreement amongst critics on criteria of value.
The reader may have been reminded by this discussion of
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criteria as descriptive definition of Charles L. Stevenson's
concept of persuasive definition. There are similarities be¬
tween his view of definition and the one presented here, but
there are also such differences as might be anticipated in
view of the previous discussion of his Ethics and Language.
In a highly suggestive chapter of that book, Stevenson shows
how definitions are used to support value judgements. In or¬
der to justify the application of terms with evaluative force
to things or situations, writers frequently argue that the des¬
criptive meaning of the terms are such that they can be proper¬
ly used to denote the things or situations in question. When
a writer encounters opposition to denoting something by a cer¬
tain term, he may re-define the term in order to persuade his
opponent that his usage (judgement) is warranted. The re¬
definition does not usually claim that the term has some hither¬
to wholly unsuspected meaning, but rather that certain features
rather than others in the thing designated are crucial for de¬
termining whether or not the term is correctly applied to it.
For instance, Clive Bell defines the term 'work of art' (mean¬
ing visual art) by stating the quality common to all things to
which that term Is properly applied. He calls this quality
'significant form', claiming that it is essential to the aes¬
thetic value of a work of architecture, stained glass, sculp¬
ture, pottery, carpetry, fresco, or oil painting, and that such
other characteristics as faithful representation and psycho¬
logical interest are merely adventitious. The formal features
which according to him constitute the defining characteristics
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of great art ("without which a work of art cannot exist;
possessing which, in the least degree, no work is altogether
ho
worthless" ) had long been recognised as contributing to the
aesthetic value of many great works, The novelty of his defi¬
nition used as a criterion lies in its rejection of suoh fea¬
tures as aoourate representation, an ethically or psychologi¬
cally interesting subject matter, appealing colours, as irrele¬
vant to a work1 s aesthetic value, Anyone who accepts Bell's
critical Judgements, for instance of Cezanne, for Bell's rea¬
sons, must also accept hie definition. For that matter, the
purpose of his definition is to Justify the inclusion within the
class of aesthetically valuable art the work of certain artists,
of whom Cezanne is one, and the exclusion of the work of others,
for example that of Frith. "The purport of the definition,"
Stevenson says, "la to alter the descriptive meaning of the
term, usually by giving it greater precision within the bounds
of its customary vagueness; but the definition does not make any
substantial change in the term's emotive [evaluative] meaning,
And the definition is used, consciously or unconsciously, in an
effort to secure, by this interplay between emotive C^^uatlve]
and descriptive meaning, a redirection of people's attitudes
in
[critical Judgements']," Stevenson finds examples of the pro¬
cedure in everyday argument about value, in advertising, ethi¬
cal and economic theory, and elsewhere. His literary example
is worth quoting her©;
Many literary critics, for instance, have debated
whether Alexander Pope was or was not "a poet."
The foolish retort would bo, "It's a mere matter
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of definition." It is indeed a matter of defini¬
tion, but not a "mere" one. If the word "poet" is
to have an unusually narrow sense, Pope will be¬
come, beyond any doubt for such a sense, no poet.
This, so far from being an Idle conclusion, has
Important consequences; It enables the critics to
deny to Pope a laudatory name, and so to Induce
people to disregard him. A persuasive definition,
tacitly employed, is at work In re-directing atti¬
tudes. Those who wish to decide whether Pope was
a poet must decide whether they ^rlll respond to
the influence of the unfavorable critics - whether
they will come to dislike Pope's work enough to
allow him to be deprived of an honorary title. This
decision will require an intimate knowledge of
literature and of their own minds. Such are the
important matters which lie behind the acceptance
or rejectance of the tacitly proposed, narrow
definition of "poet." it is not a matter of
"merely arbitrary" definition, then, nor is any
persuasive definition "merely arbitrary," if that
phrase Is taken to imply "suitably decided by a
flip of a coln."^
The subjectivlst bias, indicated by the terms 'emotive' and
•attitude' in the earlier quotation, makes Itself felt here al¬
so. It seems to me far from certain that the point of a 'per¬
suasive' definition of 'poetry' that excludes Pope is "to in¬
duce people to disregard him" or to make them "dislike Pope's
work." That was not exactly Mathew Arnold's purpose in de¬
claring that "Dryden and Pope are not classics of our poetry,
they are classics of our prose."^5 But then I do not agree
with Stevenson that the function of definition In argument
about value is primarily emotive. Hoi^ever, subject to this
reservation about his using 'emotive' in place of 'evaluative'
and 'attitude' in place of 'judgement', his example of the cri¬
tical use of definition seems to me Instructive, as are his
more general comments on a "much used but too little studied
type of definition":
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Definitions are usually studied as a propaedeutic
to science, logic, or mathematics, with emphasis
on the way they clarify common notions or make con¬
venient abbreviations. One is likely to think,
then, that definitions have the same function in
ethics, and that the selection of any defined
sense*., will be guided by purely descriptive in¬
terests. In point of fact, this is rarely the
case; description is usually a secondary considera¬
tion, Ethical definitions involve a wedding of
descriptive and emotive meaning, and accordingly
have a frequent use in redirecting and intensi¬
fying attitudes. To choose a definition is to
plead a cause, so long as the word defined is
strongly emotive..». Thus the disagreements
evinced by contrary predications of the ethical
term may also be evinced by contrary contentions
about their meaning.
It is clear from what has been said earlier, and in any case
obvious enough, that criteria are invoked in order to justify
assertions about particular works of art. A critical statement
about a work of art is intended to describe the work's features
in terms of value. Such a statement presupposes criteria of
value. It is only by virtue of having a general conception of
what is valuable in works of art of a certain kind that a critic
is able to make assertions about a particular work of the sort
that are relevant to communicating his evaluation of it. Cri¬
teria of value constitute the grounds of a critic's aesthetic
evaluations; they are the generalizations regarding the features
that belong to works of a certain kind and of a certain value
to which he is willing to commit himself. That such generali¬
zations can be supported by purely objective argument and on
grounds independent of the circumstance that the features in
question are found to belong to works that the critic does value
'was shown by reference to Aristotle (p. 303) s^d Johnson (pp.306-
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30?}, and will be further argued later in the chapter (pp.33**~
355), If critical argument consisted solely of remarks about
the features of works of art without criteria being asserted or
implied, it would not only be impossible for critical disagree¬
ments to be resolved but also impossible even to understand the
reason for them.
But in fact critical disagreements can often be explained
in terms of conflicting criteria of value. In recounting one
of the first controversies between critic and composer in musi¬
cal history, Max Graf discusses the criteria of value that
underlay Johann Adolph Seheibe's evaluation of the music of
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J. S. Bach. ' According to Graf, Scheib© had been impressed
by the philosophical ideas of the Enlightenment, particularly
by the current, rationalistic aesthetic views of Eighteenth
Century France which valued naturalness, reasonableness, clari¬
ty, and simplicity in music. Subscribing to the Encyclo¬
paedists' disparagement of Italian opera, Scheibe argued again¬
st including the characteristic features of Baroque music among
the defining characteristics of valuable music. Arid, of
course, he described these features in terms intended to justi¬
fy their exclusion; 'laboured', 'bombastic', 'over-elaborate'.
For Scheibe the ostensive field of valuable music was drawn
from the then new classicism of the Eighteenth Century, and his
description of it set forth the defining characteristics which
constituted his criteria of value.
Using his descriptive definition of this 'work as the cri¬
terion of what is valuable in music, Scheibe wrote of Bach;
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The gentleman is the most distinguished of musi¬
cians . He is an extraordinary artist on clavier
and organ,,., I have heard him play on several
occasions. One is astonished at his craftsmanship.
One wonders how it is possible for him to move his
fingers and feet so rapidly without entangling
them, or how he can stretch them to make the
widest leaps x-srlthout producing one false tone and
without distorting his body with such vehement
movements»
This great man would be admired by the whole na¬
tion, had he more agreeableness and did he not
keep naturalness away from his compositions by
employing bombastic and intricate devices and dar¬
kening beauty with over-elaborate art. He judges
the difficulties of his music according to his
fingers. His compositions, therefore, are diffi¬
cult to perform, as he demands that singers and
instrumentalists perform with their throats and
instruments the same feats he can perform on the
clavier. This, of course, is impossible. All the
ornaments, all the little grace notes, and all
that are known as aardments are written out in
full. Therefore his compositions are deprived of
beauty, of harmony, ana of clarity of melody,
since the song is unrecognizable. All voices must
work with each other, all with the same weight, so
that it is impossible to recognize the principal
voice. In short, Bach is to music what Lohenstein
is to poetry. Their inclination toward bombast
led them both from naturalness to artificiality,
from sublimity to want of clearness. With both
one admires the laborious effort and the excep¬
tional work expended In vain because they are not
conformable to reason.^
Graf disagrees with this criticism: "But the truth about Scheibe
is that he was wrong, totally wrong, when he found Bach's music
labored, intricate, and over-elaborate."2^ He explains his pre¬
decessor's error in judgement in terms of the inapproprlateness
of the criteria used: "He x^eighed Bach's music in the scales
of contemporary French rationalism and found the music too
heavy, too full of religious mysticism and polyphonic thought-
fulness, too massive in construction, and too passionate.
Graf does not deny that the features which Scheibe valued may
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characterize valuable music, but he wishes to include others,
those belonging to Baroque music, in the descriptive definition
of valuable music. The resultant criteria support his judge¬
ment of Bach and his argument against Scheibe by showing that
the unfavourable judgement was based upon a misunderstanding
of Bach's work:
But Scheibe had to be wrong, for he was the
representative of an epoch that preferred clarity
to exuberant fanoy. He could not understand the
florldlty of Bach's music. He would have been
insincere had he pretended to comprehend Baroque
opulence and emotion.*1
But he failed because he judged Bach from a
point of view that did not fit Bach at all. It
did not make the least particle of sense to miss
qualities in Bach's music which Bach had never
intended to put there. Bach did not want to
write music according to contemporary taste. He
was essentially a man of the Baroque epoch, and
he wrote his music in the Baroque style. It was
his misfortune that the Baroque style had gone -g
out of fashion with the rise of the Age of Reason.-5
An even more manifest example of the use of criteria for
reversing critical judgements is provided by Mark Twain.-'"' He
begins an essay on Fenimore Cooper's novels by quoting the
evaluations of three critics. He refutes these judgements by
showing that The Pathfinder and The Peerslayer do not have the
features claimed for them by the critics but rather their con¬
traries. In other words, he shows that the statements of high
descriptive power which can be asserted about the works on the
basis of a careful examination of them are incompatible with
the statements of high evaluative power asserted by the critics.
He does this by reference to a set of criteria of value
applicable to romantic fiction. This set of criteria consists
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of a series of statements asserting what features a work of
romantic fiction must have in order to qualify as literary art*
There is not space enough to quote as much of this instructive
and amusing essay as I would, like, but the following excerpts
clearly illustrate the function of criteria in critical argu¬
ment:
"The Pathfinder and The Peerslayer stand at the
head of Cooper's novels as artistic creations.
There are others of his works that contain parts
as perfect as are to be found in these, and scenes
even more thrilling. Not one can be compared with
either of them as a finished whole.
The defects in both of these tales are compara¬
tively slight. They were pure works of art." -
Professor Lounsbury.
"The five tales reveal an extraordinary fullness
of invention ... One of the very greatest charac¬
ters in fiction, Natty Bump©*,*.
The craft of the woodsman, the tricks of the
trapper, all the delicate art of the forest, were
familiar to Cooper from his youth up." - Professor
Brander Mathews,
"Cooper is the greatest artist in the domain of
romantic fiction yet produced by America." - Wilkie
Collins,
It seems to me that it x<ras far from right for
the Professor of English Literature in Xale, the
Professor of English Literature in Columbia, and
Wllkie Collins to deliver opinions on Cooper's
literature without having read some of it. It
would have been much more decorous to keep silent
and let persons talk who have read Cooper.
Cooper's art has some defects. In one place in
Peerslayer, and in the restricted space of two
'thirds of a page, Cooper has scored 11^ offenses
against literary art out of a possible 115. It
breaks the record.
There are nineteen rules governing literary art
in the domain of romantic fiction - some say
twenty-two. In Peerslayer Cooper violated eighteen
of them. These eighteen require:5^
7. They require that when a personage talks
like an illustrated, gilt-edged, tree-calf, hand-
tooled, seven-dollar Friendship's offering in the
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beginning of a paragraph, lie shall not talk Ills©
a negro minstrel in -the md of it. But this rule
is flung down ma danced upon la the Beerslayer
tale*
3. They require that orass stupidities shall not
be played upon tho reader as "the craft of the
woodsman, the delicate art of the forest,® by
either the author or the people In the tale. But
this rule Is persistently violated in the Doerslayer
tale.
9. They require that the personages of a tale shall
confine themselves to possibilities and let miracles
alone; or, if they venture a miracle, tho author
must so plausibly set it forth as to make it look
possible and reasonable. But those rules are not
respected in the Peerslarar tale,55
*•♦» 13 Dae the right word, not its second cousin.^
Having formulated the eighteen rules, Hark Twain moves to a
critical description of Cooper's work, showing by reference to
specific features that tho rules are violated* Parts of tho
analysis relevant to the four criteria cited above are quoted
in corresponding order:
The conversations in the Cooper books have a
curious sound in our modern ears. To believe
that such talk really came out of people's mouths
would be to believe that there was a time when
time was of no value to a person who thought he
had something to say; when it was the custom to
spread a feo-minute remark out to ten; when a
man's mouth was a rolling-mill, and busied itself
all day long in turning four-foot pigs of thought
into thirty-foot bars of railroad iron by attenua¬
tion; when subjects were seldom faithfully stuck
to, but the talk wandered all around and arrived
nowhere; when conversations consisted mainly of
irrolevancios, with here and there a relevancy, a
relevancy with an embarrassed look, as not being
able to explain how it got there.
Cooper was certainly not a master in the construc¬
tion of dialogue. Inaccurate observation defeated
him here as it defeated Mm in so many other enter¬
prises of his. He even failed to notice that the
man who talks corrupt English six days in the weak
must and will talk it on the seventh, and can't
help himself. In the Peerslavar story he lets
Doers layor talk the showiest kind of book-talk
325
sometimes, and at other times the basest of base
dialects. For Instance, whan someone asks him if he
has a sweetheart, and if so, where she abides, this
is his majestic answer:
"She's in the forest - hanging from the boughs of
the trees, in a soft rain - in the dew on the open
grass - the clouds that float about in the blue
heavens - the birds that sing in the woods - the
sweet springs where I slake my thirst - and in all
the other glorious gifts that come from God's
Providence!"
And he preceded that, a little before, with this:
"It consaras me as all things that touches a frl'nd
consams a frl'nd."
And this is another of his remarks:
"If I was Injin bom, now, I might tell of this, or
carry in the scalp and boast of the expl'ite afore
the whole tribe; or if my inimy had only been a
bear" - and so on.,..57
If Cooper had been an observer his inventive faculty
would have worked better; not more interestingly,
but more rationally, more plausibly. Cooper's prou¬
dest creations in the way of "situations" suffer
noticeably from the absence of the observer's pro¬
tecting gift. Cooper's eye was splendidly in¬
accurate. Cooper seldom saw anything correctly. He
saw nearly all things as through a glass eye, dark¬
ly, Of course a man who cannot see the commonest
little every-day matters accurately is working at a
disadvantage when he is constructing a "situation,"
In the Peerslayer tale Cooper has a stream which is
fifty feet wide where it flows out of a lake; it
presently narrows to twenty as it meanders along for
no given reason, and yet when a stream acts like
that it ought to be required to explain itself.
Fourteen pages later the width of the brook's out¬
let from the lake has suddenly shrunk thirty feet,
and become "the narrowest part of the stream." This
shrinkage is not accounted for. The stream has bends
in it, a sure indication that it has alluvial banks
and cuts them; yet these bends are only thirty and
fifty feet long. If Cooper had been a nice and jjunc-
tilious observer he would have noticed that the bends
were oftener nine hundred feet long than short of it,.
The reader will find some examples of Cooper's high
talent for Inaccurate observation in the account of
the shooting-match in The Pathfinder
The nail xfas lightly driven, its head painted, and
game called. Then the Cooper miracles began. The
bullet of the first marksman chipped an edge of the
nail-head; the next man's bullet drove the nail a
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little way into the target - and removed all the
paint. Haven*t the miracles gone far enough nw?
Mot to suit Coopers for the purpose of this whole
scheme is to show off his prodigy#..before the
ladies,
"The rifle cracked, the bullet sped its way, and the
head of the nail was buried in the wood, covered by
the pieces of flattened lead,®
The recorded feat is certainly surprising just as it
stands| but it is not surprising enough for Cooper#
Cooper adds a touch# He lias mad© Pathfinder do this
miracle with another man's riflej and not only that,
but Pathfinder did not even have the advantage of
loading it himself,#,.
Pathfinder showed off handsomely that day before the
ladles # # #•
"It's a dead miss," said Major bundle. Pathfinder
waited an impressive moment or two, then said, in
that oaln, indifferent, know-it-all way of his, 8Ho
Major, he has covered Jasper's bullet, as will be
seen if anyone will take the trouble to examine the
target•B
Hasn't it remarkable! How could he see that little
pellet fly through the air and enter that distant
bullet-hole? fat that is what he didj for nothing
is impossible to a Cooper person. Did any of those
people have any deep-seated doubts about tills thing?
floj for that would imply sanity, and these ifere all
Cooper people,59
Cooper's word-sense was singularly dull, Hhen a
person has a poor ear for music he will flat mid
sharp right along without knowing It, He keeps near
the tune, but It is not the time, When a person has
a poor ear for words, the result is a literary
flatting and sharping! you perceive what he is in¬
tending to say, but you also perceive that ho doesn't
ft it. This is Cooper# He was not a word-musician,s ear was atisfied with the aBB£2&B&&§ word. 1
will furnish some circumstantial evidence in support
of this charg©# My Instances are gathered from half-
a-dozen pages of the tale called Peerslavor. He uses
for 2£^mm» tor immm
for msi? mwiara/ for wmMiter
for jMsWUras Pr$m&$Xm,f°r
HSSII, for suim> for £mQMm
igoBi £&&» for <?on4msa; for
ImUktmr* mimMte, &&s£sm&&*
for gmmkmi kmmmim* forSS^^^nja&t js- a
podded, for .tppaqhprouff,, for .hq^Ale; m£oc&»
forjtpcip^i sMbmsfk* form0.iaMi iB. *or
for conditions for
temlki for MmJMn&t for
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celerityi distrusted, for suspicious: mental
imbecility. for imbecility: eyes. for sight:
counteracting:. -for opposing: funeral obsequies .
for obsequies.60
Mark Twain concludes his argument with a critical evaluation
of The Peerslayer inferable from his critical description of it
and contrary to the evaluations he quoted from the three other
critics:
I may be mistaken, but it does seem to me that
Peerslayer is not a work of art in any sensej it
does seem to me that it is destitute of every de¬
tail that goes to the making of a work of art; in
truth, it seems to me that Peerslayer is just simply
a literary delirium tremens <-,/
It may have been noticed that Mark Twain refers to his
statements of criteria as "rules governing literary art in the
domain of romantic fiction," and formulates them as require¬
ments. This way of speaking of criteria - it was Horace's way
also, and that of many other critics since his time - may seem
to lend support to prescriptive theories of the value judgement.
But it must be remembered that even if by making general asser¬
tions about what features works of a certain kind should have,
a critic is in some sense prescribing to artists, it does not
follow that when he uses these same assertions as the grounds
of his critical judgement he is also prescribing to his readers.
Although rendering statements of criteria as descriptive defini¬
tions may involve altering their grammatical form, it does not
involve transforming their logical character, but only makes
this more apparent by manifesting the procedure by which they
are derived. Taking statements of criteria such as those
formulated by Mark Twain literally as prescriptions tends to
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suggest that they have an arbitrary, a priori character in
that they assert the writer's personal preference for artistic
features of a certain kind. But in fact statements of cri¬
teria are intended to assert what features critical observation
has discovered to belong to works of a certain kind generally
accepted as having a certain value. This is the Justification
for reading Mark Twain's "rules" as descriptive definition, as
a generalized description of the defining characteristics of
valuable works of the kind under review.
It is not only terms of such vast generality, terms such as
•poetry', 'tragedy', and 'contemporary architecture' which re¬
fer to entire classes of works of art, that are descriptively
defined in critical writing. More specific terms, denoting
features common to works of certain kinds, are treated in the
same way. Critics use terms like 'lyrical', 'dramatic', and
•rhythmic', to refer to certain features that can be distin¬
guished by critical analysis from others. These terms, repre¬
senting concepts of varying degrees of generality, serve to
designate particular kinds of features, however much any one of
these kinds of features may differ from one work to another.
When such a terra is applied to a work of art the double claim
is made, implicitly or explicitly, that the work has certain
features that can be specified in other terms and that the work
is in some particular way valuable (or the contrary) by virtue
of having these features. The 'other terms' constitute the
meaning of the predicate. By defining it, or, alternatively,
by providing a generalized description of the feature in
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question, they provide a criterion for the application of the
predicate in any particular instance.
One does not have to look far in the literature to find
evidence of this logical procedure underlying the ascription
of critical predicates. Dissenting from earlier judgements
of Debussy's music, Neville Cardus observes that "In Debussy's
period to be lyrieal meant that a composer was obliged to
vaunt his melody, all arching to an apex of high notes, with
an appogiatura - if there should be time for one - to squeese
out the last juices,"^2 Cardus admits the absence of lyricism,
thus defined, from Debussy's Pelleas. but revises the descrip¬
tive definition of this feature in order to justify the predi¬
cation 'lyrical' of this opera.^ To clarify and defend his
partial description of lyrical music by contrast, Cardus cites
an instance of what he would exclude from the ostensive defini¬
tion of 'lyrical music': "a stretch of recitative from an
(■u
opera by Hassanet." He deals with the terra 'dramatic' in
quite the same way, first saying what the term "meant" to music
critics contemporary with Debussy by stating what musical fea¬
tures belonged to works which they called 'dramatic', He re¬
vises this descriptive definition also, citing features of
6*5
Pelleas that warrant the appellation 'dramatic'. His treat¬
ment of the term 'rhythm' is formally the same, and one state¬
ment expressly acknowledges the use of a definition as a cri¬
terion: "I cannot imagine that any musician of today will
quote the old rigid definitions of rhythm to prove that Debussy
66
was weak in rhythm." The implicit objection here Is not
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against his predecessors' having used a definition as a cri¬
terion but rather against the nature of the definition that they
*
did use. He suggests that later critics revised the old
"rigid" definition of rhythm in order to take account of inno¬
vations in respect to this feature of music. The passage in
which the above statement occurs illustrates how developments
within an art require the revision of the descriptive defini¬
tions ifhlch provide criteria for critical judgements:
In Debussy's period, rhythm meant emphasis, a
succession of balanced bar-phrases. We need not
at this time of day interrupt our argument to point
out the presence in Debussy's music of rhythm; the
development of music since the late-nineties has
concentrated much on the subtillzation of rhythm
and the liberating of melody and harmony from the
tight-pinching boots of pointed emphasis. I cannot
imagine that any musician of to-day will quote the
old rigid definitions of rhythm to prove that
Debussy was weak in rhythm. let without implying
that Debussy's pulse is even weak, we can agree
that because of Debussy's preoccupation with har¬
monic problems the movement of his music tended to
proceed in flowing lengths not sharply or abruptly
changed; Wagner, when he was similarly preoccupied
with the harmonic discoveries and revelations in
♦Lohengrin', composed nearly the whole work in four-
four time. It Is difficult for a composer to be
simultaneously flexible of rhythm and rich and
subtle in harmonic mutation. Rhythm in Dgbussy Is
less a melodic than harmonic constituent.®'
Cardus's criteria of musical value warrant the predication
of 'lyrical', 'rhythmic', and 'dramatic' of Debussy's music.
They do so because his descriptive definition of these terms Is
such that they can be appropriately applied to Debussy's work.
By virtue of the historically established evaluative implica¬
tions of these terms, Cardus'3 favourable judgement of Debussy
can be inferred from his critical description of the music.
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The example raises a difficulty. If the revision of cri¬
teria is accepted as a legitimate part of critical procedure,
then It may seem that any critical judgement whatsoever can be
justified. The critic need only descriptively re-define cer¬
tain crucial terms to make them fit the work under review.
According to this new standard (new definition) terms with old
established and generally accepted evaluative implications can
be applied to the work. The critic's reasons for assigning
the terms may be different from the usual reasons - in other
words, the features denoted by the terras may differ in Important
ways from features usually so denoted - , and yet the terms will
bear the conventional evaluative connotations. Thus the in¬
ferred critical judgement of the work rests upon the arbitrary
foundation of the critic's interference with the denotative
meaning of terms.
The possibility of capricious judgements and dogmatic argu¬
ments of this kind may be admitted. But reputable criticism
suffers from no such congenital defect. The changes which cri¬
teria of value undergo are a consequence of artistic Innovation.
If artistic production ceased, then criteria of value might in
time become stabilized. New techniques in the creation of
works of art require modification of the critical generaliza¬
tions made about aesthetic value. What seems to happen, as
the discussion of Johnson's Shakespeare criticism suggests, is
that new works appear vrhich differ in important respects from
the body of works from which the criteria in use have been de¬
rived. These new works satisfy the old set of criteria to a
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sufficient degree (or satisfy it in a sufficient number of re¬
spects) that at least some critics are prepared to assign them
the value accorded to the earlier works. But if they are to
apply the same terms of high evaluative power to the new works
as to the old, then some adjustment must be made in the criteria
upon which the assignment of critical terms is grounded. The
adjustment takes the form of modifying the criteria to admit
these new departures In style and technique as constituents of
value. Cardus's treatment of the term 'rhythm1 is an example.
Revisions of criteria, then, are forced upon a critic by
developments within whatever field of art h© happens to be en¬
gaged in criticizing. It would be misleading, therefore, to
say that whenever expedient critics simply revise criteria in
order to justify their critical judgements, For this suggests
that criteria are a mere convenience, unrestrictedly flexible,
subject to every critic's whim. But this is not so; for a
critic must justify the alterations he makes in established
criteria, giving reasons for making the changes necessary to
accommodate whatever new work is in question. It is this re¬
quirement which prevents the critical revision of criteria from
admitting any and every critical judgement as equally justified.
The question of how revisions of criteria are justified is part
of the more general question of how- criteria themselves are
justified, and this is a topic in need of immediate attention.
It has already been shown that works of art provide the
sanction for criteria of value. The terms in which criteria
of value must be formulated are the general terms of evaluative
333
fore© ifhioh critics us© to refer to groups of works of generally
recognized value, At one level of argument, then, a criterion
of value Is justified by the circumstance that the features
which it ascribes to any work of a certain kind and a certain
value are just those features which belong to works of that
kind genorally accepted as having the specified value. But
this level of argument is not very deep. Mot only is it cir¬
cular {inevitably so), but it leaves the original judgement up¬
on which all the others depend undefended. Also, many criti¬
cal predicates, being general terras, are imprecise in their de¬
notations, and so they can bo used to refer to various works
which in many respects are very different from one another. As
a precaution against making any and every work eligible for a
term of evaluative force, the critic tries to determine what
conditions must prevail in order to justify its use in a par¬
ticular instance. He often does this by an analysis of un¬
disputed works which is designed to show how the valued aes¬
thetic effects were achieved. The product of such an analysis
is an interpretation of works of art made to account for the
value thoy are judged to have and embodying the reasons for
accepting the criteria which have been derived from a orltical
study of these works.
The reasons ar© various in kind and make different kinds of
claims to acceptance. Most of the criteria for romantic fic¬
tion formulated by Mark Twain are self-evident: the features
that he attributes to valuable work in this field are so ob¬
viously requisite to artistic success that no responsible critic
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would dispute them, But criteria do not often make such a
prima facie claim to acceptance, Aristotle must occasionally
state why, according to some more general principle, a certain
feature of dramatic art is to be valued. Cardus must raise
historical and technical Issues of lyricism, rhythm, and drama
in order to establish the criteria which warrant his judgement
of Debussy's music as possessing these features. A fully de¬
veloped argument for Schelhe's neo-classic criteria of musical
value would Involve consideration of complex aesthetic and more
general philosophic issues. However, it is not necessary to
enumerate, classify, and analyse all the various forms of argu¬
ment that are offered in support of criteria. All that is re¬
quired here is to show that reasons of an objective kind are
sometimes provided to support them. And that is not difficult
to do.
Roger Pry's Last Lectures^ exemplify the kind of argument
that is advanced in support of criteria. In his attempt to
survey the history of visual art by the light of his own aes¬
thetic theory, Fry consistently uses a comparative method. His
comparisons, both of the dominant styles of different periods
and of particular works of art, are made with reference to two
criteria. These criteria are concerned with the aesthetic
qualities of sensibility and vitality. They are defined in
two introductory chapters and then used in the critical analysis
of nearly three hundred and fifty works of art. His exposition
of these aesthetic qualities as criteria and his subsequent use
of them are most illuminating in their bearing upon the problem
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of critical justification,
"The important thing,0 says Fry, speaking of his method,
"is to make sure that we are talking about the same thing and
to this end 1 propose to narrow dam our inquiry by isolating
particular qualities in various works of art and comparing then
with one another solely in regard to one or two qualities at a
time.0 ' The first quality that Fry considers is sensibility.
Fry uses the term •sensibility' to denote a certain quality in
the execution of a work of art; and this quality, in the most
general terms, is just whatever expresses the individuality of
the artist, distinguishing his work from the mechanically ex¬
act, Impersonal, rigidly uniform productions of the craftsman
and the scientist. Two poets, for instance, may use the same
verse form, the same metre, and these impose a formal structure
on their poemsj but just as the composer is forever straying
from the home key and returning to it, so in their rhythmic
modulations the poets depart from and return to the same baeic
metrical pattern. Such variations are altogether Idiosyncra¬
tic, expressing the sensibilities of their authors, and they
are of great interest to spectators of works of art. The va¬
garies of a geometer's drawings, on the other hand, are of no
interest to the student of mathematics per se; however wildly
drawn, the geometer's circles and right ami?;led triangles will
be conceived from a mathematical point of view as representing
perfect circles and perfect right angled triangles, Similarly,
we do not value a piston ring nor a carburetor because the
machinist has expressed his sensibility by introducing
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variations from the prototype. We are not interested in the
geometer's nor in the machinist's sensibility, but we are, Fry
believes, interested In the artist's sensibility. For 'sensi¬
bility1, it would seem, denotes the results of that sensitivity
to his material which allows the artist to vary his arrangement
of it without altogether deserting his chosen form, thereby
satisfying the mind's ambivalent craving for order and variety.
Further consideration of the psychological grounds of
Fry's view that the evidence of sensibility in a work is aes¬
thetically valuable may be deferred until it has been shown how
he uses this concept in the critical analysis and comparison of
works of art, Using sensibility as the criterion, he compares
a Greek vase with a Chinese bronze:
There is in the design of the Greek vase a clear
articulation of the parts; a bare spreading base,
a narrow support, and clearly defined body, neck
and evaded lip, each a separate curve of great
geometrical regularity and simplicity. It is im¬
possible to contemplate these curves for any
length of time because they are immediately com¬
prehended ,
The Chinese bronze contains the same ideas - base
and urn, plus a lid which is also clearly felt -
but though the parts are distinct they are not iso¬
lated from each other. The base spreads, but far
less markedly, and It requires no separate system
of curvature. Though it does not melt into the
urn it is not violently separated from it. In
the urn there is the idea of a bowl; and note how
satisfactory its volume is. Here too there is a
cylindrical body and evaded lip but they are com¬
prised in a single flowing curve; and throughout
the nature of the curves is vital - they vary and
grow out of each other and are never purely geo¬
metrical.
In the texture the difference is of the same nature.
In the Greek vase everything is done to deny sensi¬
bility. Though the pattern is elaborate the execu¬
tion is everywhere as near to mechanical precision
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as possible. All the sensibility of the artist has
been smoothed out, the texture has become uniform,
the design mathematical. The vase has all the marks
of an object of luxury, which perhaps accounts for
the widespread appreciation of this type in the
ancient world. Though the main ideas of form in the
Chinese um are far simpler, underneath the strong
control of the design vie feel everywhere the clay of
vital forces suggesting infinite variations,7"
The logic of this criticism is admirably plain. Fry has
selected one quality, sensibility, and defined it sufficiently
well that its presence, as defined, can be detected in a work
of art. He then critically describes two works of art, showing
whether and to what extent this quality is present in the two
works. Since sensibility, functioning here as the criterion,
is an aesthetic quality prized by Fry, the predominance of this
quality in the bronze over that in the Greek vase accounts for
his implied preference for the Chinese work. And it is by
reference to this criterion that his implicit evaluation of the
bronze as of superior aesthetic value must be justified. The
criterion provides the grounds for the transitions from state¬
ments of high descriptive power to those highly evaluative
statements which leave no uncertainty about what critical
judgement is to be Inferred from them.
It should be noticed that Fry does not explicitly state
that the Chinese bronze is a better work than the Greek vase.
He has already contended that any such final and absolute
judgement involves an Insuperable difficulty:
Now do not think that I am naive enough to
suppose that I can In this way, by taking one
quality or aspect of a work of art after an¬
other and then by adding up our judgements on
each, arrive at an objective valuation of the
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work as a whole, because, first of all, who is to
decide what sura of qualities makes up the work of
art - still more, who is to decide what relative
value is to be attached to one quality rather
than another??1
Nevertheless, it is clear which work is, in Fry's Judgement,
the more valuable one. And the total absence of the quality
of sensibility from an elaborately mounted scent bottle from
Tutankhamen's tomb accounts for his disparagement of it:
In this Egyptian example taken from Tutankhamen's
tomb we reach the high-water mark of the luxury
effect. It outdoes Bond Street and Rue de la Paix,
The craftsman has achieved the tightest mechanical
uniformity and exactitude; the artist has been
completely suppressed,?2
Anyone aware of Fry's criterion could confidently infer
that he judges the scent bottle to have little or no aesthetic
value. This evaluation, so clearly implied, Is not explicit¬
ly asserted. Fry's reticence may be attributed to his view
that there is no "objective standard of aesthetic value."?3
But surely his standard of aesthetic value (the criterion
of sensibility) is in every respect perfectly objective.
'Sensibility', in Fry's sense, characterizes not the critic's
experience but the work of art; and Fry Is able to shoif by
reference to a work's features whether and in ifhat -way the work
exhibits evidence of sensibility. The reasons he gives for
making sensibility a condition of aesthetic value are also per¬
fectly objective. They are provided by a psychological theory
of aesthetic experience which, whether or not it is accepted, is
as objective as it is possible for a theory to be.
The theory, adumbrated in his lecture on sensibility, is
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in/bonded bo explain the Intellectual pleasure taken in art.
Noting that the human mind finds satisfaction both in unifor¬
mity, order, in the recognition of mathematically regular
arrangements of parts, Ilk© those of the crystal, in repetitive
sequences that can be explained by causal laws and also, on the
other hand, in the unique, the exceptional, in variety, the un¬
expected and the fortuitous, Fry proposes that the mind takes
pleasure in art because it finds there within a formal struc¬
ture infinite variations. This is a version of the venerable
notion of art as comprising unity and variety, of course}
nevertheless, Fry1s rendering of the old view is original,
"What we call the intellect/ he says, "finds satisfaction most
definitely in the recognition of a causal sequence. When we
ask why - let us say, why does the moon change its shape? - v-re
are in a state of unrest or perplexity. When an astronomer
explains to us the causes of this, that unrest disappears, th©
mind is at rest on the question, and I think w@ all agree that
th© moment at which we grasp clearly for the first time any
such causal sequence we have a definitely pleasurable emo¬
tion/7**
Now in contemplating a work of art, wo are con¬
tinually asking why and, if the artist is one with
whom we can communicate, we ar© continually
getting answers, and this repeated recognition of
the causes of th© picture being as it is gives us
a succession of moments of pleasure as the mind
passes from unrest to rest and satisfaction.
Herein lies on© of the causes of th© richness of
art as a source of pleasure. ¥© cannot repeat
th© pleasure due to a causal explanation of a
fact or a mathematical problem because w© cannot
repeat the passage from mental unrest to rest. As
regards that particular question our mind is per¬




The thesis is, of course, debatable. Even If Fry's
apparently hedonistic presuppositions about aesthetic value
were granted, his explanation of how works of art provide
pleasure might be contested, But his argument is thoroughly
objective, and it provides a conception of criticism as being
as objective as any Intellectual activity can be. It holds
the essence of critical activity to b© this 'asking why'. By
answering such 'why' questions - why this figure is placed on
the canvas just here and left in shadow, why a discord in brass
just at this moment cuts across the melody of the violins, why
the novelist chose this particular scene for these events to be
enacted - the critic satisfies himself about the formal aesthe¬
tic justification of the elements which compose the work of
art. It Is from such analyses that critics take their in¬
tellectual pleasure in art and from which they derive their
j udgements,
Fry's denial of the objectivity of his own critical judge¬
ments and of the criteria upon which they are grounded is odd:
C.T]he value of my method [of "isolating particu¬
lar qualities in various works of art and compar¬
ing thera with one another solely in regard to one
or two qualities at a time "J is to stop that
Immediate like or dislike response to the work of
art as a whole which as we have seen is just as
likely to be due to imperfections in our re¬
ceiving set as to anything in the work of art it¬
self, It is possible, I think, by some such
methods to circumvent our native prejudice and
predilections and to acquire a more alert passi¬
vity in our attitude. And it is by cultivating
such an attitude that we can best, I think, in¬
crease the delicacy and sensibility of our
3^1
reception of the messages of the present artists.
It is the fulness, richness and significance of
our feelings in the face of viorks of art that
matters - the judgements we draw from them are only
of value in so far as they may Indicate to others
the possibilities of experiencing similar emotions.
Whatever we do we shall not attain a standard of
objective validity,76
In order to account for this disparagement of a perfectly repu¬
table standard, it must be supposed that by "a standard of ob¬
jective validity" Fry means a standard that is universal, ab¬
solute, totally competent, yielding authoritative judgements
from which there can be no appeal. But of course a criterion
need not be universal and absolute in order to be objective.
So far as I am aware, no universal and absolute standard of ar¬
tistic perfection that is of any use to practising critics has
ever been formulated, and the arguments offered in defense of
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the possibility of formulating one seem to me unconvincing.
An objective standard or criterion of artistic perfection need
make no pretension to universality or absoluteness; the objec¬
tivity of a criterion depends upon the kind of reasons offered
in support of it. And the reasons that Fry offers for sensi¬
bility as a criterion of aesthetic value are of a kind that
guarantee its objectivity.
A criterion of value does not guarantee a final and irre¬
vocable judgement of the relative value of the works considered.
But this does not imply the logical inadequacy of criteria.
Only misunderstanding their function in critical argument could
lead anyone to suppose that It does. As was mentioned earlier,
a criterion serves, In a manner analogous to an hypothesis used
3^2
in scientific investigation, to control the perceptions of the
critic. With a criterion in mind, the critic is aware of what
he is looking for, and the reader is able to understand the
point (the exact reference and evaluative implication) of criti¬
cal remarks. Secondly, the reader viho does not concur in the
critic's judgements may often discover the ground of disagree¬
ment in the diversity of criteria upon which the conflicting
judgements are based. Equally important, through considera¬
tion of criteria the reader may be made aware of aesthetic
qualities which he had not before realized ifere constituents
of aesthetic value. Such awareness, probably, underlies many
changes of taste.
Between blind disagreement and a reasoned difference of
opinion there is a distinction of importance. It is logically
unimportant that reading a piece of criticism may not yield per¬
fect agreement in judgement between critic and reader. But it
is logically Important that the reader be able to understand
the critic's reasons for his judgement, If follows from the
distinction between empirical observation and critical obser¬
vation so strongly insisted upon here that the understanding
of critical statements does not depend upon perceiving their
correspondence with a work's physical features. The features
of works of art that are talked about in critical discourse
are not perceived independently of acts of aesthetic judgement.
The statements made about these features cannot be fully under¬
stood by a reader who is ignorant of the criteria of value
which underlie them. A critical statement can be fully
3^3
understood only when the reasons for making it are understood.
An explicit criterion such as Fry's 'sensibility' helps to
supply this understanding. Whatever importance a reader may
attach to a particular criterion, and whether or not he thinks
its application in a particular case is successful, he can at
least learn by reference to it why the critic submits a certain
comparative judgement. And this, rather than that critical
statements should be unanimously accepted as asserting true
judgements, is the mark of successful critical communication.
The case of Roger Fry indicates that the ultimate grounds
of critical judgements are the aesthetic theories that may be
advanced to support the criteria of value used in argument.
Such theories comprise generalizations about the value of art
or of one of its genres. They are intended to explain in the
most general way possible why works of art are valuable. It
is not often that such theories are Included in a work of prac¬
tical criticism. And it seems very likely that many critics
never do formulate the theories of aesthetic value presupposed
in their arguments. Nevertheless, it must be supposed that
some general conception of aesthetic value, at least within a
restricted field of art, underlies ©very critical judgement.
And even if the critic is not himself very clearly aware of
the theoretical principles upon which his judgements are
grounded, it should be possible to discover these by an ana¬
lysis of his arguments.
Expositions of aesthetic theory of the kind considered
here and formulations of criteria both take the form of
3^
generalizations about the value of art or of some form of it.
Although the two modes of discourse are often amalgamated with¬
in a single piece of writing, they are nevertheless distin¬
guishable in terms of purpose. Criteria of value consist of
generalizations which set forth the features which determine
the values of works of art. They derive, as I have tried to
show, from critical studies of works which have Impressed their
audience as being aesthetically valuable. A set of criteria,
when formulated, simply renders explicit the reasons that a
critic has for applying; certain terms to certain works of art
and other terms to other works. A set of criteria partially
justifies itself pragmatically by imposing consistency and in¬
telligibility upon the arguments in which it is used. But
still it makes sense to ask a critic what reasons he has for
accepting certain criteria, and critics sometimes do feel
obliged to justify them.
The aesthetic theories upon which critical judgements are
grounded also consist of generalizations about the value of
works of art. But their primary function is not to state in
general terms what features belong to works having a specified
value. That is the function of criteria. A theory of aes¬
thetic value is intended to explain why works which have cer¬
tain features - works which satisfy certain criteria - are
valuable. Thus aesthetic theories underlie and support cri¬
teria of value by providing some reason for accepting a certain
set of criteria other than that certain works accepted as valua¬
ble can be described in the same general terms as occur in the
3^5
formulation of the criteria,
P. L. Lucas's The Decline and. Fall of the Romantic Ideal*^
provides a satisfactory example of this assertion of criteria
intermingled with supporting aesthetic theory which charac¬
terizes critical argument conducted at a high level of generali¬
ty. Lucas is dissenting from current evaluations of a number
of modern poems and attempting to justify his critical position
by arguing against the literary criteria accepted by certain un¬
named colleagues. His argument can be read as an attempt to
define the class of good poetry and to describe evaluatively
the features common to the works that occupy this class. He
makes clear that he would exclude from this class a group of
works admitted by other critics and also that his evaluative
description of works that in his judgement belong there differs
from that of these other critics. He laments the failure of
contemporary critics to agree upon a set of criteria of poetic
value, to subscribe to any set of conventions for the critical
use of 'good' as applied to poems. His remarks, which clear¬
ly presuppose that criteria of poetic value are implicit in
the critical use of terms of high evaluative power, imply some
of his own criteria:
For Antiquity, in a word, "good" poetry meant
noble poetry. For the Renaissance It meant
learned poetry; the poetry of scholars, and of
wits. For the eighteenth century it became the
poetry of men - and women - of the world. For
"the Romantics, the poetry of generous rebels.
They still had rules, if only to break them. But
now - I Twenty-three centuries after the Father
of Criticism, Aristotle, is there a single law of
literature, a single principle for writing poetry,
a single canon for criticizing it, about which a
3^6
congress of our critics would agree? For it is
no longer agreed that poetry should be beautiful,
or noble, or civilized, or well constructed, org
musical, or intelligent, or even intelligible/"
After discussing and comparing a variety of works, Lucas
describes in general terms the works that he judges to belong
in the highest rank:
Herrick, for instance, is not heroic; he is, on
the contrary, a superb example of the pure artist;
and yet how his work would drop to dust without
the graceful gaiety, the humour, and the humanity
of the man himself behindI It Is not what writers
preach that matters; it is what they themselves
are. More and more decidedly, as against work that
is tainted with mania or cruelty or barbarism, one
comes back to the vital and the sane, to Greek
poetry, to Chaucer or the Ballads, to Hansard or
Shakespeare, to Keats or Morris or Hardy. And in
moments of doubt about the value of a book, I find
myself referring it In imagination to a ghostly
jury, not of professional critics, but of men and
women of this world. To it are Invited Horace and
Montaigne; the woman's wit of Dorothy Osborne,
the sensitive simplicity of Dorothy Wordsworth;
the eighteenth century common sense of Horace
Walpole and Madam© Geoffrln; Landor with his „
stormy honesty and Hardy with his quiet irony. 0
From these and from many more detailed descriptions of
works taken as ostensively defining 'great poetry' emerge his
criteria of value, his statements of the features which are
necessary to poetry of the highest order:
Yet there remain certain qualities that for
three thousand years men have valued alike in
life and in what they have agreed to call great
literature - qualities which it has become
second nature to most normal minds to find
appealing, but which reason and experience also
tell us we do well to like. Mobility, Intensity,
courage, generosity, pity - qualities like these
cannot by themselves make a poem good, any more
than they can make a face beautiful..,. But in a
poem, as in a face, no perfection of form in
their absence can reach the highest beauty. And
in a poem, as in a face, the presence of their
34?
oppoaltes - of vulgarity or morbidity or pol¬
troonery/ or meanness or cruelty - is a flaw for
which no perfection of for® can atone.**1
In order to support these criteria of value upon which he
grounds his critical judgements, he explains why these features
of poetry rather than others are most valuable. It is at this
point that his discussion moves into the realm of aesthetic
theory:
There are, I think, certain human qualities that
we have learnt spontaneously to value, because
life has proved them valuable, This instinctive
admiration is like the instinctive pleasure we
take in. other wholesome things l but more dis¬
interested, more aesthetic. Vitality, strength,
courage, devotion, pity, grace - those move us,
as directly as beauty moves us. But not, surely,
without causa. When a woman loves a man's strength
or courage, it is only because her dead ancestors,
sitting in council within her, push her blindly
with their ghostly hands towards what she will
need, for herself and her children, in the warfare
of the world. So with the instinctive appeal audi
qualities possess in general - it is no mere
whimsy or matter of taste, W© think courage a
fine and poetic tiling, for the excellent, if pro¬
saic, reason that it has been for ages untold a
highly Important thing to have,82
Lucas's complete argument is, of course, more detailed, in¬
teresting, and persuasive than this brief resume' and series of
fragmentary quotations. But this admittedly Inadequate account
should at least indicate how he builds up the descriptive defi¬
nition of good poetry which constitutes his criteria of value
for this art and also how he defends it by a generalised theory
of aesthetic value which borrows support from ethical con¬
siderations , Els argument is, I believe, assailable at several
points, Ills set of criteria cannot be considered completely
adequate for the appraisal of poetic value, for, as he concedes,
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the qualities which he stipulates as being necessary to "the
highest Beauty" are not in themselves sufficient to make a poem
good. His comment on Herriek, that it is the "humanity of the
man himself behind" the poetry which constitutes the value of
the poems, is bewildering. What Lucas admires about Herrlck
must either manifest itself in the poetry or be discovered
through a study of the poet's biography, A critic cannot base
his aesthetic evaluations of poems upon evidence found outside
the poems; if the features which Lucas attributes to good
poetry are not discoverable in the poems themselves, then the
poems cannot be judged to satisfy Lucas's own criteria, And
if the requisite features are so discoverable in the poem, then
consideration of "the fineness of the personality glimpsed be¬
tween its lines," of "what the poets themselves are" is otiose,
irrelevant, and misleading, Lucas says that "it is hard to
say where exactly aesthetics ends and ethics begins,"®^ and
certainly it is hard to say where consideration of aesthetic
value ends and consideration of ethical value begins in Lucas's
exposition of theory and criteria. Certainly F, E, Leavis,
from whose critical evaluations published in New Bearings In
ni.
English Poetry Lucas is dissenting, would distinguish more
sharply between the two realms of value than does Lucas.
Leavis implies that the value of a poem depends {for one thing)
upon the poet's finding a subject and style suitable for ex¬
pressing the ethical problems which beset his own age. Lucas
suggests that unless a poem embodies ethical views admirable
in themselves it cannot reach the highest rank. In short,
3^9
Leavls's criteria of aesthetic value are more purely aesthetic,
based upon a theory intended to explain artistic values as
such. Moral considerations exert a great influence on Lucas's
criteria of aesthetic value, for in his theory of poetics ar¬
tistic excellence is not taken to be evaluable independently
of a work's moral tone and effect. Arbitration of these con¬
flicts of theory, criteria, and judgement does not lie within
the rights and responsibilities of this thesis. The point of
the discussion is to reveal the various levels of critical
disagreement and to indicate their connections.
The question of the aesthetic theories assumed in critical
practice has recently been discussed by Harold Osborne in a
book unsympathetlcally treated earlier in the thesis.
Osborne distinguishes five such theories or "assumptions about
the nature of beauty or artistic excellence,"^ as he calls
them, upon which most modern works of criticism are founded.
He credits only one such theory, a formalist one which he
terms "Configurational," with providing an objective standard
of judgement which can be consistently applied in aesthetic
evaluation.^ He disparages the other four theories, the
Realist, Emotional, Expressionist, and Transcendentalist,
either because the standards that they provide are subjective
or incapable of being consistently applied in practice.
Osborne's critique of theories need not detain us. What his
book offers is acknowledgement of the objective grounding of
critical evaluations in arguable theories as to what con¬
stitutes aesthetic value.
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Osborne1s statements about the basis of criteria are not
altogether in accord with this thesis. But what he says is
pertinent enough to quote:
We have seen that critics work with a number of
different assumptions about the nature of beauty
or artistic excellence and that their critical
judgements and descriptions vary in accordance
with the assumptions which they adopt. Some of
these assumptions are more convenient and work¬
able than others, but none of them Is right or
wrong in itself; for they are in the last resort
merely definitions of linguistic usage. But un¬
til you know what assumptions about the nature
of artistic excellence any critic Is making, it
is not possible to know what he means when he
says that any work of art is good or not good.
Nor is it possible to know whether disagreements
among critics are real or apparent until you know
what they mean when they advance judgements of
good and bad about works of art.©9
To say that the "assumptions" upon which critical judge¬
ments depend are neither right nor wrong may be misleading.
The statement suggests that one set of assumptions about aesthe¬
tic value is ultimately no more justifiable than any other and
that therefore no such set of assumptions is in any significant
sense justifiable. But as Osborne's own book shows, sound
reasons can be given for rejecting certain critical assumptions
and for admitting others. When Osborne says that these
assumptions "are in the last resort merely definitions of lin¬
guistic usage," he must be corrected by Stevenson's admonition
that there is nothing 'mere' about Critics must accept
full responsibility for their aesthetic theories, principles,
or assumptions which, through the criteria these sponsor, de¬
termine the use of crucial predicates. Questions about a cri¬
tic's usage are, after all, inseparable from questions about
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his judgement. To disagree with a critic's judgement Is sim¬
ply to disagree with the terms he applies to a work. In or¬
der to justify his usage in a particular context, the critic
must be able to shovi not only that according to the criteria
employed his critical terms are applicable but also that his
criteria are themselves warranted. The responsible critic is
not free merely to define his predicates; he must be able to
justify his way of using them. His criteria of value must be
defensible.
However, Osborne's view that understanding a critical judge¬
ment depends upon a knowledge of the criteria used seems to me
correct. Criteria of value are implicit in critical state¬
ments * If a reader does not understand the implications of a
critical statement, then he does not fully understand the mean¬
ing of that statement in its critically relevant sense* Identi¬
cal sentences written by different critics are not necessarily
equivalent in meaning. What each of them means by the state¬
ment he makes about a work of art (A.e., what features he im¬
putes to it by predicating certain terms of it) may be dis¬
covered only by reference to the criteria which govern his use
of terms. Acceptance of a critic's statements depends upon
acceptance of his criteria of value. Critical statements are
meaningful and justifiable only by reference to the criteria
presupposed in their formulation. Further, criteria of value
must themselves be justifiable on objective grounds if it is
to be maintained that the judgements derived from them are ob¬
jective and justifiable. The requisite grounds are ultimately
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provided by aesthetic theory.
Most criteria of value are, I believe, initially derived
from critical studies of works of art rather than deduced from
aesthetic theories. However, it could probably be shorn that
aesthetic theory sometimes has an effect upon the set of cri¬
teria which it supports. A set of criteria may be elaborated
and particularized, rendered more explicit, consistent, and re¬
strictive on the basis of a highly articulated theory of aes¬
thetic value within a given field. The neo-classlc theory of
poetry, the realist theory of fiction, the naturalistic theory
of drama, the impressionist theory of painting, the expression¬
ist theory of dancing, the functional theory of architecture
are random examples of familiar theories which have led to the
systematization of the criteria used at various times in cri¬
tical evaluation. As a Justifying factor in critical argu¬
ment (the ultimate one), aesthetic theory is her© considered
in its principal role of providing objective grounds for cri¬
teria of value rather than in its subsidiary one of influen¬
cing the decision of Individual critics or of schools of cri¬
tics as to what these shall be. By supporting one set of cri¬
teria rather than others, an aesthetic theory can be instru¬
mental in determining critical judgements. Thus the defense
of a particular judgement by a critic who is pressed hard for
justification may ultimately depend upon the soundness of the
theoretical views about aesthetic value which underlie his
argument. The claim that critical judgements can be objec¬





































construction of aesthetic theories* The theorist must select
from the multitudinous products claiming to be art certain
works upon which to base his theory. Since such selection re¬
quires critical judgement, the procedure involves circularity,
in so far as certain works judged to be valuable are taken as
the datura of a theory upon which are grounded subsequent judge¬
ments, But the circle is not vicious. For the value of the
works serving as the datum must be explicable in terms of the
theory, and the exclusion of other works must be similarly
accountable. Further, the theory is expected to provide some
highly general reasons for the value certain t^orks are judged
to have other than that all of these works possess in common
certain features describable in general terms of value.
This analysis of critical argument has new penetrated to
the bed rock of aesthetic judgement. Further exploration
would go beneath the level of criticism altogether into the
region of aesthetic theory, The relations between aesthetic
theory and critical practice raise interesting problems, but
they are for the most part beyond the scope of this thesis.
The questions concerning them which are relevant here are
whether or not aesthetic theory can provide logical support for
critical criteria, and whether or not any such theory can be
objective. There is no room for doubt about the answers to
these questions. When criteria of value are questioned they
can be defended and In principle justified on the grounds of
highly general conceptions of what constitutes artistic ex¬
cellence in a given field. The discussion of Roger Fry's
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criterion of sensibility provided an example of this procedure,
and also showed that a highly general theory of aesthetic
value can be perfectly objective. Similar examples could be
found almost anywhere in critical literature where general
principles of aesthetic value are formulated. And even where
they are not so formulated, they could be elicited from a
study of the work of any critic whose judgements are consis¬
tent with one another, that is to say, of any critic who does
have some principles.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study in critical argument has been to
show that the function of evaluative criticism is to provide
expert information about the aesthetic value of works of art.
It has been argued that since critics write about public ob¬
jects, there is no inherent reason why the correctness of their
statements cannot be ascertained. It has been shown that
since critical predicates combine descriptive and evaluative
power, it is possible to determine whether or not a critic's
statements characterize a work appropriately and, therefore,
whether or not his evaluation is to be accepted. It has been
maintained that since critical argument is conducted according
to certain logical rules, the infraction of which renders any
such argument unacceptable, it is possible to distinguish criti¬
cal arguments that are cogent from those that are not. Finally,
it has been claimed that critical judgements are based upon cri¬
teria of value and aesthetic theory which can be defended on ob¬
jective grounds, and that aesthetic evaluation, therefore, has
a rational basis.
In order to establish these theses, it was required to show,
in each case, that contrary views expounded by contemporary
theorists were not In accord with the actualities of critical
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practice. It was found that the purpose of critical state¬
ments, the identity of what they are about, the nature of their
relationships to works of art, to one another, and to their
grounds of justification were commonly misconstrued by philoso¬
phers. From the revised view of these matters presented here,
it is concluded that aesthetic evaluation can be informative,
reliable, corrigible, and objective.
In the writings of professional critics are to be found the
records of reasoned argument about aesthetic value, of attempts
to justify aesthetic evaluations of works of art. The neglect
of this literature by those who have written on the subject of
the aesthetic judgement is, to my mind, nothing short of a
philosophical scandal. No one has the right to publish his
findings on the nature of aesthetic evaluation who has not
examined some of the evaluations written by competent critics.
If I have convinced the reader that standard philosophical pro¬
cedure in this respect has been illegitimate, dogmatic, and
profitless, then I may bear his unfavourable reception of my
other arguments with a measure of equanimity.
Theory of criticism can be advanced only by an intensive
study of the best critical practice. What is required is a
better understanding of' the principles of argument inherent in
the writings of reputable critics. What is to be achieved is
a set of standards for appraising the competence of any piece
of evaluative criticism. It is not a question of philosophers
legislating to critics, of laying down a priori rules of pro¬
cedure which critics are expected to obey. It is a question
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of discovering the rules tacitly acknowledged by those who argue
seriously and intelligently about the aesthetic value of works
of art. It is a question of discovering those features which
distinguish sound criticism from idle, baseless, Irresponsible
talk about works of art. In an age when the worst that has
been thought and said in the world is highly esteemed by the
majority of people, it would be well to show that there is
philosophical justification for respecting the aesthetic
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discussion they have commonly stood for
emotions, but In ordinary speech they usually
express a judgement. * I approve of A1 is
then identical with 'I judge A good,' 'I
disapprove of A' with 'I judge A bad' {in some
respect at least). All ethical judgements ex¬
press approval or disapproval in this sense,
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by 'A is good* that I approve of A, I should
be saying that I meant by 'A is good' that I





23 1 P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics. Penguin, Harmondsworth,
195^, Ch. X, pp. 11-22.
2 IMd., Chs . 2, 3, 4, pp.23-60.





30 8 A. J. Ayer, Languages, Truth and Logic, Gollancz,
London, 1950, pp.ll3-ll4: "Such aesthetic words
as 'beautiful* and 'hideous' are employed, as
ethical words are employed, not to make state¬
ments of fact, but simply to express certain
feelings and evoke a certain response,,., the
purpose of aesthetic criticism is not so much to
give knowledge as to communicate emotion. The
critic, by calling attention to certain features
of the work under review, and expressing his own
feelings about them, endeavours to make us share
his attitude towards the tvork as a whole."
9 A. J. Ayer, "On the Analysis of Moral Judgements,"
I-Iorlzon. September, 19^9, p.175: own answer
to this question is that what are accounted rea¬
sons for our {^aesthetic-} judgements are reasons
only in the sense that they determine attitudes."
P.1?6: "As for the (^aesthetic! judgement Itself,
it may be regarded as expressing the attitude
which the reasons given for it are calculated to
invoke." (In the square brackets I have sub¬
stituted 'aesthetic' for 'moral', an interpola¬
tion warranted by Ayer's claim in LanguageT Truth
and Logic, p.113, that "our conclusions about the
nature of ethics apply to aesthetics also." In
the article quoted, where the views of the
earlier book are amended, this claim is not with¬
drawn; rather the following remark suggests that
Ayer wishes to maintain It: "We can and do give
reasons for our moral judgements, just as we do




31 10 R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals. Oxford, 1952,
p. 127j "When we commend or condemn anything, it
is always in order, at least Indirectly, to guide
choices, our own or other people's, now or in the
future." P.129: "When we commend an object, our
judgement is not solely about that particular ob¬
ject, but is Inescapably about objects like it."
11 P. R. Leavls, The Great Tradition. Chatto and
WIndus, London, 195°j P*227.
33 12 Ibid., p.234. If this appears to be a 'descrip¬
tive' remark, asserting, with reasons, within
which class of literary products the novel is to
be included - a likely enough reading, for that
matter - the reader may be reminded of the state¬
ment which immediately precedes it in the con¬
text: "He doesn't write 'poetic prose'j he writes
with a poetic force of evocation, registering
with the responsiveness of a genius of verbal ex¬
pression what he so sharply sees and feels."
34 13 Ibid., p. 223.
14 Jbid.
15 Language. Truth and Logic. p. 113.
16 Leavis, op. clt.. p.228.
17 Ibid., pp.229-230.
18 Ibid., p.230.




36 23 "On the Analysis of Moral Judgements," op.
p.175. (In the square brackets "aesthetic
again been substituted for "moral.")
24 Ibid, and Language. Truth and Logic, p.113
39 25 Oxford, 1952.
40 26 Ibid., pp.114-119.
364
Page Note
40 27 To support his prescriptive principle, Hare
cites the Oxford English Dictionary's definition
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adjective of commendation, implying the existence
in a high, or at least satisfactory, degree of
characteristic qualities which are either ad¬
mirable in themselves, or useful for some pur¬
pose..." What Hare seems not to have noticed is
that to commend is not to prescribe. On the
authority of the same lexicographers, 'commend'
means "To present as worthy of acceptance or re¬
gard j to direct attention to, as worthy of no¬
tice"} and 'prescribe' means "To write or lay
down as a rule or direction to be followed} to
appoint, ordain, direct, enjoin." According to
the dictionary meanings of these words, there¬
fore, words used to commend are not necessarily
at the same time used to prescribe. This
difference between their functions is Illustrated
by such statements as, 'Hannibal was a good lea¬
der' , 'Man o'War ran well', 'Glelgud gave a great
performance of Lear', The general, the horse,
and the actor are all being~commended} but what
is being prescribed, and to whom? Clearly, the
view that all words of commendation are words of
prescription is mistaken. It is unlikely that
the logic of evaluative discourse xfill be clari¬
fied by a study which begins by introducing this
verbal confusion.
28 The Lan^ua^e of Morals, p.146.




42 33 Ibid., p.128.
34 Ibid., p.129.
35 Ibid., p.111.
36 The claim that these statements are purely des¬
criptive might be contested, considering their
contexts, in consistency with the view expressed
later in the thesis. But the relevant fact here
is that Hare takes them to be descriptive state¬
ments. At this point I am not questioning the
365
Page Note
conventional distinction between descriptive
statements and value statements* Rather I am
pointing out that difference between technical
or moral remarks and critical remarks which be¬
comes apparent when the three corresponding
types of discourse are all construed according
to Hare's theory.
42 37 Learls, oo. cit., p.236.
43 38 IbM., p.243.
39 Ibid., p.244.
45 40 Op. oit.. p.128.
46 41 Philosophy and Logical Syntax. Kegan Paul,
Trench, and Trubner, London, 1935, P.24,
42 Language, Truth and Logic, p.108.
47 43 Ethics and Language. Yale University Press, New
Haven, 19*44, p.21,
44 "Ravel at Eighty," The Observer. London,
March 13, 1955.
43 45 Ibid.
49 46 Op. Pit., p.227.
4? Ibid.
48 Ibid.
50 49 Hare, 00. cit.. p.128.
50 Leavis, op. cit.. p.22?: "Yet, if I am right,
of all Dickens's works it ([Hard Times] is the
one that has all the strength of his genius,
together virith a strength no other of them can
show - that of a completely serious work of
art."
52 51 "Logic and Appreciation," in Aesthetics and
Language. ed. William Elton, Blackwell, Oxford,
1954, pp.168-169.
52 Op. cit., p.168.






57 57 M*. P.228.
53 Ibid.. p.22?
53 59 Ibid., p.228,
60 Zbif,. , p.229.
59 61 The reader may wonder how 1 am to account for
certain statement® said to be Incompatible with
the intention imputed to critics by prescriptive
theorists. The statements were* "Criticism, of
course, has its points to make against Hard
Times" ancl "Again, his attitude to Trade
unionism is not the only expression of a lack of
political understanding," (See p. 35 above,)
The point was that if the critic10 purpose was
to inspire a feeling or attitude of admiration
toward the book in his readers, he would avoid
making statements that were likely to discourage
such a feeling or attitude, But are these state¬
ments not also at variance with Le&via1s attempt
to show that the novel Is a masterpiece? Mo|
for It is not inconsistent with the claim that
a work Is a masterpiece to admit that it has some
defects or weaknesses. Through claiming that
Hard Times is a masterpiece Leavis is not






1 As Science of Expression and
Linguistic, translated by Douglas Ainslie,
MacMillan, London, 1929, p.100. Cp. Ren4
Wellek, "The Mode of Existence of a Literary
Work of Art," The Southern Review. Vol. VII,
1941-42, p.736": "If we destroy the writing or
even all copies of a printed book we still may
not destroy the poem, as it might be preserved
In oral tradition or In the memory of a man like
Macaulay who boasted of knowing Paradl.se Lost
and Pilgrim's Progress by heart. On the other
hand, if we destroy a painting, or a piece of
sculpture or a building, we destroy it complete¬
ly, though we may preserve descriptions or
records In another medium and might even try to
reconstruct what has been lost."
See below, p.70-71. Cp. Harold Osborne, op. clt..
p. 231: "A picture is a material thing only in¬
cidentally. As a work of art it is the enduring
possibility for the actualization of a specific
set of visual impressions.,. Thus a little
thought serves to show that even when a work of
art is not recorded but is embodied in a mater¬
ial medium, the material object is in no case
identical with the work of art."
70 3 Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, 1946,
(See Ch. XV, "Esthetic Judgment.")




72* 8 Ibid., pp.472-473.
9 Aesthetics and Criticism, p.230.
10 Ibid., pp.229-230.
11 Ibid., p.230. If the word "most" has
ingful function in this final sentence, Osborne
must be understood to imply that some of the
recordings exist prior to that which they re¬
cord. It is not clear how that is possible.
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75 12 Op. Pit., p.473.
13 Op. clt., p.230.
76 14 Ibid., p.231.
78 15 Ibid., pp.231-232.
79 16 Ibid., pp.230-231.
80 17 Ten Composers. Jonathan Cape. London. 194*5
p.165.
84 18 An Essay Toward a Theory of Art. M. Seeker,
London, 1922, p.9Q~. Cp. Margaret Maodonald,
"Some Distinctive Features of Arguments Used in
Criticism of the Arts," in Aesthetics and
Language. p.126: "Scientists observe and ex¬
plain the behaviour of objects. Whether bodies
are observed to fall by X in Italy in the six¬
teenth century or by 1 in London in the twen¬
tieth does not affect the result, unless new
facts are relevant." But the evaluations of
certain works change from period to period, and
this, Miss Macdonald thinks, is because "the
work is what it is interpreted to be.... There
seems to be no work apart from some interpreta¬
tion." P.127: "The point is that there is no
object which is • the real' play or sonata which
exists independently of any interpretation."
19 Art as Experience. Minton, Balch, New York,
193^, P7&K
20 Ibid.. p.162.
36 21 Op. cit., p.94.
8? 22 Ibid.. p.96, (The reader should notice Croce's
use of the term 'truly real' in this passage.
He may well wonder what Is unreal about the ac¬
tivity which falls under 'd'.)
23 Ibid.. p.8.
83 24 Ibid., p. 10.
25 Ibid., p.11.
89 26 Ibid,, p. 112
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90 27 Ibid.. p.116. The theoretical ground of Croce's
defense of aesthetic activity against moral or
practical judgement renders his defense useless.
Since aesthetic activity is theoretical, he ar¬
gues, and the work of art internal, a practical
or moral judgement cannot be made either of this
activity or of the work itself, but only of the
willed activity (the action of recording the
aesthetic activity in material form), which may
or may not follow the inner, creative act; in
other words, the thing made to record the work
of art and to communicate the artist's creative
(aesthetic) experience is subject to moral
judgement; the work of art 'proper' is not. But
it is always the thing made by the artist for the
purpose of communication that is the object of
moral judgement; the work of art as Croce under¬
stands it (being internal) being inaccessible
for a judgement of tiny kind.
Let us agree that the artist's intuition must
be exempt from a practical judgement 3ince it
remains In the sphere of contemplation and does
not involve an act of will, an action. We are
still left with the problem of censorship. Are
we to say that the inner, aesthetic activity is
to be exempt from moral judgement but the
created object, the product of this activity,
subject to moral judgement? That would be to
say that the artist can create (in Croce's sense)
whatever he pleases, but that he can communicate
only what morality approves.
28 £bid.. p.97: "And what else are those combina¬
tions of words called poetry, prose, poems,
novels, romances, tragedies or comedies, but
physical stimulants of reproduction ...; what
else are those combinations of sound called
operas, symphonies, sonatas, or those combina¬
tions of lines and colours called pictures,
statues, architecture? The spiritual energy of
memory, with the assistance of the physical
facts above mentioned, makes possible the
preservation and the reproduction of the in¬
tuitions produced by man."
29 Ibid.. pp.97-93.
91 30 Ibid., p.113.
92 31 Ibid.
93 32 The Principles of Art. Oxford, 1938.
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93 33 Ibid.. pp.36-3?: "...we must disabuse our¬
selves of the notion that the business of an
artist consists in producing a special kind of
artifacts, so-called 'works of art' or ob.lets
d'art. which are bodily and perceptible things
Tpainted canvasses, carved stones, and so
forth). This notion is nothing more nor less
than the technical theory of art itself. Me
shall have, later on, to consider In some detail
what it is that the artist, as such and essen¬
tially, produces. Me shall find that it is two
things. Primarily, it is an 'internal' or 'men¬
tal' thing, something (as we commonly say) 'ex¬
isting In his head' and there only: something of
the kind which we commonly call an experience.
Secondarily, it is a bodily or perceptible thing
(a picture, statue, &c.) whose exact relation to
this 'mental' thing will need very careful
definition. Of these two things, the first is
obviously not anything that can be called a work
of art, if work means something made in the
sense in which a weaver makes cloth. But since
it is the thing which the artist as such pri¬
marily produces, 1 shall argue that we are en¬
titled to call it 'the work of art proper'. The
second thing, the bodily and perceptible thing,
I shall show to be only incidental to the first.
The making of it is therefore not the activity
in virtue of which a man is an artist, but only
a subsidiary activity, incidental to that. And
consequently this thing is a work of art, not
in its own right, but only because of the re¬
lation in which it stands to the 'mental' thing
or experience of which I spoke Just now. There
is no such thing as an ob.jet d'art in itself; if
we call any bodily and perceptible thing by that
name or an equivalent we do so only because of
the relation in which it stands to the aesthetic
experience which Is the 'work of art proper'."
95 3^ ibid,, p.139.
35 m, P.300.
36 Ibid.
96 37 Ibid., P.139.
97 38 The point has also been made by Paul Ziff, "Art
and the 'Object of Art'," in Aesthetics and
Language, pp.170-186. The argument of this
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article, done with special reference to
Samuel Alexander (and mentioning also Pepper,
Collingwood, De Witt Parker, Bosanquet), is
that the distinction between the physical ob¬
ject (e.g., a painted canvas) and the work of
art {'aesthetic object') is a groundless dis¬
tinction which arises from forgetting that
different kinds of descriptive statements about
art have different uses. For certain purposes,
e.g., packaging, a canvas (painting) may be
described as flat; for some other purpose, e.g.
criticism, it may be described as having depth.
These two apparently contradictory statements
do not imply the existence of two objects, but
only the necessity of different kinds of des¬
cription, depending upon the purpose the des¬
cription is intended to serve.
97 39 Harcourt, Brace, New Xork, 19^9, p.9.
98 kO The same cannot be said of Pepper's other
books on this subject. Formulating this same
distinction in Aesthetic Quality (Scribner's,
New Xork, 1937), Pepper is led to a view of
aesthetic judgement quite like that held by
Collingwood: pp.231-232: "In this manner, an
aesthetic work of art is created out of a phy¬
sical work of art. And the objective thing
is not primarily the physical work, which as
a physical continuity we can know only as a
thin system of schematio relations. The pri¬
mary objective thing is this imaginatively-
constructed work, It is this last, and this
last only, that we judge aesthetically and
call excellent, if x%re can." Even more perti¬
nent here is the supplementary essay, "The
Aesthetic Work of Art," appended to his major
work in critical theory, The Basis of Criticism
in the Arts (Harvard, Cambridge, Mass*, 1946)j
in this essay, Pepper is exclusively concerned
with finding out what is "the focus of aesthe¬
tic judgement and criticism." (p.1*3-3) He con¬
cludes, p. 1*^-9, that "The actual aesthetic ob¬
ject for the practical critic or everyday
spectator is not a physical object, nor an
idea, nor even a single act of perception, but
the intermittent cumulative succession of per¬
ceptions which we call the perceptive series."
Dissatisfied with this presentation of his
theory, Pepper elaborated it ten years later
in The Work of Art (Indiana University Press,
Bloomington, 19557. Here (p.13) he un¬
covers what he calls "a little nest of related
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objects0; pp.30-31: "I showed the need of con¬
sidering the thing we call a work of art as a
nast of objects, I am In fact suggesting that
it consists of three closely interrelated ob¬
jects; First, the physical vehicle; second, the
object of perceptual immediacy. These two ob¬
jects within the nest of the total work of art
wo have so far bean desoriblng. The third
which we now come to 2 shall call the object of
criticism.
8The physical vehicle is the continuous endur¬
ing control object which is the source of stimu¬
lation for the succession of fugitive objects of
perceptual immediacy. The object of criticism
is some sort of synthesis or evaluative goal of
the sequence of perceptual immediacies. The
first object, the vehicle, is as enduring as the
physical and cultural materials of which it is
composed. The third object, the object of cri¬
ticism, is equally enduring because it is in
the nature of a potentiality or dispositional
property of the vehicle. It is the full poten¬
tiality of aesthetic perception available to the
aesthetic vehicle. But what connects the two
and actualizes both for aesthetic appreciation
is the sequence of perceptual immediacies stimu¬
lated by the vehicle. The second object is the
actual object of immediate aesthetic experience."
Many philosophers would grant Pepper's distinc¬
tion between the physical object and the mental
entity that comes into being during a spectator's
perception of the object; and many might even
allow him to call this second, mental entity
(image, impression, sense datum) an object, even
though this renders the term 'object* ambiguous.
What is too misleading to be allo*wed is Pepper's
suggestion that it Is the second object that is
perceived. Following up this suggestion,
Pepper construes the object of critical judge¬
ment as a composite object made up of many ob¬
jects of the second kind. Thus he contrasts the
perceived picture with the picture actually
painted by the artist, as if it were not what
the artist made that is perceived.
100 ^1 P. Loon, "The Work of Art and the Aesthetic
Object," Mind. N.S., Vol. XL, 1931, P.292: "The
aesthetic object then is primarily imagined
sound or colour or shape and only secondarily
and subsequently sense-produced and sense-appre¬
hended, while ordinary sound or colour or shape
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is primarily sense-apprehended and only second¬
arily and subsequently given in imagination in
the form of memory images. Thus the aesthetic
object differs from the work of art, which also
is primarily an object of senso-exx^erlence."
How could this •primary/secondary• distinction
be applied to the experience of the spectator?
Does the distinction refer to the temporal se¬
quence or to what is first and second in order
of importance? The first intention is suggested
by the term •subsequently1» But oloarly the
physical work of art must b© an object of sense-
experience before there can be any question of
an iaaginatlon-produced aesthetic object. And
if the notion of an imagined aesthetic object is
admitted, there is no question of Its being
sense-apprehended in either a primary or a
secondary sense. The second kind of distinction
is equally futile if Leon wishes to maintain
that both the senses and the Imagination are in¬
volved in aesthetic experience - since both are
necessary (according to him), there is no point
in saying that one is more important than the
other,
Abercrombie, oo, olt.. p.79s "The painter who
knows his trad© knows Just what graduation of
colour, what interrelation of masses and line -
in brief, what design in detail and in whole -
will, in their complex conjunction, rouse in
those -who rooeive them such feelings as h© him¬
self felt when he not only saw but spiritually
exploited the landskip: and into that design
h© modulates what he saw." P.85; "The artist
is the man who can find the symbolism which will
indirectly, but as accurately as symbolism can,
convey the whole intricacy of the experience
acquired In conceptionj devising for that end
complex associations of sensuous experience,
which will reliably provoke In the recipient
such mental and ©motional reactions as will com¬
bine intricacy of experience similar to that
which inspired the artist,"
George Allen & Unwin, London, 1937, p.167.
Ibid*, p•170»
The work of art, Miss Bartlatt writes, p.205,
"Is an object which has corn© into being as the
result of a specific activity on the part of
the artist and which can be correctly understood
only in relation to that activity. It is this
which is the •aesthetic object,' and although,
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as has been indicated, it needs activity of
mind on the part of the recipient for its full
apprehension, it is not made by him, is not
•primarily imagined,* nor is it a fusion of men¬
tal and material. It is not simply an •occasion*
through which the recipient shares in some ex¬
perience of the artist, but is something which
must be experienced and valued in and for it¬
self, directly." However, Miss Bartlett*s un¬
willingness to break with the notion of an aes¬
thetic object prevents her in the end from
allowing the work of art to possess in itself
whatever value it may be judged to have. If the
spectator fails to appreciate the value of a
work of art, she says, pp.194-195, if "he falls
to be moved, he thereby withholds from the work
of art some character which it ought to have,
or.,.he falls to bring the aesthetic object in¬
to being. What he does is to fall to apprehend
what is really before him, and the fact that he
can do so and yet still apprehend, apparently,
the physical object, leads to the conclusion
that, as G, E, Moore expresses it, beauty Is not
an intrinsic property in the sense that yellow
is. If this conclusion is accepted it obviates
the need for finding a specific property or
properties in the work of art constituting its
beauty." One wonders if the philosophers who
solemnly report having failed to find a beauty
property in a work of art really ever expected
to find such a property, and if they supposed
that those who have applied the term 'beautiful'
to works of art meant to imply that such a pro¬
perty could be found a work of art. Of
course there is no beauty property in a work, a
patch of beauty here and a patch of beauty there,
that can be pointed out as a patch of yellow
pigment can be pointed out, and the use of the
term does not require that there should be.
For the term is applied to the work as a whole,
to a construction combining many properties,
and it describes how in the speaker's opinion
these properties have been combined. In short,
•beauty' is not used to denote a certain proper¬
ty in the work but to denote the work as being
of a certain kind. To the curious objection
that the value property, beauty, does not exist
independently of the physical properties, pig¬
ments, e.g., it must be replied that neither
does the yellow exist independently of the pig¬
ment. But it does not follow from that fact





tically represent; the delusion as follows.
What actually occurs is that A, a work of art,
causes E an effect in us. which has the charac¬
ter bj A causes Eb, We speak as though we per¬
ceived that A has the quality B (Beauty); we
are perceiving AB» and if we are not careful we
think so too. No one of our recent revolutions
in thought is more important than this pro¬
gressive rediscovery of what we are talking
about."
Note
46 Boutledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1924.
4? Ibid., p.21.
48 Ibid,, footnote to p.20: "We can dlagramma-
109
111
aware that no value feature exists independently
of a physical feature. But he does not find in
this situation a resolution of the logical
difficulty which perplexes the relationship be¬
tween the 1 two kinds' of terms. Rather he finds
in the inseparability of physical feature and
value feature the source of the difficulty
about the relationship between the two supposed¬
ly distinct kinds of terms. Since he insists
upon a distinction between two kinds of terms
and of statements which has no counterpart in
the work of art itself, he is unable to discover
either a factual or a logical connection between
descriptive statements and value statements, and
he therefore construes the latter as being of
psychological import: "There is nothing that
counts as observing the deslgnata of the ethical
predicates, apart from observing the natural
features of the situation. But what alternative
is left? Certainly it can be said that the ethi¬
cal features in some way depend upon the natural.
We can and do give reasons for our moral judge¬
ments, just as we do for our aesthetic judge¬
ments , where the same argument applies.... But
the question is: In what way do these reasons
support the judgements? Not in a logical
sense. Ethical argument is not formal demon¬
stration, And not in a scientific sense either.
For then the goodness or badness of the situa¬




52 A. J. Ayer, for example, seems to be perfectly
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would have to be something apart from the situa¬
tion, something independently verifiable, for
which the facts adduced as the reasons for the
moral judgement were evidence. But in these
moral cases the two coincide. There is no pro¬
cedure of examining the value of the facts, as
distinct from examining the facts themselves.
We may say that we have evidence for our moral
judgements, but we cannot distinguish between
pointing to the evidence itself and pointing to
that for which it is supposed to be evidence.
Which means that in the scientific sense it is
not evidence at all.
"My own answer to this question is that what
are accounted reasons for our moral judgements
are reasons only in the sense that they deter¬
mine attitudes. One attempts to influence an¬
other person morally by calling his attention
to certain natural features of the situation,
which are such as will be likely to evoke from
him the desired response." ("On the Analysis of
Moral Judgements," oq. clt.. p. 175.)
The oddity of this position invites careful
scrutiny. Although Ayer does not really be¬
lieve that the work of art (no more than the
moral situation) is constituted of two kinds of
features, physical feature and value feature
being inseparable in actuality, he never ques¬
tions the legitimacy of the distinction between
the two corresponding kinds of terms, He speaks
of ethical predicates and descriptive predicates
(value terms and descriptive terms) just as if
moral situations (or works of art) were charac¬
terised by this duality. He finds that the
descriptive terras refer to features that are
manifestly present in the situation or work of
artj since there is no other kind of feature
left for the value terms to refer to, it is con¬
cluded that they cannot really be about the
situation or work in the 3ense that the descrip¬
tive terras are. The possibility that the so-
called value terms provide information of a
special sort about the same features that the
so-called descriptive terms refer to is not con¬
sidered. From this oversight arises the illu¬
sion of a logical gap between statements with



























The Art in Painting. Hareourt, Brace, New York,
1937, p.^0.
Principles of Art Appreciation, p.261.
R. H. Hare, The Language of Morals, pp.79-80:
"...it is in fact the case - and this has been
productive of logical confusion - that almost
every word in our language is capable of being
used on occasion as a value-word (that is, for
commending or its opposite); and usually it is
only by cross-examining a speaker that we can
tell whether he is so using a word. The word
'brilliant' is a good example." Although Hare
does not assume that any given critical adjec¬
tive must always be either descriptive or
evaluative, he does assume that in any instance
of its use it must be either one or the other
and not both - and this assumption has also
'been productive of logical confusion'.
Ethics. p.89.




Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities. New York,
1947, p.408.
Katharine Gilbert, op. cit.. pp.28-29.
Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1936, pp.148-149.
Quoted in Max Graf, Composer and Critic.
Chapman and Hall, London, 1947, p.317.
Donald Francis Tovey, Beethoven's Ninth Symphony
in D Minor (op. 125), An Essay in Musical
Analysis. Paterson, Edinburgh, 1922, p.28.
Cp. C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning
of Meaning. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,
1953j p.150: "The best test of whether our
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use of words Is essentially symbolic or emotive
is the question - 'Is this true or false in the
ordinary strict scientific sense?' If this
question is relevant then the use is symbolic,
if it is clearly irrelevant then we have an
emotive utterance." This absolute disjunction
between the 'strict scientific' use of words
and the 'emotive' use is utterly groundless.
That words are sometimes used in non-scientific
contexts without the intention or the effect of
expressing or arousing emotion is so obvious
that one can only wonder how these two thinkers
in collaboration managed to overlook the fact.
143 See, for example, Gilbert Seldes. "I am Here
To-day: Charlie Chaplin," in University
Readings. edd. Clarence D. Thorpe and Erich A.
Walter, Harper, New York, 1931, p.215: "I re¬
call, for example, an exquisite moment at the
end of this film fBis Night Out3 . Turpin is
staggering down the street, dragging Charlie
by the collar. Essentially the funny thing is
that one drunkard should so gravely, so soberly,
so obstinately take care of another and should
convert himself into a policeman to do it; it
is funny that they should be going nowhere, and
go so doggedly. The lurching-forward body of
Turpin, the singular angle formed with it by
Charlie's body almost flat on the ground, added
to the spectacle. And once as they went along
Charlie's right hand fell to one side, and as
idly as a girl plucks a water-lily from over the
side of a canoe he plucked a daisy from the
grass border of the path, and smelled it. The
function of that gesture was to make everything
that went before, and everything that came after,
seem funnier; and it succeeded by creating an¬
other, incongruous image out of the picture be¬
fore our eyes. The entire world, a moment
earlier, had been aslant and distorted and
wholly male; it righted itself suddenly and
created a soft idyll of tenderness." (Prom The
Seven Lively Arts. Harper, New York, 1924.)
15 University of California Press, Berkeley and
Los Angeles, 1952. See pp.72-75. (Shumaker
Implies that whereas 'funny' is objective,
'amusing' is subjective. Might one agree,
then, with Seldes (see preceding footnote) that
His Night Out is funny, but disagree with the
claim that it is amusing?)
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152 16 R. M, Hare, The Language of Morals. pp.94-110,
P. H. Nowell-Sraith, Ethics. pp.164-165.
154 1? Op. cit.. pp.80-93.
18 Ibid., p.81.
19 Ibid.. p.82.
156 20 Ibid., p.84.
153 21 The Foundations of Ethics. Oxford, 1939, p.13.
22 Prlnclpla Ethlca. Cambridge, 1922, p.6.
159 23 Ibid., p.16.
24 "Is 'Goodness' a Name of a Sjmple Non-natural
Quality?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society. N, S., Vol. XXXIV, 1934, p.255.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.. pp.257-258.
161 27 Ibid.. p.258.
23 Ibid., p.259.
162 29 p.3.
30 Penguin. 1949, p.16.
31 Ibid.
32 George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty.
Scribner's, New Xork, 1896.
163 33 Essay Towards a Theory of Art, p.33,
164 34 Ogden and Richards, 00. clt., p.140: "let,
surprising though it may seem, the only author
who appears to have expressly admitted this
difficulty and recognized Its Importance Is
Rupert Brooke. ,0ne of the perils attending on
those who ask "What is Art?" is', he says,
'that they tend as all men do, to find what
they are looking for: a common quality in
art,,,. People who start in this way are apt to
be a most intolerable nuisance both to critics
and to artists.... Of the wrong -ways of approa¬
ching the subject of "Art," or even of any one
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art, this Is the worst because it is the most
harmful'." (Prom Rupert Brook©, John Webster
and the Elizabethan Drama.) A little later,
p.l^&T"Ogden and Richards add: "For if we
approach the subject in the spirit of a visitor
to the Zoo, who, knowing that all the creatures
in a certain enclosure are 'reptiles', seeks
for the common property which distinguishes
them as a group from the fish in the Aquarium,
mistakes may be made. We enter, for example,
Burlington House, and assuming that all the ob¬
jects there collected are beautiful, attempt
similarly to establish some common property. A
little consideration of how they came there
might have raised serious doubts; but if, after
the manner of many aesthetlclans, we persist,
we may even make our discover of some relevant




173 1 S. H, K. Fumess, Qeggm M M SStUZ M
Lorraine, Koutledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1949,
p« 83,
182 2 P. H. Howell-Smith, .LtMoa, p.36.
3 Book 111, Part 1, Section if quoted in Nowell-
Sialth, £2. c£t., P.37.
I85 4 Howell-Smith, olt.. p.45: "Many disputes,
say the subjeotlvists, turn out to be disputes
about the facts or about the validity of deduc¬
tions made from those facts .and our common
ethical premises. But, they say, a point may
be reached when there is no disagreement of a
factual or logical kind; and yet a moral dis¬
agreement remains, "four approve of one thing
and I approve of another. And when this point
is reached it is tautological to say that the
dispute cannot bo settled by rational argument."
Cp. C. J, Bucasce, Art, the critics, and xou,
Oscar Piest, New fork, 1944, p.116, and Arnold
Jsenberg (who discusses the syllogistic formu¬
lation of critical argument but does not con¬
sider it apt), "Critical Communication," in
jtiqq ans lMM« A. ■J. Ayor
.Truth and bogle. p.111. and "On tho Analysis
of Moral Judgements") and H. H. Hare (The
Language of Morals, pp.39-41) both demonstrate
the invalidity of moral arguments when construed
deductively and make clear that their arguments
are intended to apply to critical discourse also,
136 5 "The Study of Poetry/ in The Great Critics.
odd. James Harry Smith and Edd Vinfield Parks,
Norton, New fork, 1932, p.632.








193 12 "On the Analysis of Moral Judgements," op. clt..
p.172.
13 Ibid.
194 14 Pp.Q-IO. In the Preface, p.8, Carnap remarks:
"Formulations which are more exact and there¬
fore more suitable as a basis of argument may
be found In my book Loglsche Syntax der
Sprache." I do not think that the longer, more
difficult book requires any alteration of the
following discussion of Carnap's view of state¬
ments made about the value of things. The
Logical Syntax of Language is primarily con¬
cerned with scientific discourse and makes only
a passing reference to discourse about value:
"The suppostitious sentences of metaphysics, of
the philosophy of values, of ethics (in so far
as it is treated as a normative discipline and
not as psycho-sociological investigation of
facts) are pseudo-sentences; they have no logi¬
cal content, but are only expressions of feel¬
ing 'which in their turn stimulate feelings and
volitional tendencies on the part of the
hearer." (Kegan Paul, London, 1937, P.273.)
15 "Meaning and Verification," in Headings in
Philosophical Analysis. edd. Herbert Feigl and
Wilfred Sellars, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New
York, 1949, p.148.
16 Op. olt.. p.14 (ay Italics).
17 Ibid.. p.25 (my italics).
13 Language. Truth and Logic, p.13: "And now I
can reformulate the principle of verification
as requiring of a literally meaningful state¬
ment, which is not analytic, that it should be
either directly or indirectly verifiable..."
(My italics.) P.15: "...if one accepts the
principle of verification, one must hold that
his statement does not have any other factual
meaning than what is contained in at least some
of the relevant empirical propositionsj and
that if it is so interpreted that no possible
experience could go to verify it, it does not
have any factual meaning at all." (My italics.)
195 19 Arguing this position in an article entitled
"Verification and Understanding," Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, N.S. XXXIV, 1934,
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Margaret Macdonald attributes the verifica¬
tions t theory of meaning to C, S. Pelrce,
Agreeing with W. B. Gallie ("Peirce In the
1870's was teaching logic on lines which were
eventually to reach Oxford some sixty years
later" - Pelrce and Pragmatism. Penguin, 1952»
p.12), she remarks, p.143, fn. 1, that "It
appears clear that Pelrce anticipated many of
the views of Wittgenstein and his followers,"
and quotes, pp.143-144, from an article con¬
tributed by Peirce to The Honlst, 1905, p.162 2
"'that whatever assertion you make to an empiri¬
cal scientist he will either understand as mean¬
ing that if a given prescription for an experi¬
ment ever can be and ever is carried out, a
given experience will result or he will see no
sense at" all in what you say1." (Cp. Collected
Papers of £. S. Pelrce. Vol. V, para. 464:
"'Consider what effects that might conceivably
have practical bearings, we conceive the object
of our conception to have. Then our conception
of these effects is the whole of our conception
of the object'," (Quoted in Gallie, op. clt.,
P.U.)
193 20 Presumably logic is also taken to be in some
sense meaningful, since Carnap distinguishes it
from metaphysics which he considers to be non¬
sense; but logic is not discourse about the phy¬
sical world; rather it is about discourse itself.
Nor is mathematics, which is not for Carnap non¬
sense either, a fact stating scienee; rather it
is a formal one, consisting of definitions, and
therefore exempt from the test of veriflability.
Discussing the logical foundations of mathe¬
matics in The Logical Syntax of Language. Carnap
says, p.326: "The formalist view is right in
holding that the construction of the system can
be effected purely formally, that is to say,
without reference to the meaning of the symbols;
that it is sufficient to lay down the rules of
transformation, from which the validity of cer¬
tain sentences and the consequent relations be¬
tween certain sentences follow; and that it is
not necessary either to ask or to answer any










198 24 Ibid., P.15.
199 25 Ibid., P.25.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.. PP. 22'
28 Ibid., p.24.
206
Pp. 24-25* "But actually a value
statement is nothing els© than a command in a
misleading grammatical form. It may have
effects upon the actions of men, and these
effects may be in accordance with our wishes
or not; but it is neither true nor false. This
is revealed as soon as we apply to such state¬
ments our method of logical analysis. From the
statement 'Killing is evil' we cannot deduce
any proposition about future experiences, Thus
this statement is not verifiable and has no
theoretical sense, and the same Is true of all
other value statements."
200 29 Ibid.. p.29.
202 30 Pp.40-41.
31 See "Is 'Goodness* A Name of A Simple Non-
Natural Quality?"
203 32 Olln Downes, Symphonic Masterpieces. quoted in
The Music Lover's Handbook, ed. Elie
Siegmeister, Morrow, New York, 19^3» p.203.
205 33 As in the tentative and cautious analysis given









41 James Thrall Soby,
PerepecUvea, No. 11, Spring, 1955, P.51.
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207 42 "On the Analysis of Moral Judgements," clt..
p.179: 8A valuation ia not a description of
something very peculiar; it Is not a descrip¬
tion at all." Cp. O. E# Moore, "A Heoly to ray
Critics," in Tl^e FfrUosop^ SL £. !• JS22£§» 0*.
Paul Arthur Schilpp, northwestern University,
1942, p.590s "...in ascribing to a thing a
property which is not a natural intrinsic pro¬
perty £e,g. goodness 3 , you are not describing
it at all.
43 Laaoaas, 3&uth Ao£^2, p. 107.
44 Ibid.. p.22,
209 ^5 Ibid., pp. 11>114.
211 See Arnold Isenberg, "Critical Communication,"
I" .?aesthetics an£ Lar^uage.
213 47 In Philosophical .Analysis, ed. Max Black,
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1950.
215 43 ■Interpretation and Evaluation In Aesthetics,"
pp. clt.. p.363.
49 iithles and Language, p.113: "The reasons which
support or attack an ethical Judgement have pre¬
viously been mentioned. Subject to some excep¬
tions that will be noted as w© proceed, they are
related to the judgement psychologically rather
than logically. They do not strictly imply the
judgement in the way that axioms imply theorems;
nor are they related to the judgement Inductive¬
ly, as statements describing observations are
related to scientific laws. Bather, they
support the judgement in the way that reasons
support Imperatives. They servo to intensify
and render more permanent the influence upon
attitudes which emotive moaning can often do no
more than begin,"
216 50 ibid., P»345♦
51 Ibid.. p.343. (The subscript 's1 (for 'simple'}
indicates that *Q' stands for a quality of a cer¬
tain appearance of a work of art and not for a
property of a work of art, which is indicated by




217 53 Ibid.. p.36^: "We must emphasize the critic's
decision partly for the reason just given: it
directs his inquiries, giving his knowledge a
special scope and organization. And we must
emphasize it for this further reason: it helps
us to see that his knowledge, however carefully
selected and organized it may be, does not
guide him with the impersonal demands of logic.
Between his beliefs and his decisions (as we
have previously seen) there is not a logical
but only a causal, psychological relation.
Hence his beliefs guide him in a way that per¬
mits his decision to be colored by his own" in¬
dividuality,"
54 Ibid., p.353.
55 Ibid., p.365: "We have been led to these ob¬
servations, it will be remembered, by questions
about the meaning of certain terms, such as
'allegorical', 'unified', and 'beautiful',"
218 56 m&., P.3^5.
219 57 According to Ethics and Language. the statement
which expresses a value judgement is to be
understood as the expression of approval or dis¬
approval combined with an imperative: "I
approve of this; do so as xirell" - p.21, passim -
is the model - a model which, it must be ob¬
served, is developed, elaborated, qualified,
and refined in the analysis for which it serves
as point of departure. The statements which ex¬
press the reason for a value judgement are about
the facts of the case relevant to deciding about
the value of something, i.e. relevant to de¬
ciding what attitude one should take toward it;
these statements are straightforward descriptive
statements, subject to the usual empirical tests,
Thus Stevenson can conceive of an argument about
the value of a thing in which a judgement is
supported by pure statements of fact.
58 "Interpretation and Evaluation in Aesthetics,"
©B- PP.376-377 ©sp.
59 Ibid.. p.3^2 esp.





220 63 Cp, Osborne, op. clt.. p.291: H...criticism
describes works of art, but describes them In
a special way, calling attention In Its des¬
criptions not to any and every characteristic
which they possess but signalizing those
characteristics in virtue of which they are
judged to be excellent or indifferent works of
art, A person who describes the physical di¬
mensions of a picture and the chemical composi¬
tion of the pigments is not, for example,
writing as a critic of painting; and one who
comments on the binding and layout of a book is
not indulging in literary criticism."
223 64 on* cit.j p.153.
22? 65 3y now it must be clear that on ray view criti¬
cal statements are not distinguished from em¬
pirical statements by positing a special, non-
observable kind of feature as their referents
but by pointing to the difference in the kind
of interest taken in objects by scientists and
by critics of art.































E.g., William Rneale, Induction and
Probability. Oxford. 1949. Part IV. S. 42.
esp. pp.223-224.
Max Black, Language and Philosophy. Cornell,
Ithaca, 1949'," p.61. *
Ibid.. p.62.
Ibid.
Time. January 10, 1955j p.17.
P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics. Ch. I. (See pp.23-
24 above.) B. M. Hare. The Language of Morals.
p.29 esp. (See pp.39-46 above.)"
P.31.* "4 judgement is not moral if It does not
provide without further imperative premisses a
reason for doing something." The context
warrants my substituting 'evaluative* for
•moral' in the text.
Ibid.. p.45; "It may be maintained that al¬
though, in the strict sense of the word, I have
indeed shown that moral judgements and impera¬
tives cannot be entailed by factural premisses,
yet there is some looser relation than entail¬
ment which holds between them. Mr. S. E.
Toulrain, for example, talks of: 'an ethical
argument, consisting partly of logical (demon¬
strative; inferences, partly of scientific
(inductive) Inferences, and partly of that form
of inference peculiar to ethical arguments, by
which we pass from factual reasons to an ethi¬
cal conclusion - what we may naturally call
"evaluative" inference'." (See Season in
Ethics. Cambridge, 1950, p.38.)
The Language of Morals. p.46.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.43: "The view which I am attacking
holds that by having special rules of in¬
ference we can say that there can be infer¬




248 13 Donald Francis Tovey, Some English Symphonists.
Oxford, 1941, pp.69-70. (The phrases in square
brackets replace Tovey's code-letter references
to excerpts from the printed score.)
253 14 Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. Vol.VII,
No. 1, 3eptember 1943, pp.42-48,
15 Ibid., p.42.
259 16 Quoted in Composer and Critic, p.253.
17 Ibid., p.252.
18 Ibid.
260 19 IbM., P.253.
265 20 Ibid.. p.232.
272 21 Ibid. (For a treasury of such irresponsible
music criticism see Nicolas Slonlmsky, Lexicon
of Musical Invective. Coleman-Ross, New York,
1953.)
274 22 Aesthetics and Criticism, pp.305-306.
23 Eight Victorian Poets. Cambridge, 1930, pp.37-38.
275 24 Serge Dlaghlleff on L'Olseau de feu, quoted in
Serge Lifar, A History of Russian Ballet.
Hutchison, London, 1954, p.269. Cp. Giorgio
Vasari, whose critical comments are customarily
deficient in descriptive information; see, for
example, his remarks on Raphael in Vasarl13
Lives of the Artists. ed, Betty Burroughs, Simon
and Schuster, New York, 1946, pp.229-230: "For
these pictures C&one f0r the palace of Agostino
Chigi) Raphael prepared the cartoons and painted
many of the figures with his oxen hand in fresco.
The subjects were from mythology: a Council of
the Gods, the Marriage of Psyche, Mercury with
his flute, and a Jupiter of the most sublime
dignity. The whole work, xirhether as painting
or poetry, is eminently beautiful. Raphael
caused Giovanni da Udine to surround it all with
festoons of fruits and flowers. All is as
beautiful as can be."
279 25 R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals. p.111.
235 26 The Observer. London, December 11, 1955.
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286 2? Ibid.. "'Simplicity, severity of form and econ¬
omy in execution should be appropriate to Soviet
architecture. Attractiveness In buildings
should be achieved not through the application
of ornate and extensive ornaments, but through
the organic relationship of architectural forms
with the purpose of the building.,,'"
(Crankshaw is quoting from a bulletin, issuod
by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and
the U.S.S,B. Council of Ministers, in which
"derivative traditionalism" Is denounced in
favour of the "functionalism" which Craakshaw
advocates. Remarks oonoerning "formalism and




















The ultimate grounds of critical judgements are
here understood to be provided by aesthetic
theory. See pp.343-351 below.
The paradox!oalaess of this situation renders
suspect the view that admits it as possible.
Such is the nature of critical language that
the features cited by a critic in support of
his judgement will be denoted by terms of such
evaluative force that another critic could net
admit that he does not share his colleague's
preference (or aversion) for features thus
characterized without at the same time confess¬
ing the bizarreness of his taste.
Herbert Head, The Meaning of Art. pp.152-153.
Much the same material on definition, somewhat
amplified, was published in an article, "The
Descriptive Definition," in The Journal of
Philosophy. Vol. XLIII, Mo. 2, January, 1946,
pp.' 29 fr," In this article Pepper is not pri¬
marily concerned with aesthetic judgement, but
he does mention in passing, p.36, that "Only by
means of a descriptive definition can value cri¬
teria be held responsible to empirical tests.
For, as is now widely recognized, the basic cri¬
terion of evaluation in any field is a definition.
If this definition is not responsible to the
facts of the field, all evaluations in the field
become utterly irresponsible."
The Basis of Criticism in the Arts. pp.3-4.
The criteria are formulated in The Basis of
Criticism in the Arts as follot^s; Mechanism <-
"Things liked or disliked for themselves"; (p.44)
Contextualism - "voluntary Intuitions of quality"j
(p.56) Organicism (objective idealism) - "the
integration of feeling"; (p.77) Formlsm - "per¬








296 13 Ibid., p.22.
299 14 Ibid., pp.2I5-26. See Richard Robinson.
Definition. Oxford. 19*54, dd. 89, 62-66.
15 The Basis of Criticism in the Arts. o.27.
16 Ibid., p.27.
17 mm p.29.
300 18 Ibid.. p.27.
301 19 Ibid., p.30.
20 1449 b. (Trans. S. H. Butcher. Aristotle's
Theory of Poetry and Fine Art. Macmilian.
London, 1398, 2nd. ed., p.23.)
302 21 1451b. (Butcher, p.37.5
22 1452 a. (Butcher, p.41.)
303 23 1455 a. (Butcher, p.61.)
24 1451 a. (Butcher, p.35*)
304 25 Cp. J. E. Spingarn, "The New Criticism,"
American Critical Essays, ed. Norman Foerster
Oxford, 1930, pp.444-44-5: "This idea, was taken
hold of by some of the German Romanticists, for
the purpose of justifying the Shakespearean
drama in its apparent divergence from the
classical 'rules'. Shakespeare cannot be judged
by the rules of the Greek theatre (so ran their
argument), for the drama is an inevitable pro¬
duct of theatrical conditions; these conditions
in Elizabethan England were not the same as
those of Periclean Athens; and it is therefore
absurd to judge Shakespeare's practice by that
of Sophocles,"
305 26 Samuel Johnson, "Preface to Shakespeare," in




306 28 Ibid.. p.456.
307 29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., pp.^55-456.
308 31 Ibid., pp.448-449.
310 32 Pierre Corneille, A Discourse in the Purpose-
fulness and the Parts of the Dramatic Poem,
trans, J, H. Smith, The Great Critics. p'.iS?1?.




311 37 Chatto and Hindus, London, 1932, p.2.
33 Ibid.
39 .S2J1I • i PP * 3 •
313 Definition, p.16,
314 if-I Ibid,, pp. 16-1? J SI now subdivide nominal
definition into word-word and word-thlnp;
definition. The purpose of all nominal defini¬
tion being to report or establish the meaning
of a word or symbol, word-word definition does
this in the form of saying that one word means
the same as another word, and word-thing does
it in the form of saying that a word means a
certain thing,,,. Word-word definition correl¬
ates a word to another word, as having the same
meaning. Word-thing definition correlates a
word to a thing, as meaning that thing."
316 U-2 Art. Chatto and Hindus, London, I9L9, pp.?-8.
317 ^3 Ethics and Language. p.210. {As I mentioned
earlier, Chap. V, p.215, Stevenson habitually
uses 'emotive' and 'attitude' where the terms
'evaluative' and 'judgement' might be expected.
I have inserted the latter words in square
brackets to ensure that the relevance of the

















45 "The Study of Poetry," In The Great Critics.
p.640.
46 Etjt&cs and Language, p.210.
4? Composer and Critic. Ch. 5.
48 Ibid., pp.80-81. (From Per Crltlsche Mu3lku3T





53 "Fenimore Cooper's Literary Offenses," (North
American Review, July, I895), in Major American
Writers f edd. Howard Mumford Jones' and "Ernest '









62 Ten Composers. p.ll6.
63 Ibid.. p.117; "But lyricism is a mode of feel¬
ing, not just a style of opera composition; all
that happens in 'Pelleas', vocally and orches-
trally, is infused tfith the feeling and there¬
fore the style of lyric-drama. It is an odd
thought - Pelleas', one of the few operas where
recitative and melody are equally vmrmed by-
music, and It is impossible to say where the
one ends and the other begins, this is the opera
which has frequently been praised for every¬




65 Iblcl.. p.116: "To be dramatic In Debussy's day
meant that a composer was under an obligation
to exploit the orchestral 01*03 cen&o, and beat
up excitement by mounting sequences* There are
no peaks of orchestral climax In 'Pelldas'; no
whippings-up of the nerves by repetition and
acceleration* Hence we have been told that
'PelXeas* is not dramatic, except in a vague
way that can be felt only if we react to the
music in some tenuous and complicated state of
our souls, If there is no palpable drama in
the faot that Goloud, human and visible, is
lost In Debussy's dim murmuring forest, then I
do not know what drama is; we feel that he is
being enveloped by strange forces that are
about to change his destiny - his destiny here
and now on earth, not in a metaphysical unknown
or void. If there is no drama, palpable and of
the theatre, when Debussy's music sends the
frightened doves fluttering from the tower, I
am at a loss to account for the pulsations of
my imagination at this point of the score. I
know few moments in opera more definitely
dramatic than when Pelleas, at the approach of
Goloud, ejaculates, 'Attends', attends!' and
the orchestra palpitates in triplets - tympani
triplets at that! and pizzicato. The crisis Is
all over within the space of a dozen bars ; but
its brevity only leaves the scene the more
sharply etched. When ilelisande's hair tumbles
from the tower over the faoe of Pelleas, all
the violins - as I have said - fall down with
it in golden tresses of tone, technically called
chords of the seventh; is this not open and
palpable drama and, like the music which tells
us of the flash of Hellsonde's ring into the
fountain, is it not graphically dramatic, and




334 68 Coobriaee, 1939.
335 &9 jm.. P«20.
33? 70 Jbia., pp.33-34.
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333 71 Ibid., pp.20-21,
72 Ibid., p.35.
73 Ibid., P.16.
339 7^ Ibid., p.29.
3^0 75 Ibid.
3^1 76 Ibid., p.21,
77 See, for example, Theodore Meyer Greene, The
Arts and The Art of Criticism. Princeton ~
University Press, 1940, who claims that there
is a "universal standard of artistic perfec¬
tion," by reference to which appraisals of in¬
dividual works of art must be made. One asks
what would be the nature of such a universal
standard when formulated? It would be a state¬
ment of those characteristics shared by all
works of art of whatever kind which were per¬
fect, Or rather, since Greene is reluctant to
admit that any existing work of art can be certi¬
fied as perfect, it would be a statement of
those characteristics which would be shared by
all works of art of whatever kind which were
perfect if any such existed. If the standard
is to be applicable to instances of every art
form, its statement must not contain any
reference to features of any one art form which
are not shared by all the others. A standard
expressed in terms of such gross generality is
in danger of becoming a tautologous definition
which is useless for critical practice. Greene
does not survive this hazard in his chapters on
"Artistic Quality and Perfection" (Ch. XXII,
PP.339-^23) and "Artistic Truth" (Ch. XXIII,
pp.424-460): P.391: "Since every work of art is
a unique solution of a unique problem, the cri¬
tic must ask: How successfully has the artist
solved his particular problem in this particular
work of art? How appropriate is this specific
form to the artist's specific intent? In this
sense every critical judgement recording an
appraisal of artistic quality is necessarily a
singular j udgeraent,
"Finally, artistic quality is dependent upon
certain universal conditions, and its appraisal
necessitates an implicit appeal to a universal
standard of artistic perfection. That this is
the case can be shown both theoretically and
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empirically. Considered theoretically, the
concept of artistic perfection is by definition
a normative concept. This means that every
appraisal of a work of art, though necessarily
a singular judgement relating to the specific
work of art in all its uniqueness, involves an
appeal to a standard universally applicable to
works of art as such. On the other hand, em¬
pirical analysis of the most divers© works of
art reveals the fact that whenever artistic in¬
tuition discovers artistic merit in a work of
art, the work in question is actually found to
satisfy, in proportion to its artistic merit,
certain determining conditions of artistic
quality as such." Greene says that he is not
attempting to define artistic quality, which is
a simple and therefore irreducible notion, but
is exhibiting its determining conditions. That
is, he is stating the conditions which would
have to be satisfied by any work of art of what¬
ever kind which achieved perfection. It follows
that if a critic is aware of these conditions,
the satisfaction of which constitutes artistic
perfection, and if he is able to assess the ex¬
tent to which any particular work of art satis¬
fies these conditions, then he will be able to
appraise the artistic quality of that work with
considerable assurance. But in order to assess
the extent to which a particular work of art
satisfies "certain universal conditions" it
must be possible to state these conditions in
such specific and concrete terms that it can be
observed whether they apply or do not apply to
the work in question. I do not think that it
is possible to do this, for the requirement of
universality is inherently incompatible with
the requirement of specificity and concreteness.
A statement of the universal conditions which
novels and poetry, music, painting, sculpture,
the dance, architecture, and drama would all
have to satisfy in order to attain perfection
must be couched in terms of such generality
that it could never be decided with precision
and finality by observation whether such terms
did or did not apply to any particular work and
therefore whether or not that work satisfied
the conditions in question. The fact that when
Greene attempts to exhibit these conditions his
analysis degenerates into a parade of truisms
and platitudes testifies to the impossibility
of formulating any workable universal standard
of artistic perfection such as he thinks is
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necessary for the appraisal of artistic quality:
P.392: "Whenever a competent artist warms to his
work and prosecutes it with spirit and dis¬
ciplined enthusiasm, the work of art itself
bears the unmistakable marks of such effort,
whenever, in contrast, an artist lapses into
mechanical passivity and works without imagina¬
tive concentration, his work will show a corres¬
ponding lack of vitality. A work of art which
possesses artistic vitality moves us, if we are
sensitive, to a correspondingly vital response,
whereas, in proportion as it lacks artistic
vitality, it 'leaves us cold' and falls to
arouse us to artistically re-creative activity."
P.399: "The extremes of artistic imperfection
are not in themselves forces with a dynamic
power of their own; they are merely states of
imperfection. But they possess for the creative
artist a perverse fascination, tempting him to
favor now one aad now the other to the detriment
of his art. If he is to be successful in his
creative labors, he must exert every effort to
recognize them as states of imperfection, and
tQ resist their psychological appeal: he must
use" all" "the artistic acumen and willpower at
his disposal to achieve a clear apprehension
of his artistic goal and to translate his in¬
sight into the sensuous pattern which it dic¬
tates. The more competent he is as an artist,
the less will he be tempted by non-artistic ex¬
tremes to which lesser artists so frequently
succumb. But even the greatest artist, since
he is a finite and fallible mortal, oannot hope
to transcend the necessity for such conscious
effort." P.413: "The mean of artistic ex¬
cellence. ..involves choosing the right subject-
matter and employing it in the right way
according to criteria dictated by the expressive
intentions of the artist." P.449: "Any or¬
ganization of a primary medium must then be
said to be artistically correct and felicitous
in proportion as it effectively expresses, in
an artistically satisfying manner. the ideas
which the artist wishes to express."
Neither Greene's theoretical nor his empiri¬
cal argument for their being an implicit appeal
to a universal standard of artistic perfection
involved in the appraisal of the quality of
works of art is cogent. "Considered theoretic¬
ally," he writes (p.391), "the concept of ar¬
tistic perfection is by definition a normative
concept." That is a correct analytical
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statement. "This means," he infers (pp.391-392),
"that every appraisal of a work of art, though
necessarily a singular judgement relating to
the specific work of art in all its uniqueness,
involves an appeal to a standard universally
applicable to all works of art as such." That
is an empirical statement which asserts what is
to be proved. The fact that the concept of ar¬
tistic perfection is a normative concept does
not entail the fact that all appraisals of
works of art involve an appeal to a universal
standard embodying this concept. The empirical
argument (p.392) is no better. It claims that
the "empirical analysis" (by which is meant
'observation,' presumably,} of works of art
will show that these works each satisfy certain
conditions in proportion to their respective
artistic merits. This implies the possibility
of determining a work's artistic merit by means
other than a value judgement, namely by an 'em¬
pirical analysis' which discovers which condi¬
tions of artistic quality the work satisfies
and to what extent. But such a 'discovery'
would not result from an empirical analysis,
for the question to be answered about a work's
artistic quality is not a question of fact, to
be answered by observation, but a question of
value, to be answered by a critical judgement.
If by "empirical analysis" is meant not empiri¬
cal analysis in the ordinary sense but empirical
analysis in an aesthetic sense, then it would be
indistinguishable from the "artistic intuition"
which discovers artistic merit in the first
place, and therefore could not be considered an
independent method, of confirming artistic in¬
tuition's judgements. And even if the notions
of artistic empirical analysis and artistic in¬
tuition could be sufficiently clarified to be
distinguished, an. artistic empirical analysis
would be normative, not factual, involving a
second judgement of value which would provide
no evidence of the kind generally termed 'em¬
pirical'. ibid even if, as he claims (p.392)
the possibility of determining by empirical
methods whether and to what extent a work satis¬
fies "certain determining conditions of artis¬
tic quality as such" is not denied, it is cer¬
tain that no reliable estimate could be made
on the basis of the formulation of these con¬
ditions which Greene has provided: P.418: "The
distinctive mean of artistic perfection in
these representational arts must be defined
then, as a unified, original, and vital ex¬
ploitation of both primary medium and
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representational subject-matter for the sake
of artistic expressiveness." No empirical ana¬
lysis could, determine whether and to what ex¬
tent this condition had been satisfied by a
work of art.
345 78 Cambridge, 1937.
346 79 Ibid., p.205.
80 Ibid.. p.221.
3^7 81 Ibid., pp.218-219.
32 Ibid.. p.211.
3^8 83 Ibid.
34 On. clt.. p.l¥k Leavis says of a verse in
Ezra Pound's Hugh Selwvn Hauberlev: "His
poise, though so varied, and for all his au¬
dacities, is surej how sure, nothing can show
better than the pun in the last stanza of the
third poem:
0 bright Apollo,
Tt'V dYSpecj TtV i\p ">«■) y* eea^j
What god, man, or hero
Shall I place a tin wreath upon*.
In v/hat poet, after the seventeenth century,
can find anything like this contributing to
a completely serious effect (the poem is not
only tragically serious but solemn). "Lucas
quotes this verdict in the context of the dis¬
cussion which I have been considering and
offers a contrary judgement, p.207J a rt'v' <£y6p& "
•tin wreath1 - the sort of joke made by prepara¬
tory schoolboys beginning Greek - 1sureness of
poise' - 'not only tragically serious but
solemn'1 Solemn? - Yes. A belfry full of owls
could not equal it. But, as wit, surely Slender
himself would have found it a little thin?"




350 39 Ibid., p.291.
90 See above, p.313.
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